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Jovens: the Notion of Youth among the Troubadours, its Meaning and Source*

A. J. DENOMY C.S.B.

ETYMOLOGICALLY, the Provencal adjective *joves*, Latin *juvenis*, has the literal meaning of young or youthful. Used substantively, in the singular it means a youth, in the plural young people. In like manner, the noun *jovens*, Latin *juventus*, has the meaning of youth in the collective sense and youth or youthfulness in the abstract. These words appear with their literal meanings in the earliest Provencal literary documents, the *Boece*[1] and the *Chanson de sainte Foi*,[2] and present no difficulty either of translation or of comprehension. The case is quite otherwise in the poetry of the troubadours. Occasionally, they use these words in their literal sense;[3] much more frequently, almost exclusively, the troubadours use *joves* and *jovens* with, seemingly, quite a different connotation. At any rate, a literal translation falls short of the meaning that the troubadours apparently intended to convey through them. The difficulty in translation and comprehension appears, for example, in one of Marcabru's poems, a diatribe against false love:

Tant cant bos Jovens fon paire
Del segle e fin' Amors maire,
Fon Proeza mantenguda
A celat et a saubuda,
Mas er l'ant avilanada
Duc e rei et emperaire.

---

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[1] Nos jove omne, quandius qu'e nos estam,
De gran follia per folledat parllam,
Quar no nos membra per cui viur' esperam. . .
Nos jove omne menam ta mal jovent,
Que us non o preza, si's trada son parent . . . ll. 1-8.

We young people, as long as we are so, speak through folly of foolish things, because we do not recall through whom we hope to live. . . We young people live out our youth so evilly that one counts it nothing if he betray his parent. . .

Ed. Carl Appel, *Provenzalische Crestomathie* (Marburg, 6th ed., 1904), p. 1.

Molt val lo bes que l'om fait e jovent;
Com el es velz, aqui pois lo soste. *Ibid.* ll. 102-103.

The good that man does in his youth is worth much; when he is old, then it sustains him.

Ibid., p. 4. Cf. also, *ibid.*, ll. 109-111; p. 5 and ll. 233-235; p. 8.

[2] O sia jovens o canuz,
Si de peccaz es peneduz,
Sempre'l venra gaujz e saluz. ll. 450-452.

Ed. *La Chanson de sainte Foi*, Ernest Hoepffner I (Paris, 1926), p. 320. Whether he be young or old, if he be repetentant of his sins, immediately shall come to him joy and salvation. Cf. also ll. 370-372; p. 309.

Achi aucis saintz a talent:
Seis mil n'i morun e seis cent.
Viraz lo camp roj e cruent!
Massa'i guirpiron lur jovent. ll. 532-535.

Ed. cit., p. 328. There he killed saints at will: six thousand and six hundred die there. You could have seen the field red and bloody! Many lost their youth there. Cf. also, ll. 342-345, p. 306.

[3] Si ben nos es savis ni pros,
Cant ieu serai partiz de vos,
Vias l'auran tornat en jos,
Car lo veiran jov' e mesquis.

Les Chansons de Guillaume IX, ed. Alfred Jeanroy (Paris, 1913), XI, 17-20, p. 27.

If he be not wise and valiant, when I shall be departed from you, quickly they will have laid him low, because they will see that he is young and weak.

Meravill me de poestatz
On a tans joves e canutz,
Comtes e reis, et amiratz
E princes en l'albre pendutz.

Poésies complètes du troubadour Marcabru, ed. J. M. L. Dejeanne (Toulouse, 1909), XXXIX, 29-32, p. 192.

I am amazed at the mighty among whom are so many young and hoary-headed, counts and kings, and Emirs and princes hung from the tree.

Qu'ieu sui assatz esprovaire,
Deffendens et enquistaire,
E vei cum Jovens se tuda,
Per que Amors es perduda
E de Joi deseretada
E cum Amors es cujaire.[4]

If we translate *Jovens* literally, then what do the stanzas mean? What does Marcabru mean by Youth when he says that it was the father of the world; that while the world was the child of its parents, Youth and Love, Worth endured; but that now royalty has brought Worth to low estate because the world is no longer the child of Love and Youth? What does the poet mean by Youth when he says that it is making away with itself, that Love is lost and deprived of its inheritance of Joy and that it is thereby troubled? Does he mean youth in its literal meaning, in the collective sense of youthfulness or the qualities generally attributed to youth,—courage, vigor, freshness, amiability? Or is there another meaning ascribed to youth by the troubadours, a meaning separate from, and perhaps quite foreign to, the literal conception of youth?

It was this possibility, apparently, that prompted Raynouard to ascribe a secondary meaning to the adjective and to the noun. In his *Lexique roman*,[5] he gives as the primary meaning 'jeune' and secondarily 'aimable, gracieux, méritant' with the explanation that 'la grâce, l'amabilité des personnes jeunes, fit appliquer au mot *jove* leurs heureuses qualités'. The noun, therefore, has the primary meaning of 'jeunesse' and then, figuratively, 'mérite, grâce, amabilité'. Emil Levy[6] denies the figurative meaning of 'gracieux' to the adjective and ascribes to it only the meaning of 'jung'. Similarly, *jovens* has the meaning of 'Jugendlickheit, jugendlische Frische, Jugendlust' but not 'gracieux'.

Whether it be figurative or not, there is a meaning behind these words as used by the troubadours that is quite technical, a meaning quite foreign to its literal and etymological meaning of young, youth, youthfulness. Settegast[7] seemed to have been aware of the technical meaning involved and understood *jovens* as conceptually allied to *joi*.[8] He ascribes to it the meaning of a lively, gay disposition peculiar to youth, a disposition that manifested itself in the social gatherings of courtly society. He points out, furthermore, that *jovens* at times denotes a sort of social, moral code of conduct which imposes duties on man and woman. Transgression against this code constitutes a sin.[9] What these duties are or in what the moral code consists, he does not say.

---

[4] As long as true Youth was father to the world and pure love its mother, Prowess was maintained secretly and publicly, but now dukes and kings and emperors have debased it. Because I am a passable assayer, defender and seeker (of it) and I see how Youth is doing away with itself, wherefore Love is lost and disinherited of Joy and (I see) how Love is troubled. Marcabru V, 37-48, *ed. cit.*, p. 21.

[5] M. Raynouard, *Lexique roman ou dictionnaire de la langue des troubadours* III (Paris, 1836-1845), p. 594. The *Dictionnaire provençal-français* of S. J. Honnorat II, (Digne, 1847), p. 481 does little more than repeat Raynouard: la grâce, l'aimabilité, la force et le courage des personnes jeunes fit appliquer ce mot à leurs heureuses qualités, et il signifia figurément aimable, gracieux, méritant, vaillant, courageux.

[6] Emil Levy, *Provenzalische Supplement-Wörterbuch* IV (Leipzig, 1904-), p. 277. So in his *Petit dictionnaire provençal-français* (Heidelberg, 1923), p. 219: jove, adj. jeune; j. homme, ouvrier, commis; *s.m.* jeune homme, garçon d'hotel; joven, *s.m.* jeunesse, les qualités propres à la jeunesse, fraîcheur de la jeunesse, les jeunes gens; (jeune) vie.

[7] Auch der Begriff von *joven* berührt sich nahe mit dem unseres Wortes. Jenes von dem lat. juventus abgeleitete Substantiv bedeutet ursprünglich 'Jugend', hat aber in der Sprache der Troubadours eine besondere, gewissermassen technische Bedeutung angenommen: es bezeichnet bei unsern Dichtern eine hervorstechende Eigenschaft jenes Lebensalters, das der Jugend vorzugsweise eigentümliche, in der Geselligkeit zum Ausdruck kommende heitere und muntere Wesen, die 'Jugendlust', dann, mit Zurücktreten des Altersbegriffes, überhaupt den in der ritterlichen Geselligkeit sich bethätigenden Frohsinn. Dieser letzere Begriff berührt sich aber sehr nahe mit dem von *joi*, da nach dem früher gesagten der durch unser Wort bezeichnete Frauendienst in der heiteren Geselligkeit ritterlicher Feste seine Hauptstütze fand. 'Joi in der Sprache der Troubadours', *Sitzungsberichte königl. Sächs. Gesellschaft der Wissenschafter*, 1889, p. 127.

[8] The writer is engaged at the present time on an article concerning the meaning of *Joi* and its origin among the early troubadours. He hopes to print that article in the next issue of *Mediaeval Studies*.

It is the purpose of this study to examine every instance of the word in the poems of those troubadours who are recognized as earliest—Guillaume IX, Marcabru, Cercamon, Alegret, Bernart Marti, Peire d'Auvergne.[10] The words do not occur in the poetry of Jaufré Rudel or Bernard de Ventadour. There are exactly thirty-nine instances of the words in the works of the troubadours enumerated above. It is hoped that, by studying the meaning of each occurrence in itself and in its context, we may arrive at the meaning attached to them by the troubadours themselves.

II

Jovens is grouped together with *cortesia* and all other true human excellences:

Dompna, c'aves la segnoria
De joven e de cortesia
E de totas finas valors.[1]

This is borne out by Marcabru. He bewails the fact that Worth and Prowess have fallen low, vanquished by Evil and baseness. As a result, Youth is brought to naught and, through its fall, Courtesy is not practised:

Li plus d'aquest segle carnau
Ant tornat joven a nuill,
Qu'ieu non trob, de que molt m'es mau,
  Qui maestrill
Cortesia ab cor leiau.[2]

In a *sirvent* castigating debauched husbands, false lovers and wantons, Cercamon complains that the wicked and the hateful win from love as much as the excellent and the most praiseworthy. Because that condition obtains, Evil has replaced Youth and has taken the place it once occupied in matters of love. *Malvestatz* and *Jovens* are directly opposed as is vice to virtue as far as love is concerned. Thus *Jovens* emerges as an attribute of the virtuous and *Malvestatz* an attribute of the wicked:

Per qe d'amor an atretan
Li malvas enojos savai
Com li meillor e'l plus prezan.
Jovens s'en fuig, fraing e dechai,
E Malvestatz a son luec pres
En amistat, c'amics non es
Amatz ni d'amigua no's jau.[3]

---

[9] Aehnlich wie *joi* wird auch *joven* zuweilen wie ein die ritterliche Gesellschaft beherrschendes Sittengestetz aufgefasst, das Pflichten auferlegt (und zwar der Frau nicht minder als dem Mann), gegen das man sich auch vergehen kann. *Ibid.* p. 127, n. 1.

[10] A further investigation of the meaning of *jovens* among the later troubadours and writers of mediaeval romance will form the basis of a forthcoming article.

[1] Alegret, 1-3; ed. J. M. L. Dejeanne, *Annales du Midi* XIX (1907), p. 231. My lady, you have dominion over youth and courtliness and over every true worth.

[2] Marcabru, XXXIII, 25-29; *ed. cit.*, pp. 160-161. The majority of this carnal world have turned youth to naught, for I do not find—wherefore woe is me—one who makes progress in courtliness with a loyal heart.

[3] *Les Poésies de Cercamon*, IV, 8-14; ed. Alfred Jeanroy (Paris, 1922), pp. 11-12. Because evil, vexatious and wicked people obtain from love as much as the best and the worthiest, Youth takes to flight, falls to pieces and declines; and Evil has taken its place in love because the lover goes unbeloved nor does he have joy of his beloved.

A similar opposition between *Jovens* and *Malvestatz* appears in the same poet's lament on the death of Guillaume X of Aquitaine. As a result of the abasement of Youth, Evil is in the ascendancy and Joy is suppressed:

Ir' e dolor e marrimen
Ai, car vei abaissar Joven:
Malvestatz puej' e Jois dissen
Despois muric lo Peitavis.
Remazut son li prez e'ill lau
Qi solon issir de Peitau.[4]

It is *Jois* which is, in this instance, directly opposed to *Malvestatz*, but it is the abasement of Youth that is the cause of the downfall of Joy. It is Youth which is a necessary condition of Joy. With the fall of Youth and with the rise of Evil, those praiseworthy and laudable actions that were wont to issue forth from Poitou cease: Youth and Joy were the necessary conditions of their existence.

This close connection between *Jois* and *Jovens* emerges in the *sirvent* addressed by Marcabru to Alfonso VII, King of Castille and Leon:

Emperaire, per mi mezeis,
Sai quant vostra proeza creis,
No'm sui jes tarzatz del venir,
Que Jois vos pais e Pretz vos creis,
E Jovens vos ten baud e freis
Que fai vostra valor doucir.[5]

The poet has never delayed or hesitated in approaching the Emperor's court because Joy, Worth and Youth increase his Prowess and enhance his moral worth.

The intimate association of *Jovens* to Love as a principle of human excellence is brought out clearly in one of Marcabru's attacks on false love. Once, he says, Love was righteous, the source of excellence; now it is perverse and perverted. As a result, men waver when confronted with *Proeza*. They are wicked. This lack of Prowess results in the fall of Youth and in false, wanton love:

Jovens faill a fraing e brisa,
E Amors es d'aital guisa
De totz cessals a ces prisa.[6]

Guillaume IX, the first troubadour, seems to recognize the inseparability of Youth and Love and their interdependence when he announces the subject matter of two of his 'vers':

Farai un vers de dreyt nien:
Non er de mi ni d'autra gen,
Non er d'amor ni de joven,
    Ni de ren au.[7]

Companho, faray un vers . . . covinen:

---

[4] Cercamon, VI, 3-8; *ed. cit.*, p. 19. I am sad, sorrowed and grieved, because I see Youth in decline. Evil ascends and Joy descends since the death of the man of Poitou. The worthy and praiseworthy actions that were wont to issue forth from Poitou are vanished.

[5] Marcabru, XXII, 1-6; *ed. cit.*, p. 107. Through my own knowledge, Emperor, I know how greatly your prowess grows. I have not at all delayed in coming because Joy nurtures you and Worth gives you increase; and Youth keeps you high-spirited and vigorous which enhances your excellence.

[6] Marcabru, XVIII, 7-9; *ed. cit.*, p. 78. Youth fails, shatters and breaks to pieces. And Love is of such a nature that it has taken a tax of all its subjects.

[7] Guillaume IX, IV, 1-4; *ed. cit.*, p. 6. I shall compose a poem about simply nothing. It will not be about me nor about other people, nor will it be about love or youth nor about anything else.

Et aura'i mais de foudatz no'y a de sen,
Et er totz mesclatz d'amor e de joy e de joven.[8]

The role of Love in conjunction with Youth becomes clearer in Marcabru's diatribe against those who set their minds on avarice and false, venal and wanton love. Yet, the poet defends the absolute necessity of setting one's mind on love because love—that is pure love—is the source and fount of all human excellence in this world. If one did not set one's mind on love, therefore, and if one failed to think on love, Youth would be dishonored and shamed, Joy would perish:

Cuiador d'amor volatgier
Son de folla cuida mainier,
Qu'en mil no'n trob una corau
D'aquestas amors cuidairitz,
        Pero cuidar
        Non dei blasmar
Del tot, que Jovens for' aunitz;
Si cuiars d'Amor fos oblitz
Jois fora tombatz en canau.[9]

In truth, the relationship between Youth and Love is this: Youth is the father of the world and Love is its mother. As long as this condition obtains, then Prowess exists. Pure Love is the source and fountain of all good and worth here below and is, as it were, the passive principle of all wordly excellence. Out of this source of all terrestrial good Youth actively engenders all the noble worldly qualities comprised under *Proeza*. When Prowess is debased, however, then Youth dies. As a result, Love is lost and loses its inheritance of Joy:

Tant cant bos Jovens fon paire
Del segle e fin' Amors maire,
Fon Proeza mantenguda
A celat et a saubuda,
Mes er l'ant avilanada
Duc e rei e emperaire.

Qu'ieu sui assatz esprovaire,
Deffendens et enquistaire,
E vei cum Jovens se tuda,
Per que Amors es perduda
E de Joi deseretada.[10]

When people take delight in evil, when the evil are rewarded and the most deserving go unrewarded, then there is no consolation in Youth because Love, its mother, is debased:

No'i a conort en Joven, mas trop fura,
Ni contra mort ressort ni cobertura,
Qu'ist acrupit l'an gitat de son aire
E de cami, per colpa de la maire.[11]

---

[8] *Ibid.*, I, 1-3; *ed. cit.*, p. 1. Companion, I shall compose a poem . . . a suitable one. In it there shall be more of silliness than of sense, and all intermingled with love and joy and youth.

[9] Marcabru, XIX, 37-45; *ed. cit.*, pp. 90-91. Those who have their minds on inconstant love belong to a senseless frame of mind because among a thousand of those who think on such love I do not find one who is staunch. But I must not blame thinking [on love] entirely, for then Youth would be dishonored; if putting one's mind on Love were forgotten, then Joy would have perished (*lit.* fallen into the canal).

[10] Cf. *supra*, note 4, p. 2.

[11] Marcabru, IX, 13-16; *ed. cit.*, p. 37. There is no consolation in Youth but it is too vacillating, nor is there protection or help from death because these rotters have

Youth, then, is conceived of as a virtue, an active principle productive of a world in which exists every good quality. These qualities are grouped together under the name of *Proeza*. Its relationship to Love, the source and well of these good qualities, is that of husband to wife. Out of Love, Youth engenders a world characterized by every human excellence. Once, however, Love, pure love, is debased to become false, shifting and sensual, then Youth disappears. It is banished by brutal, animal lust:

> Moillerat, li meillor del mon
> Foratz, mas chascus vos faitz drutz,
> Que vos confon
> E son acaminat li con
> Per qu'es Jovens forabanditz
> E vos en appell'om cornutz.[12]

In the same poem, directed mainly against adulterous husbands, Marcabru laments that, because of them and because they are in the ascendancy, Youth is vanquished:

> A tort o a dreig vant dessus
> E Jovens se clama vencutz.[13]

The imposssibility of the existence of Youth along with false love is expressed by Peire d'Auvergne:

> En estiu, quan crida'l jais
> e reviu per mieg los plais
> jovens ab la flor que nais,
> adoncs es razos qu'om lais
> fals' amors enganairitz
> als volilhos acropitz.[14]

Marcabru witnesses to the fact that evil love is the source of the destruction of Worth and Youth:

> Las baratairitz baratan,
> Frienz del barat corbaran,
> Que fan Pretz e Joven delir.[15]

The most common crime in love that is destructive of Youth is lack of fidelity. Inconstancy in love is one of the main causes of the fall and debasement of Youth. Marcabru relates the denial of a shepherdess of her love to her companion. Lack of fidelity is the reason:

> A me fe, don, ieu vos dirai,
> S'aisi es vers cum aug comtar,
> Pretz e Jovens e Jois dechai
> C'om en autre no'is pot fiar.[16]

---

hurled it out of its region and path through the fault of the mother [Love]. Dejeanne has equated 'maire' to 'courtoisie', cf.. *ed. cit.*, p. 41. The allusion to the mother of Youth seems clear from Marcabru's statement in V, 37-38, p. 21. Cf. *supra*, note 4, p. 2.

[12] Marcabru, IV, 31-36; *ed. cit.*, pp. 14-15. Husbands, you would be the best in the world, but each one makes of himself a paramour. This confounds you and your sexual organs are on the march. Wherefore Youth is exiled and therefore do men call you cuckold.

[13] *Ibid.*, 43-44; *ed. cit.*, p. 15. Rightfully or wrongfully, they have the upper hand and Youth confesses itself vanquished.

[14] *Die Lieder Peires von Auvergne* VII, 1-6, ed. Rudolf Zenker (Erlangen, 1900), p. 98. In summer time, when the jay sings and youth revives amid the plains with the flower that springs to life, then it is right that one relinquish false, deceitful love to the vulgar rotters.

[15] Marcabru, XLI, 19-21; *ed. cit.*, p. 202. These hucksters of themselves plying their shameless trade, burning hot in their ignominious trafficking, are the cause of the destruction of Worth and Youth. Cf. also *supra*, note 2.

[16] Marcabru, XXIX, 15-18; *ed. cit.*, p. 134. By my faith, sir, I shall tell you—if it is

As result of infidelity, even Joy and Youth deceive. Then, Evil is born:

> Jois e Jovens n'es trichaire
> E malvestatz eis d'aqui.[17]

A second cause asserted by the troubadours as the cause of the fall of Youth is meanness and miserliness on the part of those who were wont to lavish hospitality and largesse. Cercamon deplores the fact that meanness has overwhelmed the barons with the result that Worth, Youth and Prowess are exiled and that in their stead reigns Evil:

> Cist sirven fals fan a plusors gequir
> Pretz e Joven e lonhar ad estros,
> Don Proeza no'n cug que sia mais,
> Qu'Escarsetaz ten las claus dels baros,
> Manhs n'a serratz dins las ciutat d'Abais,
> Don Malvestatz no'n laissa un issir.[18]

Avariciousness, miserliness have driven largesse from the minds of the wealthy. Largesse is the brother of Youth and dependant on it and Joy. Marcabru bewails the decline of both of them and their disappearance:

> Desviatz de son cami
> Jovens se torn' a decli,
> E Donars qu'era sos fraire,
> Va s'en fugen a tapi,
> C'anc dons Costans l'enganaire
> Joi ni Joven non jauzi.[19]

The close relationship of Youth to Liberality is apparent in another poem by the same author:

> Jovens feuney' e trefana
> E Donars becilha,
> Saubud' es causa certana
> Que Valors guancilha,
> E Maluestatz va sobrana
> La mair' e la filha.[20]

Bernart Marti attributes the fall of Youth to those who love neither Worth nor Excellence. These recreant scoundrels—jealous and faithless husbands—are not interested in true love; they are interested only in money:

> D'aqui naisson li recrezen,
> C'us non ama pretz ni valor.
> Ai! cum an abaissat Joven
> E tornat en tan gran error!

---

true, as I hear tell—Worth and Youth and Joy fall since one cannot put his trust in another.

[17] Marcabru, XVII, 29-30; *ed. cit.*, p. 73. Joy and Youth are thereby tricksters and Evil issues thence.

[18] Cercamon, V, 25-30; *ed. cit.*, p. 16. These false menials [who deny true love] cause a great many to cast aside Worth and Youth and to discard them quickly. Whence I do not think that Prowess may endure for Meanness hold the barons' keys. It has locked up a great many of them within the city of Abasement whence Evil will not allow one to issue forth.

[19] Marcabru, XVII, 7-12; *ed. cit.*, pp. 71-72. Turned aside from its road, Youth falls into decline and Largesse, which used to be its brother, steals stealthily away for never did Sir Constans, the deceiver, enjoy Joy or Youth.

[20] Marcabru, XXI, 25-30; *ed. cit.*, p. 104. Youth is traitorous and deceitful and Largesse perishes. It is known as certain that Worth wavers and that Evil has the upper hand over mother and daughter. By mother and daughter are here meant Love and Prowess. The editor interprets: c'est-à-dire Méchanceté et Lésinerie, p. 228. Cf., however, V, 38; *ed. cit.*, p. 21, and *supra*, note 4, p. 2.

Cist tenon l'aver el destrenh
Li folh e'l garsson naturau.[21]

Marcabru likewise laments that love of riches has replaced true love. That is the cause of the downfall of Youth. Along with infidelity and deceit in love, avariciousness is the enemy of Youth:

Mas Escarsedatz e No-fes
Part Joven de son compaigno.
        Ai! cals dols es,
Que tuich volon lai li plusor,
Don lo gazaings es enfernaus![22]

Not only that, but the evil are now the object of gifts and the worthy are left unrewarded and empty-handed. Miserliness has lost its sense of shame. Marcabru states that there is no help to be had from Youth in this contingency because Youth has been thrown aside.[23]

In a *sirvent* devoted to the castigation of the evils of his day, Marcabru attacked especially the two that have occasioned the most evil consequences: false, lustful love and the abandonment of largesse on the part of wealthy nobles. The latter causes the downfall of Youth:

Per pauc Marcabrus non trasaill
De Joven, can per aver faill.[24]

In another poem—on the 'two lines of thought'—devoted to the same theme, the poet points out as followers of 'evil thinking': *los rics sordezitz, c'un pro contra donar non au* (lines 26-27) and the *cuidador d'amor voltagier* (line 37). Such as these follow the wrong path and as a result Youth is made a matter of buying and selling:

Cuidan s'en van lo tort sentier
Siulan tavan per esparvier
E laisson la dreita carrau
Per lo conseill dels garaignitz
        Que fant cuidar
        Al ric avar
So don Jovens es marchezitz,
E Jois es entre'ls francs faillitz.[25]

In a third poem of like nature, the author speaks of those evil men, the avaricious and false husbands, who have besieged Prowess in a castle. Dukes and kings have been the first to rouse men against Prowess by their miserliness and lack of largesse (lines 41-48). Youth is numbered among the besieged, the object of the wrath and the mad anger of the evil:

Pres es lo castells e'l sala,
Mas qu'en la tor es l'artilla

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[21] Appendix I, 31-36; *ed. cit.*, p. 35. It is from this source [jealous and lascivious husbands] that come the cowardly who love neither worth nor excellence. Alas, how they have debased youth and put it to great distress. These, the fools and the scoundrels by nature, hold their riches in their talons.

[22] Marcabru, XXXV, 19-23; *ed. cit.*, p. 170. But Meanness and Lack of Faith separate Youth from its companion. Oh! how grievous it is that the complete majority fly there where the reward is hellish.

[23] Cf. *supra*, note 11.

[24] Marcabru, XXII, 37-38; *ed. cit.*, p. 109. Marcabru almost falls backwards at Youth when he sees it come to naught because of money.

[25] Marcabru, XIX, 64-71; *ed. cit.*, p. 92. Thinking [evilly] they go following the wrong road whistling after a fly as if it were a sparrow-hawk. They leave the correct road through the advice of niggardly persons who cause the wealthy miser to think in such a way that Youth is made a matter of barter and Joy is made to disappear from among the noble-hearted.

On Jois e Jovens e silla
Son jutjat a pena mala;
Qu'usquecs crida "fuec e flama!
Via dinz e sia prisa!
Degolem Joi e Joven
E Proeza si' aucisa".[26]

This section of our analysis of the idea of *Jovens* may be summarized by a poem of Marcabru that is concerned wholly with the nature of *Jovens*: *Pois l'inverns d'ogan es anatz.* After the conventional nature opening, the poet speaks of a tree, wondrously high and large, that has spread about the whole world. He fears that this tree is so deeply rooted that it will ever maintain its verdure. The roots are Evil. It has reduced Youth to silence and so turned contrariwise those who used to be at its command, that they do not even cry out for someone to assist Youth:

E per so s'es enrazigatz
Car greu sera mais abatutz;
Que la razitz es Malvestatz,
Per que Jovens es confondutz,
E tornatz en tal contrapes
Per cels qui'l degran obezir,
Que tant non cridon c'us l'ades.[27]

The poet is amazed at the number of nobles of every rank that decorate this tree; it is miserliness that holds them so tightly in its grasp that they cannot escape:

Jovens fo ja bautz apellatz,
Mes aras es si recrezutz
Que jamais non er tant honratz
Per que Jois li sia rendutz,
C'Avoleza l'a si conques
C'anc de pois no'n poc erebir
Que'is parti de lui Dreitz ni Fes.[28]

For a long time now the barons have neglected Largesse and married men have tried to play the part of lovers. Thereby Youth has been proscribed. In conclusion, the poet sends a message to Youth: it should not have flown away so far for certainly there, where the poet is, Youth shall never become a prisoner.

It is clear that the early troubadours represented Youth as an active principle, a quality which constitutes perfection in their eyes. Out of Love, the passive principle, the fount and well of all worldly good, it engenders a world characterized by *Proeza*, the sum total of virtues that should bedeck the courtly lover. It is destroyed by two great evils: false, sensual, capricious love with its resultant infidelity and lack of trust, and by avarice and lack of largesse. Youth cannot exist without pure love and liberality. Thus the abstract *Jovens* may be equated in their eyes with purity in love, as conceived by the troubadours, and with liberality.

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[26] Marcabru, XI, 17-24; *ed. cit.*, p. 43. The castle and the armory are captured except that there is resistance in the tower where Joy and Youth and she are doomed to evil suffering. For everyone shouts out 'Fire and flame! Make a way within and let it be captured! Let us throttle Joy and Youth and let Prowess be killed.'

[27] Marcabru, XXXIX, 22-28; *ed. cit.*, p. 192. And therefore it is so deeply rooted that it will be difficult to cast it down. For its root is Evil whence Youth is confounded and turned to such a plight by those who should obey it that they do not so much as shout out that someone assist her.

[28] Marcabru, XXXIX, 36-42; *ed. cit.*, p. 193. Youth was once called high-spirited but now it is so recreant that never will it be honored to such an extent that Joy be given it. For Baseness has so conquered it that since that time it has not been able to prevent that Justice and Fidelity separate themselves from it.

III

It may have been noted in the excerpts quoted above that certain uses of *Jovens* are open to the interpretation that the word denotes a body of youths rather than a spiritual quality.[1] In some cases it is difficult to be sure that the latter is meant rather than the concrete association of youthful people. Either interpretation, in some cases, may be upheld with equal justification. Marcabru, especially, seems to waver between the two. For instance, in his *tençon* with Ugo Catala concerning the two species of love, the latter states:

Marcabrun, amistaz dechai,
Car a trobat Joven savai;
Eu n'ai al cor ir' et esclai,
Qar l'en a levaz tan laiz criz.[2]

The same is true in the case of the use of *Joven* in a poem castigating parsimony and false love. Youth is a source of uneasiness to him because he sees it demeaning itself daily:

Lo gen[s] temps me fai alegrar,
Mas per Joven me desconort
Quar totz jorns lo vey sordeyar.[3]

In his famous *lavador* poem, Marcabru bemoans the fact that Spain is left to bear the brunt of pagan pride and that no help comes to it in its crusade. He lays the blame on the powerful nobles who are in decline, weary of practicing Prowess, no longer loving Joy or liberality, devoted to every human vice. Youth, as a result, is the object of dishonorable praise:

En Espaigna, sai, lo Marques
E cill del temple Salamo
        Sofron lo pes
E'l fais de l'orguoill paganor,
Per que Jovens cuoill avol laus.
E'l critz per aquest lavador
Versa sobre'ls plus rics captaus
Fraitz, faillitz, de proeza las,
Que non amon Joi ni Deport.[4]

Jovens, in this case, may denote the abstract quality rather than an association of youths. The language and the thought seem to point to the latter connotation. Indeed, in certain cases, the poet seems to have had in mind youths themselves rather than the quality of youthfulness: the two bolts of Avarice and Evil have struck them down.

Jovens triatz non a vida
Que ferit l'an dui cairel
Malvestatz e Cobeïda.[5]

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[1] Cf. Marcabru, IV, 44 p. 15; IX, 13 p. 37; XIX, 43 p. 91; XXXIX, 25 p. 192; 36 p. 193.

[2] Marcabru, VI, 33-36; *ed. cit.*, p. 25. Marcabru, love is on the wane for it has found Youth mean-spirited. Because of that, my heart is sad and fearful for such evil outcries are raised against it. In this case, *Joven* may mean a body of youths. The adjective *savai* might be better applied to it than to a spiritual quality.

[3] Marcabru, XXXIV, 5-7; *ed. cit.*, p. 165. This beautiful weather causes me to rejoice except that I grow discouraged because of Youth; every day I see it demean itself. Again, the quality of Youth may grow vile or demean itself. Just as likely, perhaps more so, the poet meant that youths are doing so.

[4] Marcabru, XXXV, 55-63; *ed. cit.*, p. 171. In Spain, here, the Marquis and those who belong to the Temple of Solomon bear the weight and the burden of pagan pride whence Youth gathers to itself dishonorable praise. And the clamor for this 'lavador' falls upon the richest lords who are remiss, deficient, weary of prowess, because they have no love for either Joy or Diversion.

[5] Marcabru, XLII, 8-10; *ed, cit.*, p. 205. Distinguished Youth is lifeless because two bolts have struck it—Evil and Covetousness.

Alegret laments that largesse has been abandoned in favor of meanness by the wealthy and that covetousness and miserliness have replaced it. As a result, the youth are false, flaccid and vicious:

Joven vei fals e flac e sec,
C'a pauc de cobeïtat no fan.[6]

It is fairly clear from the language and context that in some cases *Jovens* certainly has the meaning of an association of youthful people. Both Cercamon and Marcabru lament the condition of the world in which there is no hospitality or liberality. Lack of these is inimical to Youth:

Gasco cortes, nominatiu,
Perdut avez lo segnoriu,
Fer vos deu esser et esqiu,
Don Jovenz se clama chaitiu,
Qar un non troba on s'aiziu,
Mas qan n'Anfos, q'a joi conquis.[7]

In spite of the fair weather that invites him to love and joy, Marcabru is sad because Youth flees; there is no one to give it hospitality:

Assatz m'es bel del temps essuig,
Quand la douz gem e la fonz bruig
E son li prat reverdezit,
Pesa'm de Joven car s'en fuig,
C'a penas troba qui'l convit.[8]

Like Lord Daucadel, the youth of his age have thrown away Worth and liberality and follow false love and meanness:

Jovens someilla,
Greu prendra mais revel,
E par qu'espeilla
Lo seignor Daucadel,
Tot jorn conseilla
Ab son dous caut morsel.[9]

Peire d'Auvergne, with the knowledge that he is such an excellent troubadour, composer of the best, most complete music and verse, rejoices that by his art he is advancing *la jovens*:

Quar er m'abelis e m'es belh
qu'el mieu joi s'enant la jovens.[10]

Marcabru, as a matter of fact, equates *la jovens* of Peire to *joves homes*, who, deceived by Evil, procrastinate and defer the good deeds of which they boast:

Joves homes de bel semblan

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[6] II, 15-16; ed. *Annales du Midi* XIX (1907), p. 227. I see Youth false, flabby and vicious for it almost bursts asunder with covetousness.

[7] Cercamon, VI, 33-36; *ed. cit.*, p. 21. Courteous, renowned men of Gascony, you have lost your lordship, a loss that must be hard and cruel for you. Whence Youth proclaims itself wretched for it does not find anyone to shelter it except Lord Alphonsus who has won joy.

[8] Marcabru, VIII, 1-5; *ed. cit.*, p. 32. I do love the dry weather when the spring gurgles and the fountain murmurs and the meadows are again clothed in green. I am grieved that Youth takes to flight for it scarcely finds anyone who invites it as a guest.

[9] Marcabru, XXXII, 73-81; *ed. cit.*, p. 156. Youth slumbers on and for the future will awaken only with difficulty. It seems to imitate Lord Daucadel; daily does it project (give counsel with) its sweet, hot bit.

[10] III, 30-31; *ed. cit.*, p. 88. I am glad and pleased that the youth make progress in my joy.

Vei per Malvestat deceubutz;
    Que van gaban
Dizo, mil essais encogan:
"Farem qan lo temps er floritz"
Mas lai reman lo gabs e'l brutz.[11]

Finally, Peire d'Auvergne, in his swan-song to the cultivation of Courtly Love, speaks explicitly of himself as a confrere of Youth and as its devotee. He speaks of himself as a member of a society, a confraternity:

Mas si'n sabia dieus mover,
be sai, for' encar confraire
de joven et enquistaire.[12]

The marks that distinguish these members of Youth and his colleagues are that they are upholders of the abstract quality of Youth, that is, that they are upholders of true love, that they practice liberality; they eschew false love and niggardliness. Those are the virtues they cultivate, these are the vices they avoid.

There is some evidence that just such a guild or confraternity existed among the troubadours themselves. Marcabru compains bitterly of the *gen frairina*—his fellow troubadours—who confuse and equate false love with true, pure love:

Per so'n port ir' e pesanssa
C'aug dir a la gen frairina
C'Amors engan' e trahina
Cellui cui Amars reneia;
Menton, que lor benananssa
Es Jois, Sofrirs e Mesura.[13]

It is these same troubadours, his brotherhood, that Marcabru addresses in a bitter poem directed against harlots, their loathsome ways and the evils of whoredom. He calls them *soudadier*, literally mercenaries, men who live by the *solidum* paid for their services as singers and composers by the wealthy nobles.[14] It is these subsidized men who uphold and maintain the qualities of Youth and

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[11] Marcabru, IV, 19-25; *ed. cit.*, p. 14. I see youths of fine outward appearance deceived by Evil. Contemplating a thousand projects, they go about saying in boast: "We will accomplish them when the weather is fair". But there stops their idle boasting and din.

[12] XV, 28-31; *ed. cit.*, pp. 122-123. But if God were not able to move me [from the ways of His love], I know that I should still be a confrere of youth and its devotee.

[13] XXXVII, 19-24; *ed. cit.*, p. 179. Wherefore am I sad and grieved when I hear the brotherhood say that Amors (true love) deceives and betrays him who foreswears Amars (false love). They lie for their felicity is Joy, Patience and Moderation.

[14] C'est la troisième pièce dans laquelle le troubadour s'addresse aux 'soudoyers' comme à des compagnons d'armes. On est porté à croire que Marcabru ne s'était pas contenté d'exciter par ses chants l'ardeur guerrière des Chrétiens contre les Mahométans, mais aussi avait prêché d'exemple en prenant part à ces luttes. Dejeanne, *ed. cit.*, p. 238. But there is nothing in this poem or in the other two wherein the same word is used to even suggest war, Mahometans or soldiers. *Soudadier* means simply one who accepts the *solidum* from another in payment of his service (cf. *soudadiera*, a prostitute, Daude de Pradas, XIV, 14-18, ed. A. H. Schutz [Toulouse, 1933] p. 70 and 51-53, p. 72). As applied to the troubadours, the word indicates that they are in the pay of a patron or patrons from whom they may expect gifts and rewards as salary. For Marcabru, the word apparently meant those, who like himself, lived by their art. Thus, in addition to III, 20-24; XLIV, 1-4, the poet addresses his fellow troubadours as *soudadier* in a third poem concerned with the two ways of thought—one of pure love and liberality, the other of false love and niggarliness. Their way is concerned with false love; his with the true:

La uostra cuida, soudadier,
Fai eluschar los bals Gaifier
Qu'envis si balans' enegau
La cuid'e'l prometres faillitz;
    Nostre cuidar
    Fai desviar
Lo mon[s] don issic la soritz,
C'aissi vei los rics sordezitz,
C'un pro contre donar non au.
        XIX, 19-27; *ed. cit.*, p. 90.

Joy. They are the devotees and propagandists of pure love, the enemies and aggressors against false love:

> Soudadier, per cui es Jovens
> Mantengutz e Jois eisamens,
> Entendetz los mals argumens
> De las falsas putas ardens.[15]

Exactly in the same way, the poet associates himself with his fellow troubadours in another poem directed against the parsimony, avarice and lack of largesse of the nobles of his generation in comparison to the liberality and openhandedness of those of former times. The poet compares the nobles of the older generation to fair trees, rich in foliage and fruit; the living trees of this generation are but elders and willows—bare of the fruit of which they give promise. They are full of promises but empty of accomplishment. Marcabru and all other *soudadier* condemn them:[16]

> Mort(z) son li bon arbre primier,
> E'l(s) viu(s) son ramils e festucs,
> Dels fortz assays los vey damnucx,
> Mas de bordir son fazendier(s),
> De promessas son bobansier(s),
> Al rendre sauzes e saucx,
> Don los claman flacs e baudux,
> Ieu e tug l'autre soudadier.[17]

Marcabru evidently considered himself a member of a brotherhood or fraternity (*gen frairina*) composed of *soudadier*, men who were dependant as he was for their livelihood on the bounty of those wealthy nobles for whose amusement they sang their lyrics and for whose edification and enlightenment they composed their poems. They emphasized the ideal of Youth, a basic virtue of Courtly Love comprising especially pure love and liberality. They abhorred and attacked the opposed vices, lust and niggardliness.

IV

There is no meaning in Classical Latin of its etymon that could give *Jovens* the meaning ascribed to it by the troubadours,—an abstract noun denoting a principle of virtues, especially those of purity and generosity, an association of men who were endowed with or who pursued those qualities. In classical usage, *juventus* denoted youth, age of youth, young persons; *juvenis*, as a noun, denoted one who is in the flower of his or her age, older than *adolescentes* and younger than *seniores*, between the age of twenty and forty.

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[15] XLIV, 1-4; *ed. cit.*, p. 208. Fellow dependants, by whom Youth is maintained and Joy likewise, listen to the base arguments of the evil, reeking whores.

[16] Cercamon averts to the same subject, the avarice and parsimony of the nobles of his day. It is his fear that a *soudadier*—a troubadour dependant like himself on the bounty and favor of a patron—will not find his livelihood among them because of the ill-starred tongue of alanderers:

> Ves manhtas partz vei lo segle faillir,
> Per qu'ieu n'estauc marritz e cossiros,
> Que soudadiers non truep ab cui s'apays,
> Per lauzengiers qu'an bec malahuros,
> Qui son pejor que Judas, qui Dieu trays;
> Ardre'ls degr'om o totz vius sebellir.

V, 31-36, *ed. cit.*, p. 16.

On many sides I see the world in decline; wherefore I stand amazed and uneasy that a hireling may not find someone with whom he may be maintained because of evil tongued slanderers who are worse than Judas who betrayed God. They ought to be burned or buried alive.

[17] III, 17-24; *ed. cit.*, pp. 9-10. Dead are the former excellent trees and the live ones are of twigs and straw. I see them doomed to mighty undertakings but they are assiduous at dancing and prodigal in their promises. In making them good they are willows and elder-trees (i.e. barren) whence I and all the other hirelings proclaim them flaccid and vapid.

In Mediaeval Latin, there does not seem to be any change in the application of the words. *Juvenis* as an adjective meant young and as a substantive, one who has come to that state of life when he can help himself, that is, between adolescence and manhood. *Juventus* meant a body of young men, youth, the age of youth.[1] DuCange notes further the use of the word to mean a man of the lowest social rank as opposed to a nobleman.[2]

Far from conveying the idea of virtuous behavior, the very notion of youth should signify fickleness, lack of stability, indiscretion, inconsistent, inconsiderate action. A youth should be said to act and speak indiscreetly, even inconsiderately. A trace of that meaning appears in the *Chanson de sainte Foi*:

Aujaz del traitor fraudolent,
Si'il mog ben gran affollament:
"Diana colgrun tei parent
E'll homen tuit de nostra gent.
Si laissaz aquest foll jovent
E volez faire'l meu talent,
D'aur vos farai lo liament
De vera purpra'l vestiment.[3]

It is true, avarice, covetousness, miserliness are commonly and proverbially attached to old age;[4] true, too, these qualities are universally hated.[5] But, conversely, liberality and generosity, hospitality and openhandedness are not by their very nature indicative of youth.

The source of the technical meaning of *Jovens* attributed to it by the early troubadours is to be sought elsewhere. A clue to this source may be found in the fifth chapter of the *Treatise on Love* by Avicenna entitled: 'On the love of those who are noble-minded and young for external beauty'.[6] The Arabic word used by Avicenna for the word rendered by 'young' is *fityān*, the plural of *fatā*.[7] In a note the translator of the treatise indicated that the root *fatā* has the secondary meaning of 'generous'.[8] Lane, in his dictionary, gives two meanings for the word: it signifies a youth or a young man, one who is in the prime of youth; generous, liberal, bountiful, mostly used as an epithet in which the quality of the substantive predominates: a generous man, a possessor of *futuwwa*. [9]

The abstract noun *futuwwa*, according to Lane, has the meaning of youth or youthfulness; generosity, honorableness, liberality and bountifulness.[10] In ordinary usage, *futuwwa* means all the honorable qualities that denote a youth (*fatā*), particularly generosity. Originating wholly independently of religion, it was assimilated completely to Sufism and became an ideal of their system. In their language, it is a disposition described 'as placing others above himself. This finds expression in liberality, self-effacement, unselfishness, self-denial, superiority to disappointment, indulgence of the faults of others'.[11] For the mystics, then, *futuwwa* assumed an ethical characteristic.[12] In the abstract, *futuwwa* denotes an ethical value embracing those virtues that distinguish a noble youth (*fatā*); a religious or mystic virtue that can serve as a moral standard of social conduct.

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[1] Aegidii Forcellini, *Totius Latinitatis Lexicon* I (London, 1828), p. 1047, *s.v.*

[2] *Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis* IV (nova editio, Paris, 1938), p. 479, *s.v.*

[3] *Ed. cit.*, ll. 248-255, pp. 293-294. Hear about the deceitful traitor, how he had recourse to folly: "Your parents adored Diana and all the men of your nation. So leave off this senseless youthfulness and if you are willing to follow my desire, I shall make you a cincture of gold and your clothes of real purple. The editor remarks: (foll) jovent n'a pas ici le même sens qu'aux vers 344 et 535. [Cf. p. 1. note 2.] Là-bas il désigne des jeunes gens dans un sens concret; ici, d'après l'ensemble du texte, le mot signifie l'inexpérience et la folie inhérentes à l'état de jeunesse. Le cas n'a pas été relevé dans le S.W., IV, 377, s.v. *jovent*, mais on peut en rapprocher l'expression de *senz de jovent* signalé par M. Appel (*Prov. Chrestom.*, I, 483), qui le traduit par *Kindersinn*, *Torheit*. C'est à peu près le sens dans lequel Villon parlera plus tard de sa 'jeunesse folle' (*Testament* V, 202).

[4] Cf. Elde is ful of coveytise, *Troilus and Criseyde*, IV, 1369 ed. F. N. Robinson, *The Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer* (N.Y. 1933), p. 535.

[5] Cf. Avaritia semper odiosos, claros largitas facit. *De Consolatione Philosophiae Anici Manli Severini Boethi* II, pr. 5, 2, ed. G. A. Fortescue (London, 1925), p. 43.

[6] 'A Treatise on Love by Ibn Sina' translated by Emil Fackenheim, *Mediaeval Studies* VI (1945), p. 211.

[7] *Traités mystiques d'Abou Ali al-Housain b. Abdallah b. Sînâ ou d'Avicenne*, ed. M. A. F. Mehren, III fasc. (Leyden, 1894), p. 1, l. 10; p. 11, l. 5 of the Arabic text.

[8] *Art. cit.*, p. 211, note 7.

[9] *An Arabic-English Lexicon* (London, 1877), I, part 6, p. 2337.

[10] *Ibid.*

In the concrete sense, moreover, *futuwwa* indicates a sociological phenomena, a club or an association of men, typical examples of men's clubs in general whose primary end is social goodfellowship and whose secondary ends arise from ethical and religious spheres. These clubs were made up of *fityān*, devotees and cultivators of *futuwwa*. These corporative unions were known in Islam from earliest times,[13] underwent the influence of Sufism and were reorganized by the Kalif al-Nasir (1180-1225) into aristocratic and civic centres of political and religious importance.

In this paper, our interest lies in the concept of *fatā*, in the development of *futuwwa* in both its concrete and abstract sense, in its sociological and ethical signification at the end of the eleventh and at the beginning of the twelfth century. It was at that period that the earliest Provencal troubadours lived and wrote. As a guide, we have the excellent and authoritative article of Franz Taeschner.[14] In all that follows, we use this article in tracing the genesis and formation of *futuwwa* corporations and in outlining the history of the origin and development of the abstract idea. We desire to acknowledge our debt to him and to the bibliography indicated in his notes.

The basic meaning of *fatā*, according to lexicographers, is a youth. It is used in the *Koran* with this meaning in both singular and plural.[15] It appears there, too, with the meaning of slave,[16] twice in the form *fatāt* with the meaning of maiden or slave girl.[17] In Old Arabian poetry, however,—the only reliable source for the ideas of the pre-Islamic world,—the word *fatā* was used to denote a man endowed with the typical Old Arabian virtues,—excessive liberality, unreserved surety for kin without asking the right or the wrong, virile bravery even in a lost cause. With reference to the latter virtue, *fatā* and its plural *fityān* very easily took on the meaning of 'hero'. In this its meaning was similar to *faris*. It differed from the latter in the fact that while the latter was restricted to warrior-hero, *fata* denoted as well the collective ideal of Old Arabian society, the ideal of a tribal member. This concept or picture of the *fatā*, rooted in the ideology of Old Arabia and used constantly by its poets, represents those characteristics included in the abstract *futuwwa* as it later appeared. There is, however, as yet no trace of the abstract ethical concept in pre-Islamic poetry.[18] And however much Old Arabian poetry described the ideal figure of the *fatā* and thereby virtually the abstract *futuwwa* as an ethical concept, there is as yet no trace of *futuwwa* as a sociological concept—a union or organization of *fityān* as a group separating themselves from the rest of mankind into a sort of men's club.

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[11] C. van Arendonk, *Encyclopedia of Islam* II (London, 1927), pp. 123-124.

[12] Futuwwa is described by al-Bistani as 'the relinquishing of injustice, the bestowing of rich gifts and the abstaining from complaints' (in Hermann Thorning, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des islamischen Vereinswesens*, Turkische Bibliothek 16 [Berlin, 1913], p. 185): by Dschurdschani as 'Liberality and nobility and as the terminus of altrusim concerning heavenly and earthly goods' (in C. van Arendonk, *Encyclopedia of Islam*, *art. cit.*,). According to Ahlwardt 'under Futuwwa is to be understood the virtues belonging to noble mankind, but especially the fear of God. Only he who possesses these is in truth a Fata . . . the Fata should be honorable, loyal, helpful and devout' (in Thorning, *op. cit.*, p. 184).

[13] It was these corporative unions that, according to J. von Hammer-Purgstall, provided the origins and development of chivalry and the chivalric orders in Western mediaeval civilization. Cf. 'Sur la chevalerie des Arabes antérieure à celle d'Europe, sur l'influence de la première sur la seconde', *JA* IV (1849), p. 1 ff and 'Sur les passages relatifs à la chevalerie dans les historiens arabes' *JA* V (1855), p. 282 ff. For a definitive disposal of this theory, cf. Edouard Fares, *L'Honneur chez les Arabes avant l'Islam* (Paris, 1932).

[14] 'Die islamischen Futuwwabünde. Das Problem ihrer Entstehung und die Grundlinien ihrer Geschichte', *Zeitschrift der deutshen morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 87 (1934), neue Folge, Band 12, pp. 6-49.

[15] XVIII, 10; XXI, 60.

[16] XII, 30, 36, 62; XVIII, 60, 62.

[17] IV, 24; XXIV, 33. Bickr Fares suspects that the meaning of slave is foreign to pre-Muhammdan language. Cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, Supplement (London, 1938), p. 80 and Edouard Fares, *L'Honneur chez les Arabes avant l'Islam* (Paris, 1932), p. 28, note. 2.

The case is radically different in the Islamic society of the cultured lands of Old Arabia. There quite other sources provide traces of *futuwwa*. Contemporary poetry, a picture of the age though it be, is not as fruitful in this case as the narrative prose of the period, concerned as it is with describing contemporary subjects of interest. In the so-called Adab literature of this period, *fatā* appears especially in its plural form *fityān*, but the word seems to connote an entirely different idea than in the pre-Islamic poetry. It concerns no longer the type of man endowed with all the good and worthy virtues as such, although this meaning does appear now and again. Rather it is a question of a special group of men who do not embody the social ideals of the age but who have separated themselves from the generality of mankind through some sort of peculiarity. No contemporary book on the subject of these *fityān* has survived to give us the key to the prehistory of the sociological phenomenon of *futuwwa*.[19] For our knowledge of them, we have to fall back on mentions of them in the narrative prose of the period.

These scattered bits, in the form of anecdotes, afford no positive information concerning the *fityān*, but from them it is possible to draw inferences as to their type and customs. They were corporatively united members of a fraternity with common lodgings and a common social economy, living together for the pursuit of a definite style of life. They were not particularly highly regarded, for anecdotes concerning them refer to a loose kind of moral life in which eating and drinking, dancing, sports, and sexual irregularities played a large part. It was, therefore, quite normal that singers, dancers, musicians—every sort of wandering folk—should flock about these habitués of high living there to ply their trades to their own advantage. The *fityān* were a group of men with definite customs, perhaps even a definite costume by which they were recognized, whose activity centred about the purely worldly things of 'high life', and who held themselves completely aloof from the political and religious quarrels of young Islamic society. The use of the word *fityān* indicated that originally these fraternities were composed of young unmarried men. Yet the mention of certain individuals in these anecdotes leads to the conclusion that these clubs remained constant even after the individual members had advanced in age and had founded their own homes. Only thus could this institution assume so clearly its permanent character of real corporations and provide the point of departure for its further development. The purpose of these corporations was apparently purely social: the cultivation of every possible branch of luxurious living—perhaps even in stylised form—afforded by the world of their age. Among these branches, drinking seems to have had not the last place.

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[18] The concept of *fatā* in pre-Islamic poetry closely approaches that of *muruwwa*, really and etymologically the same as Latin 'virtus'. Although the word itself does not appear in Old Arabian poetry, the idea is clearly elaborated there. According to Ignatz Goldhizer ('Muruwwa und Din' *Muhammedanischen Studien* I [Halle a. S., 1889], p. 13 ff.) it means "the observance of all those duties connected with family tie, with the relationship of protection to hospitality, the fulfilling of the great law of blood vengeance . . . fidelity to and self-immolation for every one bound to the tribe by custom". *Muruwwa* is thus a universal concept which includes that of *futuwwa* except that it seems to lack the latter's specific content of war hero. On the other hand, *furusa* contains the idea of war hero only and lacks the gerneral content of *futuwwa*. When later construction of abstract ideas was possible, *futuwwa* and *muruwwa* closely paralelled each other as ethical concepts to such an extent that it was difficult to distinguish one from the other. *Muruwwa*, however, never shared in the sociological development of *futuwwa*.

[19] That such a book existed is clear from mention made of it by its author al-Gahiz, the *Kitab al-fityān*. Cf. Taeschner, *op. cit.*, p. 12, note 2.

Is there any connection between these *fityān* of the old cultured centres of the Islamic world and the Old Arabian *fatā*? As far as the corporative element is concerned, there can be no such connection. The characteristic of the Old Arabian *fatā* was that he should be the ideal of Old Arabianism, but not a member of a group or corporation. The latter was exactly the characteristic of the *fityān*. The use of the word *fityān* to designate the members of their corporation shows that the concept of the pre-Islamic *fatā* did play a role and the point of contact was the active community spirit of the *fatā* and his heroism in battle. As with all purely worldly associations of young men, active competition in war and sport was natural to the style of life of the *fityān*.

Inspite of the fact that the words for both phenomena are the same, their concepts are quite different. Among the Fityan corporative members the old *fatā* idea has lost its ethical content founded on mutuality of interests and has moved to a lower, egotistic level. The general mutuality of the *fatā* was founded on the broad basis of natural bonds and was evident too in the exercise of the social law of *Giwār*, embracing the right to hospitality and protection. The mutuality of the *fityān*, on the contrary, was not a natural one. It substituted for natural bonds those of a new kind, uniting individuals chosen by election. In reality, it negated natural bonds and displaced them by free election of individuals into a society of a different type.

This shift was due primarily to the sociological structure assumed by the old cultural centres as opposed to that of Old Arabia. The latter was fundamentally strongly individualistic, if not anarchistic. Natural bonds formed the only stable legal groups; the smaller the group, the firmer were its natural ties and the greater was its legal security. Outside the natural ties of family, tribe and race was total lack of legal title. Besides these narrow natural bonds, was their expansion by the laws of hospitality and protection, a sort of humanitarianism of a higher kind. And indeed in the exercise of these two laws lay the great part of the claim to fame of the ideal *fatā*. In the cultural centres of early Islamism, however, natural bonds played no part. In contrast to the latitude and principle of unrestriction that existed there, were the closed clubs of the *fityān*, a narrowing down by arbitrary selection and election. The social ethics of Old Arabia developed on the broad basis of natural and legal relationship; those of the Fityan members were confined to the limits of its membership based on the rules and bylaws of their particular association and were not operative in the community at large.

This narrowing down of the scope of activity had another effect. The Old Arabian *fatā* acted through motives of praise. But this motive did not lack an ethical tinge because it was demanded that there be always an extra-personal or altruistic goal for the praiseworthy deed. This sprang from either his membership in a natural group such as the family, or from his special relationship with some other individual, such as with one, for example, joined to him by the law of hospitality. In the cultural lands, however, the quest for praise was always prompted by selfish motives—a thing quite foreign to the Old Arabian *fatā*—with no regard for ethical reasons and expressed itself simply as braggadacio or showing off:

> Thus, in place of the Old Arabian 'grand seigneur' who with reckless abandon distributed his gifts without worrying whether he was thereby making himself to want, there arose a devotee and habitué of luxurious living who used his wealth, not to be esteemed as a noble patron, but to heap up for himself in the most abundance the mediums of pleasure that the late classical world could offer. And instead of the Old Arabian heroes whose title to glory consisted in jeopardizing his life for his own on the field of

> battle, there arose either the swashbuckler who sought battle for battle's sake or a refined lord who changed battles into jousts.[20]

In comparison to the later *futuwwa* organizations, the *fityān* shared with them the main characteristic of corporative unions. But they differed radically from them in the lack of every kind of link with religion. Even in war, wherein Islam afforded a place for religion in the furthering of the *Gihād*, the *fityān* made no use of it to orientate themselves religiously. Holy War and *fityān* are two separate concepts that have nothing to do with one another during the first centuries of Islamism. With their activities limited to the purely selfish and counterbalanced by no kind of compensation such as religion might offer, it is perhaps characteristic of the *fityān* of this period that the abstract concept of *futuwwa*, at least in its technical sense, has not as yet made its appearance.

This characteristic difference between the Old Arabian *fatā* and the *fityān* of the old cultural centres of the East is a striking evidence of the change in the way of thinking which Muslim society underwent in their migration from the Old Arabian steppes, where the ethical ideal of the Bedouin prevailed, to the Old Eastern cultural centres where the citizen who enjoyed all the blessings of an effete society gave the tone. Indeed it is here that we must seek for the origins of the Fityan corporations, in pre-Islamic Persia and in those lands culturally dependant on it, such as Iraq, as well as in the already christianized Arabian frontiers.

The earliest traces of any contact of the Old Arabian *fatā* with religion comes from Iraq, specifically from the circle of Hasan al-Basri (d. 728). There is a dictum of Hasan concerning a contemporary known to him, Bakr b.'Abdallah al Muzani (d. 724/726): "Al-Hasan was the sheikh of Basra and Bakr its *fatā*" and the bestowing of the title of 'Lord of the *fityān*' by Basri on Aiyub b. Abi Tamina (687-784). The use of *fatā* and *fityān* refer primarily to the comparative youth of the persons as well as to the technical meaning of devotees of luxurious living. But Bakr and Aiyub were highly regarded traditionalists in spite of their status as *fatā* and were esteemed for their virtues which were chiefly of a charitable nature. We must see in them the first palpable representatives of the synthesis of the old *fatā* ideal with that of the later cultural centres.

The same undertone of union of these two ideals appears in a dictum handed down by the same Basri: "When a *fatā* lives an ascetic life, he is to be recognized not by his speech but by his conduct". What is meant is that one must not trust the pious words of a *fatā* pierced through and through with worldliness as were those of his circle. Appearances are against them. Hasan al-Basri was a man who did not count exterior displays of piety but only those traditional virtues such as he recognized in Bakr and Aiyub.

Later Sufis esteemed Hasan al-Basri as their patriarch and, indeed, he is to be considered as a fore-runner of Sufism. The evolution of the *fatā* ideal entered upon by his circle proceeded logically in the classic Sufism of the eighth and tenth centuries. When the Sufis of this period speak about *futuwwa*, it is clear that it is a question of a synthesis of the Old Arabian *fatā* ideal with the spirit of the Fityan corporations. What Sufism did was to seize upon the Old Arabian ideal of the *fatā*, because of its ethical content, adjust it to the fundamental concept of Sufi ethics, altruism, and create the new concept of *futuwwa*. Its principle content were the old virtues now charged with Sufi coloring, especially unreserved readiness to assist one's neighbor in every contingency. Henceforth, under the altered relationships of the Islamic Middle Ages, where the Old Arabian tribal constitutions no longer held sway, the beginnings of a higher type of humanitarianism, emerging from the Old Arabian law of hospitality, broaden and expand into a really world-wide altruism whose object is no longer the neighbor in the narrower sense but in the broader sense analagous to Christian charity.

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[20] F. Taeschner, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

This unreserved personal service, even to the point of self-denial, evolved into that sense of honor so frequently met with in later *futuwwa* and which is related to, though not absolutely identical with, that of Western chivalry. It was a sort of altruism refracted back upon one's ego in so far as it concerned unconditional service to self-chosen objects and from personal choice without regard for personal expediency. This idea of honor was a neutral one in so far as the religious aims of the Sufis was concerned; that is, it could be employed just as well against God as in His service. It became a positive tendency only through the deliberate direction given it by the Sufis.

This ideal of honor was, without doubt, latently contained in the Old Arabian conception of the *fatā*. Moreover, it was at least practically present in the Fityan corporations whose members busied themselves about war and fighting; comradeship in warfare and the sense of solidarity engendered in such clubs would develop a sense of honor. Thus they too had their share in the formation of this ideal. It was the Sufis, however, who incorporated it into their system, gave it the religious orientation hitherto denied it and provided it with a solid basis on which to thrive and to flourish.

The war ideal of the old Arabian *fatā* and of the Fityan corporations as well, by its very nature, was of little consequence to Sufism. It did not totally disappear from their system and when they do treat of it in their tractates, it appears in specifically Islamic garb, adorned with illustrations from the Prophet but without being fully utilized in the sense of developing it into the concept of a Holy War. With the Sufis, war remains a purely secular idea assimilated to their ideal of altruism but not to their positive religious teachings. It manifests itself as the giving of assistance to another without thought of profit or advancement. It is held to be the honorable, upright, purely altruistic struggle for a wholly unselfish end. In war, the warrior seeks only honor without taking thought of what may accrue to him in the way of personal advantage or gain. In the word *futuwwa*, used in this connection as an ethical concept, is contained all that appears in the West as chivalry.[21]

Closely connected with this ideal of honor contained in *futuwwa* is the virtue of unbreakable fidelity. In Sufi writings, this is always one of the qualifications demanded of a *fatā* and is supported by proverbs and examples.[22]

As a practical consequence of the central virtue of altruism, and standing in closest relationship to it, is the virtue of liberality, or hospitality, a virtue which had belonged to the set of virtues demanded of the Old Arabian *fatā*. However, unlike the foregoing virtues of honor and fidelity, openhandedness did not belong to the concept of *futuwwa* itself; in the Futuwwa writings, rather, it is usually treated in a separate chapter. Nevertheless, it is this virtue, in the form of public hospitality, which comes to the fore in the practice of later Futuwwa clubs.[23]

Finally, among the constituent virtues of *futuwwa* is purity or sexual abstinence. Its characteristic expression seems to lie in the repression of all sexuality between like-minded persons. This repression permitted the devotees of *futuwwa* to conduct themselves in each other's company in a way that would be shameful otherwise according to the strict regulations of Sufism.[24]

The lasting effect which Sufism gained through the grafting of the Old Arabian *fata* ideal on *futuwwa* consisted in its success in seizing upon the idea lying at the basis of it and in providing it with a code or formula capable of discussion. This had not been the case with the primitive stuff of *futuwwa*. The pre-Islamic poets had sung of the *fatā* as he appeared to them against the background of Old Arabian society but they had not provided a precise picture of him. The *fityān* of the old cultural lands are perceptible, too, in anecdotes contemporary with them, but there again not much light is shed upon the essential features of their organizations. On the contrary, from the very beginning Sufism strove to seize upon the ideas lying at the basis of these phenomena, to incorporate them in the abstract word *futuwwa*, and to prepare the concept expressed by the word for theoretical discussion. The centre of interest for the earliest Sufi writers that have come down to us (1021) was the portrayal of the *futuwwa* ideal. The question of external organization of its followers interested them but little, but from anecdotes current in these writings it is possible to ascertain that at this time (tenth-twelfth centuries) there were corporative clubs which had made the Sufi *futuwwa* ideal their own.

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[21] Cf. Hermann Thorning, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-193.

[22] Cf. Taeschner, *op. cit.*, p. 27, note 1.

[23] Cf. Thorning, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-191.

[24] Cf. the anecdotes in Taeschner, *op. cit.*, p. 28, note 1; and Thorning, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

It may be assumed therefore that these oldest *futuwwa* clubs of Sufi stamp had their origin in the still older *fityān* corporations of the first centuries of Islam. Men's clubs of this type are prone to establish an ideal for their clubs and eagerly seize upon an ethical formula capable of directing their activity and of leading them to their ultimate goal. Sufism, incorporating as it did ideas current in the *fityān* circles, provided them with this goal and ethics. At any rate, this seems to have been the case in regard to the concept of honor.

After the old *fatā* ideal had received through Sufism its theoretical foundation in the Sufi tinted concept of *futuwwa*, it can be taken for granted that the *fityān* corporations, or at least a part of them, imitated the Sufi corporations in their future development. Little is known about them for the period in which we are interested, in contrast to the wealth of information for what might be called the courtly Futuwwa clubs of an-Nasir's time. This may be said with some assurance, however: at the time when an-Nasir reorganized the *futuwwa* corporations (1180-1225) there were already extant firmly established clubs. Information about their external appearance is not forthcoming since the *futuwwa* writings which have come down to us before this period originate from avowedly Sufi circles. As has been said, they were not interested in that phase of *futuwwa*. These clubs were impregnated with the ideas and the teaching of Sufism. In *futuwwa* writings is visible the religious spirit of Sufism and *futuwwa* clubs take part in the religious and political strife of the times. On the other hand, in the period before an-Nasir, there existed, too, clubs of a lower order which subscribed to the *futuwwa* ideals of purity and unbreakable fidelity but held aloof from religious activity.[25]

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From the tenth to the twelfth century there existed among the Arabs an ethical ideal which they called *futuwwa* the basic meaning of which was youth. It was a Sufi ideal which had its genesis in the pre-Islamic *fatā* of Old Arabia. Sufism assimilated the virtues of the latter—excessive liberality, unreserved surety for anyone bound to him by family or legal kinship, virile bravery—to its own basic virtue of altruism. Thereby it created an ideal of its own, *futuwwa*, whose constituent virtues were a lofty sense of honor, unbreakable fidelity, excessive hospitality and purity of life. Moreover Sufism transformed the Fityan clubs of the old cultured centres of Arabia into Futuwwa corporations which made the ideal of *futuwwa* their own. These clubs, elective in character, with no tie with religion, had had as their specific end the cultivation of luxurious living. Under Sufi influence, they continued as corporative unions whose devotees cultivated the virtues comprised within the abstract *futuwwa*. This held them together and comprised the bond of their union.

In the south of France, from the beginning of the twelfth century, in the poetry of the first troubadours, there was a basic moral principle called *Jovens*. It comprised the virtues of fidelity, liberality and purity. It was a virtue that was destroyed by avarice, lack of largesse, infidelity and false, wanton love. These early troubadours refer, too, to a concrete association of men devoted to the virtues for which the abstract *Jovens* stood. These men were designated by the collective name *Jovens, joves homes, la jovens.*

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[25] Cf. Taeschner, *op cit.*, p. 31, note 3.

The two concepts, the Islamic *futuwwa* and the troubadour *Jovens*, in both the concrete and abstract sense, are practically identical in every detail—so much so that it is possible to substitute in every case the Arabian *futuwwa* for the Provencal *Jovens* and arrive at the identical meaning the troubadours intended to convey.[26] Among the troubadours, *Jovens* is a specialized concept in the sense that it has nothing to do with the idea conveyed etymologically. It is foreign to the etymon itself. That concept of *Jovens* was extant previous to them in the *futuwwa* ideal of the Arabs. In this case, Arabian influence is as clearly evident in their verse and in their thought as is Arabian influence written in stone in the sculpture of Southern France.

It is difficult to know just what was the specific point of contact between these early troubadours and the Arabian *futuwwa* ideal. For the present, I am inclined to believe that it was Marcabru who was mainly responsible for the adaption of the Arabian concept into the *Jovens* of the troubadours and that it was he who gave it currency among them. It is true, Guillaume IX had made use of the term twice in poems written after his return from Palestine where he had been, it is alleged, a prisoner of the Arabs. He had done no more, however, than couple *jovens* with two other words of like stamp, *joy* and *amor.*[27] It is Marcabru who uses the word in all the facets of its meaning and that in some three quarters of the instances of the occurrence of the word among the early troubadours examined—twenty-seven out of thirty-nine.[28] He had travelled to Spain, to Lérida and Léon, and had come directly under Andalusian influence.[29] To him the word and its meaning were directly available. The concept was available, too, to Cercamon directly from his pupil Marcabru (or as his pupil as some would have it). There is some grounds, moreover, for thinking that Cercamon had been to Spain or had contemplated going there.[30] There is no biographical data to connect Alegret directly either with Marcabru or with Spain. On the other hand, Bernart Marti knew the latter's work and imitated him servilely.[31] Peire d'Auvergne, likewise, was a disciple of Marcabru[32] and his early career as a troubadour unfolded in Spain. Thus all the early troubadours who use *Jovens*, except Alegret of whom we know little or nothing, were intimately connected with Marcabru or with Spain itself.

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[26] It is true that for the Sufi purity connoted a virtue wholly different from the concept of pure love of the troubadours. Among the followers of *futuwwa*, attraction to external beauty and the love of it was forbidden as an obstacle to the soul's ascent to the divine. This love of the natural soul was, therefore, to be suppressed and mortified. Cf. *The Kashf Al-Mahjub, the Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism by Ali b. 'Uthman al-Jullabi al-Hujwiri*, tr. R. A. Nicholson (London, 1911, Gibb Memorial Volume XVII), pp. 360-366, 397-398. The love of the highest beauty, God, by the rational soul only was permitted them. Purity, therefore, meant freedom from sexual defilement whether by thought, word, deed.

For the troubadours, purity had quite a different meaning. It meant simply freedom from lust, from false, animal love. They exalted pure love as the sole source of all human excellence or perfection. For them, pure love consisted in an intense desire for the beloved aroused by a contemplation of her beauty, a desire to be fanned and kept at white heat by the solace of all sensual delights short of actual intercourse. Cf. *'Fin' Amors*: the Pure Love of the Troubadours, its Amorality, and Possible Source', *Mediaeval Studies* VII (1945), pp. 175 ff.

In their own ways, both *futuwwa* and the pure love of the troubadours keep the ideal of purity, but on a different level. The content of the virtue differs and the reason of the difference is to be sought in the attitude towards life and living of the Sufi and the troubadours. For the Sufi mystics, this life is a period of mortification and cleansing of self leading to their perfection, union with the divine through knowledge and love. For the troubadours, on the contrary, this world is all; no other world exists for them. What they seek is human, natural perfection in contrast to a spiritual, supernatural one. What the troubadours have done is to take over the idea of purity inherent in the constitutent virtues of *futuwwa*, debase it, so to speak, to a wholly natural, human level and incorporate it along with the other virtues of *futuwwa* into their ideal of Courtly Love.

[27] Cf. *supra*, notes 7 and 8, pp. 4-5.

[28] It is rather strange that neither Jaufré Rudel nor Bernart de Ventadour make use of the word *Jovens*. It may be that they were wholly concerned with the idea of *amor*: *verai' amor, fin' amor* and unconcerned with the lack or bountifulness of largesse and liberality of patrons of which they make no mention. As such, they had no need of the word in their vocabulary, a word that connoted liberality, largesse as well as purity in love.

[29] Cf. A. R. Nykl, *The Dove's Neck-Ring* (Paris, 1931), p. LXXXIII.

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[30] Cf. Alfred Jeanroy, *Les Poésies de Cercamon* (Paris, 1912). p. vi, note 4.

[31] Cf. Ernest Hoepffner, *Les Poésies de Bernart Marti* (Paris, 1929), p. vi.

[32] Cf. Rudolf Zenker, *Die Lieder Peires von Auvergne* (Erlangen, 1900), p. 65.

L'Existence de Dieu selon Duns Scot

ETIENNE GILSON

I. *L'ETRE PREMIER*

LA métaphysique n'a pas pour objet l'essence de Dieu comme tel, mais sa méthode permet d'établir l'existence de l'être que la théologie nomme Dieu. Sans doute aussi pourra-t-elle s'exprimer sur sa nature, dans la mesure précisément où il est un certain "être". Lorsqu'il envisage ce problème, Duns Scot se voit placé entre deux adversaires; l'un, saint Thomas d'Aquin, qui vise trop bas, l'autre, Henri de Gand, qui vise trop haut. Le premier limite l'intellect humain à la connaissance de la quiddité abstraite du sensible et le condamne par suite à une connaissance purement analogique de l'être divin. Or si l'on s'en tient, comme c'est ici le cas, à une interprétation conceptuelle de l'analogie, Dieu n'est analogue à rien. Thomas d'Aquin lui-même l'a mainte fois affirmé, l'*esse* divin échappe au concept. Autant dire, conclut Duns Scot, que la raison n'a rien à en dire. Mais "il y a une autre opinion qui accorde trop à l'intellect sur la connaissance de Dieu, comme la première lui accordait trop peu",[1] c'est celle d'Henri de Gand, selon qui, étant en soi le premier intelligible, Dieu est aussi pour nous le premier connaissable et la cause de notre connaissance du reste.[2] Contre cette deuxième erreur, Duns Scot argumente avec non moins de vigueur que contre la première, mais le fondement ultime de sa démonstration réside bien au delà des limites de la philosophie. Rien de plus naturel, car l'essence même de Dieu comme Dieu est ici en cause. Le problème implique d'abord celui de la relation de l'essence de Dieu comme Dieu à une connaissance et à un objet en général.[3] Nous le retrouverons plus tard à propos du problème de l'essence et du possible. Il semble donc préférable de remettre à ce moment la réfutation de la position en cause, d'autant plus que, de toute manière, le point de départ scotiste, pour une enquête sur l'existence d'un être tel que celui dont parle la théologie, est déjà assuré. Il y en a un, et un seul, l'être univoque. Ou bien le théologien aboutira par cette voie, ou il devra renoncer à l'entreprise. De toute manière, s'il doit avancer aussi loin que possible sur cette route, elle est pour lui, la seule; il n'ira jamais plus loin qu'où elle lui permet d'aller.

L'enquête partira donc de l'être univoque, mais quel terme se propose-t-elle d'atteindre? Il s'agit cette fois d'atteindre un certain être, individuellement défini et posé dans son existence actuelle, celui que les théologiens nomment Dieu. Ceux qui ont le goût des grandes classifications philosophiques en matière d'histoire, observeront aussitôt que Duns Scot s'engage nécessairement, et de par sa méthode même, à prouver l'existence de Dieu à partir d'un concept. On décidera donc d'avance que sa preuve appartient à la famille bien connue des "arguments ontologiques". Il se peut, mais Duns Scot lui-même aurait ici bien des réserves à faire. Souvenons-nous en effet que, telle qu'il la conçoit, la métaphysique est une science "réelle", en ce sens qu'elle porte sur de l'être réel saisi sous un de ses aspects réels. Assurément l’être univoque est un concept, mais ce n’est pas un concept sans objet et son objet se trouve être précisément ce qui, dans l’être réel, est univoque. Si cet intelligible n’existait pas réellement, il n’y en aurait pas d’intellection ni de concept. Ce qui existe, rappelons-le, ce n’est pas “un être univoque” numériquement distinct, ce sont les êtres réels qui, si infiniment différent que l’un puisse l’être des autres, ont pourtant ceci en commun que tous sont réellement de l’être. L’objet ainsi conçu est un, d’une unité moindre que l’unité numérique mais pourtant réelle; il est donc lui-même réel. La métaphysique n’a pas pour objet “le concept d’être univoque”, mais “l’être univoque” saisi par ce concept.

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[1] *Rep. Par.* I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4; Vivès, t. XXII, pp. 93-94.

[2] Duns Scot ne nomme pas l'auteur de cette doctrine, mais il a été de bonne heure identifié par ses commentateurs et des recherches récentes ont confirmé cette identification. Voir Jean Paulus, 'Henri de Gand et l'argument ontologique', *Arch. d'hist. litt. et doct. du moyen âge*, X (1936), 265-323, (surtout 288-297). Du même auteur: *Henri de Gand, essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Paris, 1938), pp. 60-66.

[3] L'*Opus Oxoniense* ne fait d'ailleurs qu'esquisser la solution du problème, auquel est consacré l'admirable *Quodlib.* XIV (ch. n. 10; Vivès, t. XXVI, p. 39). Le principe décisif est pourtant le même dans les deux oeuvres: Deus ut haec essentia in se non cognoscitur naturaliter a nobis, quia sub ratione talis cognoscibilis est objectum voluntarium, et non naturale, nisi respectu sui intellectus tantum; et ideo a nullo intellectu creato potest sub ratione hujus essentiae ut haec naturaliter cognosci. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 4, n. 12; t. I, p. 313.

Une deuxième détermination s’impose au point de départ. Le fait de chercher quelque chose implique immédiatement une certain notion de ce que l’on cherche. Il faut donc, comme disent les logiciens, partir d’une “définition nominale”, qui formule provisoirement l’objet de l’enquête.[4] Ici, on tombe d’accord que le point de départ est l’“être”, mais quel être se propose-t-on de trouver? Si c’est le “sujet” de “notre” théologie, ce sera “l’être infini”. Mais pourquoi celui-là et non pas un autre? Pourquoi “l’être infini” constitue-t-il pour nous l’approximation la plus satisfaisante du Dieu chrétien qui soit naturellement accessible à l’entendement humain?

On pourrait en concevoir d’autres. Duns Scot connaissait bien Thomas d’Aquin. Il a fort bien vu du moins ceci qu’une fois l’existence de Dieu établie, la première préoccupation de Thomas d’Aquin est de prouver que Dieu est ‘simple”.[5] Or, au point où nous en sommes, nous ne savons pas encore quel sera l’équivalent philosophique de la notion théologique de Dieu, mais nous savons du moins ceci que l’être désigné par ce nom est suprême et parfait en tant qu’être. De ce point de vue, la notion d’“être simple” semble moins satisfaisante que celle d’“être infini”, parce qu’une certaine simplicité d’être peut appartenir à la créature, au lieu que l’infinité d’être est incompatible avec l’essence même de l’être créé.[6]

Mais n’y aurait-il pas d’autres déterminations de l’être qui soient telles et, s’il y en a, pourquoi choisir celle-là? Il y en a, assurément, un grand nombre. Toutes ont ceci de commun, qu’aucune d’entre elles ne conduit à un concept “absolument simple” de son objet. On voit aussitôt pourquoi. Si le point de départ de l’enquête est l’“être commun”, il est nécessaire de le restreindre, c’est-à-dire de le déterminer en le limitant par l’addition d’un autre terme, pour lui faire désigner l’“être divin”. Que l’on parte du bien ou du vrai au lieu de l’être, la nécessité ne s’en imposera pas moins. A moins de dire de l’être, ou du bien, qu’il est “suprême”, ou “infini”, ou “incréé”, ou “immense”, ni l’un ni l’autre concept ne se dira proprement de Dieu. Bref, une métaphysique de l’être commun ne peut prétendre à aucun concept de Dieu qui soit ‘absolument simple”.[7] En fait, quelque perfection que l’on conçoive comme portée au suprême degré, on obtient un concept propre à Dieu, et une manière très satisfaisante de le concevoir serait de le décrire, pour ainsi dire, comme "toutes les perfections prises absolument et au suprême degré". Pourtant, un autre concept propre à Dieu s'avère non moins parfait et plus simple, celui d'"être infini".

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[4] Cf. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 7, n. 31; t. I, pp. 327-328.

[5] Voir Thomas d’Aquin, *Summa theologica* I, 2, An Deus sit; immédiatement suivi de I, 3, *De simplicitate Dei*. La voie suivie par le *Contra Gentiles* est différente, ce qui confirme une fois de plus que, pour Duns Scot, c’est la *Somme Théologique* qui est Thomas d’Aquin. Précisons pourtant que si, en fait, Duns Scot atteint ici le Thomas d’Aquin de la *Somme*, ce n’est pas lui qu’il vise d’abord: voir le résumé de la position qu’il attaque, dans *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, n. 3; t. I, pp. 306-307. Les éditeurs l’attribuent à Henri de Gand.

[6] Ex hoc apparet improbatio illius quod dicitur in praecedenti opinione (voir note précédente), quod perfectissimum quod possumus cognoscere de Deo est cognoscere attributa reducendo illa in esse divinum, propter simplicitatem divinam; cognitio enim esse divini sub ratione infiniti est perfectior cognitione ejus sub ratione simplicitatis, quia simplicitas communicatur creaturis, infinitas autem non, secundum modum quo convenit Deo. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 4, n. 13; t. I, p. 314.

[7] Quemcumque conceptum concipimus, sive boni, sive veri, si non contrahatur per aliquid ut non sit conceptus simpliciter simplex, ut dicendo summum bonum, vel infinitum bonum, vel increatum, vel immensum et sic de aliis, nullus talis est proprius Deo. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 5; t. I, p. 187.

Il est plus simple, parce que tous les autres se forment en déterminant la notion d'être par quelque transcendental pourvu lui-même d'une notion propre. On obtient ainsi les concepts d'"être bon", d'"être vrai" et autres du même genre, où le déterminant est un véritable attribut distinct du sujet. L'infini, au contraire, ne se prédique pas comme attribut, ni de l'être ni de quoi que ce soit d'autre qu'on l'affirme. L'infini est un "mode intrinsèque" de ce qu'il qualifie, c'est-à-dire, comme nous l'avons fait observer précédemment, un mode de l'être pris en tant qu'être: "Ainsi, lorsque je dis *être infini*, je n'ai pas un concept formé en quelque sorte par accident, d'un sujet et d'un attribut, mais le concept par soi du sujet pris dans un degré défini de perfection: l'infinité. Il en est comme de *blancheur intense*, qui n'exprime pas un concept par accident comme celui de *blancheur visible*, parce que l'intensité désigne plutôt ici un degré intrinsèque de la blancheur en soi." Le concept d'"être infini" est donc, non pas certes absolument simple, mais aussi simple que peut l'être un concept humain de l'être divin, parce qu'il ne comporte qu'un seul concept, pris sous une certaine modalité. Mais il est en même temps plus parfait qu'aucun autre, parce que tous les autres sont virtuellement inclus en lui. En effet, toute perfection est virtuellement incluse dans l'être, si bien que dire "être infini", c'est dire à la fois "bien infini", "vrai infini" et ainsi de suite. En fait, on va le voir, c'est bien à la notion d'"être infini" que l'on aboutit lorsqu'on se demande quel est le principe premier de l'être. Le terme ultime atteint par une démonstration *quia*, c'est-à-dire à partir des effets créés, est nécessairement ce que l'on peut concevoir de plus parfait à partir d'un tel fondement.[8] C'est donc bien, à partir de l'être fini, vers l'être infini que devra s'orienter notre enquête. Mais est-il certain qu'une preuve soit ici nécessaire et la nature même du concept d'"être infini" ne nous permet-elle pas de nous en dispenser?

I. *L'inévidence de l'existence de Dieu*

On peut user indifféremment des termes "Dieu" ou "être" infini", comme Duns Scot lui-même en donne l'exemple en se demandant "si l'existence de quelque infini, ou de Dieu, est chose connue par soi".[9]

Qu'est-ce qu'une proposition "connue par soi"? Une proposition *per se nota* est celle dont la vérité résulte de la seule connaissance de ses termes, ou, comme le dit Duns Scot, c'est une proposition qui jouit d'une vérité évidente, en vertu des termes propres qu'elle inclut et en tant qu'ils sont inclus par elle.[10] Les exemples classiques de telles propositions sont: le tout est plus grand que la partie, ou la ligne est une longueur sans largeur. Comme il est facile de le voir, elles se composent de deux termes, dont le premier est le défini (le "tout", la "ligne") et le second sa définition. Parmi les propositions connues par soi, certaines le sont à partir d'une connaissance simplement confuse de leurs termes.[11]

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[8] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 4, n. 17; t. I, pp. 313-314.

[9] An aliquod infinitum sive an Deum esse sit per se notum. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 1; t. I, p. 180.

[10] Dicitur igitur propositio per se nota quae ex terminis propriis, qui sunt aliquid ejus, ut sunt ejus, habet veritatem evidentem, et non propter aliquid aliud quod sit extra terminos proprios. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 2; t. I, p. 182.

[11] Connaître "confusément" quelque chose est le connaître comme désigné par son nom (définition nominale); le connaître distinctement est connaître sa définition essentielle: Confuse dicitur aliquid concipi quando concipitur sicut exprimitur per nomen; distincte vero quando concipitur sicut exprimitur per definitionem". *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 2, n. 22; t. I, p. 319. Connaître "confusément" n'est pas nécessairement connaître du "confus", la première confusion étant dans notre mode d'appréhender l'objet, la deuxième dans l'object même: confusum enim idem est quod indistinctum. Exemples de *confusum*: le tout essentiel (comme l'essence "homme") au regard de ses parties, ou le tout universel (comme le concept général de l'homme) au

Tel est notamment le cas des deux que nous venons de citer; car elles sont connues par soi pour le géomètre, bien qu'il n'ait pas de la notion de "ligne", par exemple, la connaissance distincte qu'en a le métaphysicien, lorsqu'il la définit comme une des trois espèces de la quantité continue. Toute proposition connue par soi à partir d'une connaissance confuse de ses termes, l'est à plus forte raison à partir de leur connaissance distincte, mais le contraire n'est pas vrai. De ce qu'une proposition est connue par soi lorsque ses termes sont distinctement conçus, il ne suit pas qu'elle le serait si ses termes n'étaient que confusément conçus. De quelque connaissance qu'il s'agisse, on dira que sont connues par elles-mêmes toutes les propositions, et les seules propositions, dont la vérité ressort évidemment de l'intellection de ses termes.[12]

S'il en est ainsi, la qualité de "connue par soi" appartient aux propositions prises en elles-mêmes et indépendamment du sujet qui les connaît. Duns Scot refuse de distinguer des propositions "connues par soi" et des propositions qui ne seraient que "connaissables par soi". Pour lui, le "connu par soi" et le "connaissable par soi" se confondent, car le connaissable par soi ne peut être tel pour nous que parce qu'il est, de soi-même, du connu par soi. Or ce qui fait que le connu par soi est tel, c'est la nature même de ses termes. Une proposition n'est pas dite connue par soi parce qu'elle est actuellement connue comme telle, autrement, "si aucun intellect ne la connaissait actuellement, aucune proposition ne serait connue par soi", ce qui est absurde dans une doctrine où l'intelligible précède toujours l'intellection. Au contraire, affirme énergiquement Duns Scot: "une proposition est dite connue par soi, parce que, de par la nature de ses termes, elle possède la vérité évidente contenue dans ces termes, quel que soit l'intellect qui les conçoive. Que si quelque intellect ne conçoit pas les termes, ni par conséquent la proposition, elle n'en est pas moins connue par soi, en ce qui est d'elle, et c'est en ce sens que nous parlons d'une proposition connue par soi."[13]

D'autres distinctions doivent être éliminées pour la même raison. Certains proposent de distinguer le connu par soi qui l'est "en lui même" de celui qui ne l'est que "pour nous". Or, comme il vient d'être dit, ce qui est "connu par soi" est tel "en lui-même" et reste par conséquent tel pour n'importe quel intellect. Le fait que je n'aperçoive pas l'évidence d'une proposition connue par soi ne l'empêche pas d'en être une et d'en être une *même pour moi*. Je sais que c'est une proposition connue par soi dont l'évidence m'échappe et dont la nature n'en reste pas moins ce qu'elle est. Pour la même raison encore, on refusera de distinguer ce qui est "connu par soi pour les savants" de ce qui est "connu par soi pour les ignorants". Assurément, pour celui que son ignorance empêche d'en comprendre les termes, une proposition ne saurait être évidente ni par soi ni autrement. Simplement, elle n'existe pas pour lui. C'est à partir du moment où les termes sont compris qu'elle existe et que la question de savoir si elle est connue par soi commence de se poser.[14] Ses termes une fois conçus, elle est

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regard des sujets individuels dont il se prédique. Le concept de l'essence est confus, en ce sens qu'il inclut ceux de ses parties essentielles à l'état indistinct; celui de l'espèce l'est en ce sens, qu'il inclut à l'état indistinct ceux de ses *parties subjectives*.

[12] Est igitur omnis et sola illa propositio per se nota quae ex terminis, sic conceptis ut sunt ejus ejus termini, nata est habere evidentem veritatem complexionis. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 3; t. I, p. 183.

[13] Ex hoc patet quod non est distinguere inter propositionem esse per se notam et per se noscibilem, quia idem sunt. Nam propositio non dicitur per se nota quia ab aliquo intellectu cognoscatur per se; tunc enim si nullus intellectus actu cognosceret, nulla propositio esset per se nota; sed dicitur per se nota quia, quantum est de natura terminorum, nata est habere evidentem veritatem contentam in terminis, etiam in quocumque intellectu concipiente terminos. Si tamen aliquis intellectus non concipiat terminos, et ita non concipiat propositionem, non minus est per se nota, quantum est de se; et sic loquimur de propositione per se nota. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 3; t. I, pp. 183-184.

[14] *Op. Ox., ibid.* Duns Scot s'en prend manifestement ici à Thomas d'Aquin, *Sum. theol.* I, 2, 1, Resp. Saint Thomas s'y réfère à un texte de Boèce, *De Hebdomadibus* (PL

connue par soi pour tous les esprits qui les conçoivent, et elle l'est également pour tous.

Ces précisions annoncent la position personnelle de Duns Scot, que l'on peut, semble-t-il, résumer d'abord brièvement ainsi: la proposition "Dieu est" est une proposition connue par soi; en vertu des considérations qui précèdent, on doit dire que, puisqu'elle est connue par soi, elle doit nécessairement être telle même pour nous; en revanche, nous ne la concevons pas comme connue par soi, car la manière dont nous en concevons les termes ne nous permet pas de voir avec une évidence immédiate que l'existence appartient à l'essence de Dieu. Essayons d'éclaircir ce point.

La proposition qui unit ces deux termes extrêmes, l'"être" et l'"essence divine" conçue comme "cette essence" déterminée, est une proposition connue par soi. Autrement dit, le lien qui unit ces deux termes, "Dieu" et l'"être propre à Dieu" est de soi immédiatement évident, comme le savent Dieu lui-même et les bienheureux qui, dans une vision intuitive de son essence, peuvent le voir. Ne laissons pas échapper cette première occasion, qui s'offre à nous, de noter que, selon Duns Scot, l'existence de Dieu est inséparable de son essence. L'existence n'est pas un prédicat qu'il faille relier à l'essence divine par l'intermédiaire d'un autre "comme si le prédicat était extérieur à la notion du sujet". C'est pourquoi la proposition "Dieu est" est directement et immédiatement évidente à partir de ses seuls termes. Elle est *immediatissima, ad quam resolvuntur omnes propositiones enunciantes aliquid de Deo qualitercumque concepto.* Formule d'une énergie remarquable, et dont il convient d'autant plus de prendre acte que la notion de Dieu ne sera pas l'objet d'un parfait accord au sein de l'école scotiste. Ici, du moins, aucun doute n'est possible, "la proposition *Dieu est*, ou cette autre: *l'essence est*, est connue par soi, car ces deux termes sont tels qu'ils confèrent l'évidence à cette proposition pour toute personne qui en appréhende parfaitement les termes, n'y ayant rien à quoi être convienne plus parfaitement qu'à cette essence-ci".[15] Or si cette proposition est connue par soi, elle l'est nécessairement pour nous. Bien que nous n'ayons de Dieu qu'une connaissance confuse, car son nom désigne pour nous quelque chose d'imparfaitement connu et que nous ne concevons pas comme "cette essence divine que voici" (*hanc essentiam divinam*), la proposition "Dieu est" reste connue par soi.

Ajoutons pourtant que, faute d'une intuition de l'essence divine, cette proposition connue par soi, n'est pas évidente pour nous. Si elle nous assure que l'existence appartient de plein droit à l'essence divine, elle ne suffit pas à nous assurer que Dieu existe. L'existence convient à l'essence de Dieu en tant précisément qu'il est *haec essentia,* celle de l'être singulier qu'il est; or nous avons bien un concept de l'essence en général, mais non pas de "cette essence-ci" qu'est l'essence de Dieu.[16] Allons plus loin. Il peut y avoir dans notre entende-

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64,1311) sur certaines conceptions communes de l'esprit, qui sont "per se notae apud sapientes tantum". Duns Scot se débarrasse de cette autorité en répondant: vel non est idem propositio per se nota et communis conceptio, vel ipse intelligit de concepta, non de conceptibili. *Op. Ox. loc. cit.;* t. I, p. 184. Une fois de plus, il suit de près le texte de la *Somme*, argumentant non seulement contre les thèses, mais contre les autorités qu'elle invoque. On notera que les trois arguments allégués par la *Somme* en faveur de l'affirmative (rejetée par Thomas d'Aquin et par Duns Scot) sont aussi les trois premiers qu'allègue l'*Opus Oxoniense* (t. I, pp. 180-181) et dans le même ordre. Le quatrième est une addition de Duns Scot.

[15] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 4; t. I, pp. 184-185. Noter l'équivalence des formules *Deus est* et *essentia est,* cette dernière rattachant Duns Scot à la tradition de l'essentialisme théologique. (Cf. E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme* (5ᵉ ed., Paris, 1945), I Partie, ch. I: *Les théologies de l'essence*). Une différence importante l'en distingue pourtant. Comme on va le voir, l'évidence par soi de la formule *essentia est* ne dispense pas, dans le scotisme, d'une preuve de l'existence de Dieu.

[16] Secundum nullum conceptum quem nos hic de Deo concipere possumus, est aliquid de ipso nobis per se notum; nec etiam potest esse nobis notum demonstratione propter quid, quia medium istius demonstrationis propter quid, quod est ipsa deitas in se, inquantum haec deitas, non est nobis per se notum, nec est aptum per se a nobis cognosci, et ideo haec propositio, Deus est, non est (nobis) per se nota. *Rep. Par.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 2; Vivès, t. XXII, p. 63.

ment des concepts qui soient propres à Dieu, en ce sens qu'ils ne soient pas communs à Dieu et à la créature, par exemple "être nécessaire", "être infini" ou "souverain bien", et nous pouvons attribuer l'existence à leur objet. Pourtant, à la question de savoir si, en attribuant l'être à l'un quelconque de ces objets, on peut former une proposition évidente, il faut répondre non. Autrement dit, la proposition *Dieu est*, où les termes ne sont que confusément connus, est connue par soi, mais, n'étant pas évidente pour nous, elle ne garantit pas que Dieu existe; les propositions "l'être nécessaire est", ou "l'être infini est", dont les termes nous sont distinctement concevables, ne sont pas évidentes pour nous, bien que, comme on verra bientôt, elles permettent de prouver que Dieu existe. Tel est le sens scotiste qu'il convient de donner à la formule d'Avicenne que nous avons déjà citée, car Dieu, en tant précisement que Dieu, ne nous est pas évidemment connu, mais il n'y a pas à désespérer de le connaître, comme Dieu, plus tard, et, comme être infini, dès cette vie: *Deum esse non est per se notum nec desperatum cognosci.*

A défaut d'un concept propre de l'essence divine comme telle, nous ne disposons, pour atteindre Dieu, que du concept commun d'être, déterminé pourtant de manière à former des concepts qui ne puissent s'appliquer qu'à lui. Tels sont, par exemple, les concepts d'"être nécessaire", d'"être infini" ou de "souverain bien". Tous ces concepts sont tels qu'on puisse attribuer l'existence à leur objet, mais aucun ne suffit à justifier immédiatement cette attribution. On ne peut pas démontrer qu'un être existe parce qu'il est nécessaire, ou infini, ou suprême; tout au contraire, on saura que la nécessité ou l'infinité existe lorsqu'on aura prouvé l'existence d'une essence qui les possède. On ne peut pas aller des attributs de l'essence divine à son existence, parce que son existence permet seule de prouver celle de ses attributs. L'essence divine joue le rôle de moyen terme dans toute démonstration *a priori* de l'existence de ses attributs.[17] S'il faut démontrer d'abord qu'elle existe, c'est donc que nul des concepts distincts par lesquels nous concevons l'être suprême ne nous permet de poser son existence comme évidente.

Il suffit d'ailleurs d'observer le mouvement de la pensée pour s'assurer qu'il en est bien ainsi. Concevons "être infini", est-il immédiatement évident pour nous qu'un tel être existe? Assurément non. Nous pouvons croire son existence, nous pouvons démontrer son existence, en aucun cas nous ne la saisissons comme une évidence immédiate résultant de ces seuls termes. La cause de notre assentiment à la proposition: "l'être infini est", ne se trouve pas dans les termes seuls dont elle se compose, mais dans la foi ou dans la démonstration.

Ce fait tient à la nature même des concepts que nous concevons "distinctement" comme proprement applicables à Dieu. Aucun d'eux n'est absolument simple; or, pour connaître évidemment l'existence de leur objet, il nous faudrait connaître évidemment la liaison des parties qui le composent. Autrement dit, "l'être infini est" ne peut être une proposition évidente, à moins qu'il ne soit évident que l'infini est lié à l'être. Or, d'une part, tous les concepts que nous pouvons attribuer en propre à Dieu se composent de celui d'être et d'une détermination de l'être telle que "suprême", "infini", "increé", "immense", ou autre du même genre. D'autre part, rien ne peut être connu par soi, touchant un concept qui ne soit pas absolument simple, à moins qu'il ne soit connu par soi que ses parties sont effectivement unies. Si les parties d'un concept composé ne sont pas au moins unissables, le concept est contradictoire et tout ce que l'on pourrait en conclure serait faux. Or, pour savoir qu'un tel concept est possible, il faut le prouver, comme le fera d'ailleurs Duns Scot pour le concept d'"être infini". Une fois de plus, l'existence d'un tel être n'est pas connue par soi, elle est objet de démonstration.[18]

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[17] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 5; t. I, p. 185.

[18] *Op. Ox.*, *ibid.* Cf. *loc. cit.* n. 6; t. I, pp. 187-188, où Duns Scot conteste que la proposition "necesse esse est" soit immé-

Ceci dit, Duns Scot peut éliminer les autorités qui semblent attribuer une évidence immédiate à la proposition "Dieu est", prise sous les formules dont les termes nous sont distinctement accessibles.

D'abord la fameuse parole de Jean Damascène, au début du *De Fide orthodoxa*: "la connaissance de l'existence de Dieu est naturellement innée chez tous les hommes". Thomas d'Aquin avait déjà répondu que cela est vrai s'il s'agit de Dieu connu "in aliquo communi, sub quadam confusione", en ce sens, par exemple, que tous les hommes désirent le bonheur, sans savoir que ce qu'ils nomment "le bonheur" se nomme en réalité "Dieu". Duns Scot préfère interpréter la parole de Jean Damascène comme vraie, s'il s'agit "de la faculté de connaître qui nous est naturellement donnée, et par laquelle nous pouvons connaître aussitôt (*statim*), à partir des créatures, que Dieu existe, *saltem in rationibus generalibus*: du moins Dieu connu dans des notions générales". Ce docteur ne nous accorde d'ailleurs d'autre connaissance de Dieu à partir des créatures, que celle qui consiste "en notions communes à Dieu et aux créatures", posées plus parfaitement et plus éminemment en lui qu'en elles. Que s'il s'agit d'une connaissance actuelle et distincte de Dieu comme Dieu, ce ne sont pas les démonstrations qui nous la donnent; disons, plutôt, avec Jean Damascène lui-même: *Nemo novit eum, nisi quantum ipse revelavit.* On le voit, Duns Scot ne manque aucune occasion de distinguer la connaissance métaphysique de l'être premier, de la connaissance théologique de ce même être premier comme Dieu.

La deuxième objection, empruntée par Thomas d'Aquin et Duns Scot à saint Anselme, s'appuyait sur l'argument célèbre du *Prosologion* II: l'être tel qu'on n'en peut concevoir de plus grand est nécessairement existant. Notons pourtant qu'en exposant cet argument, Thomas d'Aquin n'avait pas nommé saint Anselme, mais l'avait librement interprété comme si l'on pouvait correctement l'assimiler à un "per se notum" tel que "le tout est plus grand que sa partie".[19] Duns Scot nomme au contraire saint Anselme, ce qui l'autorise à désolidariser sa thèse de l'interprétation qu'en avait proposé Saint Thomas d'Aquin. En effet, "Anselme ne dit pas que cette proposition soit connue par soi". La preuve en est que, pour en déduire la conclusion que Dieu existe, il lui faut au moins deux syllogismes, dont l'un prouve que le "suprême" n'est pas non être et l'autre que, n'étant pas non être, il est être. D'ailleurs, si l'argument d'Anselme n'établit pas l'évidence de l'existence de Dieu, on verra qu'il aide à prouver son infinité.

La troisième objection, elle aussi commune à Thomas d'Aquin et à Duns Scot, revient à ceci: "il est connu par soi que la vérité existe; or Dieu est la vérité; donc Dieu existe". A quoi Duns Scot répond, avec Thomas d'Aquin, que l'existence de la vérité en général est chose connue par soi, mais qu'il ne suit pas de là que Dieu existe. Cela n'en suit du moins pas comme une proposition connue par soi, car il n'est aucunement évident ni que l'être appartienne nécessairement à la vérité en général, ni que l'être de cette vérité soit le même que celui de cette essence déterminée qu'est celle de Dieu.[20]

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diatement évidente; elle le serait, s'il était connu par soi que *necesse* et *esse* sont en fait unis dans un sujet actuellement existant, ce qui est le point en question: quia non est per se notum partes quae sunt in subjecto uniri actualiter. Il n'est pas de soi évident qu'un existant réponde à notre concept du nécessaire. En fait, Duns Scot lui-même éprouvait une vive répugnance à admettre que le nécessaire eût droit à l'existence *en tant précisément que nécessaire;* l'être fonde la nécessité, là où elle existe, mais non pas inversement. Il ne s'agit donc pas ici de discussions méthodologiques abstraites; les méthodes rejetées par Duns Scot ne conduiraient pas à un être suprême tel que le théologien puisse l'accepter du métaphysicien.

[19] Thomas d'Aquin, *Summa theologica* I, 2. 1, 2^a obj. Le réfutation proposée par Thomas d'Aquin (*loc. cit.*, ad 2^m) porte sur la validité métaphysique de l'argument: on ne peut conclure du concept à l'être réel. Celle que propose Duns Scot, d'accord avec sa position personnelle du problème, porte d'abord sur la question de savoir si, tel que le formule saint Anselme, son argument revient à faire de l'existence de Dieu, comme Thomas d'Aquin suggère qu'il le fait, une *res per se nota*. Noter que Duns Scot laisse de côté les autres arguments allégués par Thomas d'Aquin dans le *Contra Gentiles* I, 10. Une fois de plus, c'est la *Somme* qu'il prend en considération.

[20] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 8; t. I, p. 189.

La dernière objection, toute différente de celles qu'avait alléguées Thomas d'Aquin, présente un caractère hautement formel, qui permettra d'ailleurs à Duns Scot de préciser sa propre pensée touchant ce point. La nécessité des premiers principes, dit elle, ne repose pas sur l'existence réelle de leurs termes, mais sur la liaison de ces termes tels qu'ils sont dans l'intellect qui les conçoit. Si ces propositions, portant sur des concepts qui n'ont d'autre existence que celle d'objets de pensée, sont immédiatement connues par soi, à bien plus forte raison doit être connue par soi la proposition: Dieu est, qui porte sur des termes absolument nécessaires.[21] Contre quoi Duns Scot rappelle une fois de plus que la qualité de "connue par soi" appartient aux propositions, indépendamment du fait que leurs termes existent dans l'entendement seul ou dans la réalité. L'évidence de l'accord de ces termes est l'évidence de la vérité de la proposition, cette évidence même qui en fait une proposition connue par soi. Dans la proposition: "le tout est plus grand que la partie", le rapport des termes est tel, que tout intellect, qui les conçoit, perçoit du même coup son évidence. Quelle que soit la nécessité intrinsèque de ces termes, l'évidence de la proposition qui les unit, n'en est ni plus ni moins grande.[22] Assurément, dans la proposition "Dieu est", la nécessité intrinsèque des termes et de leur rapport est infiniment plus grande et aucune proposition ne serait plus immédiatement évidente que celle-là, si nous avions un concept distinct de Dieu; mais nous n'avons que des concepts propres à Dieu obtenus par une détermination attributive de la notion commune d'être; c'est pourquoi, faute d'une notion suffisante de l'essence de Dieu, nous ne saurions percevoir la nécessité, pourtant suprême, avec laquelle l'existence lui appartient.

La position de Duns Scot est plus facile à répéter qu'à comprendre, car on se demande plus d'une fois en quoi, précisément, elle se distingue de celle de saint Thomas. Tous deux enseignent que la proposition "Dieu est" est connue par soi, mais que, faute d'en concevoir distinctement les termes, son évidence nous échappe. Ils sont donc d'accord sur l'essentiel. Cependant, Thomas d'Aquin en conclut que, connue par soi si on la prend en elle-même, cette proposition ne l'est pas pour nous. Duns Scot maintient au contraire que cette proposition reste connue par soi pour nous, comme elle l'est en elle-même, bien qu'elle ne nous soit pas actuellement connue comme telle. En d'autres termes, la qualité de "connue par soi" appartient à toute proposition dont la vérité est évidente dès que ses termes sont distinctement conçus; le fait qu'ils ne le soient pas empêche la perception de son évidence, mais ne la prive pas de son évidence. C'est pourquoi, bien que son évidence immédiate nous échappe, la proposition "Dieu est" doit être tenue pour connue par soi, à la fois en soi et en nous.

II. *La cause première*

La démonstration de l'existence d'un être infini comporte deux moments nettement distincts: la preuve qu'il existe un être premier, la preuve que cet être premier est infini.

Cette double démonstration constitue en même temps un modèle parfait de ce que Duns Scot entend par connaissance métaphysique et c'est pourquoi, s'il n'est pas accoutumé au style de la métaphysique scotiste, le lecteur risque non seulement de s'y perdre, mais même de n'en pas découvrir l'entrée. Duns Scot assure qu'il argumente des effets à leur cause; on pense donc aussitôt à des preuves *a posteriori* du type thomiste, et comme on ne rencontre que des concepts abstraits, on est désorienté. On tente alors de rapprocher les preuves scotistes des argumentations purement conceptuelles qui se rencontrent chez un Alexandre de Hales ou un saint Bonaventure et qui se tirent directement des propriétés de l'essence, mais on se heurte alors aux avertissements réitérés de Duns Scot, que ses preuves sont *a posteriori* et ne rejoignent Dieu qu'à partir de ses effets. Nous sommes au rouet et le seul espoir de sortir d'embarras est dans un retour à la notion proprement scotiste de l'objet du métaphysicien.

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[21] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 1; t. I, p. 181.

[22] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 9; t. I, p. 190.

Que les preuves de l'existence de l'être premier soient *a posteriori* et prises des effets, non *a priori* et par la cause, Duns Scot l'a maintes fois affirmé et d'ailleurs ce que nous savons déjà de sa pensée rendrait l'attitude contraire incompréhensible de sa part. Le fait qui domine ici sa doctrine, c'est l'absence d'un concept propre de Dieu dans l'entendement humain. Si nous avions un tel concept de l'essence divine, nous pourrions en user pour démontrer *propter quid,* c'est-à-dire *a priori* et comme par la cause, que cette essence existe. Mais nous ne l'avons pas; il ne nous reste donc, si la preuve en est possible, qu'à la fonder sur les créatures, qui sont les effets de Dieu: *quia de ente infinito non potest demonstrari esse demonstratione propter quid quantum ad nos, licet ex natura terminorum propositio esset demonstrabilis propter quid quantum ad nos, sed quantum ad nos propositio est demonstrabilis demonstratione quia ex creaturis.*[23] On citerait aisément d'autres textes, mais aucun ne saurait être plus explicite et celui-ci suffit à régler la question.

Si l'on hésite à prendre au pied de la lettre les déclarations de Duns Scot, c'est que les effets créés sur lesquels sa démonstration repose ne sont pas ceux auxquels la métaphysique thomiste faisait appel. Plus précisément, la métaphysique scotiste ne fait pas appel à la voie que saint Thomas considère comme la plus manifeste de toutes, celle qui passe par le mouvement. Nous avons déjà vu pourquoi et nous le verrons plus précisément encore, mais il nous suffira de rappeler ici quel genre d'être le métaphysicien prend en considération, lorsqu'il parle vraiment en métaphysicien. Puisqu'en fait toute notre connaissance dérive du sensible, l'être sensible est le seul dont le métaphysicien puisse partir, mais, en tant précisément que métaphysicien, il ne considère l'être sensible qu'en tant que l' "être". Or non seulement cet être est du réel, c'est-à-dire tout le contraire d'un pur être de raison comme ceux dont traite la logique, mais toutes les propriétés qu'y découvre la pensée sont réelles comme lui.[24] L'"être commun" et ses propriétés ne sont rien d'autre que la créature même, prise dans sa réalité concrète, conçue sous l'aspect propre du métaphysicien.

Il y a, dans l'être créé, beaucoup de caractères, qui sont eux-mêmes des réalités créés et dont il est impossible d'expliquer l'existence actuelle dans l'être, à moins de les considérer comme les effets d'une cause. On peut donc, à partir de ces effets, démontrer que leur cause existe, et qu'elle existe actuellement en réalité, comme eux-mêmes existent actuellement en réalité. Citons-en quelques uns. La "pluralité" qui appartient à l'être tel que nous le connaissons, la "dépendance", la "composition", autant de propriétés évidentes dont il est possible de partir, afin d'en montrer le lien avec une cause évidente, et de persuader, de faire voir qu'il existe réellement un être simple, indépendant et nécessaire de qui dépend tout le reste. Si l'être tel que nous le connaissons présente des caractères tels qu'il ne puisse pas exister par soi, on doit donc pouvoir établir qu'il existe une cause, supérieure à toutes les créatures, dont elles tiennent l'être.[25] Nous ne sortons pas ici du grand débat entre Averroès et

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[23] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 10; t. I, p. 190.

[24] On peut le voir par la division scotiste de la réalité: Res autem prima sui divisione dividi potest in rem creatam et increatam, sive in rem a se et in rem ab alio habentem esse, sive in rem necessariam et rem possibilem, sive in rem finitam et infinitam. Res autem increata, a se, infinita et necessaria Deus est; res autem creata, ab alio, possibilis et finita, communi nomine dicitur creatura. *Quodl.*, Praefatio, n. 1; Vivès, t. XXV, p. 3. Toutes ces déterminations disjonctives ont la réalité de l'être même qu'elles déterminent.

[25] Cf. le texte dont nous avons déjà cité la première phrase: Ad Commentatorem, *I. Phys.* dico quod Avicenna, cui contradixit, bene dixit, et Commentator male. Quod probatur primo: quia si aliquas substantias separatas esse esset suppositum in scientia metaphysicae et conclusum in naturali scientia, ergo scientia naturalis esset simpliciter

Avicenne et l'on sait assez quelle position Duns Scot lui-même y a prise. Tout ce que l'on peut atteindre à partir des êtres physiques, considérés dans leur condition physique d'être mobiles, c'est l'*existence* d'êtres dont la *nature* fera l'étude du métaphysicien. Ce que le métaphysicien lui-même peut atteindre, à partir de l'être commun qu'il étudie, c'est l'existence d'un être transmétaphysique dont la nature fera l'étude du théologien. Encore faut-il pour cela que le métaphysicien en prouve l'existence, c'est-à-dire, qu'il la prouve en métaphysicien.

Même purement métaphysique, une telle preuve ne s'adressera pas aux propriétés de l'être infini que l'on peut dire "absolues", mais à celles que l'on peut nommer "relatives". Entendons par là celles des propriétés de l'être infini qui expliquent l'existence des effets mêmes dont on part afin d'établir son existence, ou, tout au moins, qui lui appartiennent en vertu du rapport qu'ont à lui les créatures. Il s'agit donc exactement de prouver d'abord, à partir de l'être créé, "l'existence des propriétés relatives de l'être infini" que sont la "causalité" et l'"éminence". C'est précisément ce que Duns Scot entend par prouver l'existence de l'être "premier" dont, par une démarche dialectique ultérieure, il prouvera ensuite l'"infinité".[26]

Etablissons d'abord qu'il existe une cause efficiente première, c'est-à-dire une cause telle qu'elle ne soit elle-même l'effet d'aucune autre et qu'elle ne produise en vertu de rien d'autre que sa propre causalité.

"Quelque être est productible", telle est la proposition initiale de la preuve. En dépit de toutes les précautions déjà prises, elle risque d'apparaître purement abstraite, dialectique et irréelle. Elle est en effet abstraite et dialectique, car elle porte sur une propriété générale de l'être commun et pose le point de départ d'une argumentation sans autre contenu que des propriétés abstraites de ce genre, mais elle n'est pas irréelle, parce que l'être dont elle parle n'est pas un être de raison. Rappelons-le encore, la métaphysique de Duns Scot peut bien user d'une méthode dialectique, elle n'est pas une logique. En disant *aliquod ens est effectibile*, il suppose implicitement l'existence actuelle d'êtres donnés et l'existence actuelle de rapports de cause à effet entre certains de ces êtres dont les uns produisent alors que d'autres sont produits. Ce n'est pas de la production qu'il part, mais c'est parce qu'il y en a que Duns Scot peut attribuer

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prior tota metaphysica, quia philosophia naturalis ostenderet de subjecto metaphysicae si est, quod supponitur toti cognitioni scientiae metaphysicae.—Secundo, quia per omnem cognitionem effectus potest demonstrari de causa quia est, quam impossibile est inesse effectui nisi causa sit: sed multae passiones considerantur in metaphysica, quas impossibile est inesse nisi ab aliqua causa prima talium entium; ergo ex illis passionibus metaphysicis potest demonstrari aliquam primam causam istorum entium esse. Minor probatur: quia multitudo entium, dependentia et compositio et hujusmodi, quae sunt passiones metaphysicae, ostendunt aliquod esse actu simplex, independens et necesse esse. Multo etiam perfectius ostenditur primam causam esse ex passionibus causatorum consideratis in metaphysica quam ex passionibus naturalibus ubi ostenditur primum movens esse; perfectior enim cognitio et immediatior est de primo ente cognoscere ipsum ut primum ens, vel ut necesse esse, quam cognoscere ipsum ut primum movens. *Op. Ox.* Prol., q. 3, a. 7, n. 21; t. I, pp. 65-66.

[26] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 10; t. I, p. 190. Le plan général de l'argumentation est clairement décrit: Ostendam, primo quod aliquid est in effectu inter entia, quod est simpliciter primum secundum efficientiam, et aliquid est simpliciter primum secundum rationem finis, et aliquid est simpliciter primum secundum eminentiam. Secundo principaliter ostendam quod illud quod est primum secundum unam rationem primitatis, idem est primum secundum alias primitates. Tertio ostendam quod ista triplex primitas uni solae naturae convenit, ita quod non in pluribus naturis differentibus specie vel quidditative. *Loc. cit.*, n. 11; t. I, p. 191. Les trois moments correspondent à peu près aux trois genres de cause, efficiente, finale et formelle (éminence). La causalité matérielle n'a pas à intervenir ici; quant à l'exemplarité, elle se confond avec l'efficience, la cause exemplaire n'étant en Dieu que la connaissance de l'être dont il veut l'existence. La dernière clause du texte mérite attention: l'unicité qu'il annonce est celle de l'espèce. A prendre littéralement les termes dont il use, Duns Scot ne s'engage pas ici à prouver qu'il n'existe qu'un seul individu divin; une pluralité d'individus d'aspèce divine n'est pas exclue d'avance en vertu de la preuve de l'existence de l'être infini qu'il annonce.

à l'être le "productibile" et la "productibilité", propriétés douées d'un fondement réel comme l'être dont on parle, mais que l'on envisage ici, pour les raisons que Duns Scot a fait valoir, sous leur aspect proprement métaphysique, au lieu de s'arrêter à l'aspect physique et accidentel que présenterait la proposition tout empirique: il y a actuellement des êtres particuliers qui sont effectivement produits. C'est ce que lui-même nomme du "possible réel", à mi-chemin entre l'actuel réel et le possible logique.[27] Ou bien l'on acceptera de se placer, avec Duns Scot, au niveau métaphysique de l'être, et toute sa preuve se construira sur le plan d'un réel ainsi conçu, ou bien on lira ses textes comme s'ils impliquaient simplement une considération métaphysique de l'"être physique", auquel cas ils laisseront l'impression de se mouvoir sur le plan d'une *généralité conceptuelle* malaisément distinguable de celle qui caractérise l'objet de la logique. De toute manière, ne commettons pas l'erreur de critiquer les preuves scotistes de l'existence de Dieu au nom d'un ontologie qui n'était pas la sienne. Ici comme ailleurs, sauf sur le plan vraiment primitif de l'ontologie, la vraie pièce se joue derrière le décor. Nous aurons d'ailleurs occasion de revenir sur ce point important.

Admettons donc que le donné réel dont on part soit ce fait défini, la "productibilité" de l'être. Cette propriété de l'être en implique une autre, la "productivité" c'est-à-dire, puisque nous sommes dans le réel, que s'il y a de l'être productible, il y a de l'être productif. On peut d'ailleurs le montrer. Le productible, ou "effectible" ne peut être tel que par rien, ou par soi, ou par un autre. Il ne peut l'être par rien, parce que ce qui n'est rien n'est cause de rien. Il ne peut l'être par soi, parce qu'il n'y a pas de chose qui se fasse ou s'engendre elle-même. L'*effectibile* est donc fait par un autre être, qui en est l'*effectivum*. Soit donc un être producteur de ce productible, que nous désignerons par *A*. S'il est premier au sens défini plus haut, nous tenons ce que nous cherchions, c'est-à-dire un être qui soit cause efficiente première sans être lui-même l'effet d'aucune autre cause et qui produise en vertu de sa seule causalité. S'il n'est pas premier en ce sens, c'est qu'il n'est que cause seconde (*posterius effectivum*), soit parce qu'il est lui-même effet d'une cause, soit qu'il produise en vertu de quelque autre. Admettons qu'il ne soit pas premier et désignons sa cause par *B*, on raisonnera sur *B* comme sur *A*. Ou bien donc on continuera ainsi à l'infini, allant de causes efficientes en causes efficientes dont chacune sera l'effet d'une autre, ou bien l'on s'arrêtera à une cause absolument première. Or il est impossible de remonter à l'infini. Donc il existe une cause qui n'en a elle-même aucune, ce qui revient à dire que la propriété de l'être dont nous sommes partis, sa "productibilité", implique l'existence d'une productivité elle-même douée de cette autre propriété, la "primauté".

La démonstration semble tenir pour accordé qu'une régression à l'infini dans la série des causes causées est impossible, mais elle l'est en effet. On concédera sans doute d'abord qu'une série causale "circulaire" est inadmissible. Si l'on admet que rien ne se cause soi-même, on doit refuser en même temps l'hypothèse d'une série causale dont un terme serait à la fois l'effet d'un autre et la cause de tout le reste. Une telle supposition reviendrait pratiquement à admettre qu'un être puisse être cause de soi-même en tant qu'effet de son propre effet. Si l'on y renonce, il reste seulement à s'assurer qu'on ne peut faire, dans l'ordre des causes efficientes, ce que fait Aristote lorsqu'il admet que les êtres vivants puissent s'engendrer les uns les autres à l'infini, dans un univers dont on sait qu'il le suppose éternel, et cela selon l'ordre d'une génération linéaire où nulle causalité "circulaire" ne puisse être alléguée. On aurait alors une ligne indéfinie de causes secondes sans aucune cause première.

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[27] Possibile logicum est modus compositionis formatae ab intellectu, illius quidem cujus termini non includunt contradictionem. . . . Sed possibile reale est quod accipitur ab aliqua potentia in re, sicut a potentia inhaerente alicui, vel terminata ad illud sicut ad terminum. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 6, a. 2, n. 10; t. I, p. 249.

L'hypothèse est irrecevable et elle a d'ailleurs été condamnée par les philosophes eux-mêmes, car ils n'ont pas admis que l'infinité de causes "essentiellement ordonnées" fût possible; ils ne l'ont admis que dans le cas de causes "accidentellement ordonnées", ainsi qu'on peut le voir dans Avicenne, *Metaph.* tr. VI, ch. 5, où il parle de l'infinité des individus au sein de l'espèce.[28] Cette distinction ne coïncide pas avec celle des causes par soi et des causes par accident, où il ne s'agit que du rapport de deux termes, la cause et son effet, alors que, dans le cas des causes essentiellement ou accidentellement ordonnées, il s'agit du rapport de deux causes entre elles, en tant qu'elles produisent un effet. La "cause par soi" est celle qui cause selon sa nature propre et non selon quelque caractère accidentel. Dans les causes "essentiellement ordonnées",[29] la deuxième cause dépend de la première en tant que cause, c'est-à-dire qu'elle lui doit sa causalité même. Dans les causes "accidentellement ordonnées", il se peut bien que la deuxième cause dépende de la première quant à son existence, par exemple, ou sous quelque autre rapport, mais elle n'en dépend pas quant à sa causalité. Une deuxième différence est que, dans les causes essentiellement ordonnées, le rapport causal n'est pas de même ordre ni de même nature aux divers degrés considérés. Car il y a dès lors des degrés, dont l'ensemble forme, comme l'on dit, une échelle, les causes de degré plus haut y étant plus parfaites que les suivantes. Cette deuxième différence suit d'ailleurs de la première, car aucune cause ne peut tenir son pouvoir causal d'une cause de même nature; or, on s'en souvient, c'est de la causalité même de la cause qu'il s'agit ici, et comme la causalité suit la nature, il faut nécessairement recourir à une nature plus haute pour rendre raison d'une causalité elle-même plus haute. Une troisième différence est que, lorsqu'il s'agit de causes essentiellement ordonnées, la présence simultanée de toutes les causes est requise pour que l'effet soit produit. Rien de plus évident, toujours en vertu de cette raison fondamentale que l'ordonnancement "essentiel" des causes est celui de leur causalité même. Puisque la causalité des suivantes dépend de celle des précédentes, une lacune quelconque dans la chaîne suffit à rendre impossible l'existence de l'effet.[30] Ces distinctions admises, on peut établir: premièrement, qu'une infinité de causes essentiellement ordonnées est impossible; deuxièmement, qu'une infinité de causes accidentellement ordonnées est impossible; troisièmement, que même si l'on nie tout ordre essentiel dans la série des causes, la régression à l'infini est encore impossible.

On prouve qu'une infinité de causes essentiellement ordonnées est impossible. Considérons l'universalité des effets essentiellement ordonnés. Puisqu'elle est composée d'effets, elle est causée; mais sa cause ne peut faire partie de cet ensemble d'effets, sans quoi, incluant sa propre cause, il se causerait lui-même. La cause d'une universalité d'effets essentiellement ordonnés lui est donc extérieure, et puisque nous argumentons sur la totalité de l'être causé, sa cause est première. —En second lieu, nous avons précisé que, dans l'ordre des causes essentiellement ordonnées, la totalité des causes doit être posée simultanément (puisque de telles causes confèrent leur causalité même à celles qui les suivent); or, s'il n'y en avait pas de première, ces causes seraient en nombre infini. Mais une infinité d'êtres actuellement et simultanément existants est impossible; il faut donc que la série des causes s'arrête à une première, comme nous le demandons. —Troisièmement, la notion même d'"antérieur" signifie "plus proche du premier";[31]

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[28] Avicenne, *Metaph.*, tr. VI, cap. 5, fol. 94r^{c} Sur les adversaires visés par Duns Scot, voir E. Bettoni, *L'ascesa a Dio in Duns Scot* (Milano, 1943), pp. 42-45.

[29] Elles peuvent se nommer aussi causes ordonnées "par soi" (=essentiellement), en opposition aux causes ordonnées "par accident" (=accidentellement), mais il s'agit toujours du rapport de deux causes, non de celui d'une cause à son effet.

[30] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 12; t. I, p. 193.

[31] Revoie à Aristote, *Metaph.* V, 11, 1018b9-11.

si donc il n'y avait pas de cause première, il ne saurait y en avoir d'essentiellement antérieures ou postérieures.—Quatrièmement, nous supposons qu'une cause supérieure dans l'ordre de la causalité même est aussi une cause plus parfaite; si donc il y avait une série infinie de causes essentiellement ordonnées, sa cause serait infiniment supérieure à elle, infiniment plus parfaite qu'elle, d'une perfection causale infinie, et par conséquent capable de causer par soi seule, sans le secours d'aucune autre cause; bref elle serait première au sens que nous avons défini.—Cinquièmement, le caractère d'être capable de causer (être un *effectivum*) n'implique nécessairement de soi aucune imperfection; donc ce caractère peut se rencontrer quelque part sans aucune imperfection; mais s'il ne se rencontre en aucun être sans y dépendre de quelque chose d'antérieur, il ne se rencontre en aucun sans imperfection; donc il peut se rencontrer quelque part sans imperfection, et, là où il est tel, il est absolument premier en vertu de son indépendance même. S'il en est ainsi, un pouvoir causal absolument premier est possible (*ergo effectivitas simpliciter prima est possibilis*); or nous verrons plus loin que, s'il est possible, cela suffit à conclure qu'il exite en réalité.

Supposant ensuite qu'il s'agisse d'une infinité de causes accidentellement ordonnées, on prouvera qu'elle est impossible à moins qu'elle ne s'arrête à des causes essentiellement ordonnées. Une infinité de causes accidentellement ordonnées, si l'on admet par hypothèse qu'il y en ait une, est telle que la causalité de chacune des causes ne dépend pas de la causalité de celles qui les précèdent. Dans une série de ce genre, une cause postérieure peut donc exister et agir même si la cause antérieure a déjà cessé d'agir et d'exister. Les moments d'une telle série existent donc l'un après l'autre, tel le fils engendrant à son tour lorsque le père qui l'a lui-même engendré est déjà mort, car s'il lui doit d'avoir reçu l'être, il ne lui doit pas de le conserver et, de toute manière, même si son père est encore vivant, ce n'est pas en vertu du pouvoir d'engendrer qui appartient au père, que le fils engendre à son tour. Il y a donc succession de causes. Or toute succession présuppose une permanence. Ce terme permanent ne peut être une cause prochaine, sans quoi lui-même serait engagé dans cette succession. Au contraire, puisque la succession totale dépend de ce terme, il doit être antérieur par essence au successif, et d'un autre ordre. Toute série de causes accidentelles suppose donc un terme premier qui lui soit essentiellement antérieur.

On prouve enfin que même si l'on nie tout ordre essentiel, soit entre les termes de la série, soit entre la totalité de ces termes et un terme premier, la régression à l'infini dans la série des causes reste impossible. Nous savons en effet, par le premier moment de notre preuve, que rien ne peut venir de rien. Il suit de là que quelque nature est "effective"; argument, pour le noter en passant, qui montre à quel point Duns Scot lui-même a conscience de raisonner sur quelque propriété qui, si abstraite soit-elle, est celle d'un actuellement existant. Si l'on nie qu'il y ait un ordre essentiel entre les agents, cette *natura effectiva* ne cause en vertu d'aucune autre, et bien qu'elle-même puisse être posée comme causée dans quelque singulier donné, il y en a un dans lequel elle n'est pas causée, ce que l'on se proposait d'établir. En effet, si l'on pose cette nature capable de causer comme elle-même causée dans tout être singulier où elle se rencontre, il devient aussitôt contradictoire de nier tout ordre essentiel, car si elle est causée dans tous les individus, il faut que leur série totale dépende essentiellement d'une cause extérieure à la série, comme l'argument précédent vient de l'établir.

Ces trois preuves portent sur une même propriété de l'être, qu'on pourrait nommer sa "causalité". Elles envisagent cette propriété en elle-même, au plan de l'abstraction métaphysique, c'est-à-dire de l'être réel tel que le métaphysicien l'appréhende en tant que métaphysicien. Elles consistent toutes trois en arguments qui portent sur la productivité et la productibilité mêmes, dont on sait d'ailleurs qu'elles appartiennent à l'être, puisqu'il y a, en fait, des êtres qui produisent et d'autres qui sont produits. A elles trois, elles couvrent la totalité des rapports de causalité concevables entre des êtres quelconques, soit qu'on pose ces rapports comme essentiels ou qu'on les pose comme accidentels. Elles aboutissent toutes trois à poser un premier terme, cause première de toute série de causes, de quelque manière qu'on les considère. Toutes trois, enfin, procèdent à partir d'une propriété relative de l'être, celle qu'il a de pouvoir être causé.

Ce dernière caractère offre à Duns Scot l'occasion de préciser sa propre conception d'une preuve métaphysique de l'existence d'un être premier. Il s'objecte en effet lui-même que, sa preuve n'est pas une démonstration proprement dite, car toute démonstration porte sur le nécessaire, or la sienne porte sur le fait qu'il y a du "causé", ce qui est toujours contingent.[32] A quoi le Docteur Subtil répond que l'on pourrait en effet argumenter à partir du contingent, notamment de la manière suivante: un certain être subit une mutation; le terme de cette mutation commence alors d'exister dans cet être et, par conséquent, une certaine nature se trouve actuellement causée ou produite; d'où résulte, en vertu de la corelation des termes, qu'une cause efficiente existe. Un tel argument se tiendrait vraiment dans l'ordre de la contingence. Pourtant, observe Duns Scot, je n'argumente pas ainsi en prouvant la première conclusion, mais de la manière suivante: *aliqua natura est effectibilis, ergo aliqua est effectiva.* Sur quoi l'on se gardera de deux erreurs: la première, déjà signalée, serait de transposer l'argument de la métaphysique à la logique; la deuxième, que dénonce ici Duns Scot, serait de croire qu'argumentant sur du réel, c'est sur l'existence empirique de ce réel qu'il argumente. Une fois de plus, le métaphysique se tient entre le physique et le logique, plus proche du physique, car tous deux sont du réel, mais distinct de lui toutefois. Le sujet même de la preuve, ce n'est pas un changement actuellement donné, le mouvement par exemple, c'est la mobilité même du mobile, la mutabilité même du muable, la "possibilité" même du "possible". En d'autres termes, nous ne sommes pas partis d'une existence physique pour en inférer la cause, mais d'une détermination réelle de l'être métaphysique, sa "causabilité", pour en inférer une autre détermination réelle, sa "causalité", afin d'en inférer une autre détermination réelle, sa "causalité première". D'accord avec sa propre notion de l'être métaphysique, Duns Scot envisage donc tout ceci du point de vue de la "quiddité". L'essence même du causable implique celle d'une cause première. A quoi l'on objectera peut-être que, s'il en est ainsi, nous ne sommes pas dans l'ordre de l'existence actuelle. Ce ne serait pas exact, car nous sommes, au contraire, dans l'ordre de l'existence actuelle de l'être métaphysique. La possibilité de l'être, qui est réelle, permet seule d'atteindre du *nécessaire*, donc aussi du *démontré*. Nous venons d'établir, en trois cas différents qui épuisent les aspects du problème, que l'essence du causable donné implique l'essence d'une cause première non causée.[33] Il reste seulement à montrer que cette dernière essence est possible, d'où l'on verra enfin que, si elle est possible, elle existe actuellement en réalité.[34] L'existence actuelle d'une telle cause, atteinte par cette voie, ne pourra être que nécessaire, ce que Duns Scot entend précisément démontrer.

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[32] *Rep. Par.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 6; Vivès, t. XXII, pp. 65-66, *Ad secundam instantiam. Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 11; t. I, p. 192. Voir les importantes rédactions, dont plusieurs inédites, publiées par E. Bettoni, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.

[33] Le physicien argumentant sur la cause efficiente la considère comme cause de mouvement; le métaphysicien, qui fait abstraction du mouvement, la considère comme cause de l'être, c'est pourquoi Duns Scot n'en retient que la relation d'être efficient à être produit: Metaphysicus enim considerat quatuor genera causarum et naturalis similiter, sed non eodem modo sicut metaphysicus, quia sicut metaphysicus in considerando abstrahit a naturali, ita causae ut considerantur a metaphysico abstrahuntur a seipsis ut considerantur a naturali philosopho. Philosophus enim naturalis considerat causam agentem ut est movens et transmutans materiam ut est subjectum transmutationis, et formam ut dat esse per comparationem ad actionem et motum ei proprium, et finem ut est terminus motus et transmutationis. Sed sic a causis abstrahit metaphysicus, nam metaphysicus abstrahit causam moventem ut dat esse sine motu et transmutatione. *Rep. Par.* I, d. 8, q. 3, n. 10; Vivès, t. XXII, pp. 157-158.

Revenons à notre première conclusion: une certaine cause efficiente est absolument première. Il en résulte cette deuxième: la cause efficiente absolument première est incausable. On peut même dire que la deuxième suit immédiatement de la première, car une cause ne peut être absolument première, que si elle-même ne dépend d'aucune autre dans son existence ni dans sa causalité. Ceci résulte des preuves précédentes, qui ne laissent le choix qu'entre une impossible régression à l'infini, le cercle vicieux d'une série finie de causes se causant les unes les autres, ou l'arrêt à une cause première que rien ne cause. Si l'on accepte cette dernière conclusion, il faut la prendre dans toute son étendue, c'est-à-dire comme valable dans tout ordre de causalité, et non seulement pour l'efficiente, mais aussi pour la causalité matérielle, formelle ou finale. La cause finale est celle qui meut, métaphoriquement parlant, la cause efficiente elle-même à exercer sa causalité; si, comme on l'a établi, le premier efficient ne dépend de rien dans son efficience, il ne saurait dépendre d'une fin extrinsèque à son essence. Mais ce qui n'a pas de cause extrinsèque n'a pas non plus de cause intrinsèque, car la cause intrinsèque est, en tant précisément qu'intrinsèque, partie de l'effet causé. Si donc le premier efficient n'a pas de cause extrinsèque dans son action, il en a moins encore dans son être, ce qui exclut qu'il ait une cause matérielle ou une cause formelle.[35] Bref, le premier efficient est incausable.

Reste le troisième et dernier moment de la preuve, aussi rapide en sa démarche que le premier était lent et où l'on assiste au dénouement brusque de cette action métaphysique: "La troisième conclusion sur le *primum effectivum* est celle-ci: *primum effectivum est actu existens* et une certaine nature actuellement existante est cause efficiente première. Démonstration: ce à l'essence de quoi il est absolument contradictoire d'être par autrui, s'il peut être, il peut être par soi; or il est absolument contradictoire à l'essence de l'efficient premier d'être par autrui, ainsi qu'il ressort de la deuxième conclusion, et cet efficient premier est possible, comme il ressort de la cinquième raison en faveur de la première conclusion, raison qui ne semble pas conclure, mais qui conclut cela . . . Un efficient absolument premier peut donc exister par soi. Donc il existe par soi, car ce qui n'existe pas par soi ne peut pas exister par soi, autrement le non être amènerait quelque chose à l'être, ce qui est impossible, ou encore une même chose se créerait elle-même, de sorte qu'elle ne serait plus tout à fait incausable."[36]

Une telle conclusion demande plus d'un commentaire. Pour éliminer d'abord toute difficulté qui ne serait qu'apparente, rappelons que si Duns Scot procède ici par la voie de l'être de l'essence et du possible, ce n'est pas qu'il condamne celle qui procéderait à partir de l'existence empiriquement donnée, comme celle qu'avait suivie Thomas d'Aquin.[37] La sienne s'établit dans l'ordre du nécessaire, il la préfère donc à celles qui se tirent du contingent.[38] Ceci dit, et sans contester qu'il ne faille pas exagérer ce qui distingue ici Duns Scot de Thomas d'Aquin,[39] ou peut ajouter qu'il ne faut pas non plus pallier ce qui les sépare. D'abord, ces preuves dont il ne conteste pas la validité, jamais il ne les a présentées comme *les siennes*. Les seules preuves de l'existence de Dieu que Duns Scot développe en son propre nom sont celles dont nous poursuivons présentement l'analyse. En outre, la préférence de Duns Scot pour les preuves qu'il propose est liée à toute une série d'autres préférences métaphysiques dont l'ensemble est imposant, car elles incluent une noétique et une ontologie différentes de celles de saint Thomas. Duns Scot et saint Thomas n'ont la même notion ni de l'être, ni de l'essence, ni de l'existence, ni de leur rapport mutuel, ni de leur rapport à l'intellect humain. C'est pour ces raisons profondes et situées au coeur de la métaphysique même, que les preuves de l'existence de Dieu ne sont pas les mêmes dans les deux doctrines. Enfin, même si Duns Scot concède la légitimité des preuves thomistes de l'existence de Dieu, ce qu'il ne fait pas sans réserves puisqu'il en préfère d'autres, on peut douter que, s'il les eût connues, Thomas d'Aquin eût accepté celles de Duns Scot. Partant d'êtres empiriquement données, en qui l'existence est distincte de l'essence et d'où il rejoint un premier *esse* posé par un jugement d'analogie, Thomas d'Aquin n'eût sans doute pas accepté de partir d'une notion univoque de l'être, ni d'abandonner l'existence empirique des effets qui lui permet seule d'affirmer l'existence de leur cause, pour établir la réalité de celle-ci en vertu de la possibilité intrinsèque de son essence. Si telles sont les différences entre les deux doctrines, il serait vain d'imposer à qui que ce soit la conclusion qu'elles sont éloignées ou proches l'une de l'autre. Tout ce que l'on peut dire, c'est qu'il est difficile de tenir pour une seule deux métaphysiques à ce point différentes. A quel point elles le sont, on en jugera différemment selon les exigences de chacun en matière d'accord métaphysique et il n'y a pas de formule objectivement valable pour le déterminer.

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[34] Tamen non sic arguitur probando primam conclusionem, sed hoc modo: aliqua natura est effectibilis, ergo est aliqua effectiva. Antecedens probatur: quia aliquod subjectum est mutabile, et aliquod entium est possible, accipiendo possibile ut dividitur contra necessarium, et sic procedendo ex necessariis. Et tunc probatio primae conclusionis (*sc.* esse effectivum simpliciter primum) procedit vel concludit de esse quidditativo, sive de esse possibili, non autem de existentia actuali. Sed de quo nunc ostenditur possibilitas, ultra in tertia conclusione actualis existentia ostenditur. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 15; t. I, p. 195.

[35] *Op. Ox.*, loc. cit., n. 16; t. I, p. 196.

[36] Tertia conclusio de primo effectivo est ista: primum effectivum est actu existens, et aliqua natura existens actu sic est effectiva. Probatio: cujus rationi repugnat simpliciter esse ab alio, illud si potest esse, potest esse a se; sed rationi primi effectivi simpliciter repugnat esse ab alio, sicut patet ex secunda conclusione, et ipsum potest esse, sicut patet ex quinta ratione posita ad *A*, quae videtur minus concludere, tamen hoc concludit. . . . Ergo effectivum simpliciter primum potest esse a se; ergo est a se, quia quod non est a se non potest esse a se, quia tunc non ens produceret aliquid ad esse, quod est impossibile, et adhuc idem crearet se, et ita non erit incausabile omnino. *Loc. cit.*; t. I, pp. 195-196.

[37] Illa demonstratio, sive ratio dupliciter potest fieri. Uno modo, sumendo pro antecedente propositionem contingentem de inesse, quae nota est sensui, scilicet quod aliquid sit productum in actu, quod notum

Tenons-nous en donc à la preuve scotiste elle-même, afin d'écarter certaines difficultés qui risquent d'en obscurcir le sens. La première, que ses critiques ont reprise sous plusieurs formes, revient à dire, avec un de ses historiens, que "la démonstration prétendue *a posteriori* se transforme, sans qu'il le dise, en démonstration *a priori*", de sorte qu'il "est exposé aux critiques qu'il a faites lui-même de saint Anselme".[40] Remettons saint Anselme à plus tard; il sera temps d'en parler lorsque Duns Scot lui-même l'introduira dans le débat. Aussi bien sa présence n'est-elle pas ici nécessaire. On ne peut soutenir que Duns Scot procède *a priori* en aucun moment de la preuve. Il n'y prouve pas l'existence de la cause première par notre concept de cette cause, pour la simple raison qu'il nous refuse un tel concept. Sa preuve, on ne se lassera pas de le rappeler, porte sur une proposition: "l'être infini existe" qui, de soi démontrable *propter quid*, ne l'est pour nous que d'une démonstration *quia*, c'est-à-dire *ex creaturis*.[41] Ce qui produit l'illusion contraire, c'est que l'on oublie en cours de route—et ce n'est pas Duns Scot, mais son lecteur, qui l'oublie—quel aspect de la créature tombe sous la considération du métaphysicien. L'être est de la créature, et il reste tel même en tant qu'*ens commune*. A plus forte raison le reste-t-il si ce que l'on

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est sensui, quia aliquod est mutatum, quod nec negat Heraclitus, et sic ex veris evidentibus, non tamen necessariis, sequitur conclusio. *Rep. Par.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 6; Vivès, t. XXII pp. 65-66. Sur ce caractère général des preuves, voir les excellentes pages du P. E. Bettoni, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-16.

[38] Aliae autem probationes ipsius *A* possunt tractari de existentia, quam ponit haec tertia conclusio, et sunt istae probationes ex contingentibus, tamen manifestis: vel si accipiantur de natura et quidditate et possibilitate, sunt ex necessariis. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 16; t. I, p. 196. On notera que "manifestis" ne qualifie pas ici les preuves en question, mais le contingent empirique sur lequel elles reposent. Cf. Thomas d'Aquin, *Sum. theol.* I, 2, 3. Resp.: Prima autem et *manifestior* via est quae sumitur ex parte motus.

[39] Voir les intéressantes et utiles remarques du P. E. Bettoni, *op. cit.*, p. 36, n. 6.

[40] E. Pluzanski, *Essai sur la philosophie de Duns Scot* (Paris, 1888), p. 139.

[41] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 10; t. I, p. 190.

considère d'abord en lui est son caractère d'être "causable", qui est lié à sa condition même de créature. On peut dire que la preuve de Duns Scot est extrêmement abstraite, pas plus d'ailleurs que celles de Guillaume d'Auvergne qu'elle n'est pas sans rappeler à certains égards,[42] mais elle se tient exactement au niveau d'abstraction qui définit pour lui l'objet de la métaphysique. Fondée sur les propriétés réelles de "causalité", et de "producibilité" qui appartiennent en fait à la créature, elle reste démonstration *quia* d'un bout à l'autre et ne se métamorphose nulle part en démonstration *propter quid*.[43]

Passer dialectiquement du possible donné au nécessaire que ce possible implique, ce n'est pas partir de l'essence infinie de Dieu comme d'un donné, mais remonter vers elle par une démonstration *quia*, pour atteindre, à travers elle, son existence. C'est même tenter de la rejoindre par son côté pour nous le moins inabordable; cette propriété "relative" qu'elle tourne en quelque sorte vers la créature, sa causalité. Mais peut-être objecterait-on que, même s'il ne nous accorde pas d'idée de Dieu, Duns Scot n'en procède pas moins *a priori*, parce que "l'existence y est conclue d'une idée".[44] Assurément, mais de quoi pourrait-on la conclure? Ceux qui nient qu'on puisse conclure Dieu d'une idée nient généralement aussi qu'on ait aucun moyen de la conclure. Le problème est de savoir si cette idée est une pure forme logique, ou si elle a un contenu réel emprunté à l'expérience. La deuxième hypothèse est ici la bonne. Dans l'esprit de Duns Scot, sa preuve n'a pas un fondement moins *a posteriori* que les preuves thomistes, c'est l'objet de l'expérience qui n'est pas ici le même. S'appuyer sur les propriétés de l'être commun dont traite cette science "réelle", la métaphysique, c'est attribuer l'existence nécessaire à un être que l'on conclut à partir des propriétés métaphysiques de l'être donné.

La même objection peut néanmoins être reprise sous une autre forme. De quelque manière qu'on le montre consistant avec lui-même, il reste que la preuve conclut l'existence à partir du possible et ne serait-ce pas là encore une méthode de démonstration *a priori*? Le troisième moment de la preuve est ici en cause dans sa partie la plus difficile à saisir. Si l'on reproche à Duns Scot d'admettre que ce dont on doit affirmer l'existence existe nécessairement, il faudra dire, avec Kant, que toute preuve de l'existence de Dieu est soumise à cette nécessité et qu'elle est, au sens kantien de ce terme, "ontologique". Les preuves de Duns Scot le sont donc, du point de vue de l'idéalisme critique, mais elles ne le sont ni moins ni plus que celles de Thomas d'Aquin. Le seule question qu'il vaille la peine de poser ici, à moins qu'on ne s'engage dans une discussion générale du Kantisme, est de savoir si, ce qu'il y a de réalisme avicennien dans le scotisme une fois admis, la preuve de l'existence de Dieu abandonne le terrain de l'être réel au moment précis où elle atteint sa conclusion.

Examinons de plus près cette dernière péripétie dialectique. Au point où elle se produit pour précipiter le dénouement, Duns Scot a déjà établi qu'une aptitude à causer absolument première est possible: *ergo effectivitas simpliciter prima est possibilis*.[45] Que faut-il entendre par la? Exactement ceci, qu'une telle notion n'implique aucune contradiction. Celle de pouvoir causal n'inclut nécessairement de soi aucune limite: on peut donc le concevoir comme illimité. Plus précisément, on peut le concevoir comme appartenant à un sujet où il se rencontre sans aucune dépendance à quelque chose d'antérieur, c'est-à-dire dans une nature qui, en tant que cause efficiente, soit absolument première. S'il n'y a nulle contradiction à cela, et il n'y en a pas, un pouvoir causal absolument premier est "possible". En outre, nous avons déjà fait voir qu'un tel être est "incausable" et qu'il l'est en tant même que premier; il est donc contradictoire de supposer qu'un tel être soit possible en vertu d'un autre; s'il est possible, et nous savons qu'il l'est, il ne peut l'être que par soi. Et c'est ici que se place le point critique de l'argumentation: si cet être possible ne peut pas tenir d'autrui sa possibilité, il ne peut la tenir que de lui-même, et comment l'en tiendrait-il, à moins d'exister? C'est ce que dit Duns Scot: "Ce qui n'existe pas par soi n'est pas un être par soi possible", autrement, en effet, sa possibilité ne lui venant ni d'un autre, puisque ce serait contradictoire, ni de lui-même, puisqu'on ne le pose pas comme existant, ou bien elle se créerait elle-même, ce qui ne se peut puisqu'il est "incausable", ou bien elle se créerait du néant, ce qui est absurde. Bref, la seule raison concevable pour qu'une cause absolument première soit possible, c'est qu'elle existe. On n'a jamais mieux mis en lumière cette vérité fondamentale, que l'existence est la racine même de sa propre possibilité.

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[42] Duns Scot argumente volontiers *per naturam correlativorum;* par exemple, le couple "effectibilis—effectivum" qui joue un rôle décisif dans sa preuve. L'usage de pareils couples, assez fréquent chez saint Bonaventure, était déjà familier à Guillaume d'Auvergne.

[43] Hic propter ordinem quaesitorum est sciendum quod, sicut dictum est prius, secundum nullum conceptum quem nos hic de Deo concipere possumus, est aliquid de ipso nobis per se notum, nec est aptum per se a nobis cognosci, et ideo haec propositio, Deus est, non est per se nota; igitur potest de Deo a nobis cognosci demonstratione quia, in qua sumitur praemissa ab effectu; igitur immediatius ostenditur de Deo talis perfectio sub ratione illa qua immediatius respicit effectum; hujusmodi vero relationes sunt ad creaturas, ut causalitatis et producibilitatis; ideo ex hujusmodi rationibus est propositum ostendendum. *Rep. Par.* I, d. 2, n. 2; Vivès, t. XXII, pp. 63-64.

[44] E. Pluzanski, *Essai sur la philosophie de Duns Scot*, p. 139. Nous rassemblons les objections de Pluzanski contre les diverses preuves scotistes, parce qu'elles s'inspirent du même esprit. Il critique ici la preuve par l'"éminence" de l'être.

[45] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 14; t. I, p. 194.

Soit, dira-t-on, encore reste-t-il que l'existence apparaît ici soudainement au terme d'une dialectique où l'on n'a jamais manié que des concepts! C'est là une erreur, assez excusable d'ailleurs, mais dont il importe de se défaire si l'on veut comprendre Duns Scot. L'existence n'apparaît pas soudainement au terme de la preuve, car celle qu'on y rencontre est celle même dont on est parti et que l'on n'a pas perdue de vue en cours de route. L'*effectibilitas* (aptitude de l'être à être causé) et l'*effectivitas* (aptitude de l'être à causer) sont des propriétés métaphysiques de l'être réel donné dans l'expérience; le premier *effectivum*, auquel conduit la preuve, n'est pas obtenu par un progrès dialectique différent de celui qui conduit ailleurs à poser un premier moteur immobile, la seule différence étant que, suivant sa propre voie, Duns Scot aboutit plus près de Dieu comme Dieu que s'il suivait celle de la physique aristotélicienne; quant au dernier moment de la preuve, il ne consiste pas à décréter que si la cause première est possible *dans la pensée* elle existe en réalité, mais plutôt à faire voir que si elle est possible *en elle-même*, c'est précisément parce qu'elle existe. On dit bien: en elle-même, car la possibilité de l'essence est de l'être, et il s'agit ici de montrer que l'existence de cette essence peut seule en causer la possibilité. Il ne s'agit donc pas ici de métamorphoser du possible en réel par une sorte de magie dialectique, mais, au contraire, de montrer dans un réel, dont l'intuition nous échappe, le seul fondement concevable de la possibilité que nous pouvons observer.[46]

III. *La fin dernière et l'être suprême*

Comme on peut prouver qu'il existe une cause absolument première, on peut prouver qu'il existe une fin absolument ultime. D'abord en reprenant du point

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Ceci même, rappelons-le, est l'objet d'une démonstration *quia*: cf. ch. II, note 41; *Mediaeval Studies*, X (1948), p. 64.

[46] La raison pour laquelle Duns Scot préfère ses preuves par le nécessaire est qu'elles dispensent de celles par le contingent, alors que le contraire ne serait pas vrai: Sed malo de possibili conclusiones et praemissas proponere: illis quippe de actu concessis, istae de possibili non conceduntur, et non e converso. Illae etiam de actu contingentes sunt, licet satis manifestae; istae de possibili sunt necessariae. *De primo principio*, cap. I, art. 44; Vivès, t. IV, p. 751. La *possibilité* de la cause première n'est pas ici invoquée pour fonder son existence, mais pour garantir que l'objet posé comme être satisfait vraiment à l'exigence fondamentale de l'être: ergo si potest esse, quia non contradicit entitati, . . . sequitur quod potest esse a se, et ita est a se. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 16; t. I, p. 197.

de vue de la finalité les arguments déjà proposés du point de vue de l'efficience. Ici encore le point de départ est l'observation empirique portée au degré d'abstraction proprement métaphysique. Aristote enseigne que toute "nature" agit en vue d'une fin, ce qui est vrai, mais moins évident que lorsqu'il s'agit d'un agent doué de connnaissance intellectuelle. Puisque l'homme agit en vue de fins, il y a de la finalité dans l'être. Nous la considérerons métaphysiquement sous l'aspect commun du *finitivum* et du *finibile*, ce qui *est* fin et ce qui en *a* une.

Transposons, à titre d'exemple, le premier argument par l'efficience en argument par la finalité. Cet argument se fondait sur la collection totale des causes et des effets[47] et concluait à une cause efficiente première posée comme incausable. Si tout ce qui agit, agit en vue d'une fin, on peut considérer l'universalité des êtres comme agissant en vue de fins essentiellement ordonnées, c'est-à-dire tellement ordonnées que l'une soit fin en vertu de la finalité d'une cause supérieure. S'il en est ainsi, la collection totale de ces êtres, engagés dans ces rapports de finalité, dépend d'une fin qui n'y soit pas elle-même incluse, sans quoi, ou bien l'on irait à l'infini, ou bien l'on tournerait dans un cercle de fins qui soient leurs propres fins. Il faut donc poser une fin de l'univers qui soit extérieure à l'univers et qui, fin de tout le reste, n'ait pas soi-même d'autre fin.

Ceci posé, on peut ajouter que la fin première (ou ultime) est incausable dans l'ordre de la finalité, précisément parce qu'elle-même ne s'ordonne à aucune fin, et même qu'elle est incausable à l'égard d'aucune cause efficiente, parce que ce qui n'a pas de cause finale n'a pas de cause efficiente. En effet, si toute cause efficiente qui agit par soi, c'est-à-dire non par accident comme le hasard, agit en vue d'une fin, ce qui ne peut constituer la fin d'aucune action ne peut être l'effet d'aucune action. En d'autre terme, dans un univers où la finalité est coessentielle à l'efficience, ce qui ne peut servir de fin ne peut être causé. Ainsi, l'*infinibile* est de l'*ineffectibile* par définition.[48]

On vient de prouver d'abord que le caractère de première appartient à une fin, ensuite que cette fin première n'a pas de cause. Il reste à prouver qu'elle existe. Puisque la finalité est une propriété de l'être et que ce fait, tel que nous l'observons, ne serait pas possible s'il n'existait pas une fin dont rien d'autre ne soit la fin, cette fin dernière existe certainement, si seulement elle est "possible". En effet, elle n'est pas contradictoire, car il n'y a rien d'impossible à concevoir une fin qui n'ait pas elle-même de fin. On demande alors de quoi cette fin peut tenir sa possibilité. Pas d'une autre puisqu'elle-même est ultime dans l'ordre de la finalité; pas d'elle-même, puisqu'elle est strictement "incausable"; pas du néant, puisque rien ne vient de rien. C'est donc parce qu'elle existe comme telle, qu'elle est possible. Bref, *primum finitivum est actu existens*: cette primauté dans l'ordre de la fin appartient à quelque nature actuellement existante.[49]

La même conclusion pourrait d'ailleurs être obtenue directement à partir de la cause efficiente, car la fin qu'une cause se propose en agissant est un être supérieur à cette cause. Il le faut bien, puisque cette cause se le propose comme fin. Si le premier à titre de cause efficiente est parfait en tant que cause, il agit en vue d'une fin; non en vue d'une fin autre que lui, car celle-ci lui serait alors supérieure; il ne peut donc agir en vue d'une fin plus haute que lui-même, ce qui revient à dire qu'il est la plus haute de toutes.[50]

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[47] Point bien mis en évidence par Frassen, *Scotus Academicus*, nouvelle édition revue sur les corrections de l'auteur (Rome, 1900), t. I, p. 122: qui enim dicit *totam collectionem entium*, nullum aliud ens supponit, quod intra ipsam collectionem non involatur, alias non esset omnium entium collectio. On notera d'ailleurs, qu'écrivant au XVIIe siècle, Frassen relègue l'argument par la finalité à une place secondaire; t. I, p. 129 ff.

[48] S'il s'agissait de parler la métaphysique de Duns Scot en français, nous n'hésiterions pas, pour notre part, à dire "infinible" et "ineffectible". Il est vrai que ces mots ne sont pas français, mais "infinibile" et "ineffectibile" ne sont pas latins. En fait de langue, c'est du Duns Scot.

[49] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 17; t. I, p. 198.

[50] . . . quia omne agens agit propter finem; sed primum efficiens est perfecte agens; igitur agit propter finem; non propter finem alium a se, quia tunc illud esset eminentius primo efficiente; quia finis, qui est alius realiter ab agente intendente finem, est ens

La troisième preuve se propose d'établir l'existence d'une nature absolument première dans l'ordre de l'éminence. Elle le fait en suivant, dans l'ordre de la cause formelle, la voie suivie pour établir l'existence d'une cause efficiente première. La réalité sur laquelle cette dernière preuve s'appuie est celle de la nature même, c'est-à-dire de la forme. Le rapport qui permet d'établir la preuve est la hiérarchie qui règne entre les formes. Cette hiérarchie tient à la distinction même des formes, car chacune d'elles définit, si l'on peut dire, une certaine quantité d'être, que l'on ne peut changer sans l'accroître ou la diminuer. C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi, dans un texte souvent cité, Aristote disait que les formes sont comme les nombres,[51] leur distinction ne faisant qu'un avec la hiérarchie que constitue leur série. Or, dans la hiérarchie des formes, il faut admettre un premier terme et il faut l'admettre pour les mêmes raisons qu'une première cause efficiente, que les formes soient essentiellement ou accidentellement ordonnées. Il suffit d'ailleurs de le prouver dans le premier cas, celui où chaque terme de la série doit sa formalité même au terme supérieur, puisque les autres cas postulent finalement un ordre essentiel de ce genre. La preuve consiste à faire voir, une fois de plus, que les rapports de perfection inhérents à la totalité des formes, ne peuvent ni s'élever à l'infini, ni se causer circulairement, ni provenir du néant. On doit donc nécessairement poser une nature qui soit suprêmement éminente dans l'ordre de la formalité. Nous reconnaissons ici la version scotiste de la preuve par les degrés de perfection.

Suprême, cette nature est manifestement incausable, car étant suprêmement bonne, rien ne saurait être pour elle une fin, et étant suprêmement être, rien ne saurait le lui conférer. D'ailleurs, pour être causable, il lui faudrait être essentiellement ordonée à une autre, auquel cas elle-même ne serait plus suprême. Ajoutons qu'une telle nature est possible, aucune contradiction n'apparaissant entre les notions de nature ou de forme et celle de primauté absolue dans cet ordre. Ici encore la conclusion s'impose: une nature suprêmement éminente, qui, par définition, ne peut tenir sa possibilité ni de rien ni d'autre chose, ne peut la tenir que de soi-même: son existence est la seule cause concevable de sa possibilité.[52]

Dans chacun des trois cas envisagés, la preuve conduit à une nature première au sens absolu du terme, c'est-à-dire telle qu'aucune nature ne puisse être posée comme antérieure à elle. La primauté de chacune d'elles étant absolue, on peut montrer que ces trois natures n'en font qu'une, en faisant voir que ces trois primautés s'impliquent mutuellement. En effet, la première cause ne peut agir pour une fin qui lui serait supérieure, car il n'y en a pas de telle; elle ne saurait davantage agir pour une autre fin qu'elle-même, sans quoi elle dépendrait de cette fin; elle ne peut donc agir que pour une fin ultime qui soit identique à elle-même, ce qui revient à dire que la cause efficiente première et la fin ultime ne font qu'un. Quant à sa primauté dans l'ordre de la nature ou de la forme, elle n'est pas moins évidente en vertu de la causalité définie qui lui appartient.[53] La cause première est telle, parce qu'elle est cause de la collection totale des autres causes. A ce titre, nous l'avons vu, elle est littéralement hors série, ce qui revient à dire qu'elle ne cause pas les autres causes au sens où celles-ci, même essentiellement ordonées, se causent les unes les autres. Elles ne les produit donc pas à titre de cause univoque, mais équivoque, comme plus noble, et plus éminente qu'elles. Ainsi, suprêmement éminent à titre de fin comme a titre de cause efficiente, le *primum efficiens* ne fait qu'un avec le suprêmement éminent.[54]

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eminentius, cum causa finalis sit nobilissima." *Rep. Par.* I, d. 2, n. 8; Vivès, t. XXII, p. 66.

[51] Aristote, *Metaph.* VIII, 3, 1043b36-1044a2.

[52] *Op. Ox.*, I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 18; t. I, p. 198.

[53] *Op. Ox.*, *ibid.*

[54] *Op. Ox.*, I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 18; t. I, pp. 198-199. Définition de l'action univoque et de l'action équivoque: quando agens agit univoce, hoc est, inducit in passum formam ejusdem rationis cum illa per quam agit; . . .

De là sa nécessité et son unité. Cette triple primauté n'appartient pas seulement à la même nature, de telle sorte que qui possède l'une possède aussi les autres, leur identité est telle que ce qui est l'une est aussi les autres. Exactement, le premier efficient est unique en nature et en quiddité: *primum efficiens est tantum unum secundum quidditatem et naturam.*

En effet, puisqu'il est incausable, il ne doit à rien son existence, c'est-à-dire qu'il est nécessaire de soi-même, *ex se necesse.* Entendons cette formule au sens plein, comme signifiant qu'un tel être est essentiellement indestructible. Pour qu'il n'existât pas, il faudrait soit qu'il fût détruit par une contradiction interne, auquel cas il ne serait pas même possible, soit qu'il fût détruit par une cause externe, auquel cas il ne serait pas la nature suprême que nous avons dite. S'il est, comme cela est vrai, il ne peut pas ne pas être, et c'est ce que l'on nomme la necessité.

Etant nécessaire, cette nature est une. D'abord, parce que s'il y en avait deux, on ne voit pas comment on pourrait les distinguer. Si deux natures sont des êtres nécessaires, chacune d'elles ne peut se distinguer de l'autre que par des raisons réelles qui lui soient propres. On peut alors faire deux hypothèses: ces raisons sont, formellement, des raisons d'exister nécessairement, ou elles ne le sont pas. Si elles ne le sont pas, aucun des deux êtres en question n'est nécessaire. Si elles le sont, il faudra que chacun de ces deux êtres les possède toutes deux, puisqu'elles conditionnent l'une et l'autre l'existence nécessaire. Dans ce dernier cas, chacun de ces deux êtres sera nécessaire en vertu de deux raisons réelles. Or cela est impossible, car pour que ces raisons soient deux, il faut qu'aucune n'inclue l'autre, et puisque chacune d'elles est une raison d'existence nécessaire, on pourrait supprimer l'une quelconque des deux sans porter atteinte à la nécessité de cet être. Assurément, une au moins est nécessaire, mais étant donné que ce peut être n'importe laquelle, l'être en question se trouve nécessaire en vertu d'une raison telle que, si on la supprimait, il n'en serait pas moins nécessaire, ce qui est manifestement absurde.

Ajoutons que deux êtres nécessaires sont inconcevables dans quelque genre de cause qu'on les imagine. Les espèces se distinguent comme les nombres; l'idée de deux natures qui seraient distinctes en tant précisément que "cause première" ou "nature suprêmement éminente" est l'idée de deux natures qui seraient distinctes en tant qu'identiques. Quant à l'ordre de la cause finale, poser deux fins suprêmes reviendrait à poser deux systèmes d'êtres dont chacun serait ordonné à l'une de ces fins, c'est-à-dire à poser deux univers au lieu d'un.

D'une manière générale, d'ailleurs, aucun ordre donné ne saurait dépendre ultimement de deux termes, car on pourrait alors supprimer un de ces termes ultimes, tout en conservant l'autre, sans que la dépendance de l'ordre en question s'en trouvât effectée, ce qui prouve qu'il y a au moins un de ces deux termes dont l'ordre envisagé ne dépend pas. Bref, qu'il s'agisse de l'ordre de l'efficience, de la finalité ou de l'éminence des êtres, il ne saurait y avoir deux termes premiers achevant la série des êtres dans aucun de ces trois ordres de dépendance. Il y a donc une nature unique de qui les autres êtres dépendent dans cet ordre triple de dépendance; en d'autres termes, considéré dans sa quiddité ou nature, le premier efficient est le même être que l'être suprême et que la suprême fin.[55]

Ainsi s'achève la preuve de l'existence d'un être premier. Pour que la métaphysique atteigne le sujet dont traitera la théologie, il lui reste à prouver que cet être premier est infini. Pourtant, dès à présent, l'existence d'un être transcendant à l'ordre du contingent et du devenir est définitivement assurée, et elle l'est par une méthode qui consiste à déterminer une essence à laquelle

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In agentibus autem aequivoce, id est in illis agentibus quae non agunt per formam ejusdem rationis cum illa ad quam agunt . . . *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 9, a. 3, n. 27; t. I, p. 453.

[55] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 19; t. I, pp. 199-200. *Rep. Par.* I, d. 2, q. 3, n. 11; Vivès, t. XXII, p. 68.

il appartient nécessairement d'exister. Deux points doivent être ici relevés: d'une part, il est vrai que l'existence du Premier soit atteinte au moyen de l'essence, mais, d'autre part, cela même n'est possible que parce que l'existence est incluse dans cette essence conçue une impossibilité absolue de ne pas exister. On ne saurait suivre dans leur développement les preuves scotistes de l'existence de Dieu, sans se souvenir avec surprise de l'aspect qu'elles revêtiront plus tard chez certains disciples du Docteur Subtil. Il se peut que, par d'autres aspects de sa pensée, lui-même en soit indirectement responsable et l'on aurait d'ailleurs peine à croire que des hommes aussi profondément imbus de ses principes que François de Mayronnes par exemple, aient complètement trahi l'esprit de sa doctrine. Ce problème sera examiné ailleurs. Pour le moment, il est juste de constater que rien, dans la dialectique de l'*Opus Oxoniense*, ne suggère l'idée d'une essence divine à partir de laquelle, traversant un nombre plus ou moins considérable de prédicats intermédiaires, on atteindrait finalement l'existence. Il semble même particulièrement insoutenable que Duns Scot ait situé l'existence de l'essence première après son infinité, puisque nous venons de constater au contraire que l'existence du Premier est définitivement établie avant que ne le soit son infinité. Bien loin de justifier le morcellement dialectique de l'essence divine qui se produira chez certains de ses disciples, l'argumentation de Duns Scot invite irrésistiblement à concevoir le Premier comme l'indissociable identité d'une essence et de son existence ou, si l'on préfère, d'une essence telle qu'elle existe de plein droit.[56] Ajoutons que cette adéquation parfaite de l'existence à l'essence s'étend, dans la théologie de Duns Scot, à tout ce que notre pensée détermine comme un constituant de l'essence divine. Entre l'entendement ou la volonté de Dieu et son être ou sa nature, il y a adéquation réelle et complète.[57] Quoi qu'il soit arrivé plus tard à la doctrine, les preuves de l'existence du Premier, telles que l'*Opus Oxoniense* les expose, ne supportent aucune autre interprétation.

II. *L'ETRE INFINI*

Il vient d'être établi, à partir de ses "propriétés relatives", que le premier être existe. Pour prouver en outre son infinité, ce qui sera prouver que l'être infini existe, Duns Scot va commencer par faire voir, à partir de la triple primauté du premier être, que cet être est doué d'intelligence et de volonté, son intellection étant d'ailleurs celle d'une infinité d'objets distinctement saisis; il prouvera ensuite que cette intellection est l'essence même de cet être, puis, de là, que son essence est distinctement représentative d'une infinité d'objets et, enfin, qu'elle-même est infinie.

Ces préambules supposent que le problème de l'existence de l'être premier soit déjà résolu. Il ne s'agit plus désormais de prouver qu'un être premier existe, mais plutôt de prouver que cet être premier, dont l'existence est désormais tenue pour établie, est infini. Peut-être n'est-il pas excessif de considérer cette distinction comme importante, ou, à toutes fins utiles, de la signaler au passage comme pouvant apparaître significative dans la suite de nos analyses. Duns Scot ne procède pas ici en métaphysicien qui poursuivrait des fins métaphysiques, mais en théologien qui use de la métaphysique aux fins de la théologie, et d'une théologie qui n'est pas seulement la théologie chrétienne en général, mais sa théologie chrétienne particulière. On peut assurément tenir, d'un point de vue suffisamment général, qu'il n'existe qu'une thologie catholique, celle de tous les théologiens catholiques, dont la théologie est une de l'unité de leurs conclusions. On peut également tenir qu'il existe une sorte de théologie "franciscaine", dont l'unité soit due à un "air de famille spirituelle" dans la manière de justifier ces mêmes conclusions. Dégager les traits communs auxquels cette ressemblance est due, voilà certainement un objet de recherche historique réel et légitime. Le fait subsiste pourtant que, si cette famille spirituelle existe, ses membres sont des individus et qu'on ne peut les distinguer un à un que par leurs différences individuelles. Ce troisième point de vue n'est sans doute pas moins légitime que les précédents et, dans une monographie doctrinale, il prend une importance particulière. Après tout, si Duns Scot avait pensé que ses prédécesseurs avaient parfaitement réussi dans leur entreprise, il n'aurait pas tenté la sienne. En fait, ses preuves de l'existence de Dieu ne sont pas celles de saint Bonaventure, ni d'Ockham, pas plus qu'elles ne sont celles de Thomas d'Aquin, d'Anselme ou d'Augustin; ce n'est pas exagérer des différences que d'en prendre acte, là où elles existent, et c'est simplement constater un fait que de marquer le rapport de la métaphysique telle que Duns Scot l'entend à la théologie telle qu'il l'enseigne. Or il se peut que la voie suivie par ses preuves de l'existence de Dieu soit en effet significative, en ce sens qu'elle permette d'éclaircir plus tard certaines difficultés qui ne manqueront pas d'apparaître, notamment celle qui tient à la portée proprement philosophique de ses preuves. Nous ne la formulons pas ici, parce que Duns Scot lui-même ne l'y formule pas. Le Docteur Subtil est ici professeur de théologie, est-ce exagérer que de le dire? Le Dieu dont il prouve l'existence est celui qui, "sujet" de la théologie en soi, doit être atteint comme "objet" de "notre" théologie, c'est-à-dire l'être infini. Puisqu'il entend prouver, il procède en philosophe, mais la voie qu'il suit l'a conduit à un Premier Etre, transcendant à la totalité des êtres et cause "équivoque' de leur collection totale, dont la démonstration constitue à elle seule la preuve de l'existence d'un certain dieu. On peut se demander si, dans la pensée de Duns Scot, ce dieu ne serait pas, à peu près, celui d'Aristote et des philosophes ignorants du Christianisme. Simple hypothèse, présentement dénuée de toute valeur de vérité, que l'on peut du moins formuler comme telle, pourvu seulement que les faits déjà connus nous y invitent. Or le plan que Duns Scot vient de s'assigner peut être compris comme une invitation à le faire, car enfin quel philosophe non chrétien a jamais établi l'existence d'un être premier doué d'une intelligence "infinie", d'une volonté "infinie" et par conséquent "infini" das son essence même? En d'autres termes, quel philosophe non chrétien a jamais entrepris de prouver l'existence de Dieu, tel qu'il doit être conçu pour constituer l'objet de "notre" théologie entendue à la manière de Duns Scot? On peut suivre fidèlement le Docteur Subtil sans s'interdire de se demander si, à partir du point où nous en sommes, sa métaphysique ne se meut pas sur un terrain que lui-même sait spécifiquement chrétien.[1]

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[56] Ad secundum dici potest quod essentia et ejus existentia in creaturis se habent sicut quidditas et modus, ideo distinguuntur. In divinis autem existentia est de conceptu essentiae et praedicatur in primo modo dicendi per se, sic quod propositio illa per se est prima et immediata ad quam omnes aliae resolvuntur, ut patet in primo, di. 2, q. 2. Quaere in 4, 46 di. qu. 3, et primo reportationum di 45, 2 et di. 2, parte 2, q. 2, et infra q. 5, art. 3, et 2, dist. 1, q. 2, plura ad propositum harum objectionum." *Quodl.* I, q. 1, n. 4, add.; Vivès, t. XXVI p. 9. Ce texte est une addition, qui peut n'être pas de la main de Duns Scot lui-même.

[57] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 7, a. 3, n. 32; t. I, pp. 270-271. Cf. . . . essentia divina et quaecumque essentialis perfectio intrinseca sibi est indistinguibilis. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 7, a. 4, n. 34; t. I, p. 273.

I. *Préambules à la preuve de l'infinité*

Le premier préambule à la preuve établit que "le premier efficient est intelligent et voulant"; en d'autres termes, que la première cause efficiente est douée d'intelligence et de volonté.[2] En effet, ce premier efficient agit par soi et non par accident, autrement il ne serait pas premier dans l'ordre de l'efficience. Or tout ce qui agit, même dans l'ordre des simples natures physiques, agit pour une fin. Usant d'un argument remarquable, Duns Scot fait alors observer que "tout agent naturel, considéré précisément en tant que naturel, s'il n'agissait en vue d'aucune fin, agirait nécessairement et de la même manière que s'il était un agent indépendant". En d'autres termes, si nous comprenons correctement l'hypothèse, une nature prise comme cause de son opération naturelle, à l'exclusion de toute fin extérieure à cette opération même, se comporterait dans son action comme s'il n'y avait rien d'autre qu'elle. Or tel n'est pas la cas, puisque les natures agissent en vue d'une fin. C'est donc que ces natures tiennent d'ailleurs leur finalité. Pour qu'une nature agisse en vue d'une fin, il faut qu'elle dépende d'un agent qui aime cette fin. Ici encore, considérons la collection totale des êtres, *tota natura*; le seul dont elle dépende dans l'ordre de l'agir est le premier efficient; il faut donc que ce premier efficient imprime à la nature entière la finalité qui s'y trouve, et comme il ne peut le faire à moins de connaître une fin et de l'aimer, il est nécessairement doué d'intelligence et de volonté.

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[1] Nous disons bien "chrétien", et non pas seulement "théologique".

[2] L'intellect et la volonté peuvent être considérés comme des attributs divins, mais seulement en un sens large et, à vrai dire, impropre, du mot attribut; à proprement parler, ce sont des perfections intrinsèques dans l'essence divine: concedo igitur quod proprie vocando attributa illa sola quae quasi qualitates perficiunt in esse secundo rem praesuppositam in perfecto esse primo, scilicet quantum ad omnem perfectionem quae convenit rei ut substantia, hoc modo intellectus et voluntas non sunt proprie at-

Le deuxième argument procède ainsi: si la cause première agit pour une fin, cette fin agit sur la cause première ou bien comme aimée par un acte de volonté, ou bien comme aimée d'une manière seulement naturelle. Dans la première hypothèse, la cause première est douée de volonté et par conséquent d'intelligence. Dans la deuxième, on aboutit à une impossibilité, car la première cause ne peut pas aimer, de l'amour dont aime une nature, une fin autre qu'elle-même. Entendons par là, que le "premier agent" ne peut pas tendre vers un autre être en vertu d'une tendance *de nature,* comme par exemple la matière tend vers la forme ou un corps pesant vers le centre de la terre. S'il en était ainsi, en effet, ou bien il aurait lui-même une fin, ce que nous avons démontré faux, ou bien il n'aimerait *naturaliter*, d'un amour de nature, que lui-même, ce qui n'expliquerait pas qu'il soit cause du reste. La seule raison concevable, pour que la première cause agisse en vue d'une autre fin que soi-même, c'est qu'elle la veuille. Elle a donc intelligence et volonté. Notons qu'une explication complète de l'argument appellerait l'exposé de la distinction, fondamentale chez Duns Scot, entre l'action "naturelle" et l'action "volontaire", sur laquelle ce n'est pas ici le lieu de s'arrêter.

Le troisième argument n'engage pas des principes de portée moins étendue, car il met en question toute la métaphysique des causes et sous un aspect particulièrement important aux yeux de Duns Scot. Le point de départ en est une constatation empirique, le fait même qu'il y ait de la causalité contingente: *aliquid causatur contingenter*. Pour qu'il y ait de la contingence dans l'effet, il faut qu'il y en ait dans la cause. En effet, toute cause seconde cause en tant qu'elle est mue par la cause première; si donc la cause première meut par nécessité, toutes les autres causes seront mues et causeront à leur tour par nécessité; au contraire, si une cause seconde exerce une action contingente, c'est que la première exerce aussi une action contingente. Mais on sait d'autre part que le seul principe d'opérations contingentes est la volonté. Il faut donc que la première cause efficiente soit douée de volonté.[3] Le thème scotiste de l'opposition du naturel et du volontaire réapparaît dans cette preuve, lié au refus du

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tributa, imo sunt quaedam perfectiones intrinsecae in essentia ut praeintelligitur omni quantitati et quasi qualitati. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 26, n. 55; t. I, p. 1014. Cf. un peu plus loin: vel aliter declaratur et melius: quia haec essentia ut haec essentia, praecedens omnem quasi qualitatem, est intellectualis et volitiva essentia, ita quod sicut rationalitas non est attributum homini, sic nec intellectualitas huic essentiae (sc. divinae). Istud patet per simile de infinito, quod alias negavi esse proprium attributum, quia dicit modum cujuslibet in Deo, tam substantiae quam cujuslibet attributi; ita intellectualitas dicit modum intrinsecum hujus essentiae. Proprie autem attributa sunt sapientia et charitas et alio modo transcendentia, puta veritas et bonitas.

[3] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 20; t. I, pp. 202-203.

nécessitarisme gréco-arabe: si la cause première agissait uniquement par nécessité de nature, le monde serait totalement soumis à sa nécessité.

On pourrait objecter à ce raisonnement, qu'Aristote reconnaissait de la contingence dans l'univers, sans admettre pour autant que l'action de la cause première fût contingente, ce qui est d'ailleurs exact; mais quelle contingence Aristote admet-il? Celle qui s'oppose au nécessaire et à l'éternel, comme dans le cas de l'accidentel ou du hasard. Dieu cause nécessairement un mouvement uniforme, mais la motion introduit de la difformité dans ses parties et par là de la contingence. Ceci ne suffit pas à satisfaire Duns Scot, car la contingence requise pour rendre raison de la finalité ne peut être celle du hasard seul, il faut que ce soit celle d'une volonté et, pour tout dire, d'une liberté. Ce n'est pas de l'*être contingent* qu'il s'agit d'expliquer ici, mais bien de *la causalité contingente*: *ideo dixi: aliquid contingenter causatur, et non dixi aliquid esse contingens.* Le contingent dans l'ordre de la causalité est "ce dont l'opposé peut arriver lorsque cela arrive". S'il en est ainsi, ajoute Duns Scot, je dis que le Philosophe ne peut pas sauver la contingence des effets en maintenant la nécessité de la cause. La raison qu'il en donne le montre résolument engagé dans un univers bien différent de celui d'Aristote. Dans quelle mesure en a-t-il conscience? Ce sont là des questions auxquelles il est aussi difficile de répondre qu'il serait désirable de pouvoir le faire. Dans le cas présent, on notera du moins que Duns Scot ne fait rien pour décharger Aristote de la responsabilité doctrinale qui lui incombe. Sans nier aucunement que le premier moteur d'Aristote agisse par nécessité de nature, il remarque simplement que, tel étant le cas, le Philosophe n'a plus aucun moyen d'expliquer qu'il y ait de la causalité contingente et de la liberté dans le monde. En effet si le "mouvement total" (*iste totus motus*) est causé nécessairement et inévitablement lorsqu'il est causé, c'est-à-dire, si, lorsqu'il est causé, rien en lui ne peut être causé autrement qu'il ne l'est, tout ce qui est causé par une partie quelconque de ce mouvement total l'est aussi d'une manière nécessaire et inévitable.

La réponse serait la même si l'on disait que la première cause peut produire de la contingence sans être elle-même une volonté, parce que les choses mues de mouvement naturel peuvent s'empêcher mutuellement, ce qui les fait se mouvoir contrairement à leur nature, donc d'un mouvement "violent". Ici encore, Duns Scot substitue au monde non créé d'Aristote un monde chrétien créé où rien n'échappe à l'efficace de la cause créatrice. En effet, *si* la causalité du Premier est nécessaire, comme dans l'univers d'Aristote, et *si*, en même temps, l'efficace du Premier atteint directement la totalité de l'être, comme dans l'univers chrétien, une causalité nécessaire à l'origine entraîne la nécessité de toute action causale ultérieure. Tout y serait soumis à la nécessité divine comme, dans le monde chrétien, tout est soumis à la providence divine. C'est pourquoi, "ou bien rien ne se produit de manière contingente, c'est-à-dire n'est causé de manière évitable, ou bien le Premier cause immédiatement de telle manière qu'il pourrait aussi ne pas causer.[4] Rien ne permet encore de prévoir jusqu'où Duns Scot poussera le souci de sauvegarder la liberté de la causalité divine, mais elle est déjà posée comme l'origine première de toute autre liberté.

D'autres conclusions préalables sont encore requises avant d'établir l'infinité du Premier, et toutes ont trait à son intelligence et à sa volonté, qui viennent d'être requises par sa primauté absolue dans l'ordre de la causalité.

Lorsque la cause première agit, son intellection et sa volition ne sont autres que son essence, soit qu'il se connaisse et se veuille soi-même, soit qu'il connaisse et veuille autre chose que soi. Examinons d'abord le cas où le "premier agent" se veut soi-même. Avicenne dit, au tr. VI de sa *Métaphysique*, que de toutes celles qui portent sur les causes, la science qui porte sur la cause finale est la plus noble. En effet, comme nous avons eu déjà occasion de le faire observer, la cause finale précède en dignité la cause efficiente, parce qu'elle la meut à agir.[5] La causalité de la fin première est donc ultime et complètement incausable par une action causale quelconque en quelque genre de cause que ce soit. Bref, sa causalité est absolument "première". De là, transportant comme à l'intérieur du Premier le rapport établi par Aristote entre le premier moteur et le premier mobile, Duns Scot induit que la causalité de la fin première consiste à mouvoir le premier efficient par l'amour qu'il lui inspire. Or, dire qu'un objet est aimé par la volonté, c'est dire que la volonté l'aime; dire que la première fin est aimée par le premier efficient, c'est donc dire que le premier efficient aime la première fin. Cet amour est en lui incausable, car il est cause première. Donc il est de soi nécessaire, mais s'il est de l'*ex se necesse esse*, il est identique à la nature première, ce qui revient à dire que l'intellection et la volition, impliquées dans l'amour que le Premier a de soi-même, sont identiques à son essence.

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[4] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 21; t. I, p. 204.

Cette conclusion est féconde en corollaires. Duns Scot en énumère quatre: la volonté du Premier est identique à sa nature, car toute volition appartient à une volonté; se connaître est pareillement identique à la nature première, car rien n'est aimé qui ne soit connu et si l'amour qu'elle se porte est de soi nécessaire, la connaissance qu'elle a de soi est aussi de l'*ex se necesse esse*; de même que l'identité de la volition à la nature première entraîne celle de la volonté, de même aussi l'identité de l'intellection à cette nature entraîne celle de l'intelligence; enfin, puisque la raison de connaître précède toujours la connaissance, la raison que le Premier a de se connaître est aussi de l'*ex se necesse esse* et, à ce titre, elle est identique à lui.[6]

La troisième conclusion préalable à la preuve de l'infinité divine concerne le cas où l'intellection et la volition du Premier portent sur autre chose que lui-même, de quelque objet généralement quelconque qu'il s'agisse. Duns Scot le montre en prouvant, d'une manière tout à fait générale, qu'aucun acte d'intellection ne peut être un accident de la nature première. En effet, elle est cause absolument première; elle a donc de quoi causer tout effet causable, à elle seule et sans aucune condition quelconque; or, si elle n'en avait pas la connaissance, elle ne pourrait pas le causer; il n'y a donc rien d'autre qu'elle dont la connaissance qu'elle en a soit autre que sa nature. Qu'elle ne puisse causer autre chose sans le connaître, rien n'est plus certain, car elle ne peut le causer que si elle le veut par amour de la fin dernière, et elle ne peut l'aimer sans le connaître; son intellection et sa volition d'autre chose qu'elle-même sont donc bien identiques à son essence.

On pourrait établir directement le même point, en arguant que le rapport de toutes les intellections à un même intellect est le même. On le voit par notre propre intellect, où toutes les intellections sont reçues comme venant de quelque objet; or nous savons déjà qu'au moins une intellection du Premier est identique à sa nature; donc elles le sont toutes. Mais la preuve la plus élégante part du fait qu'un même acte d'intellection peut saisir plusieurs objets ordonnés les uns aux autres, et plus un acte d'intellection est parfait, plus il peut en appréhender à la fois. Si donc on envisage le cas d'un acte d'intellection si parfait qu'il soit impossible d'en concevoir un plus parfait, il suffira seul à saisir d'un coup tous les intelligibles. Tel est l'intellection du Premier; donc elle saisit tous les intelligibles, et comme son intellection est identique à son intellect, qui lui est à son tour identique, son intellection et lui-même ne font qu'un.[7]

Reste une quatrième et dernière conclusion préambulaire à la preuve de l'infinité du Premier: "L'intellect du Premier connaît toujours, par un acte distinct et nécessairement, tout intelligible, et la connaissance qu'il en a précède naturellement l'existence de cet intelligible en lui-même."[8]

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[5] Avicenne, *Metaph.*, tr. VI, cap. 5, fol. 24^{va}E.

[6] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, a. 2, n. 22; t. I, pp. 205-206.

[7] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, a. 2, n. 23; t. I, pp. 206-208.

[8] Quarta conclusio principalis praeambula de intellectu et voluntate Dei ad infinitatem

Il est d'abord certain que le Premier peut saisir intellectuellement tout intelligible. La perfection de l'intellect consiste en effet à pouvoir connaître, distinctement et en acte, tout intelligible; bien plus: pouvoir le faire appartient nécessairement à la nature de l'intellect, parce que l'intellect a pour objet l'être total pris dans sa communauté absolue (*omnis intellectus est totius entis communissime sumpti*); or on vient de prouver que le Premier ne peut avoir aucune intellection qui ne lui soit identique; il a donc l'intellection de tout intelligible, actuelle, distincte et identique à lui-même, c'est-à-dire perpétuelle et nécessaire comme lui. Que d'ailleurs la connaissance qu'il a des autres choses soit antérieure à l'être de ces choses mêmes, cela n'est pas moins certain. Identique au Premier, cette connaissance est nécessaire comme lui, et puisque l'être d'aucun autre intelligible n'est nécessaire, leur être est nécessairement postérieur à la connaissance qu'il en a.[9] Cas unique dans la doctrine de Duns Scot, où l'intellection précède l'intelligible. Il se limite d'ailleurs très précisément à la connaissance qu'a le Premier des intelligibles "autres que lui" et peut se réduire à la connaissance qu'a Dieu de sa propre essence, qui est antérieure à tout le reste.

Duns Scot tient désormais toutes les conditions requises pour établir l'infinité du Premier. En procédant à l'établissement de cette preuve, il va d'abord examiner la méthode suivie en cela par deux de ses prédécesseurs. La prise en considération de leurs preuves, à ce moment précis, se justifie par la raison que l'un et l'autre s'appuient sur l'efficience du Premier pour démontrer son infinité; or la première des preuves scotistes se fondera elle-même sur la causalité efficiente; il est donc naturel, sans s'interdire d'en chercher une démonstration nouvelle, de s'assurer d'abord si les preuves offertes par d'autres ne suffiraient pas à l'établir.

II. *La voie de l'efficience*

Il est remarquable que Duns Scot ait pensé d'abord à peser la valeur des arguments d'Aristote. Il en résume la doctrine dans cette ligne d'une correction historique parfaite: le Premier meut d'un mouvement infini, il a donc une puissance infinie. Les textes auxquels Duns Scot renvoie sont ceux de la *Physique* III, 5, et de la *Métaphysique* XII, 7, où Aristote affirme que le premier moteur immobile ne peut pas avoir de "grandeur" ni infinie, parce que la notion d'une grandeur infinie est contradictoire, ni finie, parce qu'il meut pendant un temps infini et que "rien de fini ne peut avoir une puissance infinie".[10]

On voit aussitôt en quoi le problème doit intéresser Duns Scot. Il s'agit d'abord d'un problème proprement philosophique, celui de l'existence d'un Premier, dont Duns Scot lui-même parle si purement en philosophe que, depuis qu'il a commencé d'en établir l'existence, il ne l'a pas une seule fois appelé Dieu. Tantôt il use d'un neutre, l'*Effectivum* ou le *Primum* par exemple, tantôt il en parle comme d'une *natura*, mais jamais (sauf erreur de notre part) il n'en parle, comme il faisait librement en discutant l'objet de la théologie, en le nommant *Deus*. Assurément, le Premier du philosophe est bien le même "sujet" que le Dieu du théologien, mais tout se passe comme si ce même sujet se présentait sous l'aspect de deux "objets" différents. Ici, c'est de l'objet de la métaphysique qu'il est question; Duns Scot et Aristote se trouvent donc sur le même terrain.

D'autre part, sur ce terrain, Duns Scot a déjà dépassé Aristote et l'on peut même dire qu'il lui a faussé compagnie dès le départ. En refusant de fonder sa

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probandam sit ista: intellectus Primi intelligit semper et distincto actu et necessario quodcumque intelligibile, prius naturaliter quam illud sit in se. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 24; t. I, p. 208.

[9] *Op. Ox.*, *ibid.*

[10] Aristote, *Metaph.* XII, 7,1073a7. La question de savoir si Aristote lui-même renvoie ici (1073a5) à sa propre *Physique* est controversée. Bonitz pense qu'Aristote renvoie à *Phys.* 267b17; Ross (*Aristotle's Metaphysics*, vol. II, p. 382) estime qu'il renvoie simplement à la démonstration que la *Métaphysique* même vient de donner. Quoi qu'il en soit, la puissance infinie du Premier Moteur est affirmée déjà par la *Physique* (266a24-b6) et pour la même raison: il meut éternellement.

preuve sur le fait *physique* du mouvement, et en la fondant sur la causalité dans l'ordre de l'*ens*, il s'est mis en route vers un Premier qui, s'il est infini, le sera autrement que dans l'ordre cosmologique de la motricité. C'est même pourquoi l'option initiale entre Avicenne et Averroès était décisive, Thomas d'Aquin se présentant toujours à la pensée de Duns Scot comme un métaphysicien qui choisit mal son point de départ et cherche à faire sortir la métaphysique d'une physique incapable de rendre les services qu'on lui demande. Assurément, Duns Scot voit bien que Thomas d'Aquin conclut en métaphysicien, mais, justement, pourquoi commence-t-il en physicien puisque, de toute manière, il lui faut être plus métaphysicien pour conclure à un *premier* moteur que physicien pour prouver que c'est un premier *moteur*? C'est pourquoi, s'installant d'emblée dans l'être commun, Duns Scot a directement atteint un Premier dont la connaissance embrasse la totalité des intelligibles et dont la volonté peut librement les aimer tous. Lorsqu'il se retourne à ce moment vers Aristote, comment ne verrait-il pas qu'il l'a déjà laissé bien loin en arrière? Parti d'un problème cosmologique, le stagyrite n'en est pas encore sorti. En fait, il n'en sortira jamais et, sur ce point, Averroès est son fidèle interprète en soutenant qu'il appartient à la physique, non à la métaphysique, de prouver l'existence de Dieu. Quel premier principe peut-on rejoindre à partir du mouvement, sinon un Premier Moteur? Et quelle infinité peut-on légitimement attribuer à un moteur en tant précisément que tel, sinon celle de sa puissance de mouvoir? C'est ce que fait correctement Aristote. Le Premier meut éternellement, donc sa puissance motrice est inépuisable et sans limites, elle est infinie; mais le Premier de Duns Scot ne peut pas être infini en ce sens limité, car il est déjà pour nous une essence première dont la triple causalité, dans les ordres de l'efficience, de la fin et de l'éminence, incluent une intelligence et une volonté sans limite, qui ne font qu'un avec elle. On pourrait sans inconvénient laisser cette énergie suprême du cosmos mouvoir éternellement notre monde, sans lui demander le secret d'un infini auquel Aristote lui-même n'a jamais pensé.

Mais il s'agit d'Aristote, dont l'autorité philosophique est grande et chaque fois que la chose est possible, même s'il ne se rend pas à une autorité, Duns Scot l'utilise. C'est ce qu'il nomme donner apparence à un argument, *colorare rationem.* Nul n'ignore qu'il a usé de cette méthode, dans un cas que nous retrouverons bientôt, avec le célèbre argument de saint Anselme, mais il soumet au même traitement celui dont use ici Aristote. Et il le faut bien, car sa prémisse même est inacceptable pour un chrétien. *Primum movet motu infinito*, voilà qui est vrai dans le monde éternel et incréé d'Aristote, ou qui le serait dans le monde dont Thomas d'Aquin reconnaît qu'il pourrait être créé de toute éternité, mais qui ne l'est pas dans le monde chrétien que Dieu a créé dans ou avec le temps. Pour utiliser Aristote, partons une fois de plus du *possible.* A titre de cause absolument première, l'essence peut mouvoir d'elle-même et sans l'aide de quoi que ce soit; illimitée dans son pouvoir, puisque nulle condition extérieure n'est requise, elle peut produire un mouvement infini; or ce dont l'effet peut être infini, est infini; elle est donc infinie.

Cette interprétation de la preuve implique manifestement celle de toute la métaphysique des causes. Au lieu de se présenter comme un cas privilégié qui justifie l'attribution au Premier d'une infinité limitée, celle de sa puissance—et n'oublions pas qu'Aristote exclut formellement celle de sa grandeur, qu'il lui refuse comme de soi corporelle—la causalité du mouvement ne se présente plus que comme un cas particulier d'un efficience absolument sans limites: "le premier mouvant a la force de produire tous les effets qu'on peut produire par le mouvement; or ils sont infinis, si le mouvement peut être infini; donc, s'il meut à l'infini, il est infini".[11] Pourtant, même ainsi modifié, l'argument d'Aristote n'est pas encore sans reproches, précisément parce que l'infinité du mouvement n'autorise pas à conclure plus qu'une infinité de durée et de puissance motrice, ce qui n'est pas encore l'infinité pure et simple de l'essence que nous cherchons. Pour aboutir, c'est une infinité causale sans aucune restriction qu'il faut démontrer; non pas celle qui peut causer indéfiniment des êtres de même espèce; ni même celle, dont Aristote nierait d'ailleurs la possibilité, qui pourrait causer indéfiniment une infinité d'espèces différentes; mais une infinité causale telle qu'elle puisse causer simultanément tous les effets compossibles ou, à son choix, n'importe lequel de ceux qui ne le sont pas. Entendons par là que, même si cette cause première ne peut pas causer du "blanc" qui soit du "noir", elle puisse du moins causer simultanément tout ce qui est simultanément causable et causer séparément tout effet dont la simultanéité serait contradictoire.

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[11] *Op. Ox.* 1, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 25; t. I, p. 209. Primum movens simul habet in virtute sua

Pour en arriver là, il faut décidément abandonner, non certes la conclusion d'Aristote, mais son principe, car le fait seul que le Premier puisse mouvoir éternellement ne fondera jamais une conclusion de ce genre. Duns Scot en arrive donc à inventer lui-même une ultime justification, qui lui vient à l'esprit pour éclaircir la conclusion d'Aristote. *Ultima probabilitas quae occurrit pro consequentia Aristotelis declaranda est ita*: tout ce qui peut causer, simultanément aussi bien que séparément, plusieurs effets dont chacun requiert dans sa cause la perfection particulière qui lui est propre, est plus parfait s'il peut les causer simultanément que séparément; s'il peut en causer simultanément une infinité, lui-même est infini, et il le reste quand bien même la nature de certains effets interdirait qu'ils fussent simultanément causés, puisque, quant à ce qui est d'elle-même, cette cause resterait capable d'en causer une infinité.[12]

Pour concéder en ce sens la conclusion d'Aristote, il faut donc concéder bien plus que son principe et lui conférer une généralité qu'Aristote même n'avait pas prévue. Ce que prouve ici Duns Scot, ce n'est plus l'infini d'Aristote, c'est le sien. Ce Premier, qui possède *omnem causalitatem omnis causae possibilis formaliter et simul*, ce n'est pas encore le Tout Puissant de la théologie chrétienne, dont le Docteur Subtil fera toujours un objet de "foi", et non pas de certitude accessible à la seule raison naturelle, mais c'est du moins une "puissance infinie qui, en tant qu'il est d'elle-même, possède *éminemment* la causalité requise pour causer simultanément une infinité d'effets si leur nature était telle qu'ils pussent être simultanément causés".[13] En bref, un profond remaniement de l'argument d'Aristote est nécessaire pour en tirer l'infinité de la puissance divine accessible au philosophe, qui restera encore loin de la "toute puissance" divine absolue dont connaît seule la foi du théologien.

On pourrait procéder autrement, sans quitter la voie de l'efficience, et soutenir que la puissance créatrice est infinie de plein droit. En effet, dans la création *ex nihilo*, dont les deux termes extrêmes sont la créature et le néant, la distance du néant à la créature est infinie; donc le créateur est d'une puissance infinie.[14] Que vaut cet argument?

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omnes effectus possibiles produci per motum; sed illi sunt infiniti si motus potest esse infinitus; ergo si movet in infinitum, est infinitum. *Rep. Par.* I. d. 2, q. 3, n. 6; Vivès, t. XXII, pp. 71-72.

[12] *Op. Ox., loc. cit.*, n. 26; t. I, p. 210.

[13] Licet ergo omnipotentiam proprie dictam secundum intentionem theologorum tantummodo creditam esse et non naturali ratione credam posse probari, sicut dicitur distinctione 42, probatur tamen infinita potentia, quae simul, quantum est ex se, habet eminenter omnem causalitatem, qua simul posset in infinita, si simul essent factibilia. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 27; t. I, pp. 211-212. L'objection refutée à l'art. 28 est que, même infinie, cette puissance ne serait pas encore cause totale, c'est-à-dire capable de causer ses effets ultimes sans le concours des causes intermédiaires. Comme on le verra plus tard, une causalité absolue de ce genre est justement la "toute puissance" telle que les théologiens l'entendent. Il n'est pas possible qu'aucun philosophe la démontre. Ce que l'argument d'Aristote ainsi modifié prouverait, c'est que la puissance du Premier, qu'il puisse ou non se passer des causes intermédiaires, que les philosophes requièrent *propter imperfectionem effectus*, contient *éminemment* le pouvoir causal total de l'infinité des causes secondes possibles, ce qui suffit à prouver que cette puissance est infinie.

[14] On pourrait construire cet argument à

Remarquons d'abord qu'il suppose admise la notion de création. Duns Scot lui-même s'est ailleurs demandé dans quelle mesure elle est accessible au philosophe.[15] Pour le moment il se contente de la poser comme objet de foi: *sed hoc antecedens ponitur tantum creditum.* Si le pouvoir qu'a le Premier de créer ainsi le monde est objet de foi, non de preuve, on ne peut se fonder sur lui pour démontrer philosophiquement que la puissance du Premier soit infinie. C'est sur quoi Duns Scot s'appuie pour écarter *a priori* cet argument. Pourtant, supposant même qu'on accueille sans réserves la notion de création parmi celles qui sont accessibles à la raison naturelle, on ne saurait s'appuyer sur elle pour prouver que le Premier soit infiniment puissant.

Une telle position peut surprendre, tant que l'on ignore comment Duns Scot la justifie. Les deux notions de "toute puissance" et de "création" sont liées dans les mémoires par le souvenir du symbole des Apotres: *Credo in Deum patrem omnipotentem, factorem coeli et terrae.* Tenons-nous assurés que Duns Scot lui-même ne l'oublie pas. Quoi qu'il en soit de ce point, une raison générale rend au contraire aisément compréhensible la méfiance de notre philosophe envers une preuve de ce genre. Après tout, la créature n'est que du "physique", et comment trouverait-on dans un donné fini de ce genre de quoi fonder une puissance infinie?

La manière dont Duns Scot justifie sa critique est d'ailleurs hautement significative. On l'examinera d'autant plus soigneusement que nous y rencontrerons, pour la première fois, l'une des notions les plus importantes de la métaphysique de Duns Scot, qui n'est pourtant pas la plus facile à saisir, celle qu'il se fait de l'être créé.

L'argument en question se fonde sur cette idée que, d'un être quelconque au néant, la distance est infinie, ce que Duns Scot nie absolument. Pour qu'il y ait distance infinie entre deux termes, il faut que l'un de ces termes soit infini. Entre Dieu et la créature la plus parfaite possible, s'il y en avait une, la distance serait encore infinie, non à cause de la distance intermédiaire entre les termes extrêmes, mais à cause de l'infinité d'un des deux termes. Bref, la distance entre deux termes est d'autant plus grande que l'un d'eux est plus parfait. Or, dans le cas du couple créature-néant, le terme le plus parfait est encore fini; la distance qui le sépare du néant est donc elle-même finie et point n'est besoin d'une puissance infinie pour la franchir.[16] Que l'on ne s'y trompe pas: Duns Scot n'entend pas ici soutenir qu'un autre être que le Premier puisse créer, mais, comme nous aurons plus ample occasion de le voir, il soutient expressément que si créer est un privilège divin, ce n'est pas pour cette raison.[17] Pour le moment, retenons l'enseignement, capital pour l'ontologie de Duns Scot, qui ressort de ce texte: la distance qui sépare un être du néant n'est pas mesurée par la distance infinie qui sépare exister de ne pas exister, mais par la distance finie qui sépare être quelque chose de n'être rien.[18] L'argument d'Aristote par la cause efficiente pouvait être à la rigueur conservé après avoir subi les modifications nécessaires, celui-ci doit être purement et simplement rejeté.

III. *Les voies de l'intellect, de la volonté et de l'éminence*

Après avoir établi l'infinité du Premier suivant la voie de l'efficience, on peut l'établir en suivant celles de l'intellection, de la volonté et de l'éminence. L'intel-

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partir de positions thomistes, mais, à notre connaissance, saint Thomas d'Aquin lui-même n'en a pas fait usage.

[15] Voir *Quodl.* VII; Vivès, t. XXV, pp. 282-341.

[16] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 29; t. I, pp. 213-214.

[17] *Rep. Par.* I, d. 2, q. 3, n. 4; Vivès, t. XXII, p. 70.

[18] Le degré propre à chaque être est défini par la perfection intrinsèque de son essence, indépendamment de sa référence possible à d'autres êtres: Nam quaelibet entitas habet intrinsecum sibi gradum suae perfectionis, in quo est finitum, si est finitum, vel infinitum, si est infinitum. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 33; t. I, p. 218.

lect de la cause absolument première conçoit simultanément la totalité des intelligibles. Or les intelligibles sont infinis, comme il est facile de l'observer par rapport à notre intellect, qui n'en finirait jamais de les appréhender l'un après l'autre. On nommera "infini en puissance" cette infinité de termes successivement donnés qui, étant simultanément donnés, seraient de l'"infini en acte".[19] Si, comme nous l'avons établi à titre de préambule,[20] l'intellect du Premier connaît toujours, par un acte distinct et nécessaire tout ce qui est intelligible, on peut conclure que le Premier connaît toujours et par un acte distinct, donc unique, l'infinité des intelligibles. Or un tel intellect est infini de plein droit, car il ne peut saisir d'un seul coup l'infinité des intelligibles sans inclure simultanément, à titre éminent, les perfections d'une infinité d'essences intelligibles dont chacune inclut la perfection correspondante à sa raison propre. Infinies et prises toutes à la fois, elles constituent une perfection infinie, et comme elles sont éminemment contenues dans l'intellect qui les conçoit, cet intellect est lui-même infini.

Le terme "éminemment" n'est pas subrepticement introduit dans cette démonstration, car il a été déjà prouvé, dans ses préambules, que les intelligibles sont dans l'intellect du Premier avant d'exister en eux-mêmes. Cet intellect ne résulte donc pas de leur amoncellement; ils sont produits par lui. On ne voit d'ailleurs même pas comment leur addition pourrait le constituer, car chacun d'eux, qui est fini, ajoute quelque chose à la somme des autres, dont chacun est pareillement fini, mais aucun d'eux ne peut ajouter quoi que ce soit à sa cause, qui est infinie. C'est parce qu'il est infini, que le premier intellect conçoit simultanément une infinité de raisons intelligibles finies; celles-ci présupposent un intellect infini, elles ne sauraient le constituer. Le seul présupposé qui soit requis pour une intellection de cet ordre, c'est la *natura prima*, l'essence première elle-même, dont la seule présence à l'intellect du Premier suffit à causer en lui la connaissance de tout objet intelligible quelconque, sans le concours d'aucun autre objet. C'est dire qu'aucun autre objet ne peut ajouter d'intelligibilité à celui de l'intellection première; l'intelligible premier n'est donc "fini" par rien, il est "in-fini", et il l'est dans son être même, puisque chaque chose est dans l'ordre de l'être comme elle est dans l'ordre de l'intelligibilité. Intellection infinie, intellect infini, être infini, trois moments d'une seule et même réalité.[21]

Une preuve analogue peut se tirer de la raison de fin dernière. Notre volonté peut désirer et aimer quelque chose de plus grand que tout objet fini, de même que notre intellect peut, en ce qui est de sa nature propre, connaître quelque chose de plus grand que tout objet fini.[22] Allons plus loin, il semble même qu'une inclination naturelle nous porte à aimer suprêmement un bien infini, car non seulement notre volonté, qui est libre, se porte vers un tel objet d'elle-même (*ex se*) sans disposition acquise par un effort antérieur (*sine habitu*), promptement et avec plaisir (*prompte et delectabiliter*), mais il semble qu'elle ne puisse se reposer parfaitement en rien d'autre. Cette expérience est importante et, à sa manière, décisive, car s'il était contradictoire au bien d'être infini, la volonté ne tendrait pas si facilement vers le bien infini comme le terme de son repos. Ce point sera d'ailleurs bientôt examiné de plus près, à propos de l'objet de l'intellect, mais on peut dire, dès à présent, que la tendance naturelle de notre volonté libre vers un bien infini, implique l'infinité de son objet.[23]

L'argumentation de Duns Scot sur ce point est simple, claire et rien n'autorise à penser qu'il ne la tienne pas lui-même pour strictement philosophique. Elle l'est en effet à ses yeux, car s'il n'a pas admis que l'homme eût une connaissance naturelle "distincte" et complète de sa fin dernière, il a toujours enseigné, d'abord que l'homme est naturellement ordonné à Dieu comme à sa fin, ensuite que l'homme peut le savoir et, par là même, savoir que Dieu est sa fin.[24] Il faut pourtant se souvenir des limites qu'une telle connaissance doit nécessairement comporter, en vertu des principes posés par Duns Scot lui-même. Le concept de Dieu le plus parfait qui nous soit naturellement accessible est celui d'être infini. L'homme peut donc se connaître comme naturellement ordonné à l'être infini et, pour autant qu'il s'éprouve tel, il peut savoir qu'il y a un être infini. Ceci ne signifie pourtant pas que le concept d'être infini nous permette de déduire ce qu'est Dieu en tant précisément que Dieu. La nature même de ce concept s'y oppose, *quia conceptus quosdam communes habemus de substantiis immaterialibus et materialibus.* Supposons qu'il y ait une figure géométrique "première", et que nous le sachions, mais que ce soit le triangle, et que nous ne le sachions pas, nous pourrions attribuer à cette figure première toutes les propriétés qui lui appartiennent en tant que figure, mais non en tant que triangle.[25] L'homme peut donc naturellement savoir que l'être premier est infini, parce qu'il peut observer sur soi-même qu'il en éprouve le désir, et il peut naturellement savoir de cet être tout ce qui appartient à un être, du fait qu'étant premier dans l'être, il est du même coup infini.

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[19] Quaecumque sunt infinita in potentia, ita quod accipiendo alterum post alterum nullum possunt habere finem, illa omnia, si simul actu sunt, sunt infinita actu: intelligibilia sunt infinita in potentia respectu intellectus creati: satis patet; et in intellectu increato sunt simul omnia intellecta actu quae a creato sunt successive intellecta; ergo sunt ibi actu infinita intellecta. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 30; t. I, p. 214.

[20] Voir pp. 23-24.

[21] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 30; t. I, p. 215. Cf. *Rep. Par.* I, d. 2, q. 3, n. 7; Vivès, t. XXII, p. 72.

[22] Voir *Mediaeval Studies*, X (1948), p. 54.

[23] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 31; t. I, p. 216.

Après celles de l'intellection et de la volonté, une quatrième voie qui conduit à l'infinité du Premier, est celle de l'"éminence". Cette éminence, nous l'avons fait voir, est absolue, c'est-à-dire suprême; or il n'est pas contradictoire que quelque chose soit plus parfait que du fini, mais il l'est que quelque chose soit plus parfait que l'être suprêmement éminent dans l'ordre de l'être. Si donc il n'y a pas contradiction entre l'infinité et l'être, le Premier peut être infini, et puisqu'il est plus grand d'être infini que fini, l'être suprêmement éminent en tant qu'être est nécessairement infini.

On peut présenter le même argument sous une autre forme, où l'infinité sera naturellement prise au sens d'infinité "intensive", et non pas seulement "extensive" comme l'est celle du premier moteur d'Aristote mouvant indéfiniment le monde dans le temps. Voici donc l'argument: s'il ne répugne pas à sa nature d'être infini, un être n'est pas parfait, à moins qu'il ne soit infini; en effet, il pourrait être infini; si donc, par hypothèse, il ne l'est pas, il n'est pas parfait. D'où résulte que l'être suprêmement éminent dans l'ordre de l'être, et par conséquent tout parfait, est un être infini.

Le point délicat de cette preuve, comme d'ailleurs de celle qui se tirait de l'objet de la volonté, est la compossibilité qu'elle suppose entre l'"être" et l'"infini". Duns Scot observe, à ce sujet, que leur compossibilité ne saurait être démontrée *a priori*, parce que la notion d'être étant première, ou ne peut l'éclaircir par aucune autre. Du moins peut on constater que, s'il y a quelque incompossibilité entre ces deux notions, elle n'apparaît nulle part. L'être est ce que chacun sait. Quant à l'infini, on peut décrire ainsi la notion que l'on en a communément: l'infini est ce qui n'excède précisément un fini donné en aucune proportion finie, mais le dépasse en outre ou delà de toute proportion assignable.[26] Ceci dit, aucune incompossibilité n'apparaît entre l'infinité et l'être. Rappelons-nous en effet que l'être en question est "commun", c'est-à-dire complètement indéterminé et que la "finitude' n'est pas de l'essence de l'être ainsi conçu: *de ratione entis non est finitas.* Elle n'est même pas un de ces transcendantaux qui sont convertibles avec l'être. On peut donc penser "être infin" sans s'engager dans aucune contradiction. Bien plus, on ne peut associer ces deux termes sans percevoir leur remarquable accord: "pourquoi l'intellect, dont l'objet est l'être, n'éprouve-t-il aucune répugnance à concevoir quelque chose comme infini? Pourquoi cela lui semble-t-il au contraire le plus parfait intelligible? Il serait surprenant qu'aucun intellect ne perçût une telle contradiction concernant son objet premier, alors qu'une dissonance blesse si facilement l'oreille. En effet, si une discordance est aussitôt perçue et si elle blesse, comment se fait-il qu'aucun intellect ne refuse aussitôt un intelligible infini comme ne lui convenant pas et comme détruisant même son objet premier?"[27] Il y a donc compatibilité entre l'infinité et l'être, et si l'infinité est une perfection *possible* de l'être, l'être suprême est nécessairement infini.

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[24] Item homo naturaliter appetit finem istum quem dicis supernaturalem; igitur ad istum naturaliter ordinatur; ergo ex tali ordine potest concludi iste finis ex cognitione naturae ordinatae ad ipsum. *Op. Ox.* Prol., q. 1, a. 2, n. 10; t. I, p. 10. S'exprimant sur cette objection, Duns Scot déclare plus loin: Sed inquantum adducitur (*sc.* auctoritas Augustini) contra illam responsionem de fine naturali et supernaturali, concedo Deum esse finem naturalem hominis, licet non naturaliter adipiscendum, sed supernaturaliter. Et hoc probat ratio sequens de desiderio naturali, quam concedo. *Loc. cit.*, n. 11; t. I, p. 12. Immédiatement après, Duns Scot nie qu'Avicenne ait pu savoir, sans s'aider de la théologie, "ens esse primum objectum intellectus nostri, et hoc secundum totam indifferentiam entis ad sensibilia et insensibilia."

[25] *Op. Ox.* Prol., q. I, a. 2, n. 16; t. I, pp. 16-17. A la fin de l'article, il est prévu que si l'on conteste le caractère "commun" de notre concept du Premier, il faudra du moins concéder son caractère "imparfait", puisqu'il est emprunté au sensible; la conclusion reste la même dans les deux cas. Rappelons la définition de la connaissance naturelle: Pro statu autem isto, secundum Philosophum, intellectus possibilis natus est moveri ad cognitionem ab intellectu agente et phantasmate; igitur sola illa cognitio naturalis est quae ab istis agentibus potest imprimi." *Loc. cit.*, n. 21; t. I, p. 20.

Cet être suprême en tant qu'être, ou suprêmement éminent, Duns Scot le qualifie encore "être tel qu'on n'en puisse concevoir de plus grand" et c'est pourquoi le fameux argument de saint Anselme se présente ici à lui comme utilisable, pourvu qu'on lui fasse subir la modification nécessaire, afin de transformer en preuve de l'infinité du Premier ce qui se donne pour une preuve de son existence. Que Duns Scot l'ait bien entendu ainsi, c'est ce qui ressort à la fois de ses propres déclarations et de la place qu'il assigne à l'argument du *Proslogion,* revu et corrigé par lui, dans l'ensemble de sa propre argumentation.[28] Rappelons en effet une fois de plus, qu'au point où nous en sommes, l'existence même du Premier est irrévocablement établie. On pourrait néanmoins soutenir que Duns Scot fait ici appel à un argument supplémentaire, ne serait-ce qu'à titre de probabilité renforçant des preuves elles-mêmes tenues pour acquises. Entre ces deux hypothèses, l'examen du texte permettra seul de choisir.

On a beaucoup écrit sur le sens du verbe *colorare*, dans la phrase bien connue des historiens: *Per illud potest* colorari *illa ratio Anselmi de summo cogitabili.* En fait, il serait imprudent de lui attribuer d'abord un sens précis, pour interpréter ce qui suit en fonction du sens ainsi choisi. C'est plutôt la détermination exacte de ce que fait ensuite Duns Scot, qui nous éclairera sur le sens de ce verbe. Si l'on en jugeait par l'usage que Duns Scot lui-même vient d'en faire, en "colorant" un argument d'Aristote,[29] ce verbe pourrait désigner une modification si profonde qu'elle équivaille à une transposition proprement dite. Mais pourquoi conclure d'un cas à un autre? Chaque cas se suffit.

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[26] Infinitum intelligimus per finitum, et hoc vulgariter sic expono: infinitum est quod aliquod finitum datum secundum nullam habitudinem finitam praecise excedit, sed ultra omnem habitudinem assignabilem excedit adhuc. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 31; t. I, p. 216. Infinitum est quod quodcumque finitum datum ultra omnem proportionem excedit." *Rep. Par.* 1, d. 2, q. 3, 1; Vivès, t. XXII, p. 69.

[27] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 31; t. I, p. 219. Quare intellectus, cujus objectum est ens, nullam invenit repugnantiam intelligendo aliquod infinitum, immo videtur perfectissimum intelligibile? Mirum est autem si nulli intellectui talis contradictio patens fiat circa ejus primum objectum, cum discordia in sono ita faciliter offendat auditum; si enim est disconveniens, statim percipitur et offendit. Cur nullus intellectus ab intelligibili infinito naturaliter refugit, sicut a non conveniente, immo suum objectum primum destruente? Cf. *Rep. Par.* I, d. 2, q. 3, n. 8. Vivès, t. XXII, p. 73.

[28] En sens contraire, voir E. Bettoni, *L'ascesa a Dio . . .*, ch. II, pp. 30-31, et. ch. IV, p. 79. L'auteur s'oppose à S. Belmond et à Z. Van Woestyne (*op. cit.*, p. 31, notes 2 et 3) qui soutiennent que Duns Scot a "coloré" l'argument en vue de prouver, non l'existence de Dieu, mais son infinité. Ces deux derniers interprètes se fondent sur le sens obvie du texte de Duns Scot lui-même: Quomodo autem ratio ejus (*sc.* Anselmi) valeat, dicitur in sequenti quaestione, art. 6, quod fiet ad infinitatem probandam. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 8; t. I, p. 189.

[29] Voir plus haut, p. 50.

Partant donc de la définition nominale du mot "Dieu" que propose saint Anselme dans le *Proslogion* II, et qu'il résume d'ailleurs à sa manière, Duns Scot propose d'ajouter à *Deus est quo cogitato majus cogitari non potest*, la clause importante: *sine contradictione*. Nous disons de cette clause qu'elle est importante parce que, si la définition en question impliquait contradiction, elle ne serait pas pensable. Or, précisément, Duns Scot lui-même vient d'éprouver quelque difficulté à prouver qu'il n'y a pas contradiction entre les deux notions d'"être" et d'"infini". C'est la nature même du problème qui rend difficile de le résoudre, et ce que le Docteur Subtil a finalement trouvé de mieux, c'est, on vient de le voir, d'en appeler à cette sorte d'expérience collective de l'entendement humain qui, bien loin d'y entendre aucune discordance, perçoit plutôt une consonance intime et profondément satisfaisante entre les deux termes. S'il en appelle ici à saint Anselme, c'est précisément, semble-t-il, parce que l'argument du *Proslogion* permet d'établir la *possibilité* métaphysique de la notion d'être infini. Or cette possibilité n'est autre que son absence de contradiction. Si l'on montre que la notion d'être infini n'est pas contradictoire, soit qu'on la pose d'abord dans l'entendement, puis comme réalisée, on aura démontré la possibilité complète d'un tel être. Ceci ne prouvera pas qu'un être infini existe, mais bien que le Premier, dont on vient d'établir l'existence, *peut être atteint comme infini en suivant la voie de l'éminence*, ce que précisément il entend démontrer.

Que le suprême concevable en question existe réellement sans contradiction, voilà donc ce qu'il s'agit d'établir: *summum cogitabile praedictum sine contradictione esse in re*. On le prouve d'abord pour l'être quidditatif (*esse quidditativum*), c'est-à-dire pour l'être qui appartient à l'essence que désignent ces mots: ce qui est tel que rien de plus grand ne puisse être pensé. Si la formule impliquait contradiction, il faudrait en conclure que cette essence, prise comme essence, n'a pas d'être, ce qui reviendrait à dire que, dans l'ordre de réalité propre à l'essence, celle-ci n'existe pas "en réalité". En fait, elle n'est aucunement contradictoire, mais comment Duns Scot le prouve-t-il? En faisant appel à l'expérience même qui justifie la mineure de sa *quarta via*, c'est-à-dire: *infinitum non repugnat enti*, et sa raison de l'affirmer reste celle qu'il a déjà proposée: "dans ce suprême objet de pensée (*in tali cogitabili summo*), l'entendement trouve une satisfaction suprême (*summe quiescit intellectus*); ainsi donc, cet objet suprême même inclut la raison de l'objet premier de l'intellect créé, à savoir l'être, et cela au suprême dégré (*ergo in ipso summo est ratio primi objecti intellectus creati, scilicet entis, et hoc in summo*). Pris dans son ensemble, ce premier temps de l'argument prouve donc bien que, parlant de la réalité de l'essence, celle de l'être infini, parce qu'elle est possible, existe en réalité.

Passons de l'*esse essentiae*, qui existe en réalité mais dans la pensée seule, à l'*esse existentiae*, qui existe en réalité hors de la pensée. Il s'agit alors de montrer que le "suprêmement pensable" (*summe cogitabile*) n'existe pas seulement dans l'entendement qui le pense. On y parvient en deux moments, dont aucun n'est représenté dans l'argument de saint Aselme lui-même. Le premier consiste à prendre acte que le "suprêmement pensable" est possible, ainsi qu'il vient d'être établi. Le second consiste à montrer que, si cet être "possible" n'existait pas en réalité, il serait contradictoire, non pas du tout, comme l'avait soutenu saint Anselme, parce que la notion d'un tel être qui n'existerait pas serait en elle-même contradictoire, mais pour cette raison spécifiquement scotiste, qu'il est contradictoire à la notion d'un tel être d'exister par une autre cause. D'où, c'est-à-dire de sa propre preuve, Duns Scot conclut, non pas que le suprêmement pensable existe en réalité, mais que ce qui existe en réalité est un "pensable plus grand" que ce qui n'est que dans l'entendement (*majus igitur cogitabile est quod est in re quam quod est tantum in intellectu*). Sur quoi il précise: on ne l'entendra pas en ce sens, que cet objet de pensée serait plus pensable, s'il existait, mais bien en le sens que celui qui existe est un pensable plus grand que celui qui n'est que dans l'entendement seul.[30]

Qu'a fait ici Duns Scot? D'abord, il a substitué à la preuve de l'existence de Dieu, proposée par saint Anselme, sa propre preuve de l'existence du Premier. S'il est contradictoire que le Premier n'existe pas, c'est, dit expressément le Docteur Subtil, *quia repugnat rationi ejus esse ab alia causa, sicut patuit prius in secunda conclusione de primo effectivo.* L'argument auquel nous sommes ici renvoyés, se proposait de montrer que le *primum effectivum*, dont l'existence était à ce moment déjà démontrée, devait être en outre tenu pour "incausable".[31] Comment Duns Scot invoquerait-il ici un argument qui suppose l'existence du Premier déjà démontrée, s'il se proposait d'en démontrer l'existence? On peut penser qu'il fait plutôt ceci: ayant prouvé à sa propre satisfaction et à sa manière que le Premier existe, et même qu'il est infini, Duns Scot modifie l'argument du *Proslogion* pour lui faire correctement prouver cette même infinité du Premier. L'entreprise peut réussir, car si l'on a déjà prouvé l'existence d'une première cause efficiente elle-même incausable (ce qui ne se fait pas à partir de la définition nominale de Dieu mais à partir de la causalité de l'être) on peut prouver ensuite que, loin d'être contradictoire et impossible, la notion d'un être suprême et infini qui existe est "plus" pensable que celle du même être conçu comme n'existant pas. Si cette interprétation est correcte, c'est donc bien l'infinité du Premier que l'utilisation de l'argument de saint Anselme a pour objet de prouver.

Revenant sur l'ensemble de cet édifice dialectique, afin d'en préciser le plan et l'objet sans équivoque possible, Duns Scot rappelle alors qu'il a successivement prouvé, premièrement, qu'il y a un être absolument premier (*simpliciter primum*), de la triple primauté de l'efficience, de la fin et de l'éminence, et que cet être est si absolument premier qu'il ne peut rien y avoir avant lui; par là, précise Duns Scot, l'être de Dieu se trouve établi "quant aux propriétés de Dieu relatives à la créature, ou en tant qu'il détermine les rapports et les dépendances des créatures envers lui";[32] deuxièmement, il a prouvé suivant quatre voies, que ce Premier est infini, comme premier efficient, comme premier connaissant tous les connaissables, comme fin dernière et comme suprêmement éminent. Il ne reste plus à présent, conclut enfin Duns Scot, qu'à unir les conclusions précédentes de la manière que voici: il existe actuellement parmi les êtres un être triplement premier; ce qui est triplement premier entre les êtres est infini; donc quelque être infini existe. Par là se trouve prouvé l'être de Dieu, quant à la perfection absolue de Dieu la plus parfaite que nous puissions concevoir. Nous avons donc prouvé par là l'existence de Dieu, atteint sous le concept de Dieu le plus parfait qui nous soit concevable et que nous puissions en avoir.[33] La connaissance relative la plus parfaite que nous ayons de Dieu est qu'il est l'être "premier"; la connaissance absolue la plus parfaite que nous ayons de lui est qu'il est "l'être parfait"; tout ce qui dépasse ce concept de Dieu, où ne s'y laisse pas relier par voie de conséquence nécessaire, échappe donc aux prises de la connaissance naturelle et nous demeure ici-bas inconnu, à moins qu'il n'ait plu à Dieu lui-même de le révéler.

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[30] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 32; t. I. pp. 217-218. Duns Scot, qui vient d'écarter cette dernière interprétation, la reprend pourtant aussitôt pour "colorer" encore autrement la preuve d'Anselme (*vel aliter coloratur*). On obtient alors ceci: ce qui existe est plus pensable, c'est-à-dire plus connaissable (parce qu'objet d'une *intuition* possible) que ne l'est ce qui, n'existant pas, ne peut être connu que par mode d'*abstraction*. Or la connaissance intuitive est plus parfaite que la connaissance abstractive; *ergo*.

[31] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 16; t. I, pp. 195-196.

[32] . . . et in hoc probatum est esse de Deo quantum ad proprietates respectivas Dei ad creaturam, vel in quantum determinat respectus et dependentias creaturarum ad ipsum. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 34; t. I, p. 219. Nous entendons que, dans le second membre du phrase, le sujet de *determinat* est un *Deus* sous-entendu.

[33] Et in hoc probatum est esse de Deo, quantum ad ilud absolutum quod est primum perfectione omnium a nobis conceptibilium de Deo, sicut dicetur 3 dist. et per consequens probatum est esse Deum quantum ad conceptum perfectissimum conceptibilem vel possibilem a nobis haberi de Deo. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 34; t. I, pp. 219-220.

A quel point Duns Scot a claire conscience d'avoir ici dépassé le plan de la philosophie grecque, on le voit par les réponses aux arguments qu'on en pourrait tirer contre lui. Si, s'objecte-t-il lui-même au nom des Anciens, il y avait un être infini, comment y aurait-il place pour autre chose que lui dans la nature et, plus particulièrement, comment y aurait-il place à côté de lui pour le mal? C'est que, répond le Docteur Subtil, on ne pense ici qu'à une force active infinie agissant par nécessité de nature, au lieu que le Premier, dont on vient de prouver l'existence, agit librement et volontairement; il y a donc place pour autre chose en dehors de lui, pourvu seulement que lui-même y consente, et même pour le mal.[34] Cette opposition fondamentale entre une cause première nécessaire et une cause première contingente, qui s'annonce déjà comme l'origine de beaucoup d'autres, nous servira pourtant de clef pour résoudre des problèmes que les Anciens ont mal résolu ou qu'ils ont même dû renoncer à résoudre. Comment une puissance peut-elle être infinie et pourtant mouvoir dans le temps? A cette question, comme à bien d'autres, nous verrons que la nouvelle notion du Premier, conçu comme l'"être infini", permet seule d'apporter une réponse satisfaisante. Réponse philosophique, certes, on l'a déjà dit et on le redira volontiers pour plaire à ceux de nos contemporains qui s'intéressent surtout à cet aspect du problème, mais il suffira de laisser la parole à Duns Scot pour voir à quel autre aspect du problème lui-même s'intéressait. Nous réfuterons ce point plus tard, dit-il, en argumentant contre les Philosophes, qui soutiennent que le Premier fait necéssairement tout ce qu'il fait immédiatement lui-même; mais l'argument ne fait pas difficulté pour les Chrétiens, car ils disent que Dieu agit de manière contingente.[35] Ceux qui refusent pour Duns Scot le titre de "philosophe chrétien", n'ont pas tort, car, aprés tout, lui-même ne se l'est jamais attribué, mais alors il faut aller jusqu'au bout et dire que le seul titre dont il se réclame ici n'est pas celui de Philosophe, c'est celui de Chrétien.

III. *L'UNICITE DE L'ETRE INFINI*

L'existence d'une "nature" ou "quiddité" infinie une fois démontrée, on peut encore se demander s'il n'y a qu'une nature qui soit telle, ou s'il y en a plusieurs. Au point de son commentaire sur Pierre Lombard où il se pose cette question, Duns Scot n'hésite pas à reprendre l'usage du nom "Dieu", auquel il avait provisoirement renoncé tandis qu'il prouvait l'existence du Premier. Il se demande donc, simplement et directement, s'il n'y a qu'un seul Dieu?

Aucune hésitation n'est possible sur la réponse. La conclusion est en effet certaine: il n'y a qu'un seul Dieu; mais certains disent que cette conclusion n'est pas rationnellement démontrable et qu'elle ne peut être tenue que par la foi. Telle est, notamment, la thèse soutenue par certains théologiens que cite Moïse Maïmonide, selon qui la Loi religieuse seule nous assure que Dieu est unique.[36] Que faut-il en penser?

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[34] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 3, n. 35; t. I, p. 220. Noter ici la réponse à l'instance: mais les Philosophes n'ont-ils pas admis qu'il y eût du mal dans l'univers, tout en maintenant que Dieu agisse par nécessité de nature? Réponse; oui, sans doute, mais il leur a fallu pour cela recourir à un artifice pour expliquer que du mal puisse se produire de manière contingente dans l'univers. Le Premier est alors conçu comme produisant nécessairement des biens opposés, dont les causes se contrarient, d'où, accidentellement du mal. Vaine tentative d'évasion, a déjà fait observer Duns Scot (*Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 21; t. I, p. 204), car ce "contingent" même reste de l'"inévitable", si bien que l'on ne sort pas ici de l'ordre de la nécessité.

[35] Istud improbabitur dist. 8, q. ult., ubi in hoc arguetur contra Philosophos, qui ponunt Primum agere ex necessitate quodlibet quod immediate agit. Sed Christianis non est argumentum difficile, quia dicunt Deum contingenter agere. *Op. Ox.* I d. 2, q. 2, a. 3, n. 36; t. I, p. 223.

[36] Voir Maïmonide, *Guide des Egarés*, I

On notera d'abord sous quelle forme le problème se pose dans la doctrine de Duns Scot. Ce n'est pas celle d'une option entre deux réponses dont l'une exclurait l'autre. Il est possible, sans aucune contradiction, que l'unicité de Dieu soit en même temps un article de foi et un objet de démonstration rationnelle. Tel était déjà le cas de l'existence de Dieu, que Duns Scot tient pour un article de foi et dont on a vu qu'il ne considère pourtant pas comme impossible de la démontrer.[37] De même ici. Maïmonide a raison de dire que la Loi mosaïque impose la foi en l'unicité de Dieu et nul n'a d'ailleurs oublié le texte célèbre du *Deutéronome* v, 6: *Audi, Israel, Dominus Deus tuus unus est*, à quoi l'on peut ajouter *Isaie* xlv, 5: *Extra me non est Deus.* Il est donc bien vrai que l'unicité de Dieu est objet de foi, mais Dieu lui-même l'a révélée au peuple juif parce que, grossier et enclin à l'idolatrie, ce peuple avait besoin d'en être instruit par la loi divine. Lorsque Dieu dit, dans l'*Exode* iii, 14: *Ego sum qui sum,* ou lorsque l'Apôtre enseigne, dans l'*Epître aux Hébreux* xi, 6, qu'il faut que celui qui s'approche de Dieu croie qu'il existe, ni Dieu ni saint Paul n'entendent nier que cette vérité soit démontrable. Il est utile que même ce qui peut être démontré soit enseigné à l'ensemble du peuple par voie d'autorité; à cause de la négligence dont les hommes font preuve dans la recherche de la vérité, de l'impuissance de leur intellect et des erreurs commises dans leurs démonstrations par ceux qui mêlent le faux au vrai dans la recherche de la vérité.[38] Lorsqu'ils suivent de telles démonstrations, les simples peuvent bien se demander laquelle croire;[39] il est donc bon qu'une autorité assurée et infaillible ouvre une voie facile et accessible à tous.

C'est pourquoi, sans contester aucunement que l'unicité de Dieu soit une vérité révélée, on peut en chercher des preuves démonstratives qui ne relèvent que de la raison. Toutes ces preuves, sauf celle qui se fonde sur la nécessité du Premier, s'appuient sur l'infinité de Dieu, qui vient d'être démontrée. C'est même pourquoi nous pouvons à bon droit les tenir pour strictement rationnelles; reposant sur le concept de Dieu le plus parfait qui nous soit naturellement accessible, elles n'empiètent à aucun moment sur le terrain réservé à la seule révélation.

Duns Scot aurait peut-être pu commencer par la cinquième de ses preuves, celle qui se tire directement de l'infinité absolue du Premier, car elle dispenserait au besoin des quatre qui la précèdent. L'absolument infini ne peut être dépassé; puisque nous l'avons défini comme ce qui excède, au delà de toute proportion assignable, tout fini donné, sa notion même implique que rien ne le dépasse. Or, s'il y avait plusieurs infinis, il y aurait plus dans leur ensemble que dans un seul d'entre eux. En vertu de sa notion même, une pluralité d'infinis est donc contradictoire et impossible: *ergo infinitum in pluribus omnino numerari non potest.*

Appliquant ce même principe aux modes premiers de l'être divin, on peut faire voir d'abord qu'une pluralité d'intellects infinis est impossible. La preuve en est purement dialectique et s'établit, sinon par $A + B$, du moins par A et B. Un intellect infini connaît parfaitement tout ce qui est intelligible, en tant même que cela est, de soi, intelligible. Soient donc deux dieux donnés, A et B; A connaîtra B aussi parfaitement que B est intelligible, c'est-à-dire qu'il le connaîtra parfaitement. Or cela est impossible. En effet A connaîtra B par l'essence de B ou il ne le connaîtra pas ainsi. S'il ne connaît pas B par l'essence de B, et que cependant B soit connaissable par son essence, A ne connaît pas B aussi

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partie, ch. 75; trad. S. Munk (Paris, 1856), t. I, pp. 440-450. Cf. II Partie, ch. 1; t. II, pp. 42-46.

[37] Cf. *Op. Ox.* III, d. 24, n. 21; Vivès, t. XV, pp. 52-53.

[38] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 3, n. 7; t. I, p. 230. Duns Scot renvoie ici à saint Augustin, *De civitate Dei* XVIII, 41; PL 41, 600-602.

[39] . . . et ideo quia simplices sequentes tales demonstrationes bene possent dubitare, cui esset assentiendem, ideo tuta est via et facilis et communis, auctoritas certa quae non potest fallere nec falli. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 3, n. 7; t. I, p. 230. On croit percevoir dans ces lignes la lassitude d'un temps, où certains commencent à trouver qu'il y a beaucoup de preuves de l'existence de Dieu.

parfaitement que *B* est connaissable; mais s'il connaît *B* par l'essence de *B*, l'acte cognitif d'*A* lui-même est postérieur à l'essence de *B*, et ainsi *A* n'est pas Dieu. La conséquence est inévitable, car tout acte de connaître qui n'est pas identique à son objet, est postérieur à cet objet. S'il lui était antérieur ou simultané, il pourrait s'en passer; puisqu'il en a besoin, c'est qu'il lui est postérieur. Un être dont l'essence implique un intellect infini, est donc un être unique.[40] On ne saurait pousser plus loin l'objectivité dialectique en matière de théologie naturelle: *ergo si sint duo dii, sint A et B . . .*

Procédons ensuite par la voie de la volonté. Une volonté infinie est une volonté droite; elle aime donc tout ce qui peut être aimé, en tant précisément que cela peut être aimé. Revenons donc à nos deux dieux: Si *B* est un autre Dieu, il est un bien infini et, à ce titre, infiniment aimable; donc la volonté *A* aime *B* infiniment; or cela est impossible, car puisque tout être aime naturellement son être plus que l'être d'autrui, une volonté droite, comme l'est toute volonté infinie, se préfère naturellement à tout le reste; ainsi, se préférant soi-même à *B*, *A* ne saurait l'aimer infiniment. On pourrait d'ailleurs argumenter sur la volonté elle-même comme on vient d'argumenter sur son objet. Se référant à la distinction augustinienne classique entre *uti* et *frui*, Duns Scot raisonne ainsi: *A* jouit de *B* ou il en use; s'il en use, sa volonté est ordonée à un autre objet qu'elle-même, donc elle n'est pas infinie; s'il en jouit, comme il jouit aussi de lui-même, il jouit à la fois de deux objets dont chacun suffit à lui donner une béatitude totale, ce qui est impossible. L'impossibilité de l'hypothèse est manifeste, car elle suppose qu'une volonté totalement béatifiée par un objet le soit en même temps par un autre dont, puisqu'elle est déjà parfaitement bienheureuse, la destruction n'affecterait en rien sa béatitude.[41]

Une troisième voie, celle qui passe par la notion de bien, conduit à la même conclusion. Une volonté conforme à l'ordre peut désirer un bien plus grand qu'un autre et le désirer davantage; or, s'ils étaient possibles, plusieurs biens infinis inclueraient plus de bonté qu'un seul bien infini; en un tel cas, une volonté pourrait, sans manquer à l'ordre, préférer plusieurs biens infinis à un seul; elle ne trouverait donc son parfait repos dans aucun bien infini seul, et comme il est contradictoire qu'un bien infini ne suffise pas à satisfaire la volonté, une pluralité de biens infinis est impossible.[42]

La quatrième voie part de la puissance infinie de Dieu, et l'on prévoit sans trop de peine pourquoi une puissance infinie ne saurait coexister avec une autre puissance également infinie, car chacune d'elles pouvant revendiquer la totalité des effets possibles, d'insolubles conflits de juridiction ne sauraient manquer de les mettre aux prises. D'autre part, l'indémontable sang froid dialectique de Duns Scot est en lui-même instructif. Il ne se contente pas d'indiquer, en gros, la direction générale que la pensée doit suivre; jamais il ne se tient pour satisfait, tant que le mécanisme de la preuve n'a pas été ajusté et mis au point dans ses moindres détails. Ici, par exemple, il posera d'abord que deux causes ne sauraient être causes totales du même effet dans le même ordre de causes. On le lui accorderait sans doute sans discussion, mais lui-même ne l'entend pas ainsi, et il prouve son dire: car, si tel était le cas, quelque chose se trouverait être l'effet d'une autre chose, dont pourtant il ne dépendrait pas. En effet, si l'on pose deux causes totales du même effet, nous avons l'impression de voir aussitôt que l'une de ces causes est superflue, mais, ici encore, Duns Scot ne se contente pas d'une adhésion confuse de ce genre, et il prouve impitoyablement sa preuve. Rien ne dépend essentiellement d'une autre chose, lorsque son existence ne dépend pas de celle de l'autre; mais, si *C* a deux causes totales, *A* et *B*, et cela dans le même ordre de causes, *C* existerait encore au cas où soit *A*, soit *B* cesserait d'exister. Et cela aussi se prouve, puisque *A* et *B* étant l'un et l'autre causes totales de *C*, *B* suffirait à causer *C* sans *A*, comme *A* suffirait à le causer sans *B*. La majeure ainsi démontrée, le syllogisme peut suivre son cours: deux causes ne peuvent être causes totales dans le même ordre de causes; or une puissance infinie est cause totale de tout effet quelconque, et elle l'est à titre de cause première; aucune autre puissance ne peut donc être cause première d'un effet quelconque, ce qui revient à dire qu'aucune autre puissance infinie ne peut causer cet effet.[43] La puissance infinie est donc unique, ce qu'il fallait démontrer.

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[40] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 3, n. 5; t. I, p. 228. Renvoie à saint Augustin, *De Trinitate* VII, 1, 1; PL 42, 933. Cf. Thomas d'Aquin, *Sum. theol.* I, q. 2, a. 3, Resp.

[41] *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 3; t. I, pp. 226-227.

[42] *Op. Ox., loc. cit.*, n. 4, p. 227.

Ainsi que l'indique Duns Scot lui-même, toutes ces preuves reviennent à montrer que tout *premier* est *unique* en vertu de sa primauté même. L'argument par lequel il a précédemment établi que le premier dans un ordre se confond avec le premier dans un autre, vaut encore dans le cas présent, car le problème est le même, sauf seulement en ceci, qu'au lieu de prouver qu'il n'y a qu'un Premier, nous prouvons à présent qu'il n'y a qu'un infini. De même que rien ne peut être totalement causé par deux causes distinctes, rien ne peut être ordonné à deux fins qui seraient à la fois ses fins distinctes et ses fins ultimes. C'est pourquoi, comme le dit le cinquième argument que nous avons placé avant les autres, il ne peut y avoir qu'un seul et unique terme qui excède tous les autres, dans tous les ordres concevables et au delà de toute proportion donnée: de par sa nature même, l'infini se refuse à toute multiplicité numérique, il ne saurait y en avoir plusieurs, que l'on puisse "compter".

Après avoir montré, de cinq manières à la fois conjugées et distinctes, que la nature même de l'infini implique son unicité, Duns Scot propose une sixième voie philosophique, nettement différente des précédentes, pour justifier la même conclusion. C'est la voie de la "nécessité". Il convient d'être extrêmement attentif, chaque fois que le Docteur Subtil s'engage sur ce terrain car il le partage avec son principal adversaire, le nécessitarisme gréco-arabe et parce que c'est précisément là qu'il entend le défaire, lui-même ne s'y engage qu'avec d'extrêmes précautions.

Ici, c'est d'abord au nécessitarisme brut de la nature qu'il fait appel contre la thèse adverse. S'il pouvait y avoir plusieurs infinis, ils seraient autant d'individus d'une même espèce; or, on peut le voir par les espèces des êtres corruptibles, chacune d'elles est compatible avec une infinité d'individus; la seule différence est que, dans le cas de ce qui est nécessairement, non seulement il *pourrait* y en avoir, mais il y en aurait *nécessairement* une infinité: *si possent esse infinita necesse esse, sunt infinita necesse esse*. Or, ajoute Duns Scot, ce conséquent est faux, donc l'antécédent l'est aussi:[44] puisqu'il n'y a pas une infinité d'infinis, c'est que l'infini n'est pas une espèce et qu'il ne peut y en avoir qu'un seul. La même conclusion peut d'ailleurs être établie en recourant une fois de plus à minutieuse méthode dialectique par *A* et *B*. On s'applique alors à montrer que deux êtres nécessaires inclueraient chacun nécessairement tout ce que doit nécessairement inclure l'autre, ce qui revient à dire que rien ne permet de les distinguer.

Il est donc hors de doute que l'auteur de l'*Opus Oxoniense* tienne l'unicité de Dieu pour une vérité rationellement démontrable et qu'il y voie comme un corollaire de la notion, elle même rationellement justifiable, d'un être premier et infini. Certains arguments en sens contraire, qu'il laisse ailleurs sans réponse, se trouvent ici radicalement éliminés; ou bien donc ils n'ont jamais été pour lui que des expériences dialectiques; ou bien ils relèvent d'un autre ordre de recherches que celui de l'*Opus Oxoniense*; ou bien encore, après s'être un temps laissé retenir par eux, Duns Scot les a définitivement surmontés. Que ce soit pour l'une de ces raisons ou pour toute autre, c'est un fait que la grande synthèse théologique dont nous recueillons les maîtresses thèses philosophiques n'en a pas gardé la mondre trace. Tout se passe comme s'ils n'avaient jamais existé.

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[43] *Op. Ox., loc. cit.* n. 4, pp. 227-228.

[44] *Op. Ox., loc cit.* n. 5, p. 228.

The Fifteenth Century *Review of Politics* of Laurentius of Arezzo

ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST and JAMES A. CORBETT

WHEN Clement VII was elected Pope in 1378, a few months after the election of Urban VI, few people thought that the schism thus caused would long endure. But as the years passed and each of the two claimants not only refused to yield his claims but was succeeded on his death by another claimant, it became increasingly clear that the Church in the West was undergoing the worst split in its history. Already seriously in need of reform it required even more that unity without which reform would be difficult if not impossible to achieve. The attempt to end the schism at the Council of Pisa in 1409 not only failed but made matters worse when it elected a third claimant to the papal throne in the person of Alexander V. Despite this failure the conciliar theory, whereby a Council of the Church was considered as superior to the Pope, was still urged by many.

The crisis of the times, the need for reform, and the demands of the conciliar theorists produced a large body of writings on the nature of papal power. Much of this literature has not even yet been explored, much less edited. Yet the history of the period can hardly be considered well understood until this literature has become more fully known.

The text we present below illustrates the point. It is a rather modest and obviously incomplete fifteenth century descriptive bibliography of the sources used by its author, Laurentius de Aretio (Arezzo), in writing his *Liber de Ecclesiastica Potestate.* The text constitutes the *Prohemium* of Book II of this work.

Our information on Laurentius of Arezzo is meager enough. He tells us in his *Prohemium* that he is a doctor of laws, chaplain of Pope Eugene IV, and *auditor causarum* of the Sacred Palace. As Eugene IV reigned from 1431 to 1447 and as Laurentius tells us that he was already in his old age[1] when he wrote his *Liber de Ecclesiastica Potestate*, it is clear that he lived at least through a great part of the religious crisis caused by the schism. The other known facts of his life are few. He was secretary of Pope Gregory XII in 1408 when Benedict XIII and Gregory XII were negotiating a meeting before the Council of Pisa.[2] In 1416 he was lecturing on the *Decretales* at the University of Bologna.[3] Laurentius was a student in canon law of Franciscus de Zabarellis of Padua. The father of Laurentius, Domenico de Aretio, is reputed to have written a *Fons mirabilium universe* which he dedicated to Pope Martin V. Laurentius wrote a preface to it in which he praises his father and defends him against his critics.[4]

The *Liber de Ecclesiastica Potestate* has come down to us in only one fifteenth century copy.[5] Laurentius deals in its two books with questions of Church rela-

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[*] We take this occasion to express our sincere gratitude to Rev. G. B. Flahiff C.S.B. and Rev. T. P. McLaughlin C.S.B. of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies and to Madame André Rambaud, who is cataloguing the canon law manuscripts of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, and to Dr. Stephan Kuttner of the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., for helping us with some of the notes and identifications of texts.

[1] Laurentius states at the beginning of book I: Papistarum et antipapistarum conciliabulorum involutus et in senium jam ductus.

[2] N. Valois, *La France et le grand schisme d'occident* III (Paris, 1906), p. 577.

[3] Cf. Ch. Ghirardacci, *Hist. di Bologna* II, pp. 29, 610; S. Mazzetti, *Repetitorio di tutti i professori* . . . (Bologna, 1847), p. 186.

[4] G. Mazzuchelli, *Scrittori Italiani* (Brescia, 1753) I, 2, 1024.

[5] *Ms* Vat *Lat.* 4110, paper. The *prohemium* reproduced below is on folios 70^{v}-74^{r}. The whole work is in four manuscripts, *Ms* Vat. *Lat.* 4110-4114.

tionships and wrote it because of the confusion caused by the conflicting writings on contemporary ecclesiastical problems. His purpose was to study as much of the existing literature as possible and to bring out the leading ideas of the important authors. The whole work contains many extracts from the treatises he used. He cites over thirty authors. According to Eckermann[6] Laurentius was the first to use the expressions *conciliaristae* and *papalistae* in order to distinguish partisans of the papal and conciliar theories. Although a papalist himself, he does not disparage his opponents because they disagreed with him. He does however show a certain contempt for opportunists like Augustinus of Ancona and Petrus de Palude who capitalized on their positions as papal partisans to advance their own interests.

The work is interesting for its omissions as well as for the works included. Laurentius does not, for example, mention such writers as Dante, John of Paris, Landolphus of Colonna, Lupold of Bebenburg or Nicholas of Cusa. His information on those cited is not always very complete and sometimes is inexact as regards the authorship of certain treatises. Elsewhere his judgment seems a bit severe as when he calls Pierre d'Ailly *multae simplicitatis homo*.

The exact date of the *Liber de Ecclesiastica Potestate* is unknown, but judging from the authors and works mentioned as well as Laurentius' own position at the time of Eugene IV (1431-1447), to whom the work is dedicated, it seems probable that he wrote it between 1438 and 1444 and probably closer to the earlier than to the later date. He mentions specifically having read the sermon of John of Montenigro delivered on the Feast of the Apostles Peter and Paul (June 29), 1437. Laurentius also writes of the first edition of the *De Monarchia* of Antonius de Rozellis de Aretio,[7] the compatriot of Laurentius, which was dedicated to the Emperor Sigismund (1410-1437). Eckermann points out that Laurentius refers to a sermon of Ludovicus de Urbe given in Cologne in 1438.[8] One is tempted to give some weight in dating the work to the fact that Laurentius speaks of John of Torquemada only as a Spanish Dominican. Torquemada was made Cardinal-deacon of St. Sixtus in December 1439, a title which Laurentius would hardly have ignored or failed to mention if Torquemada was cardinal at the time that Laurentius was writing his work. Torquemada's work was dedicated to Julian Caesarini, Cardinal of the Holy Angels Church since 1430, under which title Laurentius refers to him. Since Caesarini was made Cardinal-bishop of Tusculum in 1444, and as Laurentius does not give him his later title, it is reasonable to conclude that he wrote his book before 1444. From the internal evidence we are inclined to conclude that the Liber was written between 1438 and 1444, and probably between 1438 and 1439.

If we may judge from what he says about the various authors mentioned and discussed in the *Liber*, Laurentius was rather discreet in his judgments. Only rarely as in the case of Pierre d'Ailly does he express contempt for the author cited, although on several occasions he remarks that certain other works of the author in question are not of great value. It is interesting to note in view of the long controversy on the matter that he accepts William of Ockham as the author of the *Defensor Pacis* of Marsilius of Padua. Marsilius wrote the *Defensor* between 1324 and 1326, over a century before Laurentius composed his work; and even though his contemporaries had pointed out to him the difference in style between Marsilius and William of Ockham, Laurentius, relying on the similar conclusions of both authors, still assigns the work to William for whom he has great respect.

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[6] K. Eckermann, 'Studien zur Geschichte des monarchischen Gedankens im 15. Jahrhundert,' *Abhandlungen zur mittleren und neueren Geschichte*, 73 (1933).

[7] See note 38 *infra*.

[8] Laurentius makes this statement on fol. 450 of *Ms* Vat. *Lat.* 4113 (part I). Cf. K. Eckermann, *art. cit.*, 11; *Deutsche Reichsakten* XIII, 567.

We give below the complete[9] Latin text and, in the footnotes, the identification of the authors and the works mentioned.

Prohemium, in quo enumerantur omnes, qui scripserunt in ista materia[10] *et a quibus iste liber decer[p]tus est. C. 1.*

[fol. 70^{v}] Quoniam solo Romano pontifice a jamdiu cuncta gubernante et disponente conciliorum provisio siluit et solum temporibus nostris in Pisana concilio quod fuit anno Domini M^{o}CCCCVIII[11] repulullare incepit et circa ordinationem status ecclesie quasi nova doctrina surgere visa fuit, circa quam diversi diversa scribere temptaverunt, non tamen ad totum scribentium quisque attingere visus est, sed sparsim de aliquibus quisque habere aliquid est conatus, ita ut omnibus adunatis multorum materia elucescat, ideo quod sparsim tradunt ordine oportuno collectum juxta requisitionem materie ponere laboravi. Ego Laurentius de Aretio, minimus juris doctor, domini nostri pape capellanus, sacri palatii causarum auditor, omniumque scribentium, quorum notas attingere potui, ita formaliter et sub debito ordine collocavi, ut cuique legenti facilime progressus pateat et conclusiva doctrina, multa insuper necessaria superaddens, ut potius legentes excitem ad veritatem investigandam, quam dicere audeam questiones non tantum dificilimas quantum suppremas evolvere et finire. Ea enim michi principaliter cura fuit, ut antiquorum sententias sequerer potius quam de intellectu meo confidens voluerim vel velim antiquorum oppinionibus quoquomodo preferri, cum scriptum cognoverim *Ecclesiastici* xxxix [1]: *Sapientiam antiquorum exquirit sapiens et narrationem veterum conservabit.* Et merito auctoritas illa procedit, cum *Proverbiorum primo* [5] dicatur, quod *audiens sapiens, sapientior erit.* Inter quos sapientes, ut scribit Johannes de Losilia[12] in sermone suo contra Urbanum VI^{m}: *Venerabiles sunt sacre theologie magistri, qui celebri fama dicuntur antiqui et crebra experientia nominati sancti.* Insuper sapientia canibus non exhibenda, cum margarite ante porcos minime immittende, *Mathei vii,* [6]. *Columpne marmoree super aureas bases fundate, Canticorum 2*^{o} [15]. *Viri fortes ex fortissimis Israhel, qui lectulum Salomonis ambiunt tenentes gladios et ad bella doctissimi uniuscuiusque ensis super femur suum per sermones* (sic) *nocturnos etc., Canticorum iii,* [7-8]. Contra *quos gladium habent spiritus quod est verbum domini* secundum Apostolum [*Ephes. vi, 17*], *qui sunt clipeus turris Davitice et armatura fortium militantis ecclesie. Canticorum iiii* [4] secundum eum.

Diligentia (fol. 71^{r}) ergo summa perquirens inveni primo de materia disserentem excellentem ac profunde scientie virum Guiglielmum de Occam[13] de ordine fratrum minorum inter theologos quasi primum, qui papalem materiam ac Concilii potestatem inceperit aperire et maxime in *Dyalogo* suo et in libro illo responsivo quem edidit ad certum processum Johannis XXII[14] contra magistrum Michaelem de Cesena[15] etiam fratrem minorum et sui ordinis generalem, presumptuosum tamen et temerarium in aliquibus suis dictis, ut maxime in principio clarissime se ostendit, uti artistarum est moris, qui fere omnem eorum doctrinam in garrulitate consumunt. Vulpinam insuper astutiam in opere hoc assumpsisse probatur, qui in toto *Dyalogo* se amicum fingens pape Johannis XXII librum illum tamen contra eum et ad illum convincendum hereticum studiosa arte composuit. Nam si per viam questionum materiam tradidisset, uti theologorum est moris, abscondere nequivisset, quomodo et qualiter doctrinam suam contra papam excogitasset. Unde dyalogi viam assumpsit, ut quod contra papam in libro illo continebatur, non ipse se, sed alios sentire dissimulavit. Excusatus ab aliquibus, quia tyrannidem dicti pape timens et perhorrescens, necesse habuit se abscondere in passibus, quos contra Romanum pontificem proferebat. Et quoniam novit juristas in premissis secundum jura judicaturos, suis argumentis probare conatus est circa operis sui principium, quod melius theologi quam juriste jura intelligant; hoc tamen curialitatis servavit, quia textus canonum vel glosas allegans per raro dampnavit. Et in tali cogitatu persistens ego nomini suo reverebar et virum hunc laudabam quoniam, quod magne scientie vir esset, eius opera que ad me devenerant demonstrabant. Sed fere per tres annos posteaquam hec scripseram, cum ad me devenisset quidam ex libris suis, quem *Defensorium Pacis*[16] intitulavit, in quo omnes oppiniones dampnatas scismaticas et hereticas,

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[9] K. Eckermann, *art. cit.*, gives an incomplete and faulty edition of this text in the appendix to her work. She likewise fails to identify nearly all the authors and works cited by Laurentius. Because her text is "lost" in her thesis which is hard to find and relatively unknown, we have felt a new edition of this important text to be justified.

[10] *Ista materia* refers to the *ecclesiastica potestas* as discussed in book I of the *Liber.*

[11] This should be 1409, of course.

[12] We have been unable to identify this author and his sermon.

[13] As to his life, cf. J. Hofer, 'Biographische Studien über Wilhelm von Ockham,' *Arch. Francisc. Histor.*, VI (1913), 209-233, 439-465, 654-669; F. Federhofer, 'Ein Beitrag zur Bibliographie und Biographie des Wilhelms von Ockham,' *Philosophisches Jahrbuch,* XXXVIII (1925), 26-48; E. Amann, *art.* 'Occam,' *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* XI (Paris, 1931), cols. 864-872; Ph. Böhner, *The Tractatus de Successivis Attributed to William Ockham* (New York, 1944), pp. 1-15; R. Guelluy, *Philosophie et théologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham* (Louvain, Paris, 1947), pp. 1-13. Many of the details about his life are still disputed; the period of his confinement at Avignon (1324-1328), while his works were examined for certain teachings which were considered unorthodox, is certain. His flight from Avignon to the court of the Emperor Lewis at Pisa and his later removal to Munich are likewise definite. It was from Munich that Ockham launched his more important anti-papal political treatises. He died in 1349 or 1350. L. Baudry announces from Paris a study in three volumes on Ockham's social and political philosophy; the first volume, which is now in the press, will deal with the life and works of Ockham and should do much to settle some of the points in dispute. Of Ockham's political writings the most important are: *Opus XC dierum* (1333/34); cf. J. G. Sikes and others, 'Guillelmi de Ockham Opera Politica,' (1940) I (chaps. 1-6) in: *Publications of the Univ. of Manchester* CCLXXIII; Goldast. *Monarchia sive Romani Imper.* II, (1611-1613) pp. 993-1236; *Dialogus,*

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part I (1334) in Goldast II, pp. 398-739; part II of the *Dialogus,* also called *Tractatus de dogmatibus Johannis XXII papae* (1336-1339) in: Goldast II, pp. 740-770; part III of the *Dialogus* (1338/39) in: Goldast II, pp. 771-957; *Tractatus contra Johannem XXII* (1335) in: R. Scholz, *Unbekannte kirchenpolitische Streitschriften Ockhams aus der Zeit Ludwig des Bayern* II (Rome, 1914), pp. 396-403; *Tractatus contra Benedictum XII* (1337) in: R. Scholz, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 403-417; *Compendium errorum Johannis XXII papae* (1338) in: Goldast II, pp. 432-453; *De plenitudine potestatis* (1338) in: *Zeitschr. für Kirchengesch.*, VI (1884), 108 ff.; *Allegationes de potestate imperiali* (1338) in R. Scholz, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 453 ff.; *Brevilogium de principatu tyrannico* (1342) in: R. Scholz, *Wilhelm von Ockham als politischer Denker und sein Breviloqium de principatu tyrannico* (Leipzig, 1944), pp. 39-207. Besides the literature cited above, see also G. de Lagarde, *La Naissance de l'esprit laïque au déclin du moyen âge* II (Vienna 1934), pp. 13 ff.; A. Dorner, 'Das Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat nach Occam,' *Theol. Stud.*, LVIII (1885), 672-772; K. Müller, *Der Kampf Ludwig des Baiern mit der römischen Kurie,* 2 vols. (1879-1880); K. Müller, 'Einige Aktenstücke und Schriften zur Geschichte der Streitigkeiten unter den Minoriten in der ersten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts,' *Zeitschr. für Kirchengesch.*, VI (1884), 63 ff.; E. Knotte, *Untersuchungen zur Chronologie der Schriften der Minoriten am Hofe Ludwig des Bayern* (Bonn, 1903); R. Scholz, *Die Publizistik zur Zeit Philip des Schönen und Bonifaz' VIII* (1903), pp. 456 ff.; W. Mulder, 'Gulielmi Ockham tractatus de imperatorum et pontificum potestate,' *Arch. Francis. Histor.*, XVI (1923), 469-492; XVII (1924) 72-97; R. Moeller, *Ludwig der Bayer und die Kurie im Kampf um das Reich* (1914).

[14] Laurentius refers here to Ockham's *Dialogus*, part I (written in 1334), and to Ockham's *Opus Nonaginta Dierum,* which latter was written about 1333 to refute Pope John XXII's condemnation of Michael of Cesena.

[15] Michael of Cesena (Michel de Césène) O. Min., general of the Franciscan Order, was deposed by Pope John XXII in 1326. He is the author of a protest against the "poverty decrees" of John XXII which was also signed by Ockham on April 13, 1328. Cf. J. Hofer, *op. cit.*, 454. Together with Bonagratia of Bergamo and Ockham he fled towards the end of May 1328 from Avignon where he had been held in confinement pending an investigation. After their excommunication on June 6, 1328 Bonagratia, Ockham, and Cesena took refuge with Emperor Lewis in Pisa. In 1330 Cesena accompanied the Emperor to Munich where he died in 1343. Cf. J. Hofer, *op. cit.*, H. Denifle, *Chartularium Univ. Par.* II, (1891) pp. 290; 321; E. Gudenatz, *Michael von Cesena, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Streitigkeiten im Franziskaner-Orden* (Breslau, 1876); A. Budinszky, *Die Universität Paris* (Berlin, 1876), p. 199.

[16] Laurentius obviously refers here to the *Defensor Pacis* of Marsilius of Padua, written between 1324 and 1326. Cf. R. Scholz, *Fontes Iuris Germanici Antiqui in usum scholarum ex Monum. Germ. Hist. separatum editi* (Hanover, 1932). Laurentius apparently assumes, although not without some hesitation, that Ockham and not Marsilius is the true author of the *Defensor.* This raises the question whether or not Marsilius was at least under the influence of Ockham, or Ockham under the influence of Marsilius, particularly since both lived and worked in Munich much at the same time. Marsilius and John of Jandun came to Munich in 1326, while Ockham arrived there only in 1330. As to the possible influence of John

quas in *Dyalogo* suo descripserat, fingendo quod non sue sed aliene essent oppiniones, in libro hoc *Defensorii* clare manifestavit suas fuisse et esse talia dicta a cunctis quasi communiter aliena: ex quo quidem intellexi pro tunc iniquissimum fore virum et non solum Romanorum pontificum seu prelatorum, sed totius Romane ecclesie inimicum, ut in conclusionibus ibi positis comprobatur. Et cum inter alias conclusiones suas unam ponat, in qua temporalitatem nullam clericis vel ecclesie competere constanter affirmet, quod multis auctoritatibus ac rationibus probare conatur, librum illum (fol. 71^{v}) principale fundamentum Bohemorum[17] fuisse puto, qui auctoritati ecclesie inludentes ac eius censuras parvipendentes insolentias nobis notissimas contra christicolas intulerunt, cuius dicta quedam satis turpia posui infra tractatu III, c. ii^{o}, § quoad octavum. Et sub compendio quedam alia eius dicta in variis locis aliis stomacanti animo recitavi. Excusant tamen eum quam plurimi asserentes librum illum, qui *Defensorium Pacis* appellatur, per eum non fuisse compositum sed per Marsilium quemdam de Padova aliquibus tamen Sacre Scripture auctoritatibus intermixtis, quod dicunt maxime patere ex stilo, qui totaliter diversus a stilo Guigliemi in dicto *Dyalogo*, quamquam in conclusionibus concordare videantur.

Hunc vero profunde scientie virum Alvarus[18] quidam natione Hyspanus, pape capellanus et apostolicus penitentiarius jurista tamen solum positivus et solum in opere suo canonum textus et canonistarum rationes allegans, civile quodammodo insequutus est de materia concilii et pape tractatum copiosum faciendo.

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of Jandun on the *Defensor*, cf. A. Gewirth, 'John of Jandun and the *Defensor Pacis,*' *Speculum,* XXII (1948), 267 ff., and the literature cited there. J. Sullivan, in his 'Marsiglio of Padua and William of Occam ' *Am. Hist. Rev.*, II (1897), 409-426, 593-616, denies that Ockham influenced Marsilius, as does J. Rivière in: *Dictionaire de théologie catholique* X, 153-177. J. Sauter, on the other hand, in his 'Die Entwicklung der abendländischen Staatsidee,' *Archiv für Rechtsphilos.*, XXVII (1933), 72-98, claims that "the really revolutionary ideas contained in the *Defensor Pacis* must be traced back to the influence of William of Ockham. Marsilius came under the influence of Ockham while both were teaching at the University of Paris. Hence the *Defensor Pacis* is but the product and manifestation of this influence." Also the statement of Pope Clement VI: hoc dicimus propter illum Guilelmum Occam, qui diversos errores contra potestatem et auctoritatem huius sanctae sedis docuit et docet et ab illo Guilelmo didicit et recipit ille Marsilius . . ., is absolutely unreliable. In view of the known facts (cf. note 13, *supra*) Ockham never studied or taught at Paris and did not meet Marsilius before 1330, while the latter had completed his *Defensor* by 1326. *Ms* Vat. *Lat.* 3075, edited by A. Pelzer in: 'Les 51 articles de Guillaume Ockham censurés en Avignon en 1326.' *Revue d'hist. ecclésiast.*, XVIII (1922). 240-270, contains a report, written 1325-1326, which finds that Ockham's heretical views did not concern any political matters. The statement of Pope Clement VI, quoted by J. Sauter, which is also found in the *Tractatus pro Romana Ecclesia et Pontifice Johanne XXII contra Wilhelmum Occam* by Conrad of Megendorf (quoted in: K. A. Höfler, 'Aus Avignon,' *Abhandl. d. kgl. böhm. Gesellsch. d. Wissenschaften,* 6th Folge, II [Prague, 1869], 29-31), is not sufficient evidence to permit us to assume that Marsilius was under the influence of Ockham. It should be remembered that during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Marsilius and Ockham, two highly publicized opponents of the papal theory, were often mentioned in one and the same breath and probably confused. Thus a magister Adamus (cf. note 19, *infra*) wrote a *Defensorium ecclesiae contra Marsilium et Occamum*, of which the first part is preserved in *Ms.* Vat. *Lat.* 4116. Cf. M. Grabmann, 'Das *Defensorium ecclesiae* des Magister Adam,' *Festschrift für Albert Brackmann* (Weimar, 1931), 569-581. See also the *Apologia contra Marsilium et Occamum* ascribed to Alvaro Pelayo; cf. note 18, *infra.*

[17] Laurentius refers here to the Hussites.

[18] Alvarus Pelagius or Alvaro Pelayo (1275 or 1280 to 1353) studied civil law and canon law at Bologna where he became a *doctor decretorum* in 1303. In 1304 he became a Franciscan, and shortly thereafter began to teach canon law at Perugia. In 1329 he was made penitentiary of John XXII at Avignon, in 1332 bishop of Coron (in Greece), and in 1333 bishop of Silves (in Portugal) where he remained until his death. Known as a scholar of encyclopedic learning he became a great canonist and successful defender of John XXII. His most famous work, and the one referred to by Laurentius, is the *De statu et planctu ecclesiae*, written in 1331-1332 by order of John XXII as a defence of the Pope and papal power against the attacks of Marsilius of Padua and other schismatic partisans of Emperor Lewis of Bavaria. The *Apologia contra Marsilium et Occamum*, ascribed to Alvaro, is probably part of the *De statu.* Cf. N. Jung, *Un franciscain théologien du pouvoir pontifical au XIV^{e} siècle; Alvaro Pelayo évêque et pénitencier de Jean XXII* (Paris, 1931).

Quorum tempore vel parum post Adam[19] quidam de fratrum minorum ordine, sacre theologie magister, phylosophus magnus, sophista maior, textualis vero parum, contra Guiglielmum de Occam in favorem pape Johannis copiosum tractatum composuisse dicitur, in quo de capitulo ad capitulum dicta Guiglielmi de Occam prosequutus totis viribus intellectus conatus est reprobare. Quem licet audiverim, tamen eius copiam et usum non habui, ut potuerim sicut de aliis eius rationes et dicta referre.

Post quos Augustinus de Anchona,[20] sacre pagine doctor eximius, librum illum de potestate pape composuit de factis concilii inter parum et nichil se immiscendo. Ex quo libro, quia papalem causam favit, in Ariminensem episcopum est promotus, cum beati Bernardi sententia sit, quod obsequium regni regis amicus habet.

Post quos vel horum tempore, michi non constat, Armacanus[21] profunde scientie vir et Guiglielmo de Occam in scientia par, sed numquid in passione consocius michi non constat, in libro suo X, c. xii, et multis sequentibus de symonia tractando tacite deducit papam posse committere symoniam. Nam cum communis sit doctorum oppinio, quod in prohibitis quia symoniacha papa dispensare non potest, juxta notam *De officio [et potestate judicis] delegati*, [capitulo] Ex parte I,[22] et capitulo Super eo;[23] *De pactis*, [capitulo] Cum pridem[24] in glossa iiiia,[25] probat ipse quod beneficia conferre ex munere conferre sit symonia prohibita, quia de natura sit symonia, unde tacite videtur imferre quod (fol. 72^{r}) papa ex pretio conferendo symoniam incurrit, cuius tractatus effectum, quia subtilibus rationibus valde movetur, ponam infra cap. VII, §VI, versu: *Oppono xiiii in crimine symonie*, versu: *Querit demum idem Augustinus*, versu: *Armacanus vero.*

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[19] Magister Adam lived towards the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century. (Cf. Quétif-Echard, *op. cit.*, I, p. 734). He is often referred to as Teutonicus (Cf. *Ms* Munich 2610, fol. 62, where he is called Adamus Alderspacensis). Although some people, like Laurentius, claim that he was a Franciscan, he is claimed as a Dominican by Quétif-Echard, *op. cit.*, II, p. 821: . . . per magistrum Adamum de ordine Praedicatorum . . . Cf. J. Stinzing, *Geschichte der populären Literatur des römischen und kanonischen Rechts* (Leipzig, 1867), pp. 502 ff. Adam wrote a *Defensorium ecclesiae contra Marsilium et Occamum* (*Ms Vat. Lat* 4116; cf. note 16, *supra*). Cf. M. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, 569-581.

[20] Augustinus Triumphus of Ancona was born 1243 in Ancona. Together with Egidius of Rome he studied in Paris and taught there as *baccalaureus* and *magister*. Later he went to the court of King Charles II (1284-1309) and Robert (1309-1343) at Naples where he died in 1328. Augustinus is perhaps the most outstanding spokesman of the absolute and direct jurisdiction of the pope in all secular matters. His numerous writings are listed by R. Scholz, *Die Publizistik zur Zeit Philipps des Schönen und Bonifaz' VIII*, pp. 173-175. His most important political work is the *Summa de potestate ecclesiastica ad Joannem XXII*, written in 1320 by the order of John XXII (Augsburg, 1473). It is, according to Scholz, *op. cit.*, p. 174, "the first comprehensive manual dealing with the papalist doctrine." Cf. R. Scholz, *Unbekannte kirchenpolitische Streitschriften* part I (Rome, 1911), part II (Rome, 1914), in which Scholz edits a *De prelatorum potestate* of Augustinus. Cf. U. Mariani, 'Scrittori politici medioevali, 3. Egidio Romano è Dante, Agostino Triomfo,' *Giornale Dantesco*, XXIX (1926), n°. 2; H. Finke, *Aus den Tagen Bonifaz' VIII*' pp. 250 ff.; S. Riezler, *Die litterarischen Widersacher der Päpste* (1874), p. 286; B. Hauréau, *Hist. de la phil. scholast.* II, 2, pp. 290 ff.; A. Gandolfo, *Dissertatio historica de 200 celeberrimis scriptoribus Augustinianis* (Rome, 1704), pp. 20-36; Ossinger, *Biblioth. Augustiniana* (1768), pp. 44-49. H. Finke, *op. cit.*, pp. LXIX-XCIX, has published a *Tractatus contra articulos ad difamandum Bonifacium Papam*, ascribed to Augustinus. M. Disdier, in: *Dictionaire d'hist. et de géographie ecclésiast.* V, 407, also ascribes to Augustinus the *De sacerdotio ac regno ac de donatione Constantini* and the *De ortu et fine imperii seu regni Romani*. Disdier bases his opinion on *Ms* Bibl. Angel. Vat 739. R. Scholz, in his *Unbekannte kirchenpolitische Streitschriften*, part I, 191, note 1, points out, however, that these two treatises are by Jean Quidort of Paris and Engelbert of Admont respectively, and that *Ms* 739 erroneously ascribes them to Augustinus. The remark of Laurentius that Augustinus was elevated to the bishopric of Rimini is incorrect.

[21] Richard Fitzralph or Richard of Armagh (in Ireland) or Richardus Hibernicus (Eubel, *Hiararchia Catholica Medii Aevi* I, p. 109), was born at Dunkalk, studied at Oxford where later he became Chancellor of the University in 1333, Chancellor of the Cathedral of Lincoln in 1334, and archbishop of Armagh in 1347-1360. He became deeply involved in the controversy between the secular clergy and the Friars in England. Among other works he wrote a *De statu universalis ecclesiae* (unpublished) to which Laurentius seems to refer. Cf. *art.* '*Fitzralph*,' in *Dictionary of National Biography;* A. G. Little, *The Grey Friars in Oxford* (Oxford, 1891); 'Catalogus Episcoporum Ardmachanae Ecclesiae.' in C. O'Connor, *Rerum Hibernicarum Scriptores* I (1814), 3, pp. 166 ff.; H. Macmahon, *Ius primatiale Armacanum in omnes archiepiscopos, episcopos, et universum clerum totius regni Hiberniae* (Dublin, 1728).

[22] *Decret. Greg. IX*, Lib. I, Tit. 29, cap. 12.

[23] *Decret. Greg. IX*, Lib. I, Tit. 29, cap. 15.

[24] *Decret. Greg. IX*, Lib. I, Tit. 35, cap. 4.

[25] Gloss *Illicitae pactionis speciem*, which is the fourth gloss on c. 4 (*Cum pridem* . . .), identified in the preceding note.

Post hec archidyaconus quidam de maioritate in ecclesia Tolletana vocatus Johannes Alfonsi[26] natione Yspanus *Tractatum de potestate ecclesiastica* compilavit et, ut dicitur, ipso existente in Constanciensi concilio aliquantisper attamen pro concilio contra papam inclinatus et, ut a diversis ibidem existentibus percipere valui, cum audisset Martinum electum in papam ecclesia prius non reformata in capite, ut optabat, pre dolore mundo relicto heremiticam vitam dicitur sibi assumpsisse, in qua tandem migravit ad dominum.

Scripserunt et ex post profunde scientie vir Antonius de Budrio[27] primo, qui morte preventus tractatum notabilem a se inchoatum complere nequivit. Sed ex post Matheus de Mathoselanis[28] de Bononia, doctor egregius, tractatum Antonii incompletum plenissime instauravit. Franciscus insuper de Zabbarellis[29] de Padua, doctor excellentissimus et in canonibus preceptor meus, qui tandem Cardinalis Florentinus communi vocabulo nuncupatur, tractatum composuit ad materiam facientem, quem in lectura sua super Clementinas, *licet de elec.*,[30] ut omnibus esset communior, commode situavit.

Post quem famosus doctor Petrus de Ancharano[31] multa et multis plura in favorem Romanorum pontificum conatus est aperire, quamquam primo de concilio Pisano alia multa notaverit, que omnia Deo duce, prout in locis suis occurret, effectualiter explicabo.

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[26] This is John Alfonsi of Segobia, identified in note 51, *infra.*

[27] Antonio de Butrio was born around 1338 in Bologna where he studied law under Peter of Ancharano (Cf. note 31, *infra*). He became a doctor of civil law in 1384, and doctor of canon law in 1387. Since 1391 he was an extraordinary and in 1399 an ordinary member of the *Collegium Doctorum Iuris Canonici* at Bologna and successor of Caspar de Calderinis. Between 1393 and 1400 he also taught canon law at Florence. In 1402 he went to Ferrara, but returned to Bologna in 1402. Together with Antonio Corraro and bishop William of Todi he was sent in 1407 to Marseilles by Gregory XII in order to negotiate with the anti-pope Benedict XIII (Petrus de Luna). He died in 1408. Among his many disciples were Johannes ab Imola, Matteo Mattesillani, Francesco Zabarella, and Dominico of San Geminiano. For his works cf. J. F. Schulte, *Die Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des canonischen Rechts* II (Stuttgart, 1877), p. 289. At the request of Balthazar Cossa Antonio also wrote a *Responsio* addressed to the Fathers of the Council of Pisa *Ms* (Mazarine 1687, fol. 122; *Ms* Dijon 578, fols. 210-251). There is an incomplete edition of this *Responsio* in Mansi, *Sanctorum Conciliorum* . . . XXVII (Vienna, 1784), 313. Cf. N. Valois, *La France et le grand schisme,* IV, p. 57. According to Laurentius the *Responsio* was completed by Matteo Mattesillani, a disciple of Antonio (cf. note 28, *infra*).

[28] Matheus Mathesalanis or Matteo Mattesillani of Bologna, the disciple of Antonio de Butrio (cf. note 27, *supra*), became a doctor of civil law in 1398, doctor of canon law in 1402, and afterwards professor of canon law at the University of Bologna. Cf. S. Mazzetti, *Repetitorio* . . . (Bologna, 1847), p. 205. There is no mention of any work by Matteo. O. Günther, 'Zur Vorgeschichte des Konzils von Pisa,' *Neues Archiv für Kirchengeschichte*, XLI (1920), 659, states that *Ms* Vat. Lat. 4138 contains, after a fragment of Antonio de Butrio, a continuation of this fragment by Matteo, thus supporting the contention of Laurentius that Matteo completed the *Responsio* of Antonio.

[29] Francesco Zabarella, born around 1335 in Padua, studied under Laurentius de Pina, Johannes de Lignano, and Antonio de Butrio in Bologna. He taught canon law in Padua until 1379, and in Florence until 1382. In 1382, after failing to be elevated to the bishopric of Florence, he returned to Padua where he resumed his teaching. He was an intimate friend of Peter of Ancharano. In Padua, where he enjoyed great fame as a teacher and scholar, he became archpriest of the cathedral, and also for a short time secular abbot of S. Maria di Pratuleo. Pope Boniface IX called him to Rome for advice in matters of the schism, but he soon returned to Padua and his teaching. In 1940 he was finally made bishop of Florence, and in 1411 Cardinal by John XXIII. He was very active as papal legate at the Council of Constance where he died November 6, 1417. Cf. B. Hübler, *Die Konstanzer Reformation* (Leipzig, 1867), p. 469. For his works see J. Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, p. 284; A. Kneer, *Kardinal Zabarella* (Münster, 1891): N. Valois, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 57-58. The *Lectura super Clementinas,* mentioned by Laurentius, is in: *Ms* Munich 3631. It was written probably between 1403 and 1408.

[30] There is no incipit or title in the *Clementinae* corresponding to these words. There is however a title *De electione et electi potestate* (*Clem.* I, 3). It is at least possible that the *de elec.* of the text refers to this title and that the copyist of our manuscript mistook an original *tit. de elec.* for *lic; de elec.*

[31] Peter of Ancharano was born around 1330. He was related to the House Farnese. He studied civil law under Baldus, the famous Glossator in Perugia. In 1384 he went to Bologna where he taught law together with Francisco de Zabarella and Antonio de Butrio. From 1387-1390 he taught canon law in Siena, 1390-1392 in

Postea vero Petrus de Morosinis,[32] qui dominus Venetiarum junior communiter appellatur, quamplura etiam et modo scientifico calamo annotavit.

Quo tempore insuper Johannes de Podio,[33] sacre theologie magister ordinis beati Dominici, tractatum composuit quem reverendissimo domino Alphonso[34] tituli sancti Eustachii dyacano Cardinali, nepoti recolende memorie illius magni Egidii[35] presbyteri cardinalis, multis cum laudibus inti[tu]lando direxit, in quo de suo parum apposuit sequendo maxime materiam, modum et stilum prefati archidiaconi, qui ut supra dixi tractatum composuit de ecclesiastica potestate, diminuteque etiam prosequendo oportuna multa, quod cum vir doctissimus esset sine causa non fecit, ut scilicet sine fructu indignationem pape incurreret, cuius benevolentiam ex post assequutus in favorem pape totaliter est adductus, ut notavi infra tractatu V capitulo iiii (fol. 72^v) § pro solutione vero quesiti, versu: *Johannes vero de Podio.*

Post quem etiam multa dimisit magne scientie vir Cathaldinus de Buoncompangnis de Visso,[36] qui magnam partem scripture sue consumpsit in maledicendo, blasphemando et diffamando Gregorium XII et Petrum de Luna,[37] quem tractatum Johanni XXIII intitulavit, quem papam de infinitis sanctitatibus et honestis moribus multipliciter commendavit. Unde cum manifestum esset et adhuc sit toti Christianitati dictum Johannem scelestem fuisse virum bonorum morum

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Venice, 1392(?)-1402 in Bologna, and 1402-1405 in Ferrara. He then returned to Bologna. During the schism he sided with Benedict XIII. In 1408 Gregory XII called both Peter of Ancharano and Antonio de Butrio to Lucca. In 1409 he was one of the emissaries in the University of Bologna at the Council of Pisa, and in 1415 John XXIII sent him to the Council of Constance as the *advocatus concilii*,. He soon returned to Bologna where he died May 13, 1416. Due to his learning and scholarly reputation he had a great influence not only on the two councils he attended, but also on the general study of law. In the preface of Mansi to Peter's *Responsio* Peter is called *jurisconsultum etate sua facile princeps.* His more important works, among them the *Allegationes juris pro concilio Pisano* and the *Responsio in eodem concilio,* edit. Mansi XXVII, 367-394, are quoted in J. Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, 278. Cf. G. Fantuzzi, *Scrittori Bolognesi* (1781-94) I, 230; A. Kneer, 'Zur Vorgeschichte . . .' *Histor. Jahrbuch*, XII (1891), 347. For Manuscripts see M. Souchon, *Die Papstwahlen in der Zeit des grossen Schismas* I, pp. 83; 137.

[32] Peter Morosini (Petrus Maurocenus), related to the Venetian House of Morosini, was professor of canon law in Padua, and later *protonotarius apostolicus.* Gregory XII made him cardinal deacon of St. Maria in Domnica in 1408. He was also the papal legate of Martin V in Naples. He died in Rome in 1424. He wrote a *Lectura in Sextum* (Manuscript in Vatican Library), and *Determinationes legum.* See Th. Trithemius, *De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis* (1494), p. 129: Hain, *Repertorium* . . . (1832-36), 15613; J. Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, p. 43.

[33] According to Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, p. 311, Johannes de Podio or John of le Puy was born in Bologna between 1400 and 1405. He became a *doctor utriusque iuris* in Bologna about 1433; professor of canon law at Bologna 1433-1445; canon of the cathedral of Bologna in 1439; vicar general (in 1445) and bishop of Bologna March 1447. He was a great friend of Bishop Tomaso Parentucelli, later Pope Nicholas V. In September 1447 he was made governor of the City of Rome and Vice-Chancellor of the Church of Rome. He died December 1447 in Rome. His most famous political theatise is the *De potestate summi pontificis et concilii.* He also wrote an *Invectiva in Felicem Antipapam* (Basel, 1538). N. Valois, in his *Le Pape et le Concile* I, (1909) p. 173, calls him a Dominican and inquistor at Toulouse who wrote a treatise on the reciprocal powers of the council and the pope which he dedicated to Alfonso Carillo. It is called *De potestate concilii generalis et pape* (*Ms* Bibl. nat. *lat.* 1521, fols. 194-219).

[34] Alfonso Carillo was a Spanish cardinal who contributed more than anyone else to the election of Eugene IV. He was advisor of Charles VII of France on ecclesiastical affairs. Cf. the many references to him in N. Valois, *op. cit.* He was cardinal deacon of St. Eustache from 1408 to his death in 1434.

[35] There were five other cardinals with the name of Aegidius in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries; it is difficult to say which one is referrd to here.

[36] Catholdinus de Buoncampagnis de Visso was a famous canonist who died around 1435. The treatise mentioned by Laurentius is published in Mansi, XXVII, 449-488, under the title: *Cataldinus de Visso ad SS. Patrem et D. Clementissimum D. Joannem XXIII sacrosanctae et universalis ecclesiae unicum SS. et verum pastorem tractatus.* Cf. G. Mazzuchelli, *Scrittori d'Italia* II, 4 (1763), 2369 ff.

[37] Petrus de Luna was the antipope Benedict XIII (1394-1417).

insuper nullorum expertem, occasione tamen tam aperti mendacii arguitur et concluditur eum ob spem premii plus passionate quam vere fuisse loquutum.

Verum nunc nuper Antonius de Royzellis de Aretio,[38] compatriota meus, in sacro palatio advocatus, subtili consideratione multa composuit. Quia tamen principaliter liber suus ad considerationem accedit papalis excellentie ad imperium et econtra et sic ecclesiastice potestatis ad temporalem etiam et econtra, quam partem, ut in huius prohemio libri scripsi, sibi relinquo, reliqua vero clericatus potestatem solum respiciencia in presenti opere annotavi.

Post quem egregius doctor Thomas de Burago,[39] in sacro consimiliter palatio advocatus, Herveum[40] sequens et ei aliquibus superadditis et certo eius ordine commutato tractatum illum sibi appropriavit.

Et demum reverendus pater Guaspar de Perusio,[41] episcopus Frequentinus multa fundamentaliter sed brevissime conscribendo calamo annotavit.

Ac etiam famosus doctor Nicolaus de Sycilia,[42] abbas Maniatensis, etiam in modum disceptationis et cause sub quinque questionibus multa tractavit.

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[38] Antonio de Rozzellis (or, Rosselli) of Aretio was born around 1386. He became a doctor of civil law at Bologna in 1407. Soon afterwards he moved to Siena and then, upon the invitation of Pope Martin V, he went to Rome. Both Martin V, and Eugene IV used him frequently on important diplomatic missions. Failure to be appointed cardinal is said to be the reason why de deserted the papal party, and why, after fleeing from Rome, he wrote his *De Monarchia* or, *De potestate imperatoris ac pape*. He is also credited with the authorship of the bull *Deus novit* (1433). In 1438 he became professor of law at the University of Padua. Cf. K. Eckermann, *op. cit.;* N. Valois, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 253-260; J. Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, p. 303. Fabricius, *Bibl. Lat.* I, p. 131. The *De Monarchia* was condemned after its author's death in 1466.

[39] Tomaso de Burago (or, Birago) is possibly Tomaso di San Giovanni, doctor of laws in 1376, professor of civil law in Bologna from 1378-1384. He died in Bologna in 1421. Cf. C. Ghirardacci, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 25; 389 ff.; S. Mazzetti, *Repetitorio* . . . (1847), p. 306. According to K. Eckermann, *op. cit.* 165, *Ms* Vienna *lat.* 5129 ff. 72ʳ-78ᵛ contains a treatise by Thomas of Birago which begins: *Carissimi fratres et socii. Requisisti a me ut de auctoritate et potestate concilii universalis . . . scriberem ego Thomas de Birago, sacri consistori advocatus.* The ideas of Thomas de Birago closely follow those of Antonio de Rozzellis.

[40] Herveus Natalis Brito or Hervé de Nédélec entered the Dominican order in 1276, became *magister actu regens* in the faculty of theology in Paris from 1307-1309, Provincial of France in 1309, and General of the Order in 1310. In 1314 he presided over the commission charged with the examination of Durandus de S. Porciano's *Commentaria in quattuor libros sententiarum P. Lombardi.* He died August 7, 1323 in Narbonne. He wrote *De potestate pape, de jurisdictione ecclesiastica et de exemptione* (*Ms.* Vat. *Lat.* 859). Cf. Hauréau and Valois, 'Hervé de Nédélec' *Histoire littéraire de la France* XXXIV (1914), p. 308. The *De potestate pape* apparently is directed against John of Polliaco. It maintains that the authority of the bishops and the priests, like that of the pope, is directly derived from Christ. As to the power of the secular princes he states: Alii principes (scilicet seculares) non sunt vicarii Dei expresse et implicite per institutionem expressam et explicitam . . . possunt tamen principes dici vicarii Dei implicite . . . Cf. Quétif-Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum* I, pp. 500-502; F. Lajard, *Hist. litt. de la France* XXV (1869), pp. 244-266; B. Hauréau, *Hist. de la philos. scholast.* II, 2 (1872-80), p. 126; H. Finke, *Aus den Tagen Bonifaz* VIII (1902) pp. 170-177; F. Scholz, *Die Publizistik* . . . pp. 275-333; Mortier, *Hist. des maîtres généraux de l'ordre des frères prêcheurs* II, 412-525; E. Elter, 'Un ouvrage inconnu de Hervé,' *Gregor.*, IV (1923), 211; H. Finke, *Acta Concilii Constant.* II, 431; 720.

[41] Caspar of Perugia, *advocatus consistorialis* (according to H. Finke, *Acta* . . ., III, 544; IV, 284), was the Benedictine abbot of St. Peter in Perugia in 1404. Pope Martin V made him bishop of Frigento in 1424. (The bishopric of Frigento was united with that of Avellino in 1466.) Caspar died in 1455. He took part in the Council of Constance where he attracted much atention by espousing the cause of Poland against Johann von Falkenburg. Cf. J. Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 370; 381; Fabricius, *op. cit.*, III, p. 64; G. B. Vermiglioli, *Scrittori Perug.* II (1829) pp. 259 ff.; H. Finke, *Acta* . . . II, pp. 242; 279; IV, p. 284.

[42] Nicholaus of Sicily or Nicholaus Tudeschi, also called Nicholaus Panormitanus (Palermo) or Abbas Siculus, was born between 1386 and 1389 in Catania in Sicily. He entered the Benedictine order and studied canon law under Francesco Zabarella (Cf. note 24, *supra*) in Padua. He taught canon law at Siena, Parma, Bologna and perhaps Florence. In 1425 Pope Martin V made him abbot of S. Maria de Miniacio (or Miniatio) near Messina. Later he became *referendarius* and *auditor generalis* of the *camera apostolica* as well as privy counsel of King Alfonse of Castile. In 1427 he was elevated to the arch-bishopric of Palermo. He was the legate of King Alfonse to the council of Basel. He first sided with Eugene IV, but when the latter broke with Alfonse he supported Felix V who made him a cardinal in 1440. He died in 1453, or according to some, in 1445. Nicholaus was one of the greatest canonists

Post quem famosus doctor Prodoccius de Padua[43] eodem fere tempore vel parum post quedam licet pauca conscripsit. Habuimus et ex post *Responsivam* Basiliensis concilii ad oratores domini nostri pape, in qua multa tanguntur.

Post quos omnes copiose scientie vir Ludovicus de Urbe,[44] domini nostri pape capellanus et sacri palatii auditor, copiosissime multa diffudit.

Scripsit etiam de materia copiosissime scientie vir Dominicus de Sancto Geminiano,[45] tempore quo fuit in curia camere apostolice auditor, qui notata per Antonium de Budrio[46] magistrum suum et notata per Petrum de Ancharano[47] quodammodo decerpendo inter parum et nichil de suo judicio annotavit.

Verum novissime ad manus meas devenit Petrus de Palude,[48] sacre theologie magister, de ordine Predicatorum, qui, uti Incipit et Explicit dicti libri *Annotatio* probatur seu de- (fol. 73r) ducitur, quod patet, quod patriarcha Yerosolimitanus fuit, sed quo tempore michi non constat. Qui tractatum suum in sex divisit capitula, que articulos vocat, et sub unoquoque articulo questiones plurimas

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of the Middle Ages (*lucerna juris*), a fact which explains why he was so often quoted despite his political views. For manuscripts see J. Chmel, *Sitzungsbericht d. Kaiserl. Akad. d. Wiss. philos. hist. Klasse*, V (1851), 73 ff. Cf. J. Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, p. 312; J. Trithemius. *op. cit., p.* 353; Fabricius, *op. cit.*, V, pp. 134; 393 ff.; 575 ff.; Aeneas Silvius, *De viribus illustribus* 19; J. Doujat, *Praenotationum Canonicarum libri V* (Venice, 1717), 447; A. von Hove, *Commentarium Lovaniense in codicem iuris canonici*, I, 1, proleg. (1928), p. 263; J. Grossis, *Abbas vindicatus sive de Nicolai de Tudeschis . . . vita* (Florence, 1651). His sermon at Basel against the dissolution of the Council in 1437 can be found in Mansi, XXXI, 1123-1184. Cf. N. Valois, *op cit.*, *passim;* J. Chmel. *op. cit.*, *passim;* J. Schweitzer, *Nicolaus de' Tudeschi* (Strasbourg, 1927).

[43] Prodoccius of Padua is Prosdocimus Patavinus or Prosdocimus de Comitibus. In 1398 he was made a member of the *collegium juridicum*, and in 1403 professor of canon law at the University of Padua. After a brief sojourn in Siena he returned to Padua in 1411 where he taught both civil and canon law. In 1412 he was made lay chancellor of the bishop Petrus Marcellus of Padua. In 1426, together with two of his colleagues at the Univesity of Padua, he was charged with carrying on peace negotiations with the Duke of Milan. In 1429, after having been denied an increase in salary, he left Padua and went to Florence where he died in 1438. For his writings see J. Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 298 ff. Cf. Fabricius, *op. cit.*, VI, pp. 62 ff.

[44] Ludovicus de Urbe is Ludovicus de Roma, or Ludovicus de Ponte Romanus, papal chaplain and *sacri palatii auditor*. N. Valois, *op. cit.*, I, p. 254, quotes a sixteenth century manuscript (*Ms* Vat. *Lat.* 4189, fol. 170) which has the title: Incipit epistola pro veritate catholica ac justificatione S. Concilii Basiliensis defendenda, composita a Ludovico de Roma contra bullam que non est per dominum nostrum promulgata; sed dicitur Antonium de Rozellis fecisse. This refers to the bull *Deus novit*, forged by Antonius de Rozzellis. Cf. note 33, *supra;* J. Chmel, *op. cit.*, p. 56 cites: Ludovico de Roma Propositiones III, and also gives manuscripts. Other works by Ludovicus are: *Commentarii* (Frankfurt, 1577), and *Consilia* (Lyons, 1548).

[45] Dominico di San Geminiano was vicar of the bishop of Modena in 1407, and took part in the Council of Pisa. He was for a long time professor of law at Bologna and finally *auditor camerae* in Rome. He was a pupil of Antonio di Butrio (see note 27, *supra*). For his works see J. Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 294 ff.; F. Savigny, *Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalters* III (2d edit., Heidelberg, 1834-51), pp. 40 ff.; G. Panzirolus, *op. cit.*, II. p. 75.

[46] Cf. note 27, *supra.*

[47] Cf. note 31, *supra.*

[48] Petrus de Palude O.P., lectured on the *Sententiae* of Peter Lombard in Paris in 1309/10. In 1313/14 and 1316/17 together with John of Naples he drew up a list of 225 points in which Durandus de S. Porciano differed from the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Cf. J. Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano* (1927). In 1314-1317 he was *magister actu regens* at Paris and in 1317 he became General of the Dominican Order. In 1329 he was made Patriarch of Jerusalem. He died in 1342. Petrus has been credited with the authorship of the *Annotatio de causa immediate ecclesiastice potestatis* (Paris, 1506), written in 1329 according to Broderick, *Cardinal Bellarmine* I, p. 256. M. Grabmann would attribute this treatise to Cardinal Guillaume de Payre de Godin. Cf. M. Grabmann, 'Kardinal Petri de Godini O.P. und seine Lectura Thomasina,' *Divus Thomas*, 3rd series IV (Freiburg, 1926), 390 ff. Cf. P. Fournier, 'Le Cardinal Guillaume de Payre de Godin,' *Bibl. de l'Ecole des Chartes*, LXXXVI (1925), 100 ff.; J. Koch, 'Der Prozess gegen den Magister Johannes de Polliaco und seine Vorgeschichte,' *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, V (1933), 391 ff. Fournier and Koch insist that Petrus is the author of the *De cause immediata*. See also M. Laurient, 'Le testament et la succession du Cardinal Dominicain Guillaume de Pierre de Godin,' *Arch. Frat. Praed.*, II (1934), 84-231. *Ms* Bibl. Nat. *lat.* 4046 also contains an anonymous treatise, *De Potestate Ecclesiae*, which according to R. Scholz, *Unbekannte kirchenpolitische Streitschriften . . .*, pp. 250-255, has been composed by a Dominican and, we suggest, by Petrus de Palude. The *Annotatio* in six chapters or articles mentioned by Laurentius is nothing other than the *De causa immediate ecclesiastice potestatis*, the full title of which is *Annotatio de causa. . .*

situavit quas multum favorabiliter in sancte sedis subsidium pertractavit. Nec Guiglielmus de Occam tam subtiliter copiose diligenti cura per eum posita pertractavit quin Petrus iste magis in simplici sua loquutione tradiderit nota sua. Quia tamen papalem partem viriliter nec (*sic*) dicam effrene defendit, in partriarcham Yerosolomitanum dicitur fuisse promotus. Quo autem tempore fuerit vel scripta sua composuerit, michi non constat.

Sed ex post pervenit ad me liber quidam multorum celebrium virorum X tractatus continens qui ad libri materiam valde spectat.

Et ex post quendam tractatum habui fomentum habens ex disputationibus theologorum existentium Basilee quorum dicta recollegisse dicitur quidam excellens sacre theologie magister nomine magister Johannes de Ra(g)usio,[49] ordinis fratrum predicatorum, cuius tractatus scripta pro maiora parte magnam disputantium scientiam presupposuit et intellectus acumen.

Ac deinde tractatum habui editum a magne scientie viro domino Johanne patriarcha Anthyoceno,[50] in quo pro papa et contra papam multa adducens tandem pro potestate concludit ecclesie.

Post quem magne scientie vir dominus Johannes Gandisalvi,[51] Gadicensis episcopus, etiam multa scripsit.

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[49] John of Ragusa, or Johannes Stoici or Stojkovich of Ragusa in Dalmatia, was born between 1390 and 1395. He joined the Dominican Order, and being an extremely talented and learned person with a considerable knowledge of Eastern languages he achieved his master and doctor degrees in sacred theology in Paris in 1420. Cf. Quétif-Echard, *op. cit.*, I, p. 797. In 1426 he became Procurator General of the Order in Rome under Martin V who also made him one of his theologians at the Council of Basel. He arrived at Basel May 19, 1431 and, due to the failure of Cardinal Julian de Cesarini to arrive on time, he assumed the *pro tempore* presidency of the Council which opened July 23. He became famous for pressing the charges against the Hussites. He was also one of the strongest opponents to any transfer or dissolution of the Council. In 1433, and again in 1434-37 he went to Constantinople as the legate of the Council in order to bring about a reunion of the Catholic and the Greek churches. In 1439 he became bishop of Ardjish (Argos) and died October 1443. For manuscripts see J. Chmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 53, 56, 84. Cf. A. Touron, *Hist. des hommes illustres de l'Ordre de S. Dominique* III (1743-49), pp. 246-264; R. Beer, 'Eine Handschriftenschenkung aus dem Jahre 1443,' *Serta Hartel* (1896), 270; N. Valois, *op. cit., passim; Monumenta conciliorum generalium seculi decimi quinti, concilium Basiliense scriptorum* I, (Vindobona, 1857), VIII-XVIII.

[50] This is John Maurosii, a famous canonist and born intriguer of the first half of the fifteenth century. He was the 'idol' of Emperor Sigismund and a close friend of Petrus de Luna, the anti-pope Benedict XIII who made him patriarch of Antioch. He played a most puzzling role at the Council of Constance and of Basel where he was the center of many stormy controversies. At Constance he defended the thesis that the pope is above the council and thereby incurred the personal enmity of Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly. At Basel, however, he insisted that the council was above the pope. In a similar change of conviction he first sided with the pope against Emperor Sigismund, but later sided with the emperor against the pope. At one time he was the most respected member and president of the French delegation at Constance, but later he was expelled from this delegation because he favored the German emperor and England against France. He was vice-chancellor of the Roman Church in 1415, but was deposed from this office in 1417. Old and poor, pope Eugene IV conferred upon him a Benedictine priory in 1435. His most important works are: *Johannis Patriarchi Anthiocheni Propositio in Constantiani concilio facta, quod papa a negotiis excludi non possit;* Mansi, XXIX, 31-33; *Opuculum Johannis Patriarchae Antiocheni de superioritate inter concilium et papem,* written in 1434; Mansi XXIX, 512-532. In this latter work John contests the pope's right to bear the title of sovereign pontiff. Jean Granion published a better edition in Paris in the fifteenth century. This treatise was first published as a reply to Thomas de Virago. For manuscripts see J. Chmel, *op. cit.*, p. 77; Fabricius, *op. cit.*, IV; N. Valois, *Le Pape et le Concile, passim;* H. Finke, 'Zur Charakteristik des Patriarchen Johannes Maurosii von Antioch,' *Römische Quartalzeitschrift*, II (1888), 1, 165; v.d. Hardt, *Concilium Constantiense* II, p. 155. The work to which Laurentius seems to allude is also mentioned by J. Chmel, *op. cit.*, p. 77: *Johannis Antiocheni opusculum in concilio Basiliensi* . . . in which he states: quibus attestis, constat, papam non esse supra ecclesiam universalem, nec per consensus supra concilium generale ipsam repraesentans. . .

[51] Johannes Gundisalvi (John Gonzales) O.P., who lived at the time of the council of Pisa, was canon of Seville, professor of canon law at the University of Salamanca, *decretalium doctor, capellanus Sacri Palatii, auditor causarum*, and bishop of Cadiz (1426-1440). He died in 1440. Cf. C. Eubel, *Hierarchia*, I (2d edit.), p. 258; II, p. 157. N. Antonio, *op. cit.*, II, p. 203, note; Fabricius, *op. cit.*, III, 75 ff.; Quétif-Echard, *op. cit.*, I, p. 79. Gundisalvi is the author of the *Contra duos pontifices de papatu inter se*

Devenit insuper ad manus meas liber quidam, qui *Pacis Defensorium* nuncupatur, editus a Guiglielmo de Occam[52] in favorem Henrigi imperatoris[53] contra Romanum pontificem et Romanam curiam et contra universalem statum ecclesie, in quo multa prophana et multa mendosa et heretica continentur. Commotus [est] contra papam et clerum, quia cernebat non juxta virtutes sed ob temporalitates promotiones fieri et ecclesiam militantem per indignos regi et gubernari, super quo in variis locis querelanter multa promebat. Unde cum non videret regimen ecclesie apte reformari posse nisi, temporalitate summota, quo tunc tempore soli virtuosi constantes essent onera mundana portare adversus tribulationes seculi faciendo se principes et prelatos, id tempus videre optabat; ob quod contra statum ecclesie falsa multa confingens, ad quantum in eo fuit seculares potentias animabat. Optabat ergo ineptias iniquorum prelatorum contundi et reprimi, quod non infitior, sed quod ecclesiastica iurisdictione uti non possint ecclesiasticis (fol. 73^{v}) libris consonum nequaquam existit.

Ex post vero opusculum quoddam ad me devenit a reverendissimo in Christo patre et domino Johanne tituli Sancti Sixti[54] presbitero Cardinali compositum, ut famatur. In quo possetenus papalia jura defendens in tantum concilium pro nichilo reputavit, quod in scriptis suis concluserit concilium potestatem nullam in se habere vel habuisse, nisi, quatenus per Romanum pontificem pro tempore existentem concedatur eidem multis tamen acutis rationibus et motivis suffultum. Ex qua positione deducit, quod concilium papam judicare non potest de quocumque defectu etiam si labe sit heresis annotatus.

Post cuius Cardinalis mortem quedam magna additio ad dictum tractatum ad me devenit, in cuius principio Julianus Tagliada,[55] Bosanus episcopus, consimiliter de ordine Predicatorum, vir quidem profunde scientie, narrando qualiter, cum ipse tractatum prefatum composuisset librum, et quidam[56] conclusionem illam per se positam in tractatu illo scilicet, quod concilium generale in nullo casu potestatem habeat contra papam, ad conclusionem illius clarius probandam additionem illam fecit. Et sic clare dat intelligere, quod non dominus S. Sixti, sed ipse Tagliada libellum illum composuit, cuius facti series aliter michi nota non est.

Et demum quedam summa ad me devenit, cuius auctoris nomen pro adhuc invenire non valui, divisa in decem capitula que vocat *Advisamenta*, que plenissime facientia pro ecclesia et concilio enarravit, papalia vero jura quodammodo obumbrata dimittens; ut postea clarus effectus summam illam composuit

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contendentes. Ad Patres Concilii Pisani (s.l. et s.t.), quoted in Antonio, *loc. cit.* See J. Chmel, *op. cit.*, V, p. 83 (fol. 41): Christi nomine invocato Reverendissimo in Christo patri et Domino Dei gratia Archiepiscopo Hispalensi, vester canonicus Johannes Gundisalvi, sacri palatii causarum auditor, necnon unus de regentibus actu in jure canonico Cathedram Universitatis Salamanticensis licet indignus.

[52] See notes 16 and 13, *supra.*

[53] Emperor Henry VII of the House of Luxembourg (1308-1313). Laurentius is in error if he believes that William of Ockham or for that matter, Marsilius of Padua, wrote in favor of Emperor Henry VII. See note 13, *supra.*

[54] This is definitely Cardinal John of Casanova O.P., *magister theologiae.* He was at one time confessor of King Alfonse of Aragon. In 1418 he was appointed *magister Sacri Palatii* by Martin V. In 1425 he was elevated to the bishopric of Elne (or Elnen, suffr. of Narbonne). In 1430 he was made Cardinal priest of St. Sixtus. He died in 1436 in Florence. He is the author of the *Tractatus de potestate papae super concilium*, and the *Tractatus contra schismaticos Basilienses.* Cf. N. Antonio, *op. cit.*, II, p. 234; Quétif-Echard, *op. cit.*, I, p. 79; A. de Altamura, *Biblioth. Dominicana* (Rome, 1677), pp. 176 ff.; C. Eubel, *op. cit.*, I, p. 34; I, p. 37; I, p. 239.

[55] Julian Tagliada or Julian Tallada O.P., master in theology, was elevated in 1432 to the bishopric of Laodicea (in Syria), and in 1435 to that of Bosa. Cf. C. Eubel, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 109; 171; A. Frühwirth, *Acta capitulorum generalium ordinis praedicatorum* III (Rome, 1900) pp. 164; 184; B. Reichert, *Monumenta ordinis fratrum praedicatorum* VII (Rome, 1904), p. 92; F. Diago, *Historia de la provincia de Aragon v de la orden de predicatores* (Barcelona, 1599), p. 65. According to Laurentius this Tallada seems to have written an *additio* to the *De potestate papae super concilium* of John of Casanova. Cf. note 54, *supra.*

[56] The sense would seem to call for a verb meaning "attacked", of which *quidam* would be the subject.

quidam sacre theologie excellens doctor magister Johannes de Segobia[57] natione Yspanus presbiter secularis.

Habui insuper sermonem fratris Johannis de Montenigro[58] Ianuensem (*sic*), sacre pagine professorem (*sic*) ordinis Predicatorum, quem recitavit Basilee in generali synodo ibidem congregata in solempnitate apostolorum Petri et Pauli anno Domini MCCCCXXXVII. In quo licet multa in favorem potestatis Petri eloquenter posuerit, quia tamen fere in omnibus sequutus est Petrum de Palude,[59] maxime in conclusione, scilicet quod omnis potestas jurisdictionis ecclesiastice fuerit a Christo in solo Petro et ab eo transfusa in alios, ideo eius dicta parum differentia a dictis Petri apponere non curavi cum dicta Petri ad plenum recollegerim et infra per diversa loca posuerim debite ubi cadunt.

(fol. 74^r) Novissime quoque etiam tractatum domini Petri Cameracensis,[60]

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[57] John (Juan) Alfonsi of Segovia (see note 26, *supra*), archdeacon of Oviedo and professor of theology at Salamanca, was made Cardinal Priest of St. Calistus by the anti-pope Felix V in 1440. He participated in the Council of Basel and became its historiographer. One of the most ardent defenders of the conciliar theory he was dismissed as cardinal by Martin V. In 1453 he was made archbishop of Caesarea and finally retired to a priory in Savoy where he consoled himself by translating the Koran and writing his monumental history of the Council of Basel, a work of conscientious scholarship. Almost all of his works remained unpublished. Aside from his *Historia gestorum generalis synodi Basiliensis* (E. Birk, *Monumenta conciliorum generalium seculi XV*, [1873-1896] II-III) he also wrote: *Septem allegationes et totidem advisamenta pro informatione Patrum concilii Basiliensis . . . circa Marie immaculatam conceptionem* (Brussels, 1664); *De auctoritate ecclesie* (or, *De insuperabili sanctitate et suprema auctoritate generalium conciliorum*), which contains a complete exposition of the conciliar theory. It was published in 1433. Cf. *Ms* Vat. Palat. *Lat.* 600. *Justificatio sacri Basiliensis concilii et sententie ipsius contra Gabrielem olim Eugenium papam IV*; *De magna auctoritate episcoporum in concilio generali.* For manuscripts see J. Chmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 54; 68; 72. Cf. J. Vinke, in: Buchberger, *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* V, p. 531; R. Beer, *Monumenta Conciliorum Generalium saeculi XV: Concilium Basiliense* III, 4; A. Zimmermann, *Juan de Segovia* (Breslau, 1882); J. Chmel, *op. cit.*, p. 68, also mentions a *Tractatus magistri Johannis de Segovia de Ecclesiastica Potestate*, written in 1437, and (*ibid.*, p. 72) the *Avisamenta Johannis de Segovia*, completed before October 1438. This is probably the work to which Laurentius refers when speaking of John's *Advisamenta.* Cf. N. Valois, *op. cit.*, index; C. Eubel, *op. cit.*, II, p. 113; J. Gonzales, *El maestro Juan de Segovia y su bibliotheca* (Barcelona, 1944), lists among the works of John a *Petitio de superioritate et excellentia supremae potestatis ecclesiasticae facta Salamantice per Johannem Alfonsi de Segovia.* N. Antonio, *Bibliotheca Hispania vetus* II (Madrid, 1788), pp. 225-234, lists also a *De summa auctoritate episcoporum in universali concilio;* a *De actis concilii Basiliensis;* and a *De mittendo gladio in Saracenos.* Cf. v.d. Hardt, *Antique literarum monumenta* (1690-93), 1345-1385. Hurter, *Nomenclator literarius theologiae catholicae* II (1906), 831, mentions a *Tractatus avisamentorum* which is probably identical with the *Septem allegationes et totidem advisamenta. . .*

[58] John of Montenigro (in Etruria) O.P., became provincial of the Dominican Order in Lombardy in 1432. He was also professor of Holy Scripture. At the Councils of Basel and Florence he stood out as one of the most active theologians. At Basel he opposed the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, and at Florence he played an important part in winning over the Greeks for a reunion. A dialogue discussion between John of Montenigro and Torquemada before the Greeks is found in Mansi, XXXI, 119 ff. Cf. N. Valois, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 321; 393; article on John of Montenigro in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique;* A. Touron, *op. cit.*, III., p. 287; Quétif-Echard, *op. cit.*, I, p. 799; II, p. 823; J. Chmel, *op. cit.*, *p.*, 72. We have not been able to identify the sermon mentioned by Laurentius. The Kgl. Bibl. in Stuttgart (*Ms Chart.* in fol. *Sec.* XVIII, fols. 241, vol. XXVI) fol. 1, contains the *Avisamenta Dominis Johannis de Segovia . . . de conceptione Marie . . .*, to which Hardt adds the following remark on the title page: A. 1438 seems to imply that these *avisamenta* were dircted against the magister Johannes de Monte Nigro: in *Ms* Wolffenbüttel n° 71.4, folio 33. Cf. J. Chmel, *op. cit.*, p. 72; Hurter, *op. cit.*, II, p. 820.

[59] See note 48, *supra.*

[60] Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly became bishop of Cambrai in 1396, and cardinal in 1411. At the Council of Constance where he frequently clashed with John Maurosii (Cf. note 50, *supra*), he represented the party which stood for the supremacy of the general council over the pope. His many works are listed by P. Tschackerts, *Peter von Ailli, Zur Geschichte des grossen abendländischen Schismas und der Reformkonzilien von Pisa und Konstanz* (1877), pp. 352-357. To this list we must add *Ms* Bibl. Nat. *Lat* 14579 which contains excerpts from the *Dialogus* of William of Ockham. Cf. N. Valois, *Un ouvrage inédit de Pierre d'Ailly: De persecutionibus ecclesiae* (Paris, 1904). Pierre d'Ailly was strongly under the influence of the nominalist-voluntarist tradition of William of Ockham and John of Mirecourt. At the Council of Constance he read, September 1416, his famous *Tractatus de ecclesiastica potestate* which contains his attacks upon John Maurosii. Other treatises which expound the conciliar theory are the

Cardinalis vulgariter nuncupati, optinui, in quo multa tetigit et currendo cum penna pauca fundamentaliter plene et trite examinavit, ut ex eius dictis infra patebit et ostendunt eius scripta, quod multe simplicitatis homo fuerit nec scrupulose quoquo modo scientie.

Post cuius tractatum opusculum habui magistri Johannis de Turricremata[61] natione Yspani de ordine (Predicatorum), quod intitulavit reverendo patri Domino Juliano de Cesarinis[62] de Roma Cardinali Sancti Angeli. In quo ponit questionum conclusiones et dicta beati Thome [Aquinatis] facientes ad materiam questionis de potestate pape et potestate concilii sive universalis ecclesie et sic ad nostram materiam facientis.

Post quem tractatum habui tractatum etiam magistri Jacobi de Viterbio,[63]

Canones reformandi ecclesiam; Propositiones utiles ad extinctionem schismaticis, per viam concilii generalis: De emendatione ecclesiae. Cf. B. Hauréau, *Hist. de la philos. scholast.* II, 2, p. 455; K. Werner, *Der Endausgang der mittelalterlichen Scholastik* (Wien, 1887); L. Salembier, *Petrus de Alliaco* (Lille, 1886); L. Salembier, *Les oeuvres françaises du cardinal Pierre d'Ailly, évêque de Cambrai* (Arras, 1908); L. Salembier, *Bibliographie des oeuvres du cardinal Pierre d'Ailly* (Besançon, 1909).

[61] John of Torquemada or Turrecremata O.P., studied canon law and theology in Paris where he became of doctor of theology. After having served as abbot in two Dominican cloisters in Spain he was made *magister Sacri Palatii* under Eugene IV in Rome. He took part in the Council of Basel where he probably wrote and expounded his treatise, *Divi Aquinatis de summi pontificis auctoritate quaestiones,* also called *Flores sententiarum Divi Thomae Aquinatis de auctoritate summi pontificis.* This work was written in 1437 by order of Cardinal Cesarini, and published in Naples 1715. Cf. N. Valois, *op. cit.*, II, p. 115. In December 1439 Eugene IV made him cardinal deacon *tituli S. Sixti.* In 1446 he became cardinal bishop of Albano, and in 1463 cardinal bishop of Sabina. He died in 1468. The *Divi Aquinatis de summi pontificis auctoritate quaestiones* were widely known and are the work to which Laurentius refers. It also appears as a part of Turrecremata's *Summa de ecclesia* (Rome, 1489). Cf. E. Dublanchy, 'Turrecremata et le pouvoir du Pape dans les questions temporelles,' *Revue Thomiste,* n.s. VI (1923), 74 ff. Aside from some noteworthy treatises on canon law (Cf. J. Schulte, *op. cit.*, II, p. 322), Turrecremata is also the author of the *Opusculum ad honorem Romani imperii et dominorum Romanorum* (*Ms* Vat. *Lat.* 974, fols. 65^r-67^v; cf. A. Pelzer, *Codices Vaticani Latini,* p. 434 in which he defends the empire in a moderate dignified manner. Rodrigo Sanchez de Arevalo wrote a strongly worded pamphlet against the views of Turrecremata which is preserved in *Ms* Vat. *Lat.* 4881, fols. 99^r-116^r. Cf. *Dictionnaire d'histoire ecclésiastique* III, 1657. Turrecremata upholds the moderate doctrine of the papal *potestas indirecta in temporalibus,* as it was held by St. Thomas in his *De regimine principum* I, 14, and *Summa Theol.* II, II, q. 60, art. 6; *Comment. in IV libr. sent. P. Lombardi ad librum* II (ad finem). Turrecremata is definitely opposed to the more radical publicists and theologians of the fifteenth century. Cf. J. N. Figgis, *Studies of political thought from Gerson to Grotius* (Cambridge, 1931), who considers Turrecremata's views as the beginning of modern political theory. For Turrecremata's treatise, *Solemnis tractatus fratris Johannis de Turrecremata . . . in favorem Eugenii IV contra decreta Constantiensis,* see Mansi, XXX, 550-590; and for his treatise *Tractatus factus contra avisamentum quoddam Basiliensem quod nobis liceat appellare a concilio ad papam, Mansi,* XXX, 1072-1094. Cf. N. Valois, *op. cit., passim.*

[62] Julian de Cesarini was born in Rome in 1398. He was made cardinal deacon and *auditor rotae* in 1426. He died the same year at Varna in Bulgaria. He was appointed president of the Council of Basel, but due to his inability to attend the opening of the council he was replaced for some time by John of Ragusa. See note 49, *supra.* Cf. H. Fechner, *Guiliano Cesarini bis zu seiner Ankunft in Basel* (Berlin 1907); N. Valois, *op. cit., passim;* Fabricius, *op. cit.*, I, p. 874; IV, p. 569; R. Jenkins, *The last crusader, or the life and times of cardinal Julian of the house of Cesarini* (London, 1862); Tirobaschi, *Stor. della let. Ital.* IV (1807), 1, p. 274.

[63] James of Viterbo, of Jacomo Capocci O.S.A., also called *doctor speculationis,* was professor of theology at the University of Paris from 1291-1302. In 1302 he was made archbishop of Beneventum, and then archbishop of Naples where he died in 1308. Among other works he wrote in 1301-1302 the *De regimine Christiano* which he dedicated to Boniface VIII. Cf. H. Arquillière, *Le plus ancien traité de l'Eglise: Jacques de Viterbe, De regimine Christiano* (Paris, 1926). According to R. Scholz, *Die Publizistik . . .*, p. 131, the *De regimine Christiano,* aside from the work of Egidius of Rome, is the most comprehensive *kirchenpolitische* treatise of that time. Cf. G. Perugi, *Il De regimine Christiano di Giacomo Capocci, Viterbese* (Rome, 1914); U. Mariani, 'Il libro De regimone Christiano do Giacomo da Viterbo,' *Giornale Dantesco,* 27 (1924), 2, 161-167; U. Mariani, 'Giacomo da Viterbo,' *Arch. della Soc. Romana di storia patria,* 48 (1925), 137-169; B. Hauréau, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 2, 159-164; P. Feret, *La faculté de théologie de Paris* III, p. 447; H. Finke, *Aus den Tagen Bonifaz' VIII,* p. 129; R. Scholz, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-154; M. Grabmann, *Die Lehre des hl. Thomas von der Kirche als Gotteswerk,* p. 31. On the whole James of Viterbo is a moderate representative of the theory of the papal

ordinis fratrum heremitarum sancti Augustini, quem in duas partes divisit. In quarum prima de regno ecclesie multa notavit, scilicet quod ecclesia proprie regnum dicitur, ii,° quod est orthodoxum et in quibus consistit eius gloria; iii,° quod tale regnum est unum et quomodo etc.; iiii, quod est catholicum; v, quod est sanctum, vi, quod est apostolicum etc. In secunda vero parte ponit de potentia Christi et eius vicharii, quam in decem capitulis situavit; de qua inter parum[64] et nichil decerpsi uti de materia huic operi nullatenus oportuna. Sed expost Herveum[65] habui, qui primo de jurisdictione et de exemptionibus, secundario vero de potestate ecclesiastica multa conscripsit.

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potestas directa in temporalibus. In this he follows Egidius of Rome. For the influence of James of Viterbo on Alvarus Pelagius, see N. Jung, *op. cit.*, p. 39-42.

[64] From *inter parum* on, the text is written by another hand.

[65] See note 40, *supra.*

L'Enseignement de la Philosophie Morale au XII^{e} Siècle

PHILIPPE DELHAYE

I. *ETHIQUE ET TRIVIUM*

LES classifications des disciplines scientifiques qui foisonnent au XII^{e} siècle montrent qu'à cette époque déjà on distinguait une éthique philosophique et une morale théologique.[1] Mais cette éthique était-elle enseignée? Constituait-elle le sujet d'études et de cours, ou bien n'était-elle mentionnée que pour mémoire, par fidélité à une tradition dont on ne comprenait peut-être plus tout le sens? La question est ardue car l'organisation scolaire du XII^{e} siècle[2] est très variée et, en dehors de directives générales, fait une très large place à l'initiative des professeurs, surtout dans les écoles des maîtres agrégés. Mais précisément certaines observations dues à des professeurs célèbres de l'époque permettent de voir de quel côté nous pouvons diriger notre enquête avec quelque espoir de succès.

Hugues de Saint-Victor précise l'ordre dans lequel il souhaite voir enseigner les différentes parties du programme d'étude qu'il a tracé: "On commencera", dit-il, "par la logique; en second lieu on étudiera l'éthique et, enfin, on abordera la philosophique théorique et la mécanique. En effet, il faut tout d'abord apprendre à s'exprimer; ensuite, selon le conseil de Socrate, il importe de se purifier le coeur des passions par l'étude de la vertu. Ainsi on abordera plus aisément la recherche de la vérité théorique."[3] Guillaume de Conches est plus précis encore. A moins de raisons d'utilité commune, il veut qu'on enseigne tout d'abord les disciplines qui relèvent de l'art de la parole: grammaire, dialectique, rhétorique. On passera alors à la philosophie pratique: éthique, économique, politique. C'est alors seulement qu'on entreprendra l'étude des êtres corporels (mathématique et physique) et des êtres incorporels, tout spécialement de Dieu (théologie au sens ancien du mot).[4] Pour Richard de Saint-Victor, l'étude de l'éthique est non seulement proche de celle du *trivium*, elle s'y intègre. Il souhaite qu'on étudie l'éthique entre la logique et la rhétorique.[5] Le *De Septem septenis*, qui est peut-être dû à Jean de Salisbury, déclare que l'enseignement de l'éthique va de pair avec celui des belles lettres. La grammaire apprend à bien parler et à bien vivre. Plusieurs genres littéraires, l'apologue et le proverbe notamment, appartiennent à l'éthique. La dialectique résoud des problèmes théoriques et fixe des devoirs pratiques. La rhétorique ne sert de rien si elle n'allie le souci de la morale et du droit à celui de l'éloquence. Ainsi, peut-on dire, le *trivium* enseigne à la fois l'éloquence et la vertu.[6]

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[1] Cf. mon étude 'La Place de l'éthique parmi les classifications scientifiques au XII^{e} siècle', *Miscellanea moralia in honorem E. D. A. Janssen* (Louvain, 1948), 29 ff.

[2] Ph. Delhaye, 'L'Organisation scolaire au XII^{e} siècle', *Traditio*, V (1947), 211 ff.

[3] Hugues de Saint Victor, *Didascalion* VI, 14; ed. Buttimer (Washington, 1939), p. 131, l. 28 ff.; PL 176, 810: In his quattor partibus philosophiae talis ordo in doctrina servari debet, ut prima ponatur logica, secunda ethica, tertia theoretica, quarta mechanica. Primum enim comparanda est eloquentia, deinde, ut ait Socrates in Ethica, per studium virtutis oculus cordis mundandus est, ut deinde in theorica ad investigationem veritatis perspicax esse possit. Novissime mechanica sequitur, quae per se omni modo inefficax est, nisi ratione praecedentium fulciatur.

[4] Ch. Jourdain, 'Des Commentaires inédits de Guillaume de Conches . . . sur la consolation de la Philosophie . . .', *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Impériale*, XX, 2^{e} partie (Paris, 1862), 74: A practica adscendendum est ad theoricam, non de theorica descendendum ad practicam, nisi causa communis utilitatis. Qui vero sint illi gradus philosophie, id est ordo ascendendi de practica ad theoricam, sic videndum est. Prius est homo instruendus in moribus per ethicam, deinde in dispensatione proprie familie per economicam, postea in gubernatione rerum per politicam. Deinde, cum in istis perfecte exercitatus fuerit, debet transire ad contemplationem eorum quae sunt circa corpora, per mathematicam et physicam, usque ad celestia, deinde ad contemplationem incorporeorum usque ad creatorem, per theologiam. Et hic est ordo philosophie. In eloquentia vero, prius addiscenda est grammatica quia principium est eloquentie scire recte scribere et recte pronunciare scripta, deinde dialectica, quasi argumentum eloquentie, scilicet scientia probandi quod contradicitur. Deinde rhetorica, quasi perfectio scilicet scientie dissuadendi vel persuadendi.

[5] Richard de Saint Victor, *Excerptionum priorum* I, 23; PL 177, 208: In legendis artibus talis ordo est servandus. Prima omnium comparanda est eloquentia, et ideo expetenda logica, deinde per ethicam purificandus oculus mentis, et sic ad rhetoricam transeundum . . . Au sujet des arts mécaniques, il note encore: Sciendum quoque est quod mechanica secundum rationem sui sub philosophia continetur, non secundum administrationem.

De pareilles remarques ne peuvent se comprendre que si on les remet dans le contexte de la pédagogie latine que le XIIe siècle avait acceptée dans ses grandes lignes. Si tant d'auteurs modernes ont prétendu que cette époque n'avait connu aucun enseignement de l'éthique, c'est parce qu'ils ont oublié que le plan d'étude alors en vigueur était calqué sur celui des pédagogues romains, et que ceux-ci étudiaient l'éthique, comme tant d'autres disciplines d'ailleurs, en concurrence avec les textes de la littérature classique et comme une partie de la rhétorique.

La Grèce avait connu deux types d'enseignement, l'un philosophique, l'autre littéraire.[7] Le premier, auquel Platon donna son éclat et son modèle, enseignait pour elles-mêmes les différentes disciplines comme la logique, la physique et l'éthique. Le second, proposé par Isocrate, ne traitait ces matières que pour autant qu'elles ressortissaient à la culture générale et qu'elles contribuaient à former un orateur capable de défendre une cause, proposer un avis dans une délibération publique ou louer un personnage. La faveur des Grecs allait nettement à l'école d'Isocrate, et les Romains lui marquèrent une préférence exclusive.[8] Quelques privilégiés iront bien faire des études supérieures en Grèce, il y aura peut-être de-ci de-là quelques essais sporadiques d'un enseignement philosophique à Rome même, mais la grande masse des élèves latins n'étudieront l'éthique, la physique comme l'histoire, que dans les leçons des professeurs de grammaire (*grammaticus*) et de rhétorique (*rhetor*) commentant des textes ou enseignant les éléments positifs nécessaires à la formation de l'orateur ou de l'homme de lettre.

Le "grammairien" n'enseignait pas seulement les préceptes de l'art de bien dire et de bien écrire, mais encore une partie de la littérature. En principe les poètes lui étaient réservés, tandis que les prosateurs étaient expliqués par le professeur de rhétorique. Mais en pratique les rhéteurs ayant négligé les auteurs qui n'étaient pas des orateurs au sens strict du mot, les grammairiens avaient pris sur eux de commenter certaines oeuvres de prose, notamment les historiens. Pour accomplir leur tâche, ils devaient d'ailleurs recourir à d'autres disciplines et c'est ainsi qu'ils étaient amenés à s'occuper des arts qui, au Moyen Age, faisaient partie du *quadrivium* et même de la philosophie proprement dite.

"Lorsque l'enfant saura lire et écrire," dit Quintillien, "c'est le professeur de grammaire qui doit s'occuper de lui . . . Cet enseignement se divise en deux parties: les principes de l'art de bien dire et le commentaire des poètes . . . Mais cela ne suffit pas; il faut étudier à fond des écrivains de tous les genres tant pour le fond que pour les mots,[9] et même certains "arts" comme la musique et l'astronomie.[10] La grammaire ne peut pas non plus ignorer la philosophie à cause des nombreux passages qui, dans tous les poèmes, sont empruntés aux questions naturelles les plus subtiles et surtout à cause d'Empédocle chez les Grecs, de Varron et Lucrèce chez les Latins qui ont exposé en vers les préceptes de la sagesse.[11] Le souci de la formation morale ne peut pas être séparé du travail littéraire ou grammatical;[12] dans l'étude des poèmes, comme dans celle des traits historiques,[13] il faut rechercher non seulement ce qui est d'une belle facture littéraire, mais encore ce qui est d'une grande élévation morale. Que l'on donne à lire aux enfants ce qui peut le mieux nourrir leur esprit et élever leur âme."[14]

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[6] *De Septem septenis*, sect. 2; PL 199, 948 et 949. Quintus modus, apologus, qui est sermo causa dilectionis inductus, totus ethicus, sextus proverbium quod est constans sententiae compendium ethicum et docile reddens ingenium. His igitur sex modis . . . omnes scripturae quadam dulcedine colorantur et mores per artes gradientium reformantur . . . Grammaticus . . . viam grammaticae recte ingreditur et per eam graditur quando post rectam locutionem vitae et morum sequitur aequitatem. Ille . . . aequam dialecticae viam sequitur, et tam opere quam sermone veraciter argumentatur, qui verum a falso, rectum a curvo dividendo rationcinatur . . . Hic . . . in via recta rhetoricis vestigiis incedit qui lingua censoria rotunda auditores persuadendo commonefacit et de iure stricto in aequum revocando instruit. Sic igitur trivium eloquentem reddit et ad virtutes vias construit.

[7] Ce travail était rédigé avant que ne paraisse le bel ouvrage de M. H. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité* (Paris, 1948). A quoi bon dès lors alourdir l'exposé de multiple citations ou références que le lecteur trouvera si aisément. Je le renvoie notamment aux pages 35, 77, 90, 99, 135, 270, 287, 290, 343, 379 qui concernent plus spécialement l'histoire de l'enseignement de la morale.

[8] L'Occident ne connaîtra la formation du type philosophique qu'au XIIIe siècle quand Aristote régira les écoles. A la Renaissance, les humanistes retourneront à la pédagogie littéraire qui sera codifiée et répandue dans les célèbres collèges jésuites.

Ainsi formé, le jeune homme passera sous la direction du rhéteur; il s'y exercera à divers travaux de composition,[15] étudiera les auteurs[16] et recevra les préceptes spéciaux à l'art de la rhétorique.[17] Ici encore, l'éthique tient une grande place au point que Cicéron a pu dire que la rhétorique ressortissait de la science politique, partie de la morale.[18] La morale est impliquée dans les genres laudatif et délibératif de l'éloquence.[19] Bref, l'éducation de l'orateur doit faire une large place à l'étude de l'éthique.[20] Crassus a raison de le dire; toutes les questions relatives à l'équité, à la justice, à la vérité et au bien moral rentrent dans le domaine de l'orateur et lorsque les philosophes ont recours à l'éloquence pour défendre ces vertus, ils se servent des armes de la rhétorique plutôt que des leurs.[21] Il ne faut pas laisser aux philosophes ce qui regarde la morale, dit encore Quintillien, car l'homme qui doit appliquer la morale, c'est l'orateur . . . Si au cours des âges, les philosophes se sont emparé de l'étude de la morale, il faut que la rhétorique reprenne cette part de son patrimoine en insistant bien sur le fait qu'il ne s'agit pas pour elle de s'emparer ainsi du bien d'autrui, mais uniquement de recouvrer le sien.[22] L'orateur ne peut se désintéresser d'aucune partie de la philosophie, mais plus que tout autre, la morale doit retenir son attention car elle est tout entière en rapport avec l'art oratoire. Songeons à cette prodigieuse variété des causes, parmi lesquelles il n'en est, pour ainsi dire, pas une qui n'admette un développement sur l'équité ou l'honnêteté. Dans les délibérations, est-il un motif de persuasion qui soit absolument indépendant de la morale? La troisième partie de l'art oratoire a pour rôle de louer et de blâmer; elle parle de ce qui est bien et mal moralement. Toute question de droit ne tourne-t-elle pas autour du sens propre des mots, d'une discussion sur la justice, d'une conjecture sur l'intention, ce qui se ramène en partie à la dialectique, en partie à l'éthique? Tous ces éléments philosophiques sont donc, par nature, étroitement mêlés à un discours digne de ce nom.[23] Ainsi donc la morale, dont les préceptes seront soigneusement enseignés,[24] se trouve mise sur le même pied que la dialectique et même que le droit;[25] ce sont les instruments de l'orateur, ce sont ses armes.[26]

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[9] Quintillien, *De Institutione oratoria* I, 4: 1. Primus in eo, qui scribendi legendique adeptus erit facultatem, grammaticis est locus. 2. Haec igitur professio, cum brevissime in duas partes dividatur, recte loquendi scientiam et poetarum enarrationem plus habet in recessu quam fronte promittit . . . 4. Nec poetas legisse satis est, excutiendum omne scriptorum genus non propter historias modo sed verba quae frequenter ius ab auctoribus sumunt.

[10] *Ibidem*. Tum neque citra musicen grammatice potest esse perfecta . . . nec, si rationem siderum ignoret, poetas intelliget. Cette idée est reprise et étendue à l'étude de l'arithmétique et de la géométrie au chapitre 10 du même livre 1: An oratori futuro necessaria sit plurium artium cognitio.

[11] *Ibidem*. I, 4. . . . Nec ignara (grammatica) philosophiae cum propter plurimos in omnibus fere carminibus locos ex intima naturalium quaestionum subtilitate repetitos, tum vel propter Empedoclea in Graecis, Varronem ac Lucretium in Latinis qui praecepta sapientiae versibus tradiderunt.

[12] *Ibidem*, II, 1, n°4. Et grammatice, quam in latinum transferentes litteraturam vocaverunt . . . cf. Suetonius, *De Illustribus grammaticis* I, 4: Appelatio grammaticorum graeca consuetudine invaluit, sed initio litterati vocabantur. Cornelius Nepos . . . ait . . . proprie sic appelandos poetarum interpretes qui a graecis *grammatikoi* nominentur.

[13] *Ibidem*, I, 8, n° 18.

[14] *Ibidem*, I, 8, n° 4: . . . Non modo quae diserta sed vel magis quae honesta sunt, discant . . . n° 8 . . . quae maxime ingenium alant atque animum augeant, praelegenda . . .

[15] Sur ces exercices, voir *Institutiones oratoriae* II, 4. Nombre d'entre eux traitent de sujets moraux.

[16] *Ibidem*, II, 5: De lectione oratorum et historicorum apud rhetorem.

[17] *Ibidem*, II, 11: An artis necessaria cognitio?

[18] *Ibidem*, II, 15, n° 33: Rhetoricen autem quidam eandem civilitatem esse iudicaverunt, Cicero scientiae civilis partem vocat (civilis autem scientia idem quod sapientia est) . . .

[19] *Ibidem*, III, 7: De laude et vituperatione. C. 8: De suasoria et prosopopoeia.

[20] *Ibidem*, XII, 2: Cognoscenda oratori quibus mores formantur.

[21] *Ibidem*, XII, 2, n° 5: Neque enim frustra . . . L. Crassus cuncta quae de aequo, iusto, vero, bono, deque iis quae sunt contra posita dicantur, propria esse oratoris affirmat ac philosophos, cum ea dicendi viribus tuentur, uti rhetorum armis non suis.

[22] *Ibidem*, I, proemium, n° 10: Neque enim hoc concesserim, rationem rectae honestaeque vitae, ut quidam putaverunt, ad philosophos relegandam, cum vir ille vere civilis et publicarum privatarumque rerum administrationi accommodatus, qui regere consiliis urbes, fundare legibus, emendare iudiciis possit, non alius sit profecto quam orator . . . N° 17: Sed ea et sciet optime et eloquetur orator; qui si fuisset aliquando perfectus, non a philosophorum scholis virtutis prae-

On le voit, ce système d'éducation est conçu tout différemment que le nôtre. Dans la formation d'un avocat—qui est le successeur moderne du rhéteur—on mettra aujourd'hui au premier plan l'acquisition des connaissances techniques; l'exercice de la parole sera relégué au second plan. Les Romains, eux, donnaient la première place à l'art de la parole et la seconde aux connaissances réelles. L'éthique, dont on ne peut certes dire qu'ils la tenaient pour une chose sans importance, avait ainsi sa place dans cette formation littéraire confiée au *grammaticus* et au *rhetor*. Ce système permettait-il une étude sérieuse de l'éthique? Oui, certes, si le texte à expliquer était un *De Officiis*, un *De Amicitia* ou les lettres de Sénèque à Lucilius, comme ce sera le cas à l'époque qui nous occupe.

II. *ETHIQUE ET GRAMMAIRE. AUTEURS ANCIENS*

En effet, la renaissance du XII^e^ siècle, tout comme celle de l'époque carolingienne, tend à ressusciter les écoles anciennes et leur pédagogie beaucoup plus qu' à innover. Sans doute, on ne reprendra pas le plan d'enseignement antique dans tous ses détails et la différence entre le *rhetor* et le *grammaticus* s'estompera par exemple, mais la formation de la jeunesse restera essentiellement littéraire. C'est en étudiant les "auteurs" que l'on cherchera à s'instruire des différentes disciplines. La grammaire, nous dirions la littérature, comprend toutes les sciences. Thierry de Chartres le déclare dans le prologue de son *Heptateuchon* ou *Manuel des sept arts*: "la grammaire n'enseigne pas seulement à bien parler et à bien écrire, elle revendique aussi comme sa tâche propre l'explication et l'étude de tous les auteurs. Tout ce qui est écrit tombe sous sa mouvence".[1]

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cepta peterentur; nunc necesse est ad eos auctores recurrere, qui desertam, ut dixi, partem oratoriae artis, meliorem praesertim, occupaverunt, et, velut nostrum reposcere, non ut nos illorum utamur inventis sed ut illos alienis usos esse doceamus.

[23] *Ibidem*, XII, 12, 2, n° 10: Quae quidem (philosophia) cum sit in tres divisa partes, naturalem, moralem, rationalem, qua tamen non est cum oratoris opere coniuncta. . . . 15. Iam quidem pars illa moralis, quae dicitur ethices, certe tota oratori est accommodata. Nam in tanta causarum . . . varietate . . . 16. In conciliis vero quae ratio suadendi est ab honesti quaestione seposita? Quid illa pars tertia, quae laudandi ac vituperandi officiis continetur. Nempe in tractatu recti pravique versatur. 19. Quid? Non quaestio iuris omnis aut verborum proprietate aut aequi disputatione aut voluntatis coniectura continetur, quorum pars ad rationalem, pars ad moralem tractatum redundat? 20. Ergo natura permixta est omnibus istis oratio, quae quidem oratio est vere.

[24] *Ibidem*, XII, 2, n° 4: Ad illud sequens praevertar, ne dicendi quidem satis peritum fore, qui non et naturae vim omnem penitus perspexerit et mores praeceptis ac ratione formarit.

[25] *Ibidem*, XII, 3: Necessariam iuris civilis oratori scientiam.

[26] *Ibidem*, XII, 5, n° I: Hae sunt quae me redditurum promiseram instrumenta non artis, ut quidam putaverunt, sed ipsius oratoris. Haec arma habere ad manum.

[1] Thierry de Chartres, *Heptateuchon*, proemium: In hac autem septem artium liberalium synodo ad cultum humanitatis conducta prima omnium grammatica procedit in medium, matrona vultuque habituque severo. Pueros convocat, rationes recte

On peut noter en particulier que les idées pédagogiques de Quintillien étaient connues et que sa voix était entendue.[2] Jean de Salisbury, qui le cite souvent, voit en lui un prédécesseur de Bernard de Chartres dont la méthode de commentaire, mêlant très intimement grammaire et éthique, fut reprise par des professeurs aussi célèbres que Guillaume de Conches et Richard l'Evêque. Après avoir expliqué le texte au point de vue grammatical, ces maîtres l'étudiaient au point de vue doctrinal et regroupaient les éléments concernant les diverses disciplines scientifiques que l'auteur y avait introduits. Selon Salisbury, on voulait séparer par l'analyse les éléments des différentes disciplines scientifiques, que les auteurs avaient enchassés dans leurs oeuvres, comme on sépare selon leurs couleurs les plumes d'un oiseau qu'on dépouille. On distinguait donc ce que l'auteur apportait au point de vue littéraire, ce qu'il disait des sciences du *quadrivium*, de la nature et surtout de l'éthique. On trouvait ainsi chez Virgile ou Lucain, par exemple, les bases de toute une morale. De cette façon donc on exposait tout ce que les textes recèlent de science et de philosophie selon la capacité des auditeurs.[3]

Pareille méthode risquait évidemment de créer la confusion. L'élève ne devait plus très bien savoir sur quel aspect du texte il devait faire porter son attention, comme il arriverait à quelqu'un qui entreprendrait de lire quelques pages arrachées à un livre dont il ignorerait et le titre et l'auteur. Si l'on songe de plus

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scribendi recteque loquendi prescribit: ydiomata linguarum decenter transmutit, expositionem omnium auctorum sibi debitam profitetur: quicquid dicitur auctoritati eius committitur. Cf. A. Clerval, *L'enseignement des arts libéraux à Chartres et à Paris dans la première moitié du XII^e^ siècle d'après l'Heptateuchon de Thierry de Chartres* (Paris, 1889), p. 12. On peut rapprocher la formule de celle de Saint Augustin dans le *De Ordine* II, 12, 37: Poterat iam perfecta esse grammatica, sed quia ipso nomine profiteri se litteras clamat, unde etiam latine litteratura dicitur, factum est ut quidquid dignum memoria litteris mandaretur ad eam necessario pertineret. De même Saint Isidore de Séville dans les *Etymologiae;* PL 82, 122. Les deux derniers auteurs en font ici l'application à l'histoire. Les historiens du droit romain sont d'accord pour dire que du VII^{e} siècle au début du XII^{e} (Irnerius) il existe une certaine étude des textes juridiques mêlée à celle de la grammaire. Des parties de la *lex romana* (le code théodosien particulièrement) étaient commentées dans les écoles, en Italie surtout. Sur ce premier stade, littéraire pourrait-on dire, des études juridiques médiévales on verra A. Tardif, *Histoire des sources du droit français* (Paris, 1887), p. 184 ff.; V. Martin, *Les origines du Gallicanisme* I (Paris, 1939), p. 135 ff.; H. Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, a new edit. by F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden I (Oxford, 1942), p. 122 et les bibliographies indiquées par ces auteurs. Lanfranc étudia sans doute ainsi le droit civil (eruditus est in scholis liberalium artium et legum saecularium ad suae morem patriae, *Vita Lanfranci*, c. 5; PL 150, 39) et, venu en Normandie, eut une influence certaine sur l'expansion des études juridiques en France et en Angleterre. Il se pourrait aussi que ce fut lui qui attira l'attention des lettrés sur les oeuvres de Quintillien ainsi que le suggère A. Mollard, 'La Diffusion de l'institution oratoire au XII^{e} siècle', *Le Moyen Age*, XLIV (1934), 161 ff.

[2] M. Mollard qui a fait une enquête sur la diffusion de l'Institution oratoire au Moyen Age (voir note précédente) relève, pour le XII^{e} siècle, des traces d'une influence de Quintillien chez Wibald de Stavelot, Geoffroy de Croyland (mais ce témoignage sur l'état des écoles de Cambridge et d'Orléans est un faux, cf. mon étude sur 'L'Organisation scolaire au XII^{e} siecle' *Traditio*, V (1947), 249, note 69), Jean de Salisbury, Abélard, Pierre de Blois. On pourrait aussi ajouter le témoignage très significatif du programme d'Alexandre Neckam dont nous parlerons plus loin.

[3] Jean de Salisbury, *Metalogicus* I, 24; PL 199, 853, 854, 856: De usu legendi et praelegendi et consuetudine Bernardi Carnotensis et sequacium eius . . . Ergo ab auctoritate eiusdem Quintiliani in prelegendo, grammaticus et illa quidem minora praestare debebit ut partes orationis reddi sibi soluto versu desideret . . . . Deprehendat quae barbara, quae impropria . . . Auctores excutiat et sine intuentium risu eos plumis spoliet quas (ad modum corniculae) ex variis disciplinis, ut color aptior sit, suis operibus indiderunt. Quantum pluribus disciplinis et abundantius quisque imbutus fuerit, tanto elegantiam auctorum plenius intuebitur, planiusque docebit . . . Physica, exploratis naturae consoliis, de promptuario suo affert multiplicem colorum venustatem. Illa autem quae ceteris philosophiae partibus praeeminet, ethicam dico, sine qua nec philosophi subsistit nomen, collati decoris gratia omnes alias antecedit. Excute Virgilium aut Lucanum et ibi, cuiuscumque philosophiae professor sis, eiusdem invenies conditurам. Ergo pro capacitate discentis aut docentis industria et diligentia constat fructus praelectionis auctorum. Sequebatur hunc morem Bernardus Carnotensis . . . et qua parte sui propositae lectionis articulus respiciebat ad alias disciplinas proponebat in medio . . . Ad huius magistri formam praeceptores mei in grammatica, Gulielmus de Conchis et Ricardus, cognomento Episcopus . . . suos discipulos aliquandiu informaverunt.

que nombre d'ouvrages anciens portent des titres allégoriques et peu significatifs, que les préfaces des auteurs semblent destinées à montrer des talents de bel esprit beaucoup plus qu'à éclairer le lecteur, que l'exposé est d'ordinaire peu ordonné et traite de tout à propos de tout, on comprend que les professeurs, abordant le commentaire d'extraits ou d'un ouvrage complet, aient senti le besoin de donner nombre de renseignements au début de leurs commentaires et de diriger dès l'abord l'attention des élèves sur un point déterminé. Aussi l'habitude s'était-elle prise de donner tout d'abord quelques indications générales sur l'auteur et le texte. A ce propos, le professeur rappelait le titre de l'ouvrage, l'objet traité dont on faisait remarquer l'intérêt, et surtout il précisait la partie de la philosophie dont il relevait *cui parti philosophiae supponatur.* Au XII^e^ siècle, la pratique de l'*accessus ad auctores* est tout à fait commune. On la retrouve non seulement chez les professeurs de lettres ou de philosophie, mais encore chez les exégètes,[4] les canonistes[5] et les juristes. Sans doute les médiévaux l'ont-ils empruntée à Boèce,[6] qui n'a fait lui-même qu'imiter un procédé familier de certains auteurs grecs qui commentairent les textes de philosophie et de rhétorique. Le nombre de point traité peut varier d'ailleurs mais le procédé reste substantiellement identique et, ce qui est très significatif pour notre propos, la référence à telle ou telle partie de la philosophie reste constante.

"Quand les anciens voulaient expliquer un ouvrage", écrit Conrad d'Hirschau,[7] "ils se posaient sept questions: quel est l'auteur, le titre, la qualité de l'écrit, l'intention de l'écrivain, l'ordre et le nombre des livres, le type de commentaire qui s'impose. Plus récemment, on s'est contenté de quatre questions et on a seulement recherché la matière de l'ouvrage, l'intention de l'auteur, la cause finale de l'oeuvre et à quelle partie de la 'philosophie' il appartient (*cui parti philosophiae subponatur*)." Guillaume de Conches se contente de six questions parmi lesquelles on trouve *cui parti philosophiae subponatur.*[8] Quant à Gondisalvi, il estime, pour sa part, que l'on doit être fidèle aux sept questions parmi lesquelles on remarque celle de l'appartenance à une partie de la philosophie· *ad quem partem philosophiae spectet.*[9] De même Abélard répond à cette question au début de son Commentaire de Porphyre[10] ainsi que Clarembaud d'Arras au prologue de son Commentaire sur le *De Trinitate* de Boèce.[11] Guillaume de Conches ouvre son commentaire du *Timée* en disant que cette oeuvre (ou plus exactement l'extrait qu'il en connaissait) relève de la philosophie pratique, puisqu'elle traite de justice positive, de la "théologie" en raison de ce qu'elle dit des causes, et, par d'autres aspects, de la physique et des mathématiques.[12] Aux yeux du même auteur, la *Consolation* de Boèce est une oeuvre d'éthique puisqu'elle traite de la conduite à tenir.[13]

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[4] Dans une excellente étude publiée dans *Traditio,* III (1945), 215 k., 'The Mediaeval accessus ad auctores', le R. P. E. A. Quain S. J. a montré l'extension de cette pratique aux différentes branches du savoir. Pour l'exégèse, trop rapidement traitée, on notera encore le renseignement suggestif fourni par Mlle E. M. Sanford, 'Honorius, presbyter et scholasticus', *Speculum,* XXIII (1948), 407. Depuis, a paru l'étude de M. R. W. Hunt, 'The Introduction of the "Artes" in the Twelfth Century', *Studia mediaevalia in honorem A. R. P. J. Martin O. P.* (Bruges, 1948), 85 ff.

[5] Les canonistes, et pour cause, ne traitent pas d'ordinaire le dernier point *cui pars philosophiae supponatur.*

[6] Boèce, *In Isagogen Porphyrium commentorum editio primo,* ed. S. Brandt, CSEL, 48, 4, l. 17 ff.: Sex omnino, inquam, magistri in omni expositione praelibant. Praedocent enim quae sit cuiuscumque operis intentio . . . , secundum quae utilitas . . . , tertium qui ordo . . . , quartum si eius cuius esse opus dicitur germanus propriusque liber est . . . , quintum quae sit eius operis inscriptio. Sextum est id dicere ad quam partem philosophiae cuiuscumque libri ducatur intentio, quod Graeca oratione dicitur *heis poion meros philosophias anagetai.* Haec ergo omnia in quolibet philosophiae libro quaeri conuenit atque expediri.

[7] Conrad d'Hirschau, *Dialogus super auctores sive Didascalion,* Ed. G. Schepss (Würzburg, 1889), pp. 27-28: Nec te lateat quod in libris explanandis VII antiqui requirebant: auctorem, titulum operis, carminis qualitatem, scribentis intentionem, ordinem, numerum librorum, explanationem; sed moderni IIII requirenda censuerunt: operis materiam, scribentis intentionem, finalem causam et cui parti philosophiae subponatur cui scribitur.

[8] Guillaume de Conches, *In Boethium de Consolatione;* A. Jourdain, 'Commentaire de Guillaume de Conches et de Nicolas Triveth sur la Consolation de Boèce', *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Impériale,* XX, 2^e^ partie (Paris, 1862), 46: In principiis philosophorum, ista sex requiruntur: causa compositionis operis, materia, modus sive ordo agendi, utilitas cur agatur, cui parti philosophiae subponatur et titulus.

[9] Gondissalvi, *De divisione philosophie;* ed. L. Baur, *Beiträge . . . ,* IV, 2-8 (1903), 140: Hiis expletis quod circa unumquemque librum cuiuslibet artis inquirendum est videamus. Circa librum enim cuiuslibet artis septem sunt inquirenda scilicet: que est intencio auctoris, que utilitas operis, nomen eciam auctoris, titulus operis, ordo quoque legendi et ad quam partem philosophie spectet et de distinctione libri in partes et capitula.

Dans ces conditions, nous pourrons avoir une idée assez fidèle de ce qu'était au XII^e siècle l'étude de la philosophie morale, si nous relevons les noms des auteurs et des oeuvres qui servaient de base à cet enseignement. A notre point de vue, nous pouvons les grouper sous trois chefs: les oeuvres qui traitent de ce sujet *ex professo*, celles qui en parlent occasionnellement et, enfin, celles qui se prêtent à une interprétation morale ou allégorique.

Les Victorins reconnaissaient comme auteurs d'éthique et fondateurs de cette discipline Socrate, Platon, Cicéron et Sénèque.[14] Du premier, ils ne possédaient rien, et pour cause; du second, uniquement un extrait du *Timée*; nous avons vu que Guillaume de Conches l'attribuait aussi à l'éthique. D'une façon générale, ce siècle connaissait peu les Grecs et les bibliothèques ne contenaient que des auteurs latins. Disposait-on alors de la *République* de Cicéron dont parlent les Victorins? On ne sait trop. Le fait que l'époque moderne l'ait ignorée jusqu'au début du XIX^e siècle ne prouve rien car les lettrés du XII^e siècle possédaient des textes antiques que nous n'avons plus. En tout cas, ils avaient entre les mains un extrait au moins de cette oeuvre, le *Songe de Scipion* commenté par Macrobe, qu'ils citent et utilisent à tout propos.[15] Une précieuse liste de livres commentés dans les écoles de Paris et qui date du dernier quart du XII^e siècle, montre la faveur dont jouissaient alors le *De Officiis*, le *De Amicitia*, le *De Senectute* et les *Tusculanes* de Cicéron. Alexandre Neckam, auteur de ce programme, conseille en effet d'étudier ces oeuvres et tout spécialement le *De Officiis* qui est parmi les livres les plus utiles.[16] Conrad d'Hirschau apprécie tout spécialement le *De Amicitia*: "Ce livre", dit-il, "paraît ne traiter que de l'amitié, mais, en fait, s'occupe d'autres vertus encore; il recommande la chasteté et la pudeur, la dignité des moeurs et l'honnêteté de vie dont il fait la condition même de l'amitié. Il ressortit principalement à l'éthique, mais on y trouve aussi quelques notions de philosophie naturelle et même de logique".[17] Sénèque jouit aussi d'une grande faveur: Neckam ne veut pas qu'on néglige "le prophète de Cordoue".[18] Pierre le Chantre le cite comme le philosophe par excellence au cours du *Verbum abbreviatum* et Jean de Salisbury voit en lui un des moralistes les plus autorisés. "Il excelle", dit-il, "à louer la vertu et à enseigner les bonnes moeurs. Son art est de frapper des formules qui font la joie de ceux qui aiment la vertu, comme de ceux qui cultivent l'art de bien dire. Parmi tous les païens, on n'en trouvera pas ou peu qui puisse lui être comparé pour les leçons qu'il enseigne".[19] Il vaudrait la peine, pensons-nous, de pousser quelque peu des recherches dans cette direction. Les commentaires de ces oeuvres que nous possédons ne sont ni très nombreux, ni très révélateurs, engoncés qu'ils sont dans le mot à mot. Mais les adaptations de ces oeuvres anciennes par des lettrés du XIIe siècle sont très révélatrices et méritent d'être étudiées. Elles nous révèlent en effet ce qui a frappé les penseurs de l'époque et ce qui a été jugé par eux digne d'être retenu.[20]

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[10] Abélard, *Incipiunt glossae secundum Magistrum Petrum Abaelardum super Porphyrium, Logica Ingredientibus*, ed. B. Geyer, *Beiträge*, XXI, 1-3 (1919-1927), 2: Iste autem Porphyrius sicut ipsa inscriptio tituli docet, hanc introductionem ad Praedicamenta Aristotelis praeparat, quam tamen ipse ad totam artem necessariam posterius demonstrat . . . Cuius intentio, materia, modus tractandi, utilitas aut cui dialecticae parti supponatur praesens scientia, breviter distinguatur subtilius.

[11] W. Jansen, *Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius de Trinitate* (Breslau, 1926), p. 27: Donnant une division des sciences dont nous avons déjà parlé, Clarembaud écrit: Sed logica atque ethica praetermissis theoricam partiamur donec eam partem eius (philosophiae) attigeremus cui libellum istum supponi non dubium habeatur.

[12] Guillaume de Conches, *In Timaeum; Ms.* Paris, B. N., *lat.* 14065, fol. 53^v: De practica (agitur in hoc opere) in recapitulatione positive iusticie, de theologia uero: de efficiente, formali et finali causa mundi et de anima mundi loquitur . . . Cf. Appendice A, *infra*, pp. 95-96.

[13] Guillaume de Conches, *In Boethium de Consolatione*: Ethice vero supponitur quia sermo est de moribus; *Ms.* Paris, B.N. *lat.* 6406, fol. I^r-I^v. Voir la réponse à la même question dans le prologue au *De Trinitate* de Boèce; J. Parent, *La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres* (Ottawa, 1938), p. 181.

[14] Hugues de Saint Victor, *Didascalicon* III, 2: *De auctoribus artium*; ed. Buttimer, p. 50, l. 3 ff.; PL 176, 766: Ethicae inventor Socrates fuit, de qua viginti quattuor libros secundum positivam iustitiam scripsit deinde Plato discipulus eius libros multos *De Republica* secundum utramque iustitiam, naturalem scilicet et positivam, conscripsit. Deinde Tullius in latino sermone libros *De Republica* ordinavit. Richard ne fait que répéter Hugues mais Geoffroy ajoute le nom de Sénèque. Cf. Appendice B *infra*, p. 97.

[15] Cf. M. Schelder, *Die Philosophie des Macrobius und ihr Einfluss auf die Philosophie des christlichen Mittelalters, Beiträge* XIII, 1 (1916).

[16] C. Haskins, *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science* (Cambridge, 1924), Chap. 18: *A List of Text-books from the Close of the Twelfth Century*, p. 372: Salustius et Tullius de oratore et thuscularum et de amicitia et de senectute et de fato multa commendacione digni sunt et paradoxe. Liber inscriptus de multitudine deorum a quibusdam reprobatur. Tullius de officiis utilissimus est.

A côté de ces oeuvres qui enseignent l'éthique *ex professo*, nos auteurs lisent et commentent beaucoup d'autres textes qui contiennent des préceptes et des exemples moraux. Assez naturellement ils les groupent et de là naissent ces recueils de sentences qui ordonnent les textes de morale selon les matières traitées,—oeuvres de Jean de Salisbury, Pierre de Blois, Pierre le Chantre, du Pseudo-Thomas le Cistercien et de Guillaume de Conches. On peut y joindre certains florilèges qui ont préféré le classement par auteurs. Ici encore une étude plus poussée s'impose. Notons de suite les avis de Neckam à ce propos. Il conseille d'expliquer les satiristes et les historiens aux élèves pour leur apprendre dès le jeune âge à fuir les vices et à imiter de grands exemples. On ne négligera pas l'*Enéide*, les *Georgiques* et les *Bucoliques* et on recueillera avec soin les leçons morales de Juvénal. D'Horace, on étudiera les discours et les lettres, les odes et les épodes. Quelques ouvrages d'Ovide pourront retenir l'attention: les *Métamorphoses* notamment et les *Remèdes à l'amour*, mais on évitera les *Fastes* et le *De Arte amandi*. Stace est recommandé par des personnes sérieuses. Martial et Pétrone ne peuvent être étudiés qu'avec discernement, car à côté des meilleures choses, ils contiennent les pires.[21] Conrad d'Hirschau dans son *Didascalion* prévoit que l'on étudie dans les écoles les oeuvres de Cicéron, Horace, Juvénal, Iuvencus, Lucain, Ovide, Perse, Salluste, Stace, Virgile, Prudence, Sedulius, Boèce; il donne les notions propédentiques nécessaires au commentaire de leurs oeuvres. Pierre de Blois se réjouit de ce que ceux qui l'éduquèrent, insistèrent spécialement sur l'étude des historiens antiques. Il a scruté ainsi Trogue Pompée, Josèphe, Suétone, Hégésippe, Quinte-Curce, Tacite et Tite-Live; il y a trouvé à la fois d'utiles leçons pour l'art littéraire et de précieux préceptes de morale. D'une façon générale d'ailleurs, la lecture des anciens lui a été des plus utiles.[22] Au début du XIII^e siècle, un faussaire publie un ouvrage de pédagogie sous le nom de Boèce pour combattre l'influence grandissante d'Aristote et recommande les "bons auteurs". Ce sont Sénèque, Lucain, Virgile, Stace, Horace, Perse, Martianus, Ovide, Cicéron et, d'une façon générale, les philosophes qui se sont occupés de morale.[23]

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[17] Conrad d'Hirschau, *Dialogus super auctores sive Didascalion*, ed. G. Schepss (Würzburg, 1889), pp. 51-52-53: Nobilissimus auctor iste (Tullius) libros plurimos philosophicos studiosis philosophiae pernecessarios edidit et vix similem in prosa vel praecedentem vel subsequentem habuit. Scripsit igitur ad Atticum de amicicia probans omne genus amicorum falsum nisi quod causa honestatis virtutis et aeternae beatitudinis assumitur . . . Licet autem de sola amicicia tractare videatur in hoc libro, de servanda tamen castitate et pudicicia, de colenda morum honestate sine fictione dolosa multum invigilat eius exhortatio . . . Materia eius (libri) sunt amicicia et praecepta data de amicicia, quomodo vel a quibus quaerenda, invenienda, ad quem finem virtus eius sit referenda . . . Ethicae subponitur; potest et phisicae subponi quia de natura intentionem facit sed et logicae quia rhetoricus est.

[18] C. Haskins, *op. cit.*, p. 372: Nec negligat vatem quem Corduba genuit . . .

[19] Jean de Salisbury, *Metalogicus* I, 22; PL 199, 852: Qui quidem (Seneca) duabus de causis merito a pluribus commendatur. Multus enim est in laude virtutis morumque doctrina; et commatico genere dicendi utens quod breviter et succincte sententias colligit, ornatu verborum splendet: ut eis displicere non possit qui aut virtutem amant aut eloquentiam . . . Nullus inter gentiles ethicus invenitur aut rarus, cuius verbis aut sententiis in omni negotio commodius uti possis.

[20] C'est dans cet esprit que nous avons étudié 'Deux adaptations du De Amicitia au XIIe siècle', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, XV (1948), 304 ff. Déjà nous avons présenté à la même revue une étude analogue sur cette adaptation du *De Officiis* qu'est le *Moralium dogma* souvent attribué à Guillaume de Conches.

[21] C. Haskins, *op. cit.*, p. 372: Deinde satiricos et ystoriographos legat ut vitia etiam in minori aetate addiscat esse fugienda et nobilia gesta eroum desideret imitari . . . Transeat ad divinam eneidam . . . Iuvenalis moralia dicta in archano pectoris reservet . . . Sermones Oracii et epistolas legat et poetriam et odas cum libro epodon. Elegias Nasonis et Ovidium metamorfossos audiat sed et praecipue libellum de remedio amoris familiarem habeat . . . Stacius Achilleidos etiam a viris multae gravitatis probatur. Bucolica Maronis et georgica multe sunt

III. *ETHIQUE ET GRAMMAIRE.* AUTEURS "MODERNES" ET "MORALISATIONS".

A cette veine de la morale humaniste, dont le tracé se continue durant tout le Moyen Age,[1] on peut encore rattacher certaines oeuvres dans lesquelles des lettrés, comme Hildebert de Lavardin, Marbode, Abélard, Alain de Lille, imitent la littérature morale des anciens en restant presque exclusivement sur le plan rationel. Peu d'entre elles accèdent au stade philosophique, mais nous donnerions un tableau trop incomplet de la littérature latine morale du XII^e siècle, si nous ne nous y arrêtions un instant. Puisque nous n'aurons plus l'occasion d'y revenir, disons-en ici quelques mots.

Signalons tout d'abord une oeuvre de poésie morale d'Hildebert de Lavardin, le *Libellus de quatuor virtutibus vitae honestae*.[2] C'est un échantillon de ces oeuvres scolaires écrites par l'évêque du Mans qui furent répandues, non seulement en France, mais encore en Italie. En effet, Orderic Vital note qu'en visite en France, des cardinaux admirèrent les poésies morales d'Hildebert et en rapportèrent des exemplaires à Rome où ils furent utilisés dans les écoles.[3]

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utilitatis . . . Martialis totus et Petronius multa continent in se utilia sed multa auditu indigna . . .

[22] Pierre de Blois, *Epistola* 102; PL 207, 314: Scio mihi plurimum profuisse quod cum in arte versificatoria parvulus erudirer, praecipiente magistro mihi materiam non de fabulis sed de historiarum veritate sumabam . . . Praeter ceteros etiam libros qui celebres sunt in scholis, profuit mihi frequenter inspicere Trogum Pompeium, Josephum, Suetonium, Hegesippum, Q. Curtium, Corn. Tacitum, Titum Livium qui omnes in historiis quas referunt multa ad morum aedificationem et ad profectum scientiae liberalis interserunt. Legi et alios qui de historiis nihil agunt, quorum non est numerus. In quibus omnibus quasi in hortis aromatum flores decerpere et urbana suavitate loquendi mellificare sibi potest diligentia modernorum.

[23] *De Disciplina scolastica*, PL 64, 1225: Senecae traditio, inexpletio Lucani, Virgilii prolixitas et Statii urbanitas, dura Flacci translatio, durior Persii editio, Martiani non indigna laesio, Nasonis discretie sunt indiganda memorialique cellulae commendanda. Ceterorumque philosophorum (prout ingenii suppetit capacitas) non sub silentio est praetereunda moralitas ut sic sententiosa dictaminis vigeat serenitas et metrorum floreat iucunditas. O quam Tulii venerabilis facundia summis desideriis est collocanda!

[1] A côté de la morale aristotélicienne qui se taille la part du lion dans le champ de l'éthique, dès le XIII^e siècle, il faut, en effet, remarquer la survivance d'une morale naturelle plus littéraire et dont le *Speculum morale* attribué autrefois à Vincent de Beauvais est le représentant le plus notable. L'idée de chercher chez les littérateurs et spécialement chez les poètes non pas seulement des leçons de bien dire qui ne heurtent pas la morale, mais encore des leçons de morale proprement dites, a longtemps survécu; j'ai sous les yeux un manuel de morale du siècle dernier qui est composé exclusivement d'extraits de poètes: M. Moustalon, *La morale des poètes ou pensées extraites des plus célèbres poètes latins et français* (Paris, 1809).

[2] Hildebert de Lavardin, *Libellus de quatuor virtuibus vitae honestae*; PL 171, 1055.

[3] Orderic Vital, *Historia ecclesiastica* X, 6; PL 188, 732: Hildebertus autem, post mortem Gisleberti Turonensis archiepiscopi a clero et populo electus est . . . His mansuetus fuit ac religiosus et tam divinarum quam saecularium eruditioni litterarum studiosus. Temporibus nostris incomparabilis versificator floruit et multa carmina priscis poematibus aequalia vel eminentia condidit quae fervidus calor philosophorum subtiliter rimari appetit ac super aurum et topazion sibi consciscere diligenter satagit. Eleganter enim et sapienter loquitur de Christo et

L'oeuvre est versifiée comme presque toutes celles qui furent alors composées à l'usage des écoles. Inutile de dire que l'abbé Brémond n'aurait pas trouvé ici le compte de la poésie pure! Après un court prologue, elle se divise en deux parties d'étendue inégale: un traité sur les oeuvres des quatre vertus cardinales et un court aperçu sur le juste milieu de ces vertus. La prudence connaît les vrais biens et s'adapte aux évènements. Elle discerne les meilleurs conseils, juge avec précaution et prévoit l'avenir, tout en se défiant des impressions sensibles. La force rend libre et intrépide; elle vainct les ennemis, mais sait aussi leur pardonner. La tempérance, elle, freine les désirs immodérés et se contente de ce qu'elle a. Elle évite les excès de table, le luxe de la maison ou des habits, les rires désordonnés. Elle évite de vouloir paraître au-delà de sa valeur, domine la chair, conserve la pudeur et évite les plaisanteries grivoises. Elle accepte les reproches comme elle évite les flatteries et va jusqu'à se réjouir de l'adversité. Quant à la justice, elle est conçue d'une manière fort large qui inclut la charité et couvre pratiquement tout le champ des devoirs vis-à-vis du prochain et de Dieu. En effet, cette vertu nous fait craindre et aimer Dieu. Elle veille à ne nuire à personne, mais au contraire, à aider les autres. Elle dicte notamment des devoirs précis dans l'usage de la parole. Enfin, le poème fixe l'exacte mesure des vertus. La prudence doit veiller à ne devenir ni ruse, ni curiosité exagérée, ni suspicion. L'homme magnanime se gardera de céder à l'orgueil, de devenir un troublion qui a toujours la menace à la bouche. La sobriété évitera l'avarice et la justice conservera un juste milieu entre la sévérité et la douceur excessive.

Les traités de morale que l'on mettait dans les mains des étudiants n'avaient pas toujours la belle ordonnance du *Libellus*. Il existait aussi des recueils composés d'une série de conseils moraux sans beaucoup de suite logique. C'est le cas notamment du *Carmen ad Astralabum*, écrit par Abélard à l'intention de son fils.[4] Si, au début de ce millier de vers, l'auteur paraît suivre quelque plan, on le voit bientôt s'abandonner à la fantaisie et au caprice. Aussi bien trouve-t-on ici des conseils concrets, des règles de psychologie et de morale pratique plus que de grands principes. Certains ne manquent pas de saveur dans la bouche d'Abélard: ne publier ses écrits que le plus tard possible, savoir apprendre avant d'enseigner, apprendre à distinguer chez quelqu'un la valeur morale de la dignité de la profession et du succès, se méfier des femmes, dans le malheur reprendre courage en pensant à la bonté de Dieu. Certaines doctrines exposées ici correspondent à des points de vue qu'Abélard aimait à exposer: confiance en la raison qui permet de faire le discernement entre les autorités discordantes, caractère subjectif du péché, diminution de la responsabilité par l'ignorance.

Les deux oeuvres dont nous venons de parler sont bien courtes, si on les compare à l'épopée philosophique et morale qu'Alain de Lille a publiée sous le nom d'*Anticlaudianus seu libri de officio viri boni et perfecti*.[5] *Anticlaudianus*: le titre s'explique par l'intention de prendre le contre-pied de Claudien dans l'*In Rufinum*. Alors que le poète latin racontait comment les vices ligués parvenaient à expulser les vertus de la nature, Alain décrit la nature s'accordant avec les vertus pour chasser les vices et former un homme parfait. On sait que l'ouvrage eut de suite un très vif succès, dans les écoles où elle fut très rapidement commentée comme auprès du grand public qui la connut par des tra-

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Ecclesia, de corpore et anima, de gestis sanctorum et virtutibus eorum, de laude virtutum et vituperatione vitiorum. A Romanis cardinalibus qui frequenter Galliarum plagas adeunt quia mansuetos illic et obedientes sibi reperiunt, plurima Hildeberti carmina Romam transferuntur quae dicacium scholis et didascalis Quiritum admiranda censentur.

[4] B. Hauréau, 'Le poème addressé par Abélard à son fils Astralabe', *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, XXXIV, 2e partie (Paris, 1895), 153-187.

[5] Alain de Lille, *Anticlaudianus seu libri de officio viri boni et perfecti*; PL 210. 483 ff. Pour la bibliographie, voir W. H. Cornog, *The Anticlaudianus of Alain de Lille* (Philadelphia, 1935).

ductions.[6] Au début de l'ouvrage, on voit la nature se désoler de la dépravation des hommes. Elle voudrait former un homme plus parfait et, pour ce, appelle les "vertus" à son aide. Le poème nous les décrit à mesure qu'elles entrent en scène: la concorde, l'abondance, la faveur, la jeunesse, le rire, la pudeur, la modestie, la raison, l'honnêteté, la beauté, la prudence, la piété, la confiance, la largesse et la noblesse. Singulier mélange, on le voit, de dons naturels et de vertus morales; aussi bien s'agit-il de faire un homme juste et heureux. Le conseil décide d'envoyer la prudence au ciel pour demander à Dieu une âme pure qui, unie à un corps par les soins de la nature et des vertus, deviendra l'homme nouveau. Les sept arts libéraux, qui sont les servantes de la concorde, façonnent un char pour ce voyage céleste, et c'est pour l'auteur l'occasion de les décrire par le menu. A ce char, on attelle cinq chevaux qui sont les cinq sens de l'homme. La raison s'assied au timon et prend la conduite de l'attelage. Le voyage du char dans les airs permet, on le devine, de décrire bien des phénomènes naturels; l'auteur en profite pour placer ici tout un cours de "physique". Mais le char de la concorde, mené par les sens, ne peut accéder au domaine surnaturel; ainsi, chez Dante, Virgile devra-t-il s'arrêter à la porte du ciel. La prudence doit recourir aux bons offices de la théologie et de la foi pour entrer dans le secret des cieux. Là, sa requête est exaucée: Dieu décrit lui-même les qualités de l'homme nouveau et accorde l'âme parfaite. Revenant avec joie vers la terre, la concorde apporte son précieux fardeau à la nature et aux vertus. La nature forme un corps et chacune des vertus fait un don au nouvel homme. Mais les vices ont été prévenus du danger qui les menace; ils arrivent pour détruire cet homme qui échappe complètement à leur domaine. Une lutte épique s'en suit où les vertus parviennent à remporter la victoire. Sa description dans les dernières pages de l'ouvrage fournit la matière de tout un traité de morale.

Signalons encore les "moralisations". Nous n'utilisons plus aujourd'hui l'exégèse allégorique que dans les commentaires de la Sainte-Ecriture et encore, malgré les protestations de quelques poètes, ce mode de pensée ne connaît-il, de nos jours, qu'un succès restreint. L'antiquité et le Moyen Age l'appliquaient à tout écrit surtout si le sens littéral leur faisait difficulté. Les philosophes stoïciens semblent avoir été les premiers à chercher une valeur symbolique aux mythes grecs. Ils prétendent notamment retrouver chez Homère toute leur philosophie: Zeus devient l'âme du monde, Hermes la raison universelle, etc. Si les païens de l'époque hellénistique allégorisaient les légendes mythologiques, les Juifs de la Diaspora en usaient de même pour établir une concordance entre la sagesse grecque et la révélation mosaïque. Les auteurs du XII^e^ siècle ont très largement usé du procédé pour donner un sens moralisateur ou renforcer celui que déjà possédaient certains écrits qu'ils avaient en haut estime.

"On peut commenter un texte de quatre manières", écrivait Conrad d'Hirschau: "l'explication littérale dit comment il faut le comprendre grammaticalement; le commentaire doctrinal s'occupe des idées que l'auteur a voulu enseigner; l'allégorie expose le texte dans un sens différent de ce qui apparemment il signifie; le sens moral enfin plie ce qui est écrit au désir de trouver des leçons de morale".[7] Nous verrons ici cette "moralisation" appliquée à Boèce, Virgile et Ovide.

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[6] On trouvera de nombreux renseignements sur les commentaires (Adam de la Bassée, Raoul de Longchamp, Robert de Sorbon, Gilbert d'Auxerre) et sur les traductions dans R. Bossuat, 'Une prétendue traduction de l'Anticlaudianus d'Alain de Lille', *Mélanges Alfred Jeanroy* (Paris, 1928), 265 ff. Quelques témoignages sur l'utilisation dans les écoles: Ebrard de Béthune cite Alain parmi les poètes dont on lisait les écrits dans les écoles, Ceillier, *Ecrivains ecclésiastiques* XIV (Paris, 1845), p. 864: Septenas artes quis alat describit Alanus, virtutis species proprietate docet; E. K. Rand, 'The Classics in the XIIIth Century', *Speculum*, IV (1929), 260; *Notices et extraits . . .* , V (Paris, an. VII), 509; *La bataille des sept arts*, ed. et commentaire de L. J. Paetow (Berkeley, 1914).

[7] Conrad d'Hirschau, *Dialogus super auctores sive Didascalion*, ed. G. Schepss, p. 27: Explanatio est ad literam ubi dicitur quomodo nuda littera intelligenda sit; ad sensum (ubi dicitur) ad quid referatur quod dicitur,

La *Consolation* de Boèce a connu au XIIᵉ siècle le plus grand succès; quatre commentaires de cette époque nous montrent l'intérêt que les hommes d'école portaient à ce texte.[8] Le plus célèbre d'entre eux est celui de Guillaume de Conches qui présente l'ouvrage, nous l'avons vu, comme un texte d'éthique. De fait, Boèce a fait la bonne part dans son oeuvre aux préceptes moraux. Mais il y a aussi introduit nombre d'allégories auxquelles nos auteurs veulent donner un sens moral. Pour eux, Boèce est un chrétien et même un martyr. Si l'ouvrage ne fait aucune allusion à la foi, s'il se présente comme un texte païen digne d'un *philosophus* et fait appel à la mythologie, c'est parce que l'auteur devait se garder d'ennemis qui n'eussent pas manqué de jeter au feu un ouvrage chrétien et auxquels un autre langage eut été inintelligible.[9] Même sur le terrain purement rationnel, il faut percer à jour ces allégories païennes et y trouver les leçons morales que l'auteur y a mises. Aussi, les allusions mythologiques si fréquentes dans l'ouvrage cachent-elles pour Guillaume de Conches une vérité morale. Hercule vainqueur des monstres, c'est la sagesse qui triomphe du vice; Tantale mourant d'inanition, c'est l'image de l'avare à qui son vice rend ses trésors inutiles; les géants révoltés figurent les sens qu'il faut dominer, etc.[10]

Dès l'antiquité, on a considéré que les oeuvres de Virgile relevaient plus de la philosophie que de la philologie. Sénèque estime qu'en les commentant, on doit être plus attentif aux leçons morales qu'au point de vue strictement grammatical qui ne s'attache qu'à des mots. L'apprenti grammairien qui lit le vers fameux: *Fugit irreparabile tempus* ne devrait pas songer à la fréquence du terme *fugit* chez Virgile pour exprimer la célérité du temps, mais trouver là une leçon de vigilance selon la véritable intention du poète.[11] C'est là précisément le point de vue adopté par nos auteurs.[12] Ils veulent trouver toute une philosophie chez Virgile et, comme elle ne s'y trouve pas toujours, force leur est de dépasser

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ad allegoriam ubi aliud intelligitur et aliud significatur, ad moralitatem ubi quod dicitur ad mores bonos excitandos colendosque reflectitur.

[8] M. P. Courcelle, 'Etude critique sur les commentaires de Boèce', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 14 (1939), 120-133, relève ces quatre commentaires: Guillaume de Conches. Principaux manuscrits: Orléans, 274; Troyes, 1101, 1381; Leipzig, Bibl. Univ., *lat.* 1253; Munich, *lat.* 4603; Vatican, *lat.* 5202. Extraits publiés dans C. Jourdain, 'Des commentaires inédits de Guillaume de Conches et de Nicolas Triveth sur la Consolation de Boèce', *Notices et extraits . . .*, XX, 2ᵉ partie, 29; J. M. Parent, *La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres* (Ottawa, 1938), p. 122.

Anonyme des manuscrits Reginenses 72 et 244. Autres manuscrits: Arsenal, 910; Orléans, 260; Paris *lat.* 15173. Extraits dans A. Wilmart, *Analecta Reginensia*, Studi e testi, 59 (1933), 259-262.

Anonyme du *Ms.* Erfurt *Q.* 5. Edition: E. T. Silk, *Saeculi noni auctoris in Boetii consolationem philosophiae commentarius* (Rome, 1935). L'attribution à un auteur du IXᵉ siècle est erronée.

Anonyme du Vatican *lat.* 919 (manuscrit incomplet).

[9] Conrad d'Hirschau, *Dialogus super auctores sive Didascalion*, ed. Schepss, p. 60: Discipulus: Admiratione dignum videtur quod vir iste totus catholicus Fortunam totiens in hoc opere ponit et testimoniis divinis literam elegantem vacuam ostendit. Magister: Huius rei causa et prima quidem quod inter hostes veritatis versabatur, si testimoniis scripturae cingeret opus quod fecerat, incredulorum malicia combureret quod non intelligebat; secunda causa est quod vir prudentissimus ad incertos temporalium eventus demonstrandos ratione magis uti voluit quam scripturarum auctoritate ut vel sola ratione mundi contemptum persuaderet qui tunc temporis nihil ex auctoritate divina ex perverso interprete vel lectore perficeret . . .

[10] Guillaume de Conches, *In Boethium*, *Notices et extraits . . .*, XX, 2ᵉ partie, 55-56: Hercules pro sapiente et pro eloquente ponitur; unde dicitur monstra terre domare quia sapiens et eloquens omnia vicia domat . . . Tantalus ponitur pro quolibet avaro qui plenus divitiis, mala egestatis in affluentia patitur, dum non vult in necessariis sua expendere, quia non sustinet acervum nummorum minuere.

[11] Senèque, *Ad Lucilium*, Epist. 108: Itaque quae philosophia fuit, facta philologia est. Multum autem ad rem pertinet quo proposito ad quamdam rem accedas. Qui, grammaticus futurus, Virgilium scrutatur, non hoc animo legit illud egregium: . . . *Fugit irreparabile tempus*: vigilandum est! nisi properamus, relinquemur; agit nos, agiturque velox dies, inscii rapimur, omnia in futurum disponimus et inter praecipitia lenti sumus, sed ut observet quoties Virgilius de celeritate temporum dicit, hoc uti verbo illum, fugit . . . Ille qui ad philosophiam spectat, haec eadem quo debet, adducit.

[12] Sur Virgile au Moyen Age, on consultera D. Comparetti, *Virgilio nel medio evo* (Naples, 1887), qui conserve toujours de la valeur et le numero spécial des *Studi Medievali* (Turin, 1932), qui porte le même titre.

la lettre du texte par l'allégorie. Bernard Silvestre, qui commente l'*Enéide* à Chartres au début du siècle, veut voir dans Virgile un philosophe autant qu'un poète.[13] "Si on étudie ce texte avec attention", dit-il, "on n'apprendra pas seulement à écrire avec élégance, on trouvera encore de nombreuses raisons et exemples incitant à observer les règles morales et à fuir ce qui est défendu. C'est là la double utilité de ce travail: le progrès dans l'art littéraire, l'acquisition de la prudence. On peut en donner des exemples nombreux: les difficultés qu'a traversées Enée nous enseignent à pratiquer la patience, son attitude vis-à-vis d'Anchise et d'Ascagne nous montre ce que doit être la piété filiale. Le lecteur est encouragé à la dévotion, lorsqu'il voit le héros vénérer les dieux, consulter les oracles, prier et faire des voeux. L'exemple déplorable des amours de Didon doit faire fuir les liaisons dangereuses."[14] Pour Jean de Salisbury, Virgile est le poète par antonomase, comme Aristote est le philosophe et Rome la ville,[15] mais il est plus encore un penseur qui a exprimé toute la philosophie sous le couvert et l'image des fables poétiques.[16] S'inspirant de Bernard Silvestre, Salisbury voit dans les aventures d'Enée l'image des étapes de la vie de l'homme. C'est ainsi que contre l'épicurisme, il en appellera à Virgile: la recherche du plaisir ne peut avoir d'autre résultat que les pérégrinations d'Enée qui furent semées de tant de malheurs. Enée, c'est l'homme qui traverse six étapes dans sa vie comme les voyages du héros troyen sont racontés en six livres. Le naufrage raconté au premier livre, c'est l'image de l'enfance; la réunion des amis qui fait suite, représente l'adolescence et enseigne les défauts qu'il faut éviter à cet âge. La jeunesse a ses dangers que le troisième livre apprend à éviter, tandis que le quatrième enseigne à fuir les amours dangereux. Vint ensuite l'âge mûr qui est l'époque de l'activité publique aux multiples devoirs, tandis que s'apprête la vieillesse riche de la sagesse que le héros antique conçut en descendant aux enfers.[17]

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[13] Bernard Silvestre, *Commentum super sex libros Eneidos Virgilii*, ed. Riedel (Greifswald, 1924). Extraits dans V. Cousin, *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard* (Paris, 1836), p. 640.

[14] Bernard Silvestre, *Commentum super sex libros Eneidos*, ed. V. Cousin, *Ouvrages inédits d' Abélard*, p. 640: Prologus. Quoniam in hoc opere et poeta et philosophus perhibetur esse Virgilius . . . Si quis vero haec omnia studeat imitari, maximam scribendi peritiam consequetur; maxima etiam exempla et exercitationes aggrediendi honesta et fugiendi illicita per ea quae narrantur, habentur. Est itaque lectorum gemina utilitas: una scribendi peritia quae habetur ex imitatione, altera vero recte agendi prudentia quasi capitur exemplo et exhortatione; verbi gratia, ex laboribus Aeneae tolerantiae exemplum habemus, ex affectu eius in Anchisum et Ascanium, pietatis; ex veneratione quam diis exhibebat et ex oraculis quae poscebat, ex sacrificiis quae offerebat, ex votis et precibus quae fundebat, quodammodo ad religionem incitamur; per immoderatum vero Didonis amorem ab illicitorum appetitu revocamur.

[15] Jean de Salisbury, *Polycraticus* VII, 6; PL 199, 642: Sicut enim urbs Romam. Maronem poeta exprimit, sic et philosophi nomen circa Aristotelem utentium placito contractum est. Salva pace Ioannis . . . , pour employer une de ses expressions, ses contemporains ne pensent pas tous à Aristote quand ils disent "le philosophe". Ils ont plus souvent en vue Platon ou même Sénèque, du moins chez les moralistes.

[16] Jean de Salisbury, *Polycraticus* VI, 22; PL 199, 621: Procedat tibi poeta Mantuanus qui, sub imagine fabularum, totius philosophiae exprimit veritatem. Une autre expression du même auteur a peut-être été influencé par Bernard Silvestre: *Polycraticus* VIII, 24; PL 199, 818: Constat enim apud eos qui mentem diligentius perscrutantur auctorum, Maronem germinae doctrinae vires declarasse dum vanitate figmenti poetici, philosophicae veritatis involvit arcana.

[17] Jean de Salisbury, *Polycraticus* VIII, 24; PL 199, 817: . . . Hoc ipsum . . . in Aeneide sua, sub involucro fictitii commenti, innuisse visus est Maro dum sex aetatem gradus, sex librorum distinctionibus prudenter expressit. Quibus conditionis humanae . . . ortum exprimere visus est et processum, ipsumque quem educit et provehit, producit et deducit ad manes. Nam Aeneas . . . significet animam quasi carnis tugurio habitantem . . . Primus itaque liber Aeneidos, sub imagine naufragii manifestas infantiae quae suis procellis agitatur, exponit tunsiones et in fine suo abundantia cibi et potus adulta, prosilit ad laetitiam convivalem. In confinio ergo adolescentiae prodeunt colloquiorum commercia et eorum intemperies aut fabulas narrat aut veris falsa permiscet eo quod multiloquio peccata deesse non possunt. Porro tertius varios juventutis quasi suos canit errores eo quod illa aetas solos fere novit errores . . . Quarto illicitos amores conciliat et ignem imprudenter conceptum in pectore, ad amantis infelicem producit rogum . . . Quinta maturitatem civilem promit et aetatem depingit vicinam senectuti imo quae ipsam iam ingreditur senectutem. Nam et Patrum honores recolit maiorum memo-

Le succès de Virgile au XII^e^ siècle n'est rien à côté de celui d'Ovide. Tout le monde le cite à cette époque, y compris le pape Innocent III et un docteur aussi sévère que saint Bernard. On va jusqu'à en faire un professeur de morale et jusqu'à présenter ses oeuvres comme des écrits d'éthique.[18] Au dire d'Arnulf d'Orléans des ouvrages comme les *Fastes*, l'*Ars amatoria*, les *Remèdes*, l'*Ex Ponto*, les *Métamorphoses* doivent être rangés parmi les écrits de philosophie morale.[19] Inutile de dire qu'ici encore, et plus que jamais, on allégorise et on moralise. Chacune des métamorphoses devient la punition de quelque faute. Les géants sont transformés en montagne pour avoir nié l'existence de Dieu. Nés de la terre, ils représentent les hommes; ils s'attaquèrent à Jupiter à l'image de ceux qui veulent supprimer Dieu en le niant. Mais le Seigneur les a frappés et changés en pierre; leur coeur est dur et fermé. Hélas! de leur sang, c'est-à-dire de leur souche, naissent les hommes mauvais.[20] Lichaon fut changé en loup; il avait tenté Dieu, mettant le Seigneur au défi de le punir du meurtre qu'il commettait. Jupiter le frappa et le condamna à vivre toujours dans le crime.[21] Apollon fut privé de sa dignité divine parce qu'il avait tué les Ciclopes qui étaient au service de Jupiter et devint berger. Souvent ceux qui ont une confiance exagérée en leur propre sagesse s'attaquent aux prédicateurs qui enseignent la parole de Dieu; celui-ci les punit en leur retirant toute sagesse et en leur donnant autant d'idée qu'un berger.[22]

IV. *ETHIQUE, RHETORIQUE ET DIALECTIQUE*

Après ce que Quintillien nous a révélé de la connexion entre la rhétorique et de l'éthique chez les anciens, on aurait pu croire que de côté aussi on allaît trouver à l'époque qui nous occupe, une étude de la morale philosophique. En fait, ici on trouve moins à récolter pour l'histoire de l'éthique au XII^e^ siècle qu'on aurait pu l'escompter. A y réfléchir, la chose s'explique: chez les anciens,

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riam veneratur et quasi ad tumulum Anchisae solemnes celebret lusos in his ipsis exilii sui miseriam recognoscit. Dum vero hinc egreditur, transit ad sextam et amissis Palimuro et Miseno, duce scilicet navigii dormitante et temerarii praelii incentore, cum iam frigescat affectus viresque deficiant non tam senectutem sentit quam senium et velut quemdam descensum ad inferos, ubi quasi rebus inutiliter gestis, totius anteactae vitae recognoscat errores et discat alia via incedendum esse his qui volunt ad dulces laviniae complexus et fatale regnum Italiae quasi ad quamdam arcem beatitudinis pervenire.

[18] Sur l'*Ovidius moralizatus* on verra par exemple F. Ghisalberti, 'Arnulfo d'Orléans, un cultore di Ovidio nel secolo XII', *Memorie del Istituto Lombardo di scienze e lettere*, Classe di lettere, scienze morali e storiche, XXIV, 4 (Milan, 1932-XI) et du même auteur l'*Ovidius Moralizatus di Pierre Bersuire* (Rome, 1938).

[19] F. Ghisalberti, *art. cit.* Arnulf range tous ces écrits sous l'éthique. Par exemple pour l'art d'aimer: Ethice supponitur quia de moribus iuvenum et puellarum loquitur; p. 167. Au sujet de l'*Ex Ponto*: Ethice supponitur quia de moribus amicorum loquitur ad quos dirigit epistulas; p. 173. De même pour les *Métamorphoses*: Ethicae supponitur quia docet nos ista temporalia quae transitoria et mutabilia contempnere quod pertinet ad moralitatem; p. 181.

[20] Arnulf d'Orléans, *Allegoriae super Ovidii Metamorphosion* I, n° 5; ed. F. Ghisalberti, p. 202: Terra in gigantes. Allegoria talis est. Gigantes dicunter a *ge* quod est terra, quasi terrena amantes, unde et serpentinos habuerunt pedes quia serpebant in terrenis. Jovem de celo eiicere voluerunt quod adhuc multi faciunt, Deum coeli nullum esse credentes. Sed a Deo fulminati, versi sunt in montes, id est a Deo exterminati, versi sunt in sensum reprobum facti lapidei et obstinati. Sed de eorum sanguine, id est de progenie obstinatorum nascuntur iterum homines mali.

[21] Arnulf d'Orléans, *Allegoriae super Ovidii Metamorphosion* I, n° 6; ed. F. Ghisalberti, p. 202: Lichaon contemptor deorum ignorans illud: non temptabis dominum tuum . . . , voluit tentare si verus deus esset Jupiter faciendo homicidium quia crederetur statim esse verus si eum statim pro homicidio puniret. Jupiter vero pro suo homicidio eum obstinatum fecit esse in sua tyrannide. Qui in lupum fingitur mutatus quid luporum est esse tyrannos ovium.

[22] Arnulf d'Orléans, *Allegoriae super Ovidii Metamorphosion* II, n° 11; ed. F. Ghisalberti, p. 206; Apollo propter Ciclopes occisos qui fuerunt fabri Jovis deitate sua spoliatus factus est pastor. Saepe enim sapiens alias delirans quia fabros Jovis, id est praedicatores qui verbum divinum hominibus fabricant impedit et offendit, a sapientia destitutus, id est a dignitate, pastoralem induit simplicitatem. Cuius vaccas, id est beata opera, postea Mercurius, id est facundia sua, furatur cum ipse sibi contraria argumentando opponit quibus adhaereat et quae reliquerit.

la rhétorique comprenait l'étude de l'éthique parce qu'elle présidait à l'étude des auteurs qui avaient écrit en prose, tandis que la grammaire se contentait de l'explication des poètes. Cette répartition des tâches n'a pas été maintenue à l'époque médiévale et le successeur du *grammaticus* s'est vu confier l'étude de tous les classiques, y compris les prosateurs qui traitaient de l'éthique.[1] Cependant dans ce qui reste d'autonomie à la rhétorique nous trouvons encore trace de l'*ethica*.

En Italie, la rhétorique s'est survécue en étroite connexion avec l'art notarial et le droit. Les Italiens n'ont pas perdu la tradition des notaires impériaux et sont à la tête de ceux qui enseignent aussi bien le style de curie, les formules diplomatiques que le simple art de la correspondance, *ars dictaminis*.[2] De plus, il existe dans le nord de la péninsule des communes puissantes dont la législation s'inspire toujours du droit romain: Milan, Pavie, Ravenne, Bologne. C'est dans cette dernière ville qu'Irnerius, au début du XII^{e} siècle, va organiser un enseignement systématique et technique du droit romain. Il connaîtra en cela le plus vif succès et un pleiade de disciples suivant son exemple; Bologne deviendra la cité du droit où afflueront des élèves de toute l'Europe. Comme il arrive souvent aux initiateurs, les nouveaux légistes ne marqueront pas de suite toute l'autonomie de leur science et conserveront encore les cadres anciens, en théorie tout au moins. En présentant les textes de droit romain qu'ils vont commenter et en utilisant le schème traditionnel de l'*accessus ad auctores* dont nous avons parlé plus haut, certains diront que ces pages relèvent de l'*ethica*. *Ethices est* déclarera Bulgarus au début de son commentaire du code de Justinien.[3] Cette façon de voir pouvait paraître d'autant plus plausible que les *Institutes* s'ouvrent par une définition de la justice et qu' à cette occasion, Irnerius aurait disserté sur la vertu.[4] Il va de soi que ce n'est pas de ce côté que nous aurons beaucoup à glâner pour l'histoire de la philosophie morale, mais cet usage du terme *ethica* méritait d'être noté. Il fait comprendre certaines remarques d'auteurs qui, comme

[1] Remarquons que pour certains "grammairiens" du XII^{e} siecle, la rhétorique est uniquement l'art d'orner le style. Cf. Guillaume de Conches, *Philosophia mundi* IV, 41; PL 172, 100: Cuius (eloquentiae) sunt tres partes: recte scribere et recte pronuntiare scripta quae confert grammatica; probare quod probandum est quod docet dialectica; ornare verba et sententias quod tradit rhetorica.

[2] Principaux textes médiévaux de l'*ars notaria*: L. Rockinger, 'Briefsteller und Formelbücher des XI bis XIV Jahrhunderts', *Quellen und Erörterungen zur bayerische und deutschen Geschichte*, IX (1863-64); *idem*, 'Ueber die Ars dictandi und die Summae dictaminis in Italien', *Sitzungsberichte der Müncher Akademie*, I (1861), 98-151; A. Gaudenzi, 'The Formularius tabellionum of Irnerius, the Rhetorica antiqua of Buoncompagno', *Bibliotheca iuridica medii aevi: scripta, anecdota glossatorum* 3 vols. (Bologna, 1888-1891); A. Gaudenzi, *Ranieri da Perugia Ars notaria*, (Bologna, 1890); L. Delisle, 'Notice sur une Summa dictaminis jadis conservée à Beauvais', *Notices et extraits . . .*, XXXVI, 1re partie (1899), 171-205: *idem*, 'Des recueils épistolaires de Bérard de Naples', *Notices et extraits . . .*, XXVII. 2^{e} partie (1879), 87-149: *idem*, 'Le Formulaire de Clairmarais', *Journal des savants*, (1889), 172-95; *idem*, 'Le Formulaire du Tréguier et les écoliers bretons des écoles d'Orléans du commencement du XIV^{e} siècle', *Mémoires de la Société archéologique de l'orléannais* (Orléans, 1890); H. Kalbfuss, 'Eine Bologneser Ars dictandi des 12 Jahrhunderts', *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliothek* (Rome, 1914); A. Cartellieri, *Eine Donaueschinger Briefsteller* (Innsbruck, 1898); L. Wahrmund, *Die Ars notaria des Rainerius Perusianus*, (Innsbruck, 1917); K. Hampe, 'Formelbücher und Briefsteller in englischen Hss.', *Neue Archiv*, XXII (1897), 609-628; G. Mari, 'Poetri magistri Johannis Anglici (Garlandi) de arte prosayca, metrica et rithmica', *Romanische Forschungen*, XIII (1902), 883-965; E. Heller, 'Die Ars dictandi des Thomas von Capua', *Sitzungsbericht Heidelberg Akademie*, IV, A (1929).

[3] H. Kantorowicz, *Studies on the Glossators of the Roman Law* (Cambridge, 1938), pp. 37 et 233.

[4] *Exordium Institutionum secundum Irnerium*; H. Kantorowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 240: Et nota quod in definitione iustitie ponit diffinitionem sui generis, idem est virtutis. Cum enim dicit 'constans', intelligit mentis bene constitute, constantia etenim non nisi in bona significatione intelligitur, cum autem dicit 'perpetua' intelligit habitum, habitus enim est voluntas difficile mobilis et in vita permanens, ac si diceret: Iusticia est habitus mentis bene constitute tribuens ius suum unicuique. Istud solum est diffinitio propria iustitie. Huius speciei virtus est genus, virtus enim quatuor principales habet species: iustitia, prudentia, fortitudo, temperantia.

Geoffroy de Saint-Victor, enumèrent comme textes d'éthique, à côté de ceux de Cicéron et de Sénèque, les ordonnances du droit positif.[5]

Dans les pays transalpins, et notamment en France, la rhétorique est plus académique, plus désintéressée, moins recherchée aussi peut-être. Et cependant elle va avoir une grande influence sur l'éthique; de concert avec le commentaire de Macrobe sur le songe de Scipion, elle est à l'origine de ces nombreux tableaux des vertus que nous rencontrons chez les auteurs du XII^e siècle.[6] La rhétorique ancienne, en effet, n'étudiait pas seulement le genre judiciaire, mais encore les genres délibératif et démonstratif. Or ceux-ci, au dire de Cicéron,[7] ont pour objet l'honnête et l'utile, et partant la rhétorique doit s'expliquer sur ces sujets et préparer le futur orateur à louer les vertus d'une personnalité ou à conseiller une décision conforme au bien. D'où à la fin de la rhétorique, un petit traité sur la vertu. Cicéron la définit "un état d'âme conforme à la nature et à la raison" et entreprend de la faire connaître par le procédé d'énumération. Il prend pour base de sa division les quatre vertus de prudence, justice, force et tempérance[8] et distingue leurs diverses parties dont brièvement il explique le sens et la valeur. La prudence se base sur la mémoire, l'intelligence et la prévoyance.[9] La justice se subdivise en droit naturel, coutumier, légal. Le droit naturel comprend la religion, la piété, la reconnaissance, la vindicte, le respect, la véracité.[10] La force a pour parties la noblesse d'âme, la confiance en soi, la patience et la persévérance.[11] Enfin la tempérance se manifeste dans la retenue, la clémence et la modestie.[12] Bref il y a là sous une forme concise un résumé de toute une éthique, et même plus précisément du *De Officiis* de Cicéron.[13] On comprend que les chrétiens, particulièrement attentifs aux choses morales, aient remarqué ces pages. Saint Augustin les reproduit dans son *Liber de diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII* sous le titre *Sententia Ciceronis quemadmodum virtutes animi ab illo divisae ac definitae sunt*[14] et leur assure ainsi la plus large diffusion. Nous les retrouvons encore dans la *Disputatio de rhetorica et virtutibus sapientissimi regis Karti et Albini magistri.*[15] Certains se sont étonnés de cette conjonction entre la rhétorique et les vertus. "A son dialogue sur la rhétorique", écrit M. A. Kleinclausz, "il (Alcuin) a ajouté d'une manière inattendue une courte dissertation sur les vertus".[16] D'autres ont pensé que l'ouvrage dans sa forme actuelle était formé par la réunion de deux opuscules primitivement indépendants.[17] Et cependant Alcuin s'est contenté de suivre son modèle et, ici encore, de reproduire ce qu'avait écrit Cicéron[18] avec une telle fidélité que le ton de son exposé reste entièrement païen au grand étonnement de son élève.[19] D'autres auteurs encore enchasseront dans leurs oeuvres ce petit traité de la vertu, Ermenric d'Ellwagen par exemple[20] et, au XIIe siècle, Guillaume de Conches dans sa *Tertia philosophia*.[21] A la même époque, d'ailleurs, ce texte est au programme des études littéraires. L'*Eptateuche* de Thierry de Chartres prévoie qu'on étudiera le *De Inventione* et le *De Partitione oratoria* de Cicéron, la *Rhétorique à Herennius* que l'on attribue alors au même auteur, les *Préceptes* de Severianus et le *De Rhetorica* de Martianus Cappella.[22] Alexandre Neckam conseille pour sa part la première rhétorique et le *De Oratore* de Cicéron, la rhétorique à Herennius, les *Causae* et le *De Oratoris institutione* de Quintillien.[23] De plus nous possédons un commentaire du *De Inventione* dû à Thierry de Chartres dont nous reproduisons un extrait en Appendice C, les pages qui concernent le genre délibératif et la vertu. Selon la méthode du temps, Thierry a expliqué mot à mot les passages qui demandaient quelque éclaircissement et s'est contenté de lire les autres. Mais plus encore qu'à cet ouvrage ou à d'autres du même genre, il faudrait recourir ici aux textes des lettrés, philosophes et théologiens qui définissent les vertus ou en proposent une classification. En attendant de pouvoir mener à bien ce travail[24] nous ne pouvons livrer qu'une impression: c'est qu'au XIIe siècle, tout autant qu'au XIIIe, ces pages du *De Inventione* ont été un classique de la morale. Les lettrés du XIIe siècle n'ont pas procédé autrement que saint Thomas dont tout lecteur des pages de la *Somme théologique* consacrées à la morale aura remarqué les nombreuses références au *De Inventione*.[25] On sait d'ailleurs qu'au temps de saint Thomas le second livre du *De Inventione*—et seulement celui-là—continuait à être étudié dans les écoles. En effet un "guide pour examens" qui date de la première moitié du XIIIe siècle montre qu'alors on ne commentait plus que cette partie de l'ouvrage de Cicéron. La raison qui en est donnée est bien significative: "Dans le premier livre, Tullius traite de la manière de présenter les causes judiciaires. Dans le second, il en parle aussi mais il ajoute des choses utiles à l'étude des arts et c'est pourquoi on ne lit que ce livre."[26] Or la seule chose dont Cicéron parle ici, en dehors du genre judiciaire, c'est des genres délibératif et démonstratif qui contiennent précisément l'étude de la vertu ainsi que nous venons de le dire.

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[5] Voir Appendice B, *infra*, p. 97.

[6] Ces classifications des vertus voisinent souvent avec celles des sciences. Peut-être y a-t-il à ce fait une origine antique. Les stoïciens ne distinguant pas les points de vue intellectuel et moral classaient ensemble sciences et vertus. De même l'école aristotélicienne étudiait dans l'*Ethique* du maître les vertus intellectuels et morales.

[7] Cicéron, *De inventione* II, 51: Nunc expositis iis argumentationibus quae in judiciale causarum genus accommodantur, deinceps in deliberativum genus et demonstrativum argumentandi locos et praecepta dabimus : . . In deliberativo autem Aristoteli placet (finem esse) utilitatem, nobis et honestatem et utilitatem, in demonstrativo honestatem.

[8] *Ibidem*, c. 53; Virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus. Quamobrem omnibus eius partibus cognitis tota vis erit simplicis honestatis considerata. Habet igitur partes quatuor: prudentiam, justitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam.

[9] *Ibidem*: Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum neutrarumque scientia. Partes eius: memoria, intelligentia, providentia.

[10] *Ibidem*: Iustitia est habitus animi communi utilitate conservata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem. Eius initium est a natura profectum, deinde quaedam in consuetudinem ex utilitatis ratione venerunt; postea res et ab natura profectas et ab consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit. Naturae ius est quod non opinio genuit sed quaedam in natura vis insevit, ut religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, observantiam, veritatem.

[11] *Ibidem*, c. 54: Eius (fortitudinis) partes magnificentia, fidentia, patientia, perseverantia.

[12] *Ibidem*: Temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio. Eius partes continentia, clementia, modestia.

[13] Remarquons que les autres traités de rhétorique comportent aussi une étude de l'honnêteté et de la vertu à propos des genres délibératif et démonstratif. Par ex. *Partitiones oratoriae*, c. 22 ff.; *Rhetorica ad Herennium* III, 2. Aucune ne connut la fortune que l'extrait *De Inventione* dût à saint Augustin.

[14] Saint Augustin, *De Diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII liber unus*, c. 31; PL 40. 20-22.

[15] Texte et commentaire dans W. S. Howell, *The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne* (Princeton, 1941). Voir aussi le texte; PL 101, 919 ff.

[16] A. Kleinclausz, *Alcuin* (Paris, 1948), pp. 217-218.

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[17] Voir une discussion à ce sujet dans M. Roger, *L'enseignement des lettres classiques d'Ausone à Alcuin* (Paris, 1905), p. 397.

[18] Les lignes 1199-1286 de l'édition Howell reproduisent le *De Inventione* II, 4, n° 157; 53, n^{os} 159-164. Il n'y a que 14 lignes qui soient ici propres à Alcuin.

[19] Ed. Howell, ligne 1287. Karlus . . . Sed miror nos christianos, si illi philosophi has virtutes ob illarum tantum dignitatem vel laudem vitae servaverunt, cur nos ab his in multis devio errore declinamus.

[20] Ermenric d'Ellwagen, *Epistolae*; MGH Epistolae V; pp. 541-542.

[21] C. Ottaviano, *Un brano inedito della "Philosophia" di Guglielmo di Conches* (Napoli, 1935), p. 29 à 30. Pour l'identification de la source cicéronienne, voir Dom O. Lottin recension de l'ouvrage précédent dans *Bulletin de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, II (1936), 464.

[22] Thierry de Chartres, *Eptateuchen* (*Ms* Carn. 497), Rhetorica: Ciceronis de Inventione rhetorica libri 2, Rhetoricorum ad Herennium libri 4, de Partitione oratoria dialogus (fol. 191-264), Severiani Syntomata ac praecepta artis rhetoricae (fol. 265-269^{r}), Capellae De rhetorica libri 5 (fol. 269^{v}-279). Cf. A. Clerval, *Les écoles de Chartres au moyen-âge du Ve au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1895), p. 222.

[23] A Haskins, *A list of Text-books from the Close of the Twelfth Century*, p. 372: In rhetorica educandus legat primam Tulii rhetoricam et librum ad Herennium et Tullium de Oratore et Causas Quintilliani et Quintillianum de Oratoris institutione.

[24] Signalons dès maintenant l'utilisation du *De Inventione* dans le *Dialogus* d'Abélard et trois écrits de son école *Sententiae parisienses, Ysagoge, Sententiae Hermani*, la *Summa* de Simon de Tournai et le *De Virtutibus et vitiis* d'Alain de Lille.

[25] L'influence de Cicéron sur saint Thomas, au point de vue de la morale, a été étudiée par E. K. Rand, *Cicero in the Courtroom of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Milwaukee, 1946), et M. Pallasse, 'Brève histoire d'un schème cicéronien au Moyen Age', *Revue du Moyen Age latin*, I (1945), 39.

[26] M. Grabmann, *I divieti ecclesiastici di Aristotele sotto Innocenzo III e Gregorio IX* (Roma, 1941), p. 124: Hec autem scientia (rhetorica) traditur a Tullio in rhetoricis et sunt ibi duo libri partiales. In primo agitur in generali de inventione istorum que proponenda sunt coram iudice et de modo proponendi. In secundo vero agitur de

Il nous reste encore à voir si la dialectique, qui conquiert au cours du XII^e^ siècle une autonomie toujours plus grande vis-à-vis de la rhétorique, ne prend pas pour thème de ses exercices des problèmes d'éthique. On serait tenté d'évoquer ici une lettre dans laquelle Pierre de Blois déclare qu'on discute dans les écoles bien des questions trop difficiles pour les débutants comme la naissance, l'usage et la diminution des vertus. Mais, je pense l'avoir montré ailleurs, Pierre de Blois n'est pas ici un témoin véridique. Il bluffe et trompe son correspondant en reproduisant une liste d'apories qu'il a trouvée chez Jean de Salisbury.[27] Par contre nous pourrons faire confiance à Salisbury lui-même lorsqu'il nous dit que les trois parties de la philosophie, physique, éthique et logique, fournissent à la dialectique une ample moisson de problèmes à débattre, de questions à discuter. Il en cite deux pour la philosophie morale: en cas de désaccord entre les parents et les lois à qui faut-il obéir? peut-on poser une action par pure recherche du plaisir?[28] Sans doute, ces discussions n'auront pas l'ampleur des *quaestiones disputatae* ou *quodlibetales* du XIII^e^ et du XIV^e^ siècles, mais il n'en reste pas moins que, contrairement à ce qu'on dit trop souvent, la jeune science dialectique s'est exercée aussi dans le domaine de la philosophie morale. J'espère avoir l'occasion de montrer comment Salisbury précisément, et plus encore Abélard, ont discuté d'une manière très serrée les thèmes fondamentaux de l'éthique: le bien suprême, la vertu, le plaisir.

V. *CONCLUSION*

1° Faisons le point. Ayant remarqué que les classifications scientifiques du XII^e^ siècle font place à l'*ethica* comme une science morale distincte de la théologie, nous avons recherché si cette discipline était vraiment enseignée et en quoi elle consistait. Des indications fournies par Hugues et Richard de Saint-Victor, Guillaume de Conches et Jean de Salisbury, il appert que l'enseignement de l'*ethica* est rattaché plus ou moins intimement au *trivium*.

2° Cette façon de faire, si étonnante pour nous, se rattache directement à la pédagogie romaine qui concevait l'enseignement des différentes disciplines comme une partie du commentaire des auteurs confié au *grammaticus* et au *rhetor*. Quintillien notamment revendique l'éthique comme une partie du programme de la rhétorique. Les lettrés du XII^e^ siècle reprennent cette tradition. Pour bien indiquer leur intention, ils font remarquer que tel ou tel livre ou passage relève de l'éthique en répondant à la question *cui parti philosophiae supponatur* qui est normalement agitée dans l'*accessus ad auctores*.

3° L'étude de la grammaire fera place à l'éthique
(a) par le commentaire ou l'adaptation des oeuvres systématiques des moralistes latins comme le *De Officiis*, le *De Amicitia* de Cicéron, les *Epistulae morales* de Sénèque et d'autres encore cités dans ces guides du professeur que sont le *Didascalion* de Conrad d'Hirschau et le programme d'Alexandre Neckam. Il faudrait entreprendre une étude précise de telle ou telle de ces adaptations.

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eisdem supperaddendo que sunt ad artem utilia et ideo non legitur nisi secundus liber tantum.

[27] Ph. Delhaye, 'Un témoignage frauduleux de Pierre de Blois sur la pédagogie du XII^e^ siècle', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, XIV (1947), 329-331.

[28] Jean de Salisbury, *Metalogicus* II, 5; PL 199, 86: Physicus enim et ethicus in suis assertionibus non procedunt nisi probationibus a logico mutuatis. *Ibidem*, c. 13; 870: Tres itaque facultates, naturalis, moralis et rationalis, materiam praestant quia singulae suas exponunt quaestiones. Quaerit enim ethica parentibus magis an legibus oporteat obedire si forte dissentiant. Physica an mundus aeternus sit . . . *Ibidem*, c. 15; 872: Porro ad scientiam et veritatem trium disciplinarum quaestiones aeque contendunt. Utrum voluptas eligenda sit vel non, ethica speculatio propter se utilis. Utrum mundus aeternus . . .

(b) par la composition de chaînes, florilèges, centons ou traités basés sur des morceaux choisis repris aux auteurs classiques. Jean de Salisbury, Pierre de Blois, Pierre le Chantre, Guillaume de Conches, le *Commentaire du Cantique* autrefois attribué à Thomas de Citeaux devront être étudiés à ce point de vue ainsi que certains "Miroirs des princes".

(c) enfin par des oeuvres plus récentes imitant des anciens ou donnant une interprétation allégorique et moralisante des textes classiques. Il y a là aussi bien des textes intéressants mais qui relèvent plus souvent de l'histoire de la littérature que de celle des idées.

4° La rhétorique, qui n'a pas conservé au XII^e siècle la prédominance d'autrefois sur la grammaire, connaît encore l'*ethica* sous deux aspects:

(a) comme étude du droit positif jusqu'au moment où celui-ci aura marqué son autonomie dans l'organisation scolaire nouvelle du XIII^e siècle. De ceci nous ne faisons que mémoire car cela ne concerne pas nos études.

(b) comme étude de la vertu et de ses subdivisions telles qu'elles sont exposées dans le *De Inventione* à propos des genres delibératif et démonstratif. Ceci intéresserait certainement notre sujet et il faudrait entreprendre une enquête sur l'influence de la classification cicéronienne.

Subsidiairement on pourrait encore rechercher dans quelle mesure la dialectique a été utilisée dès le XII^e siècle pour la discussion des thèmes de l'éthique, et même de la philosophie morale fondamentale.

Voilà certes du pain sur la planche! Et cependant ce n'est pas tout. Car il faudrait de plus interroger les médiévaux sur ce qu'ils pensent de cette *ethica* d'inspiration païenne. Des chrétiens peuvent-ils l'étudier? Dans quelle mesure convient-il qu'ils s'en inspirent? Tout cela demandera bien du temps . . . En se proposant cette oeuvre on est peut-être téméraire et l'on risque le sort désagréable de ceux qui annoncent toute leur vie les mêmes oeuvres en préparation . . . Mais il faut prendre date aussi . . . Et puis est-il nécessaire "d'espérer pour entreprendre?"

APPENDICE A

Pour éclairer ce qui est dit, p. 82, de l'*accessus ad auctores*, il m'a paru intéressant de reproduire ici ce prologue de Guillaume de Conches à son Commentaire sur le *Timée* (Paris, B. N., *lat.* 14065, fols. 53^r et 53^v).

Incipientibus Thimaeum inquirendum est quae compositionis illius causa fuerit et unde in eo agatur et qualiter etc et cui parti philosophiae subponatur et titulus. Causa vero compositionis huius operis talis fuit. Cum inter omnes recte philosophantes iusticiam in conservatione Rei Publicae principatus optinere certum sit, circa illius inquisitionem maxima fuit eorum contentio. Quorum Thimea cuius orator sic ipsam definivit: iusticia est que plurimum prodest qui plurimum potest, illud attendens quod propter conservationem iusticie ad illum qui plurimum potest gubernacula rei publicae transferuntur. Cuius definitione relata in scola, Socrates ait: non uno iusticia est que plurimum prodest ei qui minimum potest; qui non plurimum potest se et sua sine omni iusticia conservat sed qui minimum minime. Et quia tam perfectam de ea dederat sententiam, rogaverunt eum sui discipuli ut de illa tractatum componeret. Quorum satisfaciens voluntati de parte ipsius iusticie, id est de positiva iusticia tractavit. Iusticia enim alia positiva, alia naturalis. Et est positiva que est ab hominibus inventa ut suspensio latronis etc. Naturalis vero que non est homine inventa ut parentum dilectio et similia. Sed quoniam positiva iusticia circa instituta rei publicae maxime apparet, in tractatu de ea ad rem publicam se transtulit ut circa eam iusticiam ostenderet. Sed, quia in nulla republica perfectam potuit invenire iusticiam

que in exemplum pretendet, novam: scilicet veterem Athenensium confixit. Demum Plato eiusque discipulus cum decem volumina de republica composuisset, volens perficere quod magister suus pretermiserat, de naturali iusticia hoc opus composuit, sed quoniam illa circa conservationem mundi maxime apparet, ad illam se transfert. Unde possumus dicere quod materia huius libri est naturalis iusticia vel conservatio mundi, de ea enim propter naturalem iusticiam agit.

Agit hoc modo de tali materia, ostendendo efficientem, formalem, finalem, materialem causam mundi. Demum causam excogitationis anime et modum et coniunctionem eius cum corpore et potentias quas in eo exercet. Postea conservationem celestis animalis, aerei, aquatilis, reptilis. Deinde agit de etatibus hominis, de officio et utilitate membrorum eiusdem. Ad ultimum et primordiali materia, hac utilitate agit de tali materia, tali modo ut visa potentia divina et sapientia et bonitate in conservatione rerum, timeamus tam potentem, veneremus tam sapientem, diligamus tam benignum.

Non uni tamen parti philosophiae supponitur sed de pluribus aliquid in eo continetur. Quod, ut melius intelligatur, partes philosophiae divisione prodamus.

Philosophia igitur eorum que sunt et videntur et eorum que sunt et videntur vera est comprehensio. Huius due sunt species: practica et theorica. Practice vero sunt tres: etica de instructione morum, ethis enim mos; echonomica dispensativa, echonomus enim est dispensator, haec docet qualiter unusquisque propriam familiam debeat dispensare; politica civilis, polis est civitas, hec docet qualiter res publica tractetur. Theorice similiter sunt species tres: theologia, mathematica, phisica. Et est theologia de divinis, theos enim est deus, logos est racio. Mathematica quadrivium continet, dicta mathematica id est doctrinalis. Mathesis cum aspiratione est doctrina, sine ea est vanitas et dicitur doctrinalis antonomasice quia scilicet perfectior sit doctrina (fol. 53^{b}) in quadrivio quam in ceteris artibus. In aliis enim sola voce fit doctrina, in ista vero et voce et oculis ut enim dicitur actorum regula ostendit sub oculis in figura. Mathematice sunt quatuor species: arithmatica, musica, geometria, astronomia. Phisica vero de naturis et complexionibus corporum est: phisis enim est natura. Musica sunt species tres: instrumentalis, mundana, humana. Instrumentalis tres: melica, metrica, rithmica. Melice tres: diatonica, enarmonica, cromatica. De omnibus ergo artibus in hoc opere aliquid continetur. De practica in recapitulatione positive iusticie, de theologia vero de efficiente, formali et finali causa mundi et de anima mundi loquitur, ubi vero de numeris et proportionibus de mathematica, ubi vero de quatuor elementis et circa conservationem animalium et de primordiali materia phisice.

APPENDICE B

Nous avons dit, p. 91, comment les commentateurs du droit romain considéraient au XII^{e} siècle que leur science relevait de l'éthique. Il est intéressant de noter que ce point de vue n'est pas étranger à un "littéraire" comme Geoffroy de Saint-Victor qui, énumérant les auteurs d'éthique, réunit Socrate, Platon et Sénèque aux autorités qui promulguent les lois nouvelles. Voici un texte significatif à cet égard, extrait du *Microcosmus* (Paris, B. N., *lat.* 14515, fols. 21^{v} et 22^{r}).[1]

Subdivisio practice (philosophiae).

Et primi quidem fluminis divisionibus inferiora terre sic irrigantibus, secundi fluminis divisiones nichilominus eiusdem terre superiora circumeunt et sua irrigatione eam ligna pomifera germinare faciunt. Sunt autem tres secundi fluminis divisiones, nam practica tres habet species: ethicam, echonomicam, politicam. Quarum prima dum propria conversationis uniuscuiusque exteriora laudabiliter vite huius institutis adornat, secunda dum patris familias domum foris in oculis hominum pulchre ordinat, tercia quoque dum subiectum populum suo principi laudabiliter conformat, quasi terram nostram ligna pomifera germinare faciunt. Siquidem moralia instituta et secundum seculi huius formam tradita, dum sui observatores sublimes (fol. 22^{r}) et robustos in via morum et fructuosos aliis et laudabiles fama bone opinionis faciunt non iam quasi herbe virentes sed quasi ligna pomorum odoriferorum feratia sunt. Quia tamen ad eternitatem non perveniunt eorum quasi pomorum transeuntium fructus et odor pretereunt, hinc est quod antiqui moralium preceptorum doctores et observatores. Socrates videlicet et Plato et alii multi, Seneca quoque iunior his sed sublimior in his ita ut etiam quibusdam nostris mirabilis esset, omnes quidem in vita sua quasi odorifera poma longe lateque redolentia fuerunt sed nunc ut aromatum fumus evanuerunt.

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[1] Sur cet auteur et le plan de l'ouvrage, voir Ph. Delhaye. 'Le Microcosmus de Geoffroy de Saint-Victor', *Revue bénédictine* 58 (1948), 93 ff.; 'Le Sens littéral et le sens allégorique du Microcosmus de Geoffroy de Saint-Victor', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* XVI (1949), 155 ff.

Quod deficientibus auctoribus scientiarum non deficiant ipse sciencie.

Verumtamen, licet ligna pomifera cum pomis et odoribus suis transeant, flumina tamen ea gignentia semper augentur et multiplicantur in tria. Semper enim novi ethicorum, echonomicorum et politicorum libri crescunt et iuris priuati et publici, ciuilis quoque et gentium et principum constitutiones innouantur et de die in diem arida nostra novorum lignorum pomiferorum cum pomis suis feratior efficitur. Hec est tercii diei in microcosmo divinitus facta dispositio. Vidit igitur Deus quod esset bonum. Factum quoque est vespere et mane dies tercius quia prior est dissolutio morum quam disciplina.

APPENDICE C

Les genres délibératif et démonstratif de la rhétorique dans leurs relations avec l'éthique d'après un commentaire de Thierry de Chartres.

Les commentaires de rhétorique sont rares pour l'époque qui nous occupe. Aussi est-il intéressant de donner ici des extraits de celui qu'a écrit Thierry de Chartres sur le *De Inventione* et qui est conservé dans le *Ms* Bruxellensis, B. R., 10057, fol. xxviii^{ra}—xxviii^{vb}. On verra comment l'étude des genres délibératif et démonstratif était liée à celle de l'éthique, parce qu'ils impliquaient la considération de l'honnête et de l'utile.

¶Nunc expositis etc.

Postquam docuit qui loci et que argumenta conveniant questionibus et legalibus controversii in iudiciari genere causarum, nunc docet illud in deliberativo et in demonstrativo, non quod eedem questiones in hec genera que in iudiciale genus incidant sed quoniam alii loci et alia argumenta eisdem questionibus in eisdem generibus conveniant, scilicet fines horum generum. Et hoc est quod ait: nam constitutione separati, scilicet ad fines horum etc.

¶Nam placatione etc.

Ostendit fines generum causarum ut appareat secundum diversitatem finium quatinus oporteat diversos locos assignare.

¶Quare etc.

Quia honestas in utroque (fol. xxviii^{rb}) sed alia in uno, alia in alio, idcirco et quidam loci sunt communes et quidam proprii.

¶Rerum igitur etc.

Enumerat res ex quibus argumenta propria deliberativi generis duci

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14. Ms. ducid with 'd' deleted.

solent. Diuisio uero earum rerum talis est: appetendorum bonorum alia sunt bona in se uoluntate, ut uirtus, nam uirtus bonitas est; alia uero sunt bona propter aliud eo quod bonitate participent in eo quod utilia sunt; ut pecunia, alia uero in se bona sunt et utilia. Sic se habent res bone quod quedam earum sunt bonitates, quedam autem quibus accidit bonitas esse propter usum quamvis non sint bonitates, alie autem que et bonitates sunt et ad usum bone sunt et hoc est quod Tullius ait in predicta diuisione. Nam est quiddam quod allicit nos sua dignitate non aliquo emolumento, id est quod ex se bonum est ita ut non accipiat esse bonum ab extrinseco usu. Genera uocat emolumentum. Alie vero non propter suam uim et naturam uel non in se bone sunt sed quia apte sunt ut eis utamur, idcirco bone esse indicantur. Sunt uero alia que propter utrumque bona sunt scilicet et in se et quia per se gerunt utilitatem, id est quandam utilitatem pretendunt.

¶Sed ut expeditius etc.

Vult in duo diuidere quod superius in tria diuisit ut binorum sit diuersio. Et ea que utroque modo bona sunt a digniori parte bona appellat et hoc est conferre in meliorem partem uocabuli.

¶His igitur.

Necessitas attributa est honestati quia necesse est quedam fieri propter honestatem. Affectio uero est consuetutinus aliqua de causa commutatio. Hoc item honestati attributa est quoniam multas dimittimus consuetudines propter honestatem. Item utraque res attributa est utilitati quoniam et quedam fieri necesse est propter utilitatem et quedam commutantur propter eandem.

¶Est igitur etc.

Hoc nomen commune est et ius, id est significatio eadem.

¶Nam uirtus etc.

Diffinitio uirtutis sic intelligenda est: uirtus est habitus animi quo redditur in modum nature consentiendo rationi. Nam modus nature per uitium exceditur, ad quem modum per uirtutem, sequendo rationem, fit reversio.

¶Prudentia

Scientiam hic vocat discretionem eligendi unum et detestandi aliud.

¶Justicia

Posteaquam dixit iusticiam tribuere suam dignitatem cuique, id est quod iustum, ne hoc uideatur dici de solo iure naturali, ideo addidit: conseruata etc ut scilicet in diffinitione concludat utramque iusticiam et naturalem et positivam.

¶Gratia consulto sic facienda est etc.

Gratia est in qua continetur memoria et uoluntas renumerandi scilicet alterius memoria, id est amicitiarum, et alterius voluntas renumerandi, id est officiorum.

¶Magnificentia

Tria concurrunt ut magnificentia fiat. Primum cogitatio, id est discretio (fol. xxviii^{va}) magnarum rerum et arduarum. Magna vocat difficilia nunc autem et utilia. Ardua uero sunt ea que fiunt magne dignitatis. Demum auxit propositum amplum quantum ad magnum, splendidum quantum ad arduum, ad utrumque uero amministratio, id est propositi executio. Nam magnifici corde magno cogitant et id in anima proponunt atque execuitur.

¶Clementia etc.

Ordo uerborum sic faciendus est. Clementia est per quam animi temere concitati in odium alicuius inuectionis, id est in odium ex aliqua inuectione, id est iniuria ortum, retinentur comitate, id est quadam urbanitate siue curialitate. Quidam libri habent: inuectionis, quod idem valet. Quidam vero

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17. Ms. voluntas.
18. Ms. sicu with 'u' deleted.
19. Ms. quibusdam.
29. Ms. sit se diversio.
31. Ms. volcabuli.
33. Ms. attribita.
34. Ms. propter inhonestatem.

neutrum habent quod satis planum est.

¶Modestia

Pudorem honestum appellat uerecundiam ex munda conscientia procedentem. Caram uero auctoritatem que omnibus placet.

¶Sed propter se etc.

Postquam bonitates enumerauit, nunc contraria et eorum media enumerat, quorum mediorum quedam habent nomina, quedam autem per negationem utrorumque summorum designantur.

¶Amicitia

Non est amicus nisi diligat vere aliquem et ab eo pariter diligatur.

¶Nichil quia diuersa genera amicitiarum sunt: nam est amicitia quedam propter se appetenda, quedam autem propter se et propter utilitatem, que amicitia propter regimem ciuitatum habenda est.

¶Amicitiarum autem etc.

Istum dicit species amicitie. Nam quidam fiunt amici propter regionem in qua sunt, quidam uero propter impudicitiam. Item quidam ab infantia se dilexerunt, quidam autem nouiter, etc. Rursus quidam amici fiunt dando et accipiendo. Item quedam amicitia nociua, quedam utilis est. Hoc autem omnia enumerat ut sciamus secundum qualitatem causarum et oportunitatem temporum et secundum hominum officia et etates argumenta ducere. Nota uero quod gloria et amplitudo ad fortunam pertinent, amicitia uero ad iustum. Dignitas autem et decus ad sequens negotium.

¶Utilitas autem etc.

Postquam de honesto dixit, diuidit utilitatem dicens eam esse aut in possessionibus aut in villis, domibus, magna est utilitas, aut in corpore ut in uiribus et uelocitate et in ceteris talibus, aut in contrariis rebus sicut in <?> et sociis et in rebus eorum, quibus rebus multum augmentatur utilitas corporis.

¶Ut in republica

Ponit exempla eius utilitatis que est in corpore sicut in corpore ciuitatis est hoc: utilia agri, portus etc quibus incolumis ciuitas (fol. xxviii^{vb}) seruatur ne periculum incurrat aut libertas retineatur ne animo subiaceat.

¶Alia uero.

Predictas ad uires pertinent civitatis, ista uero ad ornamentum et maiorem amplificationem nec tantummodo ad uires. Sic igitur superior triplex diuisio redigenda est in duo, ut scilicet dicatur quod utilitatis alia pars est incoluminitas, alia ad uires pertinet, alia uero potentia que ad amplificationem atque ad ornamentum pertinet. Nam ultimum quedam sunt ad tutelam, quedam ad ornamentum utilia.

¶Atque in his omnibus etc.

Facit terciam diuisionem utilium, quod scilicet quedam eorum sunt facilia, quedam difficilia et ostendit diffinitionibus quid sit facile et quid difficile. Tres igitur diuisiones utilium ponit, quarum prima est quod utilium alia sunt in possessionibus, alia in corpore, alia in externis rebus. Secunda uero diuisio est quod utilium alia ad uires pertinent, alia ad ornamentum. Tercia uero diuisio est quod utilium alia sunt facilia, alia difficilia. Hec autem omnia vel ad fortunam pertinent vel ad naturam et ad facultatem. Nam utilium quedam ex fortuna contingunt ut pecunia et talia, quedam autem ex natura ut uires corporis natura naturales et etiam quodlibet aliud naturale siue in corpore, siue in anima. Quedam autem ad facultatem pertinent sicut res uelut auxilia amicorum et consimila.

¶Quoniam ergo etc.

Postquam egit de honestate et utilitate, nunc agit de his rebus quas honestati et utilitati attributis esse diximus ac prius de necessitate.

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78. Ms. per se appetenda.

98. Ms. servatur nec periculus.

101. Ms. triplex triplex diuisio with second triplex deleted.

Peter Cantor's View on Ecclesiastical Excommunication and Its Practical Consequences

N. M. HARING S.A.C.

PETER CANTOR (d. 1197), a professor of theology in Paris during the last quarter of the twelfth century, was much more interested in the moral aspects of theology than in the speculative problems of the sacred sciences. Especially the second part of his *Summa de sacramentis et de anima consiliis,*[1] which was apparently written down by scribes in Cantor's class-room, reveals his strong tendency towards moral-theological casuistry. Although he was obviously familiar with canon law, we can hardly classify him as a canonist, for his primary concern was not so much to state and interpret the law as to show its practical application in the Christian's daily life. In his zeal for the reform of Christian morals, he was not satisfied with the existing legislation concerning abuses, such as simony, or with the actual laws of excommunication as they existed in his time. Hence, in dealing with his view on ecclesiastical excommunication, a clear line must be drawn between offences to which excommunication was attached by law and other offences which, according to Peter Cantor, merit excommunication. He went so far as to demand that this second class of people be treated as if they had actually incurred excommunication.

Among the offences to which excommunication was attached by law, the famous canon: *Si quis suadente diabolo*[2] deserves a prominent place, because it called for a pilgrimage to Rome to obtain absolution and no bishop had faculties to grant it, except in the penitent's danger of death.

Since the feudal tournaments had been outlawed by the Church on various solemn occasions,[3] *torneatores* were excommunicated and even barred from Christian burial. Cantor tells us that a priest could not say Mass for the repose of their souls.[4]

If it was publicly known that a priest lived with a woman, he also was excommunicated and the faithful were not permitted to attend his Mass. Although the interpreters of the law taught that an official conviction and sentence was required to apply the canon, Cantor favours the view that, even after such an official sentence, people must not stay away from his Mass, particularly on the principal feasts, nor withold the three annual offerings prescribed by law.[5]

Likewise under excommunication were all *public* usurers identifiable as such by a money bag attached to a pole in front of the house.[6]

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[1] The date of this (unpublished) *Summa* is about the year 1190. To establish a reliable text I have used three manuscripts and, unless noted otherwise, all texts cited or referred to in this article are taken from Cantor's *Summa*. The title is not repeated in the notes and the following abbreviations have been adopted: *A*: *Ms* Troyes *Lat.* 276 and *B*: *Ms* Paris, Bibl. Nat. *Lat.* 14521. In addition, *Ms* Paris, Bibl. Nat. *Lat.* 9553 has been used. On Peter Cantor's life and works see F. S. Gutjahr, *Petrus Cantor Parisiensis* (Graz, 1899), and A. M. Landgraf, *Einfuehrung in die Geschichte der theol. Literatur de Fruehscholastik* (Regensburg, 1948).

[2] Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 17, q. 4, c. 29. Lateran Council (1139), can. 15; Mansi, 21, 530C. Although this is the first canon prescribing a journey to Rome, it had long been customary to send to Rome all those guilty of enormous crimes. Cf. E. Vernay, *Le 'Liber de excommunicatione' du Cardinal Bérenger Frédol* (Paris, 1912), p. XLIII.

[3] See the Council of Clermont (1130), can. 9; Mansi, 21, 439B. The Lateran Council of 1139, can. 14; Mansi, 21, 530B. The Synod of Rheims (1148), can. 12; Mansi, 21, 716E. The Lateran Council of 1179, can. 20; Mansi, 22, Mansi, 22, 229B.

[4] *A* fol. 122^{rb} and *B* fol. 109^{ra}.

[5] Council of Rheims (1131), can. 5 and Lateran Council of 1139, can. 7, Mansi, 21, 459A. Cf. Gratian, *Decretum*, D. 32, c. 5 and c. 6.

[6] *A* fol. 76^{va} and *B* fol. $69.^{rb}$ Cf. *Decr. Greg.* V, 19, 1ff.

To the same class, as Cantor relates, belonged *public* prostitutes although they were tolerated by the Church,[7] *sortiarii*, those who willfully set fire to buildings, poisoners, and such like.[8]

In all these cases, he points out, a court sentence was not required, but the crime had to be notorious or, as some authors held, publicly confessed.[9]

Other people *should* be excommunicated to Cantor's mind, although there was no *sententia lata.* For instance actors, public champions (*campiones*) and public *fornicariae.*[10] To the same class belonged mimes, jongleurs, magicians, dicers, *tyrocinatores*,[11] certain tailors, manufacturers and operators of large military engines called *ballistae,* pugilists, and others about whom Cantor is less definite and less severe. Despite the fact that these people were not excommunicatd by law, Cantor holds that they should be treated as if they were actually excommunicated.[12]

In connection with Cantor's attitude towards actors and jongleurs, some of his texts have been quoted before,[13] but they do not fully cover his sweeping demands for excommunication. To begin with, a statement commonly attributed to an author of the early thirteenth century actually dates back to Peter Cantor[14] and shows the following argumentation: Making an offering to actors is the same as offering a sacrifice to the devils.[15] Some authors make a distinction, saying that he who offers something to a person to become an actor offers a sacrifice to the devils. Those, however, who offer something to a full-fledged actor, do not commit sin, provided it is not done in view of an obscene performance. I believe, Cantor continues, that whenever we give something to actors because they are actors, not because they are human beings, we sacrifice to the demons. However, we are allowed to listen to comical verses dealing with a decent subject or to musical instruments played for our entertainment, but never if played for sensual pleasure. I make a similar statement concerning all magicians, enchanters, sooth-sayers, inspectors of entrails or swords or mirrors, augurs, fortune-tellers, rope-dancers, dancers, jongleurs, people who make dice, low-cut garments or long tail-coats. Their work is of no use in human life. Therefore, whoever gives something to such people, sacrifices to the devils. Hence the Apostle orders all those to be excommunicated and sparated from the Church who eat their bread idle.[16]

Yet, as our author remarks later, some distinction should be made regarding jongleurs. Some of them make their living by making funny faces[17] and obscene movements of their bodies. Thus they distort the image of God and, if they receive a reward for their performances, they are obliged to make restitution. But if they sing to the accompaniment of instruments or sing *chansons de geste* for our enjoyment or perhaps for educational purposes, they are close to excommunication.[18] Thus it happened when such a jongleur approached Pope Alexander[19] and enquired whether he could save his soul by making a living in this manner, since he had no other trade, the Pope said neither yes nor no. Perhaps he would have allowed him to live a jongleur's life, had he not feared that a permission might be conducive to greater license.[20]

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[7] *Ibidem.* Prostitutes, he claims, are tolerated by the Church, *ne turpiores fiant libidines* and *quia multitudo est in causa. A fol.* 107^{ra} and *B* fol. 96^{ra}.

[8] *A* fol. 76^{va} and *B* fol. 69^{rb}.

[9] *Ibidem*, Cf. *Verbum abbreviatum*, c. 50; PL 205, 156C.

[10] *A* fol. 76^{vb} and *B* fol. 60^{rb}.

[11] See *Verbum abbreviatum*, c. 49; PL PL 205, 153C.

[21] *Ibidem.*

[13] Cf. E. Faral, *Les Jongleurs en France au moyen âge* (Paris, 1910), p. 288.

[14] See L. Gautier, *Les Epopées françaises* II (Paris, 1892), pp. 185ff copied by E. Faral, *op. cit.*, p. 290. Gautier quoted from a *Summa de septem sacramentis, Ms* Paris, Bibl. Nat. *Lat.* 14859, supposedly of the thirteenth century. I have not been able to verify whether the author copied from Peter Cantor or whether the work is identical with Cantor's *Summa.*

[15] Cf. Augustine, *In Ev. Joh.*, Tract. 100, 2; PL 35, 1819; and *Enarr. in Ps.* CII, 6, 13; PL 37, 1527. In *Verbum abbreviatum*, c. 49; PL 205, 155B Cantor attributes the saying to St. Jerome.

[16] Claiming that idleness is the root of all evil, John of Salisbury had come to the same conclusion in *Policraticus* I, 8; ed. C.C.I. Webb, I (Oxford, 1909), p.47.

[17] *Ludibrium* (not listed in Du Cange) is derived from *ludibris* which refers primarily to facial expressions.

[18] L. Gautier, *op. cit.*, p. 24 reads *excusationi.*

[19] Reference to Pope Alexander III (1159-1181). See also *Verbum abbreviatum*, c. 84; PL 205, 253C.

In discussing an often quoted passage from St. Jerome, in which the patrons of actors are censured, Cantor follows a similar line of argument. He quotes St. Jerome as saying:

> Heri in foro
> Hodie in choro
> Heri fautor hystrionum
> Hodie consecrator uirginum.[21]

Cantor maintains that actors in the proper sense are those who, by certain gestures, make a cariature of their bodies. Then he poses the question: Is the word "actor" also to be extended to comprise those who *without any gesture* recite "enormous" and effeminate poems?[22] Are not those equally infamous who wander from one castle to another and produce nothing but obscenities and vainglorious talks? The Apostle demands their excommunication.[23] Who are those "curiously meddling people" with whom he forbids us to share our food? Do the falconers belong to them whose work is good for nothing, who consume the bread of the poor and kill many a horse without any useful reason? Of dice-makers I state with precision: They eat their bread idle and useless since the use of dice is no good for anything. But concerning jongleurs who do not make a cariature of their bodies nor tell obscene and effeminate tales, I believe they can be tolerated.[24]

A detailed description of the other classes of people, whose activities Cantor demands to be censured by excommunication, would lead us too far,[25] but we may single out some of them to have a better understanding of the motives for Cantor's attitude. Since, as St. Augustine says, a donkey is not to be dressed up like a queen,[26] Cantor holds that people should be dressed in keeping with their social rank. He is certain that it is a mortal sin to make long, wide, low-cut dresses and tail-coats imitating the shape of the devil, though the general custom of wearing them had gradually obscured the wickedness of the fashion. For that reason those "tailed men", for instance, were not prevented from receiving the Eucharist, principally because it was a common fault. A nobleman may, in fact, be excused and free from sin but, being of the lower class, those tailors and the dice-makers[27] can easily be forced by the Church. They do not have the masses behind them and, unless there is fear of offending a prince, must be refused the Eucharist.[28]

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[20] *A* fol. 107^{va} and *B* fol. 96^{vb}: Hystrionibus dare est demonibus immolare, licet quidam distingunt dicentes *qui dant aliquibus ut hystriones fiant, demonibus immolant, sed qui hystrionibus iam factis dant non peccant, dummodo non dent propter turpitudinem aliquam.* Credimus quod quandocumque aliqui dant hystrionibus quia hystriones, non quia homines sunt, demonibus immolant. Possumus tamen licite audire uersus iocundos de honesta materia uel instrumenta musica ad recreationem, sed nullo modo ad uoluptatem. Simile dicimus de omnibus magis et incantatoribus et ariolis et aruspicibus et inspectatoribus gladiorum uel speculorum uel augurum et assardariis (*var.* sortiariis) et funambulis et funambulis et saltatoribus, ioculatoribus et illis etiam qui decios faciunt et qui faciunt incisiones uestium et caudationes quorum opera nichil prosunt humane uite. Quicumque ergo talibus dat, demonibus immolat. Unde Apostolus omnes tales precipit excommunicari et ab ecclesia separari qui comedunt panem ociosum. . . Distinguendum est modicum in superioribus circa iaculatores. Quidam enim cum ludibrio et turpitudine sui corporis acquirunt necessaria et deformant ymaginem Dei. De talibus uera sunt que diximus. Sed si cantent cum instrumentis uel cantent de rebus gestis ad recreationem uel forte ad informationem, uicini sunt excommunicationi. Unde quidam talis cum accessisset ad papam Alexandrum et quesisset ab eo utrum posset saluare animam suam sic sibi uictum queritando, papa nec dedit licentiam ioculandi nec prohibuit. Et forte dedisset licentiam, nisi quia per consequentiam illius concessio illius traheret ad ampliorem licentiam.

[21] Cf. St. Jerome, *Ep.* 69, 9 to Oceanus; PL 22, 663. Cantor's quotation agrees with *Glossa ordinaria in Lev.* XXV, 47; PL 113, 371B. It is alluded to by Gratian, *Decretum*, D. 48, d. ante c. 1.

[22] *enormia (uel effeminata) carmina* seems to imply enormous wickedness related by the poet.

[23] Cantor quotes *2 Thess.* iii, 11-14.

[24] *A* fol. 145^{va} and *B* fol. 169^{vb}: Quid comprehenditur nomine 'hystrionum' in predicto capitulo? Proprie dicitur hystrio qui in gestibus quibusdam tradit proprium corpus ad ludibria. Sed habetne extendi illud nomen etiam ad illos qui sine gestu omni recitant enormia uel effeminata carmina? Nonne eque infames sunt illi qui sequuntur castra principum et non deseruiunt nisi de turpiloquio uel uaniloquio? Apostolus omnes tales precipit excommunicari. . . Qui sunt illi *curiose agentes* cum quibus uetat nos Apostolus cibum sumere? Suntne de numero illorum falconarii quorum labor ad nichil utilis est, immo consumunt cibos pauperum et equitaturas multas occidunt sine utilitate? De deciariis precise dicimus quod illi inutilem panem comedunt et ociosum, quia usus deciorum ad nil utilis est. De ioculatoribus autem qui non exponunt corpora sua ludibrio nec turpia uel effeminata dicunt credimus quod sustineri possunt.

[25] It may be found in John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* I, 12; ed. Webb, I, pp. 50ff and Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 26, q. 5, c. 14.

In the same way, Cantor goes on to say, the manufacturers of large military engines, called *ballistae*, and pugilists should be repelled, for almost everybody admits that their trade is sinful. Yet, being favoured by the princes, we must treat them with tolerance, though we should deter them in private from receiving the Eucharist. Cantor then warns: To *public* actors and *public* prostitutes the Eucharist must never be given under any circumstances for they are of a low class and not supported by the masses. Everyone admits that their trade is sinful.[29]

Men whose office it is to operate a *ballista* are to be judged according to similar standards, for they practise a profession in which they cannot save their souls.[30] If a *well known* member of this trade is impenitent and unwilling to quit his office, he must be denied Communion on the Apostle's authority.[31] Such useless trades have no place in Christian society.[32]

CONCEPT AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF EXCOMMUNICATION

After describing the classes of people which, according to Cantor, are excommunicated by law or should be censured by excommunication, we may proceed to Cantor's concept of excommunication and his views on its practical consequences. Excommunication meant exclusion from participation in the life of the Church, varying in degree according to the gravity of the guilt. To the same varying degree, the excommunicated person had to be avoided or shunned by the faithful and thus excommunication affected both the culprit and the people who lived with him.

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[26] *A* fol. 61^{va} and *B* fol. 56^{ra}: Augustinus: Non sic anus uestiatur ut regina. Cf. *Verbum abbreviatum*, c. 83; PL 205, 251C.

[27] In *Verbum abbreviatum*, c. 84, PL 205, 253 he condemns compositores deciorum, maxime plumbatorum, alearum, non dico schaccorum quia his ad recreandum quis ludere potest.

[28] *A* fol. 117^{va} and *B* fol. 105^{ra}: Hinc etiam est quod, licet sit peccatum mortale caudare uestes et imitare formam diaboli, tamen quia occultatum est crimen et dicitur non esse crimen sed uanitas quedam, non arcentur tales caudati ab eucharistia, precipue quia multitudo est in culpa. Si quis tamen nobilis caudaret uestes suas ut conformaretur sociis, ne scandalizaret eos, et doloret de eo quod oporteret eum sic facere, credo quod non peccaret in caudando. Illi tamen artifices qui caudant et deciarii, quia uiles persone sunt, de facili possunt cogi ab ecclesia nec habent sociam multitudinem, nisi timeatur offensa alicuius principis, debent repelli ab eucharistia.

[29] *Ibidem:* Eodem modo deberent arbalastrii et pugilatores repelli, quia non est crimen occultatum. Fere omnes dicunt hoc esse peccatum. . . Sed publicis hystrionibus et publicis meretricibus nullo modo danda est eucharistia quia uiles persone sunt et non timetur multitudo et omnes fatentur hoc esse peccatum.

[30] He refers to a text from Gregory VII, found in both Gratian, *Decretum*, D.5, c.6 de pen. and Lombard, *Sentences* IV, 16, 3; ed. Quaracchi II (1916), p.842.

[31] *A* fol. 157^{vb} and *B* fol. 136^{ra}: Dicit Gregorius si qui sunt in aliquo officio in quo se non possunt saluare, quod faciant interim quicquid poterunt ut Deus cor eorum illustret ad penitentiam. . . Aliquis ergo ballistarius est in officio in quo se saluare non potest. Stipendiarius enim est et addictus, immo astrictus, est suscepto pretio, ut interficiat homines innocentes. . . Dicit Magister (i.e. Cantor) quod debet denegari (eucharistia) auctoritate Apostoli qui precipit *curiosos non laborantes* (2 *Thess.* III, 11) excommunicari et non communicari eis. Ergo illis neganda est eucharistia quia ociosa curiositate queritant uictum.

[32] Regarding Cantor's distinction between useful and useless trades see *Verbum abbreviatum*, c. 84; PL 205, 253A.

The *locus classicus* for this doctrine was seen in *1 Cor.* v,11 beginning with the words: *Si quis frater nominatur.* In interpreting this Pauline text, Cantor first points out that the excommunication of great masses is out of place, since it would lead to schism. In excommunicating a king or a powerful man with a large following, one should not proceed without great caution.[1]

In dependence on St. Paul's *nominatur*, exclusion began with the *nominatio* which was divided into *nominatio sententiae* and *notae*. The former was established by sentence, the latter by the publicity of the crime. After the *nominatio* by sentence, Christians were not allowed to share their daily food or the Eucharist with the excommunicated person or to pray for him, except for his conversion.[2] The *nominatio* by publicity varied. The offence could be actually unknown, but of such a nature that it could be proven. It could be known, but not notorious. Finally, it could be notorious. Notorious could be a crime for which general excommunication had been pronounced or a crime for which no such censure existed.

If the crime was unknown but could easily be proven, Christians were supposed to resort to private correction, in accordance with the precept of the Gospel.[3] If it was known, though not notorious, and such as was condemned by excommunication, it was doubtful according to some authors whether the culprit had to be shunned. If the *nominatio* was notorious and concerned a crime to which excommunication was attached, for instance tournaments or violence done to a cleric, he had to be shunned in every possible way. If it concerned other notorious crimes such as prostitution notoriously practised or an actor who had become notorious, the faithful were still bound to communicate with them in prayers because prostitutes and actors could not be barred from entering the church. But they had to be strictly excluded from the Eucharist. The faithful were not allowed to dine with them, in fact they sinned grievously in the eyes of Peter Cantor if they sat at the same table with those notorious sinners, except in the case of grave necessity. The reason for this policy given by Cantor was twofold: By associating with them, the Christians would favour their errors and, by assisting them, they would provide the means for other despicable purposes.[4]

Once a person was excommunicated, association with him was prohibited under pain of excommunication on the strength of the legal principle: *Qui communicat*

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[1] *A* fol. 116^{vb} and *B* fol. 104^{va}. See also *A* fol. 76^{va} and *B* fol. 69^{ra}. The French Church did not fear to excommunicate princes, as Cantor relates: "We have often seen many princes excommunicated because they ordered the removal of thieves who had taken refuge beneath a cross on the royal highway." *A* fol. 131^{va} and *B* fol. 118^{ra}.

[2] *A* fol. 116^{vb} and *B* fol. 104^{va}: Nominatio autem quedam est sententie, quedam note. Si notatus fuerit per sententiam precise, cum eo nec est sumendus cibus sacre eucharistie nec cibus communis nec est communicanda ei oratio, nisi ad corrigendum eum.

[3] *Matth.* xviii, 15.

[4] *Ibidem:* Nominatio note quedam est *occulta* sed probari potest, quedam *manifesta* sed non notoria, quedam *notoria*. Et item illa notoria uel est de tali crimine pro quo excommunicatum est in generali uel de tali crimine pro quo non est excommunicatum. In primo casu dicimus quod si nominatio occulta est sed de facili potest probari, debes uti precepto uangelico: *Si peccauerit in te etc.* Si autem manifesta est sed non notoria et de tali crimine pro quo excommunicatum est, debes eum uitare in priuato, sed in publico non. Immo orandum est cum tali in ecclesia et communicandum est ei in similibus. Sed si nominatio est de tali pro quo non est excommunicatum, dubitant quidam an talis sit uitandus. . . Si autem sit nominatio notoria et sit de crimine pro quo est excommunicatum ut de tyrociniis uel de uiolentia facta in clericum, modis omnibus uitandus est. Si autem sit de aliis criminibus notorie nominatus, ut meretrix que notorie uenalis est et hystrio notorius, communicandum est eis in orationibus quia non possunt arceri ab ecclesia. . . Sed ab eucharistia sunt penitus arcendi. Nec etiam debes tales habere commensurales, immo peccas mortaliter si recipis eos in mensam, nisi in summa necessitate, duplici de causa: tum quia foues eos in errore tum quia, si dederis eis aliquid, ipsi in turpes usus expendunt.

excommunicato, excommunicatus est.[5] Cantor offers a number of examples illustrating the application of this rule. He observes that, despite the Apostle's doctrine in *1 Cor.* v, 11, an excommunicated father was allowed to eat with his family. Personally, he fails to see any justification for this leniency and refers us to the decretists: *Hoc uideant decretiste.*[6] If, however, an excommunicated person was married and succeeded in finding a priest who was willing to say Mass for his intention, his wife was also excommunicated if she attended the Mass.[7] If an excommunicated father had a son in Holy Orders who, unable to support himself, was maintained by his father, the son was excommunicated if he communicated with his father because, being ordained, he was emancipated from his father's authority. Should a strange priest live in such dependence on him, the priest would be obliged to leave as soon as he heard of the excommunication, even if he had to beg for a living.[8]

Cantor thinks that, to all appearances, one could not admit to one's dinner a poor relative who was excommunicated. The procedure of putting up a different table or of letting him eat by himself from a special plate at the corner of the common table are evasions which Cantor abhors, for he deems it essential in excommunication to put the culprit to shame. This can be achieved if we make him eat where people can see him, for instance in the yard of the house. To offer him money to buy his own food is not advisable. The worst humiliation would be if, while he was eating outside, the left-overs from dinner were cast to the dogs or if the table cloth and all the utensils that he used to eat and drink, including his knife, were destroyed. We read, in fact, that this was done in the case of Gilbert of London when he was excommunicated by Blessed Thomas. Cantor, however, wonders whether this procedure is not too wasteful.[9]

Strictly speaking, as Cantor points out in this context, an abbot who followed a fugitive monk and ate with him, trying to persuade him to come back, would be communicating with an excommunicated person and thus be excommunicated himself. Yet, we read that Hugh, abbot of Clairvaux, did it and his action is considered praiseworthy.[10]

How far then may we go? Would we have to leave the church if an excommunicated person entered it? Cantor believes that, in all probability, we would not have to leave, for our leaving would not humble him, *provided* he did not know of our presence. But if a priest were celebrating Mass when he entered, the Mass would have to be interrupted.[11] Between the Gospel and the Consecration the priest could do so at any moment. After the Consecration, however, he would have to wait until he had taken the sacred species. Then he must stop and have some strong parishioners remove the intruder by force, if possible, for such a man is like a heretic against whom the Church can invoke the armed intervention of the secular power.[12] The priest himself would not incur the penalty of the canon *latae sententiae*, prohibiting clerics to use violence. If the priest cannot put him out by force, Cantor suggests the use of the Eucharist.[13]

If an excommunicated person is standing in front of the church and soldiers, rather than enter, stand there talking, they communicate with him, as Cantor warns his audience.[14] Should he decide to take some offerings to the priest, they must be rejected, excepting those offerings that are required by law three times a year. These the priest may and must accept.[15]

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[5] *A* fol. 79^{vb} and *B* fol. 71^{vb}. Cf. Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 11, q. 3, cc. 16-19 and c. 28.

[6] *A* fol. 124^{ra} and *B* fol. 110^{vb}.

[7] *A* fol. 123^{vb} and *B* fol. 110^{va}.

[8] *A* fol. 124^{ra} and *B* fol. 110^{vb}.

[9] *A* fol. 79^{rb} and *B* fol. 71^{va}. The reference is to Gilbert Foliot, bishop of London (1163-1188) who was excommunicated by St. Thomas Becket on various occasions. Cf. *Dict. of Nat. Biography* VII (London, 1908), pp. 358ff.

[10] *A* fol. 79^{va} and*B* fol. 71^{vb}. Cantor probably means St. Hugh the Great, abbot of Cluny, who died in 1109. His *Vitae* are published in *Bibliotheca Cluniacensis*, ed. M. Marrier and A. Quercetain (Brussels, 1914), pp,413ff.

[11] *Ibidem.*

[12] *A* fol. 123^{rb} and *B* fol. 110^{ra}.

[13] *Ibidem.*

[14] *A* fol. 123^{vb} and *B* fol. 110^{va}.

If a prelate has someone read the "daily hours" to him, in his room or on a journey, and an excommunicated person happens to pass by, the prelate must interrupt the reading until the person is removed.[16] Cantor is unable to decide whether one may even greet such a person.[17]

May I give him advice, if he asks for it and if it has nothing to do with his excommunication? May I defend his cause, if he has been sentenced injustly? May I receive his census or the monetary penalty for his excommunications? May I accept a gift or buy from him or sell to him or make any other kind of contract with him? Cantor does not believe that I am excommunicated by having such dealings with him, but he considers them sinful. If, however, the excommunication explicitly comprises "all those who communicate with him", I incur excommunication.[18]

Some communication with an excommunicated person may even be without sin. If I meet him on a journey, I may ask directions of him. Should a robber waylay me, I could ask an excommunicated person to help me. Perhaps I could even approach him for advice in a lawsuit, if he is an expert lawyer and a great loss may arise if I fail to consult him. Cantor has no answer to the following two cases: If a medical doctor is excommunicated whom a sick person had engaged before the excommunication, may he continue calling him? If a father placed the education of his children in a tutor's hand, if he obliged to take them back in case the tutor incurs excommunication?[19]

Cantor tells us that an excommunicated person could not attend a theological lecture or a sermon in a church. Should, therefore, a sermon be preached against the Cathars, the most detested heretics of the time, no heretic could attend.[20] A sermon to convert such heretics had to be delivered outside the church, with no Catholics attending it, except, perhaps, a few. To counter the objection that Augustine, the Manichean, listened to a sermon preached by St. Ambrose, Cantor suggests that St. Ambrose was not aware of Augustine's presence. He has no answer to the question as to what Catholics are to do if they live in the district of Toulouse which teems with a multitude of Cathars.[21]

Special prayers in church for the excommunicated were prohibited. The liturgical prayers for heretics and schismatics are, as Cantor observes, general and therefore lawful. He concedes that special prayers may be said privately and outside the church. As a consequence, a priest was not supposed to mention people dear to him in the canon of the Mass or mention names of the dead in the canon, for it might have been the case that one of them happened to be excommunicated and by saying "Amen", at the end of the prayers, the faithful would communicate with him. Cantor relates that the Pope once told a priest to discontinue his practice of mentioning names in the canon.[22] He also knows of a priest in the diocese of Paris who suffered horrible pains after mentioning an excommunicated person in the prayers of the Mass.[23]

It could happen that a whole city was excommunicated for setting fire to a church or killing a cleric. As a result, every citizen who took part in the crime would be excommunicated *quasi nominatim*, as Cantor puts it. Could the poor of the city who had no part in it accept alms from the others or could the lepers who live outside go through the city on Sundays begging for alms with their little bells? Cantor does not consider it advisable to do so if they have another way of making a living.[24] If such a city were under an unjust attack, the subjects of the city could lawfully come to its aid, but no soldiers could allow themselves to be hired for its defence, if they had some other way of earning their living. Otherwise, they would also be under excommunication. Necessity would excuse them, however, for, just as we are permitted to sell to the excommunicated in case of necessity, we are also allowed to receive from them in case of emergency.[25]

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[15] *Ibidem.*

[16] *Ibidem.*

[17] See, however, Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 11, q. 3, c. 17: Ne "Ave" eis dicant. Cf. 2 *John*, 10.

[18] *A* fol. 79^{va} and *B* fol. 71^{vb}.

[19] *A* fol. 124^{ra} and *B* fol. 110^{vb}.

[20] *A* fol. 79^{vb} and *B* fol. 71^{vb}.

[21] *A* fol. 79^{vb} and *B* fol. 72^{ra}.

[22] *A* fol. 76^{ra} and *B* fol. 68^{vb}.

[23] *Ibidem.*

[24] *A* fol. 123^{vb} and *B* fol. 110^{va}.

What conditions then were required to incur excommunication? In dealing with the canon prohibiting violence to clerics, Cantor attempts to outline the required degrees of guilt. Naturally, striking a cleric playfully or in course of a game might seem excusable. But this is, as Cantor believes, not generally true, for it depends on the nature of the game and the observation of its rules. If a layman faced a priest in some disreputable game, for instance during the preparation for a *monomachia* or single combat behind shields, and struck the priest, he would be subject to the canon. For he could under no circumstances treat playfully an "anointed of the Lord", even if the priest himself wanted it.[26] Moreover, if a layman overdid a joke or overstepped the rules of a game, for instance in the *pala* game, and hit the priest's foot with the sharp pole or struck him harder than the rule of the game called for, the canon would apply. The same holds good if he oversteps the rules of a decent and tolerable game. If, for example, in a snow-ball fight a layman pressed the snow so hard as to turn it into ice and did so to hurt the priest, he would violate the canon.[27]

Cantor is not certain as to how far evil intention is required. He grants that, if a cleric went to watch a forbidden game such as a tournament and got himself into danger, it would be harsh to say that those who hurt him are subject to the canonical penalty. After all, he was not supposed to be there. "Yet, I would doubt about this case", Cantor adds. Similarly, if a priest mingled with the crowd on "All Fools' Day" and someone struck him with a bladder—a thing which happens so often—it would be doubtful if the canon could be applied.[28] If a joke goes too far, though no evil is intended, the canon applies. Cantor declares: "I say boldly that, if someone does notable harm to a priest in a joke such as *si mitteret urinam subiugalis in uultum eius* or bruised his head, he would incur the canonical penalty." Likewise, if somebody is playing an idle and useless game and strikes a cleric by mere chance, he is guilty.[29] In a respectable game, on the other hand, it is difficult to decide at what point one may speak of notable harm. In case of doubt, the decision depends on the player's intention.[30]

If anyone strikes a cleric who has not yet received the tonsure, provided the offender knows he is a cleric, he is also condemned by the canon, as is clearly stated in a decretal of Alexander III. If he is doubtful, Cantor continues, and yet strikes the cleric, he is likewise guilty.[31]

The penalty of the canon is incurred by anyone who orders the violation of a cleric. It is also incurred by consent in such a violation and, since silence is consent, one may become guilty by mere silence, provided one could easily prevent the action by an expression of disapproval. Cantor believes that even a casual insinuation, which leads to the violation of a cleric, is sufficient to incur the penalty.[32]

If a cleric struck another cleric, the penalty was the same, including the obligation to appear in Rome. Excused from this obligation were, among others, monks,[33] canons regular and schoolmasters.[34] Cantor approves of a schoolmaster beating clerics who are obliged to attend school, even if those clerics were deacons, provided he does it "out of zeal for justice, lest the scholastic dignity disappear."[35]

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[25] *A* fol. 137^{vb} and *B* fol. 124^{rb}.

[26] *A* fol. 141^{ra} and *B* fol. 127^{vb}.

[27] *Ibidem.*

[28] *Ibidem.*

[29] *A* fol. 141^{rb} and *B* fol. 128^{ra}. Age does not excuse for "malice supplies the age", as Cantor puts it (*A* fol. 141^{vb} and *B* fol. 128^{va}). Cf. *Decr. Greg.* V, 23: De delictis puerorum. While a mentally defective person is excused, a drunken person is not (*ibidem*).

[30] *A* fol. 141^{rb} and *B* fol. 128^{ra}.

[31] *Ibidem.* Cf. *Decr. Greg.* V, 39, 5ff.

[32] *A* fol. 141^{rb}-141^{va} and *B* fol. 128^{ra}-128^{rb}.

[33] *A* fol. 118^{ra} and *B* fol. 105^{va}. The abbot could also absolve those who wished to enter a monastery, unless the candidate was excommunicated *nominatim.* Cantor believes that great distances and perilous journeys would call for greater leniency even in regard to *nominatim* excommuni-

THE COMPETENT JUDGE IN EXCOMMUNICATION AND ABSOLUTION

Excommunication could be incurred *ipso facto* or without official court sentence and, as Cantor states, it was the bishop's right to declare it. A *sententia diffinitiua* passed by a competent judge did not bind, however, if the proper court procedure was not followed.[1] Cantor cannot reconcile himself to the fact that a parish priest who, as he holds, has the same power as the bishop in the sacrament of Penance cannot likewise excommunicate, or declare excommunicated, *nominatim* one of his own parishioners. This, he strongly believes, is a bad custom that has crept in. According to custom, a parish priest could not excommunicate *nominatim*, unless the bishop was notified, or the bishop or the archdeacon demanded the excommunication.[2] Suspicious of such customs, Cantor tells us that, if in their parishes a case arises which promises a pecuniary reward, the priests are obliged to notify the archdeacon. If, for instance, two people come to blows in a cemetery or on a feast day, the parish priest cannot settle the issue between them unless he submits the case first to the bishop *ut exhauriat bursam eorum.*[3]

Apparently, the question of jurisdiction was not yet sufficiently clarified in Cantor's time. As a general rule he suggests that, if a parish priest denounced a parishioner excommunicated because he violated a cleric and the bishop considered him absolved, it would be best for the priest to consult the Apostolic See or, if this proved to be too difficult, to leave the parish. In all doubtful cases Rome should be consulted.[4] Rather than propose some solution for cases of conflict between a parish priest and his bishop, Cantor criticizes the custom which calls for the authorization by the bishop or the archdeacon for any *nominatim* excommunication.[5]

The question of competence was ruled by the legal maxim: *Neminem ligat sententia a non suo iudice dicta nisi in casu depredationis.*[6] Again Cantor does not fully agree with this maxim. He maintains that a non-resident guilty of plundering in Paris and excommunicated by the church of Paris should not be allowed to be tried by his own local court but be returned to the Parisian court, if he succeeded in escaping to his home land. Cantor reasons as follows: If Paris is entitled to excommunicate him on the authority of the Pope who issued the canon, it would seem that the Pope put the whole lawsuit in the Parisian judge's hands. Or are there two judges in this case?[7]

On the other hand, Cantor feels that a bishop should have power outside his own diocese to excommunicate a person who is not a resident of the diocese through which the bishop happens to pass.[8]

Once the judge is competent, the sentence of excommunication binds and must be obeyed, no matter whether it is just or not.[9] Excommunication without proper procedure also binds, except in the case of a *sententia diffinitiua.*[10]

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cation.

[34] Cf. *Decr. Greg.* V, 39, 1-2. Women could also be absolved by the bishop (*ibidem*, c. 6).

[35] *A* fol. 141^{vb} and *B* fol. 128^{va}.

[1] *A* fol. 75^{rb} and *B* fol. 68^{ra}.

[2] It would seem that an exception to this rule was rapina, quia qui rapinam fecerit in alia parochia excommunicari potest a sacerdotibus illius loci. *A* fol. 111^{va} and *B* fol. 100^{va}.

[3] *A* fol. 141^{va} and *B* fol. 128^{rb}. A legatus diaconus has no power of excommunication, "except perhaps by delegation." *A* fol. 74^{vb} and *B* fol. 67^{vb}.

[4] *A* fol. 141^{vb} and *B* fol. 128^{ra}. That certain sins were reserved to the bishop is borne out by the following remark: Quedam nobiles puelle que suffocant partes suos de quo facinore consilium requiritur episcopi... *A* fol. 123^{ra} and *B* fol. 109^{vb}.

[5] *A* fol. 141^{ra} and *B* fol. 127^{va}.

[6] *A* fol. 75^{rb} and *B* fol. 68^{ra}. See *A* fol. 120^{ra} and *B* fol. 107^{rb} where it is stated that, if a bishop excommunicates a cleric of another bishop, the excommunication is invalid.

[7] *A* fol. 75^{rb} and *B* fol. 68^{ra}.

[8] *A* fol. 111^{va} and *B* fol. 100^{va}.

[9] *A* fol. 74^{va} and *B* fol. 67^{rb}. Cf. Gregory I, *Hom.* 26, 6; PL 76, 1201B.

[10] *A* fol. 80^{ra} and *B* fol. 72^{ra}. If a com-

Cantor's difficulties concerning the legal competence in imposing excommunication are reflected in his attitude towards the process of absolution. With regard to the competent authority in handling what he calls *excommunicatio generalis*, he is vague and undecided.[11] Regarding an *excommunicatio specialis*, he considers it advisable to return the penitent to the judge or the confessor of the locality where the censure was incurred, on the strength of the axiom: *Eius est solvere cuius est ligare.*[12]

Cantor who, incidentally, rejects conditional Baptism does not approve of conditional absolution: *Non enim est absolutio conditionalis nec esse debet.* He proposes the case of a priest guilty of violating a cleric and excommunicated by the episcopal court. Later he falls ill, repents, and the bishop absolves him after swearing an oath to the effect that he will visit the Apostolic See as soon as the illness has passed. The absolution is valid, but he must be sent to the *Curia*. The opinion, held by some authors, that the excommunication is revived as soon as the penitent's health returns is absurd to Cantor's mind. If he delays his visit to Rome too long without necessary reason, he must be shunned, not because he is excommunicated, but to avoid abuses in this respect.[13]

The power of absolving from the penalty of the canon protecting clerics from violence was, as we have seen, granted to the penitent's own bishop if there was reasonable fear that the pilgrim might not be able to reach Rome. If, as Cantor explains, a crusader incurred a canonical penalty for striking a cleric during an expedition to Jerusalem, no priest or bishop could absolve him, for "such a case (of absolution) is not accepted in this part of the world."[14] Yet the culprit could be absolved by his own bishop before commencing his journey to Rome if it was feared that he might die on the way.[15] Analogically, Cantor favours the absolution of such a crusader in case of necessity and believes that the Pope would ratify it.[16]

The will and promise to make restitution for material as well as spiritual damage was an essential part of absolution. If restitution was promised, excommunication ceased after confession.[17] Cantor often repeats the axiom: *Non dimittitur peccatum nisi restituatur ablatum*, but he is aware of the dangers in carrying out the resolution of restitution. Supposing a person were excommunicated in Paris for a crime committed in that city and, after taking up residence in Cologne, confessed his resolution to make restitution to the citizen of Paris. While absolved in Cologne, he is still excommunicated in Paris until he has actually made restitution. Will Cologne notify Paris of this fact and thus obtain his absolution? Must Paris ask the citizen to forgive the offender before absolution can be granted? But by approaching him, the matter may become public and both publicity and the risk of capital punishment must be avoided at any cost.[18] Cantor does not approve of the idea of feigning an excommunication in such a case as was advocated and practised by some people. He favours a conditional sentence: *Excommunicamus illum . . . si habeat unde reddat et non reddit.*[19]

If the excommunicated person was willing to make restitution and, at the same time, did not feel sorry for other grievous sins, he could not be absolved. Otherwise, as Cantor declares, it would be manifest that the Church is only interested in the penitent's money.[20] He insists that a monetary penalty was not to be imposed unless it served as a penitential remedy, for instance if the penitent

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petent judge incurred excommunication, the power to excommunicate ceased according to the principle: *Excommunicatus non excommunicat.* (*A* fol. 79^{rb} and *B* fol. 71^{va}). Cf. Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 24, q. 1, c. 4.

[11] *A* fol. 75^{rb} and *B* fol. 68^{ra}.

[12] *A* fol. 75^{va} and *B* fol. 68^{rb}.

[13] *A* fol. 129^{va} and *B* fol. 116^{ra}.

[14] *A* fol. 75^{vb} and *B* fol. 68^{va}.

[15] Cf. Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 11, q. 14, c. 29.

[16] *A* fol. 75^{vb} and *B* fol. 68^{va}.

[17] *A* fol. 76^{rb} and *B* fol. 68^{vb}.

[18] *A* fol. 76^{ra} and *B* fol. 68^{va}. The risk of execution refers to secular law, and the precaution to the seal of confession. Cantor is strictly opposed to any cooperation of Church and State in prosecuting criminals. *A* fol. 140^{rb} and *B* fol. 127^{ra}.

[19] *A* fol. 76^{ra} and *B* fol. 68^{va}.

[20] *A* fol. 77^{va} and *B* fol. 70^{ra}.

happened to be greedy. Even then the prelate must order him to give the money to some poor institution and must not fill his own pockets with it.[21] If a prelate refuses to absolve unless he is paid a certain amount of money, Cantor advises the penitent to go to a higher authority: "The Pope accepts nothing in such cases."[22]

CRITICAL REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

Cantor has some harsh words to say concerning certain aspects of excommunication. There is, no doubt, a note of sarcasm in the remark: "The Church excommunicates for a donkey stolen from her, how much more should she excommunicate for stolen souls."[1] On an earlier occasion he had stated: *Multi excommunicati uolant ad requiem quia iniuste sunt excommunicati.*[2] We read, he says, that in the early days of the Church the devil bodily tormented the excommunicated immediately on their excommunication. To-day this is no longer the case. The first reason is because, in our present days, the *anathema* is pronounced inconsiderately and with so little discretion that the Lord considers it null and void. The devil himself is aware of this and therefore no longer rages in such people. After quoting *1 Cor.* v,11 Cantor exclaims: Behold, by common consent should a person be excommunicated; it should not be done in the field or in a (private) room.[3] Our Lord says: When the crime is revealed, *tell the Church*;[4] He does not say: tell a person. Besides, what does a prelate who presides neither in a court room nor in a church mean when he says: *Habeo te pro excommunicato*? It is unbelievable that a person should be excommunicated on the strength of this kind of excommunication. Yet, the man has to obey as if he were truly excommunicated. And thus, in view of such a hasty and indiscreet sentence, the devil does not bother.[5]

Cantor is equally critical of certain inconsistencies. He states: We communicate with many in prayers, greetings and suffrages, with whom we do not communicate in the Eucharist or Christian burial. To-day the Eucharist is not given to public prostitutes nor are they buried in consecrated ground if they die without penance. Are we to pray for them after death? For, while they were living, the priest would allow them to pray in church, he accepted their offerings and, if they asked, said Mass for them. Why does he not grant the dead the same communion as he granted the living? The canon states clearly: *Quibus communicauimus uiuis, communicamus et mortuis.*[6] Similarly, we refuse the Eucharist and Christian burial to rope-dancers and notorious lechers if they die without penance.[7] Yet we communicate with them at banquets, in greetings and so on, although in view of *Deut.* xxiii, 18 many priests will not accept their offerings. Nowadays it is also customary to refuse the Eucharist to *campiones conducticii*,[8] yet they hear Mass before combat. If one is killed in the contest, he is barred from the cemetery. What peculiar kind of communion is this? First we allow him to attend Mass and then refuse to bury him.[9] Cantor warns us that this case is not exactly the same as that of a public *torneator* "who exercises himself in risky combat to show off his strength."[10] To him Christian burial is denied on account of the homicides which frequently occur in such displays.[11] While expressing more leniency with regard to "clerical poetasters" (*rimarii clerici*) and other *hystriones*,[12] Cantor insists that a pugilist who allows himself to be killed to avoid acknowledgement of his defeat should definitely be denied Christian burial.[13]

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[21] Non autem ipse prelatus debet inde inflare marsupium.

[22] *A* fol. 85^{ra} and *B* fol. 76^{vb}. Cf. *Decr. Greg.* V, 37, 3.

[1] *A* fol. 134^{va} and *B* fol. 120^{vb}.

[2] *A* fol. 122^{va} and *B* fol. 109^{rb}.

[3] *A* fol. 167^{vb} (not contained in *B*): Ecce de communi consensu est aliquis excommunicandus, non in agro, non in thalamo.

[4] *Matth.* xviii, 17.

[5] *A* fol. 168^{ra}.

[6] *A* fol. 122^{va} and *B* fol. 109^{rb}. Cf. Leo I, *Ep.* 167, 8; PL 54, 1205C and *Decr. Greg.* III, 28, 11.

[7] *A* fol. 122^{vb} and *B* fol. 109^{va}. He relates that the Church of Paris refused to bury a rope-walker who fell off the rope and died.

[8] *Campiones* refers to single combat such as a duel, while *conductitii* denotes that the athletes were hired.

[9] *A* fol. 122^{vb} and *B* fol. 109^{va}.

[10] The wording "in temeraria militia ad ostentationem uirium suarum" is derived from can. 20 of the Lateran Council (1179). Cf. *Decr. Greg.* V, 13, 1.

[11] *A* fol. 76^{vb} and *B* fol. 69^{rb}.

Our author has deep-rooted aversions to certain types of combats or tests practised in his days. In the bishop's court, he observes, duels are fought, robbers hanged and similar things done.[14] Some churches, he remarks later, organize single combats and even maintain that duels should take place to settle differences between peasants. They make those peasants fight in the *curia* of the church or in the bishop's *atrium*, as is done in Paris. Consulted about this practice, Pope Eugene III (1145-1153) replied: *Utimini consuetudine uestra.* But is the cleric not responsible for the consequences? "I know what I would say, had the Pope not given this reply", muses Cantor. All ordeals, the cold or hot water test, the hot iron test and such are the devil's invention. "I cannot understand how Holy Church permits priests to bless the water in such a procedure."[15]

Previously, Cantor had noted: The Church seems to give consent to certain crimes that should be condemned by excommunication.[16] Consent and action deserve the same punishment.[17] By giving her consent, the Church errs,[18] although it is said that she only tolerates it. But does the Church not seem to favour the error in view of the revenue?[19] In fact, she seems to tempt God.[20] Since the same is to be said of single combat, why then does the Church lend her authority to it?[21]

Despite some rigid opinions on excommunication, Cantor abhors the idea of burial outside the cemetery as long as there is the slightest evidence of penance. He told his students a story of a man, excommunicated *nominatim*, whose bones lay outside the cemetery for forty years. On a slight evidence of penance given by an old man, the Pope ordered the bones to be transferred to the cemetery.[22] In another such story, he relates that Pope Eugene adopted a similar attitude.[23]

Denial of Christian burial could happen even to a person who died at peace with the Church, for instance to a monk if after his death it was discovered that he had some money hidden away.[24] Cantor states explicitly that public prostitutes and public *torneatores* or *tyrocinatores* were not denied Communion if they repented before death, but Christian burial was forbidden.[25]

CONCLUSION

Cantor's concept of excommunication was obviously wider than our own.[1] Essentially implying a separation from the Church and her sacraments, it comprised various degrees beginning with the denial of the Eucharist.[2] Its highest degree consisted in complete separation from all association with fellow Christians. Since necessity has its own law, he admits that, under certain circumstances, communication with the excommunicated may be inevitable. On various occasions, Cantor points out that, between the denial of the Eucharist and complete separation from the *consortium fidelium*, there was a variety of degrees which was sometimes defined by law, sometimes a matter of personal discretion or local usage. This may account for the fact that Cantor's exposition, as found in different parts of his *Summa*, contains certain elements which seem to reflect conditions and customs in France rather than in the Church in general.

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[12] From *rimarii* is derived the French *rimeurs*: poetasters.

[13] *Ibidem.* Cf. *Verbum abbreviatum*, c. 78; PL 205, 233A.

[14] *A* fol. 128^{ra} and *B* fol. 114^{vb}.

[15] *A* fol. 140^{va} and *B* fol. 127^{ra}.

[16] Excommunicatione ferenda (not lata).

[17] *A* fol. 77^{ra} and *B* fol. 69^{va}.

[18] *Ibidem.*

[19] Nonne ecclesia uidetur hunc *errorem adulatione fouere* propter lucrum quod inde percipitur? Cf. Lombard, *In Rom.* I, 32; PL 191, 1336B.

[20] This last argument was very common in Cantor's time. Cf. P. Browe, *De ordaliis* II (Rome, 1933), pp. 78ff.

[21] *A* fol. 77^{ra} and *B* fol. 69^{va}. See, however, Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 2, q. 5, c. 19 and *Verbum abbreviatum*, c. 78; PL 205, 226A.

[22] *A* fol. 122^{va} and *B* fol. 109^{rb}.

[23] *A* fol. 126^{vb} and *B* fol. 113^{va}.

[24] *A* fol. 76^{vb} and *B* fol. 69^{rb}.

[25] *Ibidem.*

[1] See *B* fol. 150^{ra} (not found in *A*): Triplex est excommunicatio: separatio a sacramentis, separatio a protectione diuine gratie, separatio a suffragiis ecclesie.

[2] Cf. Gratian, *Decretum*, C. 11, q. 3, D. post c. 24. E. Vernay, *Le 'Liber de excommunicatione' du Cardinal Bérenger Frédol* (Paris, 1912), p. XIX.

It may be added that excommunictaion is not to be confused with an interdict which could affect a whole family or a territory. Also varying greatly in severity, it barred the interdicted either from entering the chancel of the church or from entering the church itself or from eating at the same table with the non-interdicted[3] or from other things. If a whole family was interdicted because of the violation of a law committed by the head of the family, the dependents were free to attend Mass and receive the Eucharist outside the interdicted territory.[4] The culprit himself was barred wherever he went. The inhabitants of an interdicted town or parish had to be shunned as if they were excommunicated,[5] although they were not excommunicated in the strict sense of the word.[6]

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[3] *A* fol. 78ra and *B* fol. 70va.

[4] *A* fol. 123va and *B* fol. 110^{rb}.

[5] *A* fol. 78^{rb} and *B* fol. 70va. Cf. W. Richter, *De origine et evolutione interdicti* (Rome, 1934).

[6] *Ibidem*: Probabile est quod excommunicati dicantur hii tantum qui a communione fratrum generaliter sunt separati.

King Alfred's Letter on Educational Policy According to the Cambridge Manuscripts

FRANCIS P. MAGOUN, Jr.

PERHAPS the richest and most informative shorter prose document in Old English is Alfred the Great's letter on educational policy attached to certain copies of his translation of St. Gregory the Great's *Regulae Pastoralis Liber*[1] intended for distribution to his bishops. This letter survives in three manuscripts from the Anglo-Saxon period, also in Francis Junius' not quite accurate late seventeenth-century transcript[2] of Sir Robert Bruce Cotton's *Ms Tiberius* B XI, the latter all but completely destroyed in the disastrous fire of 1731.

Of these three Anglo-Saxon manuscripts one has been reliably edited, namely, Bodleian *Ms Hatton* 20 (formerly *Hatton* 88: Bodl. No. 4113), addressed to Wǽrferþ, bishop of Worcester,[3] also Junius' transcript, mentioned above, without name of addressee, both by Henry Sweet on facing pages for the Early English Text Society, Orig. Ser., Nos. 45, 50 (London, 1871), pp. 2-9. Of the three Cambridge manuscripts of Alfred's version of Gregory's work two likewise include this letter: Corpus Christi College *Ms* 12, fol. 1^r-3^v, with omission of the name of addressee, and University Library (earlier the Common or Public Library) *Ms* Ii. 2. 4, fol. 5^r-6^v, addressed to Wulfsige, bishop of Sherborne (Dorset), both described below.[4] None of the Cambridge manuscripts were used by Sweet who, somewhat surprisingly, learned of their existence too late for his edition (see *ed. cit.*, p. xiv).

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[1] On the title of Gregory's work see my paper 'Some Notes on King Alfred's Circular Letter,' etc., *Mediaeval Studies*, X (Toronto, 1948), 103. For some account of all manuscripts (except the Kassel fragments) see Mrs. Margareta Aangström, *Studies in Old English Mss.* (Uppsala diss., 1937), pp. 35-40; cp. also E. V. K. Dobbie, *The Anglo-Saxon Minor Poems* (Columbia University Press, 1942), pp. cxii-cxv, and G. K. Anderson, *The Literature of the Anglo-Saxons* (Princeton Univ. Press., 1948), pp. 299-300, note 18.

[2] For a description of *Ms Junius* (Bodl. No. 5165) see Falconer Madan *et al.*, *A Summary Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford*, etc., II, ii (Oxford, 1937), 976 (No. 5165); this work is referred to hereafter as *Summary Catalogue.* On Junius' unreliability as a copyist see Henri Logeman, *The Rule of St. Benet*, etc. (EETS, Orig. Ser., No. 90, London, 1888), pp. xxxi-xxxii; Karl Jost, 'Zu den Handschriften der Cura Pastoralis,' *Anglia*, XXXVII (1913), esp. 64-67; *idem*, *Indogermanische Forschungen*, XLVIII (1938), 86-89.

[3] For a description of this manuscript see *Summary Catalogue* II, ii, 845-46 (No. 4113). The letter according to *Ms Hatton* 20 was first published by Humphrey Wanley (1672-1726), *Catalogus Historicus*, forming Bk. II or Vol. III of George Hickes, *Linguarum Veterum Septentrionalium*, etc. (London, 1705), p. 217, col. 2; later by Reinhold Pauli (1832-82), *König Aelfred und seine Stellung in der Geschichte Englands* (Berlin, 1851), pp. 313-17, including the metrical preface and epilogue, and is given on pp. 401-06 of Thomas Wright's translation of Pauli (London, 1852) though not in Benjamin Thorpe's translation of Pauli (cp. pp. 183-84). The Hatton text was translated by H. W. Norman for inclusion in J. A. Giles ed., *The Whole Works of Alfred the Great*, etc., Vol. III (bound in with Vol. II) (London, 1858), pp. 64-66, 66-67 (OE text of the metrical preface with translation); pp. 67-88 contain a translation of Gregory's Prologue and the Alfredian chapters I-X, the only sample of Alfred's translation of this work until Sweet's edition of the original text, *cit. infra.* Selections from the letter are given in translation by Thomas Hughes, *Alfred the Great* (London, 1869, pp. 292-94. Mention may also be made of a transcription of *Ms Hatton* 20 by the antiquary George Ballard (1706-55), preserved in Bodl. *Ms Ballard* 57, described in *Summary Catalogue* III (Oxford, 1895), 166 (No. 10843).

The Junius transcript, *Ms Junius* 53 (Bodl. No. 5165), was first printed by Francis Wise (1695-1767), *Annales Rerum Gestarum Aelfredi Magni*, etc. (Oxford, 1722), pp. 81-86 (OE text with elaborate apparatus of variants), 87-91 (Latin translation of the same); selections in German appear in Friedrich Lorenz, *Geschichte Alfreds des Grossen* (Hamburg, 1823), pp. 161-64 *passim.* Parts of Wise's text are translated by Sharon Turner (1768-1847), *History of the Anglo-Saxons*, Bk. V, ch. 1 (4 vols, London, 1799-1805, and many later editions): 7th ed. (London, 1852), Vol. II, pp. 15-19. The text is also printed by J. A. Giles (1808-84), *The Life and Times of Alfred the Great* (London, 1848), Appendix, pp. 29-32, though the accompanying translation (pp. 32-34) is, somewhat oddly, Sir John Spelman's rendering of Cambridge University Library *Ms* Ii, 2, 4, noted p. 114, below.

[4] Trinity College *Ms* R. 5. 22, section III, includes Alfred's version of Gregory and

Corpus Christi College *Ms* 12 is, as will be seen, pp. 115-118, below, a text very closely related to *Ms Hatton* 20 and to the transcript in *Ms Junius* 53 and has, to my knowledge, never been edited.[5] That Sweet should have overlooked it is not extraordinary. The latter's oversight of University Library *Ms* Ii. 2. 4 is, however, more curious, since long before his time this version of the letter, addressed to Bishop Wulfsige, had been well known and had, in fact, been what one might quite properly call the standard edition. Between 1574 and 1853 the Old-English text and/or translations of the same were printed at least nine times, viz., by:

1° Matthew Parker (1504-75), Protestant archbishop of Canterbury (1559-75), in his edition (London, 1574) of Bishop Asser of Sherborne's *Ælfredi Regis Res Gestae* where the letter is given on unnumbered pp. [41]-[43] (OE text with interlinear English gloss), pp. [45]-[48] (Latin translation).[6]

2° Bonaventura Vulcanius Brugensis, pseudonym of Bonaventure de Smet of Bruges (1538-1615),[7] *De Literis et Lingua Getarum sive Gothorum*, etc. (Leyden, 1597), pp. 73-80 (OE text and interlinear gloss), pp. 81-88 (Latin translation), according to Parker, §1, above.

3° William Camden (1551-1623), *Anglica, Normannica, Hibernica, Cambrica*, etc. (Frankfurt / Main, 1602, reprinted 1603), pp. 25-27 (OE text and interlinear gloss), pp. 27-28 (Latin translation), according to Parker §1, above.

4° Sir John Spelman (1594-1643), Christopher Wase (1625?-90) transl., *Ælfredi Magni Anglorum Regis Invictissimi Vita*, etc. (Oxford, 1678), pp. 196-97 (OE text without gloss and with Latin translation parallel), according to Parker, §1, above; p. 198 contains the metrical preface with a Latin translation. On pp. 104-06 (§62) is Wase's Latin translation of Spelman's English translation of the OE, mentioned §5, below. Wase's Latin text, appearing thirty-five years after Spelman's death, is a translation of the latter's *The Life of Alfred the Great*, preserved in Bodl. *Ms e Musaeo* 75, formerly 230 (*Summary Catalogue*, II, ii, 733, No. 3696).

5° *idem*, Thomas Hearne (1678-1735) ed., *The Life of Alfred the Great* (Oxford, 1709), where Spelman's translation of the letter appears on pp. 141-43. Sixty-six years after Spelman's death and thirty-one years after the appearance of Wase's Latin translation of his work (§4, above) Hearne published the English original with a few annotations; Hearne's edition is based on a careful transcript (Bodl.

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the metrical preface but does not include the circular letter; for a description of this manuscript see Montague R. James, *The Western Manuscripts in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge* II (Cambridge, 1901), p. 192.

[5] The manuscript was known to John Caius (Jr., 1510-73), who in his *De Antiquitate Cantabrigiensis Academiae* (London, 1568), p. 287, quotes inaccurately from §IV ("7 to ælcum bisceop stole . . . fiftigumme monecessa"; cp. p. 117, below), in the course of a discussion of the value of the mancus. This excerpt is followed by a Latin translation in which OE *æstel* is rendered *pugillarem* (see further p. 122, below) vs. Parker's later (1574) rendering *stilum*. In the second edition (London, 1574) this excerpt occurs on p. 208, a reference which Parker entered on fol. 6^{v} of Univ. Lib. *Ms* Ii.2.4, and included marginally on p. [47] of his edition.

The manuscript seems first to have been noted in modern times by Richard Wülker, *Grundriss der angelsächsischem Literatur*, etc. (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 402-03. Variants from the metrical preface (with siglum "D") are given by Dobbie, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-12.

[6] On this bibliographically somewhat unusual book see W. H. Stevenson, *Asser's Life of King Alfred*, etc. (Oxford, 1904), pp. xiv-xvii; see also E. N. Adams, *Old English Scholarship in England from 1566-1800* (Yale Studies in English, LV. 1917), pp. 33-37. Parker's book is No. 863 in the *Short Title Catalogue*.

[7] On de Smet see *Biographie des hommes remarquables de la Flandrie occidental* II (Bruges, 1844), pp. 290-98: *Biographie nationale, publiée par l'Academie Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux Arts de Belgique* V (Brussels, 1876), 753-59; P. C. Molhuysen and Fr. K. H. Kossmann, edd., *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biographisch Woordenboek X* (Leyden, 1937), 1143-45 (with up-to-date bibliography), references for which I am grateful to Dr. René Derolez of the University of Ghent.

Ms Ballard 10841: *Summary Catalogue*, III, 166) of Spelman's original manuscript noted under §4, above.
6° Thomas Wright (1810-77), *Biographia Britannica Literaria*, etc. *Anglo-Saxon Period* (London, 1842), pp. 397-400 (OE text with a new translation at the foot of the page).
7° J. A. Giles (1808-84), *The Life and Times of Alfred the Great* (London, 1848), Appendix, pp. 32-34 (Spelman's English translation; see §§4, 5, above). As stated in n. 3, above, the preceeding OE text (pp. 29-32) is that of *Ms Junius* 53.
8° L. F. Klipstein (1813-78), first American to publish significantly in the OE field, *Analecta Anglo-Saxonica*, I (New York, 1849), pp. 242-45 (OE text according to Wright, §6, above). There is a second printing of this work, New York, 1856.
9° Ottomar Behnsch, *Geschichte der englischen Sprache und Literatur* (Breslau, 1853), pp. 87-91, according to Wright, §6, above.

Apart from a certain bibliographical interest, the foregoing account of editions of the letter before Sweet (1871) serves to emphasize the early recognition of the importance of this little document and the sustained interest accorded it through nearly four centuries. The following pages are given over to editions of the two Cambridge texts of the letter: (1) Corpus Christi College *Ms* 12, here edited for the first time; (2) University Library *Ms* Ii. 2. 4, for at least the tenth (including translations). The physical arrangement of the text is that of my recent edition of *Ms Hatton* 20 in *Mediaeval Studies,* X(1949), 94-104.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE MS 12 (CCC 12)

CCC 12, consisting of 225 + 2 folios of 27 lines to the page, measures 16 1/5″ x 10 1/5″ (41 cm x 25.5 cm) and is written in a very large bold black hand. The opening word of the letter, *Ælfred*, is in red.[8] The letter occupies fol. 1^r - 3^v. St Gregory's *Regulae Pastoralis Liber*, together with the letter and the OE metrical preface and epilogue, is the only text. James suggests with a query an eleventh-century date and is followed without query by Turner (*cit. infra*, p. lvii) and Aangström (*op. cit.*, p. 35), but it well may be somewhat earlier (Dobbie, *op. cit.*, p. cxiv). As noted p. 114, note 5, above, only the metrical preface and epilogue have hitherto been utilized, namely, by Dobbie for variants (*op. cit.*, pp. 110-12, with the siglum "D").

Though, as will appear directly, this manuscript unquestionably was for some time at the Worcester Priory, it cannot well have originated there, since Bishop Wærferþ is not named as addressee; in fact, like *Ms Junius* 53 (*J*) to which it is very closely related, it is addressed to no one at all, hence perhaps looking back to a Winchester archetype prepared before personalized copies were made for Alfred's individual bishops. That the manuscript resided for some time at Worcester is, on the other hand, clear from the large number of marginal and some interlinear glosses (mostly Latin but four English)[9] in the well-known "tremulous" hand, presumably of some elderly Worcester monk of the first half of the thirteenth century[10] who understood pre-Conquest English better than his fellows and by his glosses attempted to explain various difficulties to them.[11]

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[8] See M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge* I (Cambridge, 1912), 32-33.

[9] Namely, *spedden* (?) glossing *him spéow* of IIa, *onstal* repeating the same in IIb, *hiredebōc*, wrongly glossing *Hierdebŏc* of IIId, *indicatorium œstel festuca* glossing *œstel* of IV. The words repeated in the margin were perhaps to have been further explained. On *œstel* see note 12, also p. 122, below.

[10] On this date see N. E. Ker, 'The Date of the "Tremulous" Worcester Hand', *Leeds Studies in English*, VI (1937), 28-29 (with plate), who has shown that this scribe was active between 1225 and 1250.

[11] For manuscripts by this man see Wolfgang Keller, 'Die litterarischen Bestrebungen von Worcester in angelsächsischer Zeit,' *Quellen und Forschungen zur Sprach- und Culturgeschichte*, No. 84 (Strassburg /El., 1900), p. 20 ("mit zitternder Hand"); James, *op. cit.*, p. 33; Cuthbert H. Turner, *Early Worcester MSS*, etc. (Oxford, 1916), pp. lv-lix, esp. lvii (No. 9 for the present

There are also Latin glosses, interlinear and marginal, by one or perhaps two other glossators. Finally, mention may be made of a footnote on fol. 3^r in a much later, perhaps fifteenth-century hand, regarding the disputed word *æstel* of §IV, where the reader is referred to William of Malmesbury (d. *ca.* 1142), *De Gestis Regum Anglorum*, Bk. II, §123, where, apparently with reference to Alfred's æstel, the object is referred to as a *pugillar aureum* "gold writing-tablet."[12]

TEXT

I.

Ælfréd cyning háteð grétan [N. N.] his wordum luflíce 7 fréondlíce.

IIa.

7 ðé cýðan háte ðæt me cóm swíðe oft on gemynd hwylce witan ió wǽron geond Angelcyn, ǽgðer ge godcundra háda ge weoruldcundra; 7 hú gesǽliglíca tída ðá wǽron geond Angelcyn; 7 hú ðá cyningas ðe ðone onweald hæfdon ðæs folces Gode 7 His ǽrendwrecum híersumedon; 7 hú híe ǽgðer ge hiora sibbe ge hiora sido ge hiora anweald innan bordes gehéoldon 7 éac út hiora éðel rýmdon; 7 hú him ðá spéow ǽgðer ge mid wíge ge mid wísdóme; 7 éac ðá godcundan hádas, hú georne híe wǽron ǽgðer ge ymb láre ge ymb liornunga 7 ymb ealle ðá ðíowotdómas ðe híe Gode dón sceoldon; 7 hú mon útan bordes wísdóm 7 láre hieder on lond sóhte; 7 hú wé híe nú sceoldon úte begietan, gif wé híe habban sceoldon.

IIb.

Swá clǽne hío wæs oðfeallenu on Angelcynne ðætte swíðe féawe (fol. 1^v) wǽron behionon Humbre ðe hiora ðénunge cúðen understondan on Englisc oððe furðum án ǽrendgewrit of Lædene on Englisc áreccan; 7 ic wéne ðætte náuht monige begeondan Humbre nǽren. Swá féawe hiora wǽron, ðætte ic furðum ánne ánlépne ne mæg geðencean besúðan Temese, ðá-ðá ic tó ríce féng. Gode Ælmihtegum síe ðé ðonc ðætte we nú ǽnigne onstal habbað láréowa!

IIc.

For-ðǽm ic ðé bebéode ðæt ðú doo swá ic gelýfe ðæt ðú wille, ðæt ðú ðé ðissa weoruldðinga tó ðǽm geǽmtgige swá ðú oftost mæge, ðæt ðú ðone wísdóm ðe ðé God sealde, ðǽr-ðǽr ðú hiene befæstan mæge, befæste.

IId.

Geðenc hwelc wítu ús ðá becómon for ðisse weorulde, ðá-ðá wé hit nóhwæðer ne selfe ne lufedon ne éac óðrum monnum ne lífdon. Đone naman ánne wé hæfdon ðætte wé Crístene wǽron 7 swíðe féawe ðá ðéawas.

IIe.

Đá ic ðá ðis eal gemunde, ðá gemunde ic éac hú ic geseah, ǽr-ðǽm-ðe hit eal forheregod (fol. 2^r) wǽre 7 forbærned, hú ðá cirican geond eal Angelcyn stódon máðma 7 bóca gefylda, 7 éac micel menigu Godes ðéowa, 7 ðá swíðe lýtle fiorme ðára bóca wiston, for-ðǽm-ðe híe heora nán-

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manuscript); Aangström, *op. cit.*, 84-102, also pp. 37-38, 88 (on the present manuscript); Ker, *art. cit.* note 10, above.

[12] The same passage from William of Malmesbury is briefly discussed in Bosworth-Toller under *æstel.* See further p. 122, below.

wuht ongietan ne meahton, for-ðǽm-ðe híe nǽron on hiora ágen geðíode áwritene. Swylce híe cwǽden: "Ure yldran, ðá ðe ðás stówa ǽr híoldon, híe lufedon wísdóm 7 ðurh ðone híe begeáton welan 7 ús lǽfdon. Hér mon mæg gíet gesíon hiora swæð, ac wé him ne cunnon æfterspyrigan, for-ðǽm wé habbað nú ǽgðer forlǽten ge ðone welan ge ðone wísdóm, for-ðǽm-ðe wé noldon tó ðǽm spore mid úre móde anlútan."

IIIa.

Ðá ic ðá ðis eal gemunde, ðá wundrode ic swíðe-swíðe ðára gódena witena ðe gió wǽron geond Angelcyn 7 ðá béc be-fullan ealla geliornod hæfdon, ðæt híe hiora ðá nánne dǽl noldon on hiora ágen geðíode wendan. Ac ic ðá sóna eft mé selfum andwyrde 7 cwæð: "Híe ne wéndon ðætte ǽfre men sceoldon swá recceléase weorðan 7 síо lár swá oðfeallan; for (fol. 2^{v}) ðǽre wilnunga híe hit forléton 7 woldon ðæt hér ðý mára wísdóm on londe wǽre ðý wé má geðíoda cúðon."

IIIb.

Ðá gemunde ic hú síо Æ wæs ǽrest on Ebrisc-geðíode funden 7 eft, ðá-ðá híe Crécas geleornodon, ðá wendon hí híe on hiora ágen geðíode ealle, 7 éac ealle óðre béc, 7 eft Lædenwære swá same, siððan híe híe geleornodon, híe híe wendon ealla ðurh wíse wealhstódas on hiora ágen geðíode 7 éac ealla óðra Crístena ðíoda sumne dǽl hiora on hiora ágen geðíode wendon.

IIIc.

For-ðý mé ðyncð betre, gif éow swá ðyncð, ðæt wé éac sume béc, ðá ðe níedbeðyrfesta síen eallum monnum tó witanne, ðæt wé ðá on ðæt geðíode wenden ðe wé ealle gecnáwan mægen.

7 gedón swá wé swíðe éaðe magon mid Godes fultume, gif wé ðá stilnesse habbað, ðætte eal síо geoguð ðe nú is on Angelcynne fréora monna, ðára ðe ðá spéda hæbben ðæt híe ðǽm befíolan mægen, síen to leornunga oðfæste, ðá-hwíle-ðe híe tó nánre óðerre note ne mægen, oð ðone fierst ðe híe wel cunnen Englisc gewrit á- (fol. 3^{r}) -rǽdan. Lǽre mon siððan furður on Læden-geðíode ðá ðe mon furður lǽran wille 7 tó híerran háde dón wille.

IIId.

Ðá ic ðá gemunde hú síо lár Læden-geðíodes ǽr ðysum oðfeallen wæs geond Angelcyn—7 ðéah monege cúðon Englisc gewrit árǽdan—, ðá ongan ic ongemang óðrum missenlícum 7 monigfealdum bisgum ðisses cynerices ðá bóc wendan on Englisc ðe is genemned on Læden "Pastoralis" 7 on Englisc "Hierde-bóc", hwílum word be worde, hwílum ondgiet of ondgiete, swá-swá ic híe geleornade æt Plegmunde, mínum ærcebisceope, 7 æt Assere, mínum bisceope, 7 æt Grimbolde, mínum mæsse (-préoste, *marginally added*), 7 æt Ióhanne, mínum mæssepréoste. Siððan ic híe ðá geleornod hæfde, swá-swá ic híe forstód swá ic híe andgietfullícost áreccan meahte, ic híe on Englisc áwende.

IV.

7 tó ǽlcum biscepstóle on mínum ríce wille áne onsendan; 7 on ǽlcre bið án æstel: sé bið on fíftigum moncessa. Ond ic bebéode on Godes noman ðæt nán mon (fol. 3^{v}) ðone æstel from ðǽre béc ne dó ne ðá bóc from ðǽm mynstre. Uncúð hú longe ðǽr swá gelǽrede bisceopas síen, swá-swá

> nú, Gode ðonc, wel-hwǽr siendon. For-ðý ic wolde ðætte híe ealneg ðǽre stówe wǽren, búton sé bisceop híe mid him habban wille, oððe hío hwǽr tó lǽne síe, oððe hwá óðre bí wríte.

Verbally and orthographically CCC 12 stands in some very close relationship to *Ms Hatton* 20 (*H*) and to *J*. Turner (*op. cit.*, p. lvii, No. 7) implies that this is a copy of *H* ("[of which] it cannot really be thought surprising that in the course of the eleventh century a second copy should be made"), but Aangström (*op. cit.*, p. 37) urges with some reason that it was likely copied from *Ms Cotton Tiberius* B XI (the exemplar of *J*) or a copy of the same now lost. So Dobbie, *op. cit.*, p. cxiv. Like *H* and *J* the language of CCC 12 is Alfredian West Saxon, with spellings at times agreeing with *H*, at times with *J*, those differing from both being insignificant in number and character. Four slightly different readings may be noted: §IIb *Gode Ælmihtegum sie ðé ðonc ðœtte* "Thanks be to God Almighty for the reason that" vs. *Gode Ælmi*(*e*)*htegum síe*(*e*) *ðonc ðœtte* of *HJ*; and *forstód swá ic* vs. *forstód 7 swá ic* of HJ. In §III*d* the scribe substitutes the more common *missenlícum* for the less common *mislícum* of the other versions.

UNIVERSITY LIBRARY MS Ii, 2.4 (U)

There seems to be no published description of *U*,[13] a manuscript of the early eleventh century. The folios measure *ca.* 12⅞" x 9⅛" with 24 lines to the page and written in a clear pleasing hand; the top of the ascending strokes of *b*, *h*, *l*, and *þ* are finished off with characteristic forked serifs. The first line of the text of the letter (*Ælfréd . . . his*) is in rustic capitals of sorts. Originally owned by Parker it was one of a number of manuscripts given by him in 1574 to the University Library (earlier Common or Public Library) largely at the instance of Andrew Perne (1519?-89), dean of Ely.[14] Attached to the manuscript is a letter of presentation (18 January 1568) to Parker from John Jewel (1522-71), bishop (1560-71) of Salisbury, Wilts., stating that he found the manuscript in the library (of Salisbury cathedral).[15] Now, in the Trinity College copy of Alfred's Gregory (note 4, above) there is in a sixteenth-century hand, probably by one of Parker's scribes, the following note: *His ipsus liber est quem Alvredus Rex misit ad Ecclesiam Syreburnensem, quem et transtulit è "Pastorali" Gregori Latine in Anglicum.*[16] Evidently on the assumption that *Syreburnensem* means "of or pertaining to Salisbury" the question has been raised as to whether Jewel's letter in *U* did not refer to the Trinity College manuscript.[17] But Latin adjectives for Salisbury are *Serberiensis*, *Sarisberiensis*, *Salisberiensis*, and the like, of which anything on the order of *Syreburnensis* would be a grave distortion. Far more likely *Syreburnensem* is a slight error or misspelling for *S*(*c*)*yreburnensem* "of or pertaining to Sherborne (Dorset)", see of Bishop Wilfsige. If this is the case, as seems very likely, there is no conflict or confusion between Jewel's letter in *U* and the statement in the Trinity College manuscript; *U* would have come to Parker from Salisbury, part III of the Trinity College manuscript from

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[13] Listed but not described in *A Catalogue of the Manuscripts preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge* III (Cambridge, 158), p. 372.

[14] James, *CCCC Catalogue, cit. supra*, I, p. xxiii.

[15] This letter is printed in Jewel's *Works*, R. W. Jelf ed., VIII (Oxford, 1848), p. 193, No. XLIII; also John Ayre ed., IV (London, 1850), pp. 1273-74, No. XLVI. The pertinent part of the letter runs: ". . . it may please your grace to understand, that according to my promise I have ransacked our poor library of Sarisbury, and have found nothing worthy the finding, saving only one book written in the Saxon tongue, which I mind to send to your grace by the next convenient messenger. The book is of a reasonable bigness, well-near as thick as the communion-book. Your grace hath three or four of the same size. It may be Alfricus [i.e. Aelfric] for all my cunning: but your grace will soon find what he is."

[16] James, *Trinity College Catalogue, cit. supra*, II, p. 191 *ad fin.*

[17] James, *CCCC Cat.* I, p. xxiii, item 6 (somewhat misinterpreted by Aangström, p. 39); *Trinity Cat.* II, p. 192 *ad init.*

Sherborne.[18] The book begins with the same heading as in *J* (ed. Sweet, p. 2): *Ðis is séo foresprac hú Sanctus Gregorius þás bóc gedihte, þe man "Pastoralem" nemnað,"* a caption referring to Gregory's own preface (cp. Sweet, pp. 22-25) in which the latter explains the circumstances of the composition of the work and its purpose. Contrary to Dobbie (*op. cit.*, p. cxv) it contains on fol. 6^v-7^r the metrical preface. The manuscript ends on fol. 146b with the words *oð ic tó lande cume* of Sweet's edition, p. 467, l. 25, with about a half a page of text, including the metrical epilogue, missing, due to the loss of fol. 147-48.[19]

The scribe quite systematically uses *þ* for the voiceless and *ð* for the voiced interdental spirant initially and intervocally respectively, finally only *ð*. The crossed *þ* is regularly used for the conjunction *þæt*; the suspension of final *m* is occasionally shown by a macron.

Apart from Parker's English translation interlined in the text, there are four words written in the margin in a later, perhaps indeed much later, hand imitative of Old-English script. The last three of these are intended as corrections or alternates to underlined words in the text proper. The first marginal word, *grétung*, is, however, not intended thus—the corresponding verb *grétan* of §I is not underlined—but is merely a caption "Salutatio", appropriate to §I. Parker apparently misunderstood this, for he glossed *grétan* of the text with "gretinge" and published his text to read "*Ælfréd kyning háteð grétung*," etc. In the margin of his edition he prints opposite this "alias gretun." This false reading was continued through succeeding editions of the letter based on *U*, and until I obtained photostats, I not unnaturally assumed that the reading, however peculiar, was genuine, hence my now rather silly discussion of the matter in *Mediaeval Studies*, X, 94. In probably the same hand as these marginal glosses is a straight sharply drawn cross-stroke added to the *d* of *wordum* (§I), producing a form *worðum* which Parker glosses "worthye;" this *ð* is quite different from all other *ð*'s in the manuscript. The text is somewhat carelessly copied. In §II*a* *béode* appears for *bebéode*, in §III*a* *receléase* for *recceléase,* in §III*b* *hic* for *hit*, the same error two lines below being corrected in the margin to *hit*. In §III*c* the article *þone* is omitted before *fyrst*. In a somewhat special category seem to belong the two words *þéowdómas* of §II*a* and *andgitlícost* of §III*d* vs. *ðíowotdómas* and *andgietfullícost* of *Ms* CCC 12, *H* and *J*. The shorter forms of *U* are synonymous with, and familiar alternate forms of, the longer forms of the other manuscripts and in each case differ from the longer forms by the omission of a single sylliable within the word (*ot*, *full*). One may perhaps ask whether the shorter forms of *U* represent a conscious substitution on the part of the scribe (as in the case of *ǽryndwrytum* of §II*a*, discussed p. 122, below) or arose accidentally as a result of careless omission of the syllables in question, encouraged by the fact that such shorter forms actually existed.

TEXT

I: *Grétung* (in marg.)

Ælfréd kyning háteð grétan Wulfsige bisceop his wordum (*in Ms 'corrected' to* worðum) luflíce 7 fréondlíce.

IIa.

7 þé cýðan háte *þæt* me cóm swíðe oft on gemynd hwylce witan geó wǽron

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[18] The fact that part II of this book, a twelfth-century manuscript, may well have come from Jewel in Salisbury, proves nothing, of course, as to the provenience of part III.

[19] For this information I am grateful to Mr. A. Tillotson, Secretary of the Library.

geond Angelcyn ǽgðer ge godcundra háda ge woruldcundra; 7 hú gesǽliglíca tída þá wǽron geond Angelcyn; 7 hú þá cyningas þe þone anweald hæfdon þæs folces Gode 7 His ǽryndwrytum hýrsumodon; 7 hú hí ǽgðer ge heora sybbe ge heora sydo ge heora anweald innan borde gehéaldon 7 éac út hira éðel rýmdon; 7 hú him þá spéow ǽgðer ge mid wíge ge wísdóme; 7 éac þá godcundan hádas, hú georne hí wǽron ǽgðer ge ymbe lára ge ymbe leornunga 7 ymbe ealle þá þéowdómas þe hí Gode sceoldon; 7 hú mon úton borde wísdóm 7 láre hider on land sóhte; 7 hú wé hí nú sceoldon úte begitan, gif wé hí habban sceoldon.

IIb.

Swá clǽne héo wæs oðfeallen<u> on Angelcynne *þæt* swíðe féawe wǽron beheonon Humbre þe hira þénunge cúðon understandan on Englisc oððe furðon án ǽrendgewryt of Ledene on Englisc áreccan; 7 ic wéne *þæt* náht monige begeondon Humbre nǽron. Swá féawe hira (*corrected in marg. to* heora) wǽron *þæt* ic furþon ánne ǽnlépne ne mæg geþencan besúðan Temese, þá-þá ic tó ríce féng. Gode Ælmihtigum sý þanc *þæt* wé nú ǽnigne ansteal habbað láréowa!

IIc.

For-þám ic þé bebéode *þæt* þú dó (fol. 5^v) swá ic gelýfe pæt þú wylle, *þæt* þú þé þissa woruldþinga tó þám geǽmtige swá þú oftost mæge, *þæt* þú þone wísdóm þe þé God sealde, þǽr-þǽr þú hine befæstan mæge, befæste.

IId.

Geþenc hwilce wítu ús þá becómon for þisse worulde, þá-þá wé hit náhwæðer ne selfe lufedon ne éac óðru*m* mannum ne lýfdon. Þone naman ánne wé lufdon *þæt* wé Crístene wǽron 7 swíðe féawe þá þéawas.

IIe.

Þá ic þis eall gemunde, þá gemunde ic éac hú ic geseah, ǽr-þám-þe hit eal forheregod wǽre 7 forbærned, hú þá circan geond eall Angelcyn stódon máðma 7 bóca gefylled, 7 éac micel mæniu Godes þéawa, 7 þá swíðe lýtle feorme þára bóca wiston, for-þám-þe hí hira nán þing ongitan ne mihton for-þám-þe hí nǽron on hira ágen geþéode áwritene. Swilce hí cwǽdon(*sic*): "Ure yldran, þá þe þás stówa ǽr héoldon, hi lufedon wísdóm 7 þurh þone hí begéton welan 7 ús lǽfdon. Hér mon mæg gýt geséon hira swæð, ac wé him ne cunnon æfterspyrgean, for-þám wé habbað ǽgðer forlǽten ge þone wela<n> ge þone wísdóm, for-þám-þe wé noldon tó þám spore mid úre mode onlútan."

IIIa.

Þá ic þá þis eall gemunde, þá wundrode ic swíðe þǽra gódera witena þe geó wǽron geond Angelcyn 7 þá béc be-fullan ealle geleornod hæfdon, *þæt* hira þá nánne dǽl noldon on hira ágen geþéode wendan. Ac ic þá sóna eft mé sylfum andwyrde 7 cwæð: "Hí ne wéndon *þæt* ǽfre men sceoldon swá rec<c>eléase (fol. 6^r) wurðan 7 séo lár swá oðfeallan; for þǽre wylnunge hí hit forléton 7 woldon *þæt* hér þé mára wísdóm on lande wǽre þí wé má geþéode cuðon."

IIIb.

Þá gemunde ic hú séo Æ wæs ǽryst on Ebréisc-geþéode fundon 7 eft, þá Crécas geleornodon, þá wendon hí hit (*Ms* hic) on hira ágen geþéode ealle 7 éac ealle óðra béc, 7 eft Ledenware swá-some. Siððan hí hic (*corr. in marg. to* hit) geleornodon, hí wendon ealle þurh wíse wealhstódas on heora ágen geþéode 7 éac ealle óðra Crístene þéode sumne dǽl hira on hira ágen geþeóde wendon.

IIIc.

For-þi mé þingð betere, gif geów swá þincð, *þæt* wé éac sume béc, þá þe níedbeþyrfysta sýn eallum mannum tó witanne, *þæt* wé þá on *þæt* geþéode wendon þe wé ealle gecnáwan mægen.

7 gedón swá wé swíðe éaðe magon mid Godes fultume, gif wé þá stylnesse habbað, *þæt* eall séo geoguð þe nú is on Angelcynne fréora manna, þára þe þá spéda hæbben *þæt* hí þám beféolan mægen, sýn **tó** leornunga oðfæste, þá-hwíle-þe hí nánre óðerre note ne mægen, oð <þone> fyrst þe hí wel cunnen Englisc gewrit árǽdan. Lǽre mon siððan furðor on Ledengeþéode þá þé man furðor lǽran wylle 7 tó hérran (*corr. in marg. to* héahran) háde dón wille.

IIId.

Þá ic gemunde hú séo lár Leden-geþéodes ǽr þysu*m* áfeallen wæs geond Angelcyn—7 þéah manega cúðon Englisc gewrit árǽdan—, þá ongan ic gemong óðru*m* mislícum 7 monigfealdum bisgum þisses kyneríces þá bóc wendan on Englisc þe is genemned on Leden "Pastoralis" 7 on Englisc "Hirdebóc" (fol. 6^{v}), hwílum word be worde, hwílum andgit of andgite, swá-swá ic hí geleornode æt Plegmunde, minu*m* ǽrcebiscope, 7 æt Assere, mínon biscope, 7 æt Grimbolde, mínu*m* mæssepréoste, 7 æt Ióhanne, minu*m* mæssepréoste. Siððan ic hí þá geleornod hæfde, swá-swá ic hí forstód swá ic hí andgitlícost áreccan meahte, ic hí on Englisc áwende.

IV.

7 tó ǽlcum biscepstóle on mínu*m* ríce wylle áne onsendan; 7 on ǽlcre bið án æstel, sé bíð on fiftegum mancessa. 7 ic bebéode on Godes naman *þæt* man þone æstel fram þǽre béc ne dó ne þá bóc fram þám mynstre. Uncúð hú lange þǽr swá gelǽrede biscepas sýn, swá-swá nú, Gode þanc, wel-hwár sindon. For-þí ic wolde *þæt* hí ealne weg æt þǽre stówe wǽren, búton sé biscop hí mid him habban wylle, oððe héo hwǽr tó lǽne sý, oððe hwá óðre bí wríte.

The language is lWS of the third period, i.e., of Ælfríc and Wulfstán. There are no *ío*(*io*) spellings as in the other manuscripts; *ie* survives only in *níedbeþyrfysta* (§IIIc), for which original sound *i* and very frequently *y* is used. LWS is the substitution of *y* for *e* in unstressed syllables as *ǽrynd-* (§II*a* vs. *ǽrend-*II*b*), *ǽryst* (§III*b*), *níedbeþyrfysta* (§IIIc), also confusion of the verbal endings *-on* and *-en*, *mínon* (IIId) for *mínum*, *mǽniu* (II*e*) for *menigu*, *wurðan* (III*a*) for *weorðan*. The forms *gehéaldon* (II*a*) for *gehéoldon*, *þéawa* (II*e*) for *þéowa*, and *hérran* (IIIc) for *hieran* or the like are probably Anglian. LWS, too, is the gen. pl. *gódera* (III*a*) vs. *gódena* of the other texts. An early instance of the dat.-acc. *geów* for *éow* occurs in §IIIc; cp. *NED, s.v.* "you" Ib, which records *ieów* from *Ms Hatton* 20 (Sweet, *ed. cit.*, p. 181, 1.23).

Supported by the present text, one reading which has hitherto perhaps been doubtful now seems assured, namely, the phrase (§II*a*): *þá þéowdómas þe hí Godes sceoldon* "those duties which they owe to God" which is to be preferred to *þá þéowutdómas þé híe Gode dón sceoldon* "those duties (or services) which they should *perform* for God", unique to *J*. In III*d* it may be noted that *swá-swá ic hí forstód swá ic hí andgitlícost áreccan meahte* "so that I understood it so that I could expound it quite clearly (or intelligently)" agrees with CCC 12 as opposed to *H* and *J* with *swǽ-swǽ ic hit forstód 7 swǽ ic híe andgitfullícost áreccean meahte*[20] "so that I understood it *and* so that I could" etc. Both readings make good sense, and it seems scarcely possible to chose between them.

In §II*a* the scribe has substituted an acceptable, indeed more common construction of *innan* with the dat. *borde* vs. the gen. *bordes* of the other versions; in this same section *úton*, elsewhere only recorded as constructed with the gen. (*útan bordes*), likewise appears with the dat. *borde*. The substituted form *ǽryndwrytum* in this same section (vs. *ǽrendwrecum* of the other versions) deserves some comment. In the first place, with *-wrecum* found in *Ms* CCC 12 it is now, I think, necessary to assume the complete correctness of the form, i.e., that it is no blunder for *-wracum* as has been proposed (see *Mediaeval Studies*, X, 96). It seems, furthermore, somewhat unlikely that the scribe of *U* did not understand the word, possible but perhaps not very likely that the writing in his exemplar was at this point ambiguous. Hence it is tempting to suppose that *ǽryndwrytum* is a substituted synonym (see p. 119, above, for some less drastic substitutions). Now *ǽryndwrytum* surely means "written communications (of the Bible?)" or the like. If all this is true, *wrecum* would likewise have a similar meaning and would thus seem to be an otherwise unrecorded subst. (*wrecu*, f.?), based on the root of *wrecan* in the sense "to recite, utter" and hence meaning "pronouncement" or the like. In any event such a possibility seems to deserve consideration.

Finally as to the much discussed *æstel* of §IV (see *Mediaeval Studies*, X, 104-06) it may be noted that Parker chose to render the word by "stile" (*NED* "style," sb., 1) and Lat. *stilus* (see n. 5, also p. 116, above). All this gets us precisely nowhere, though it furnishes additional evidence of early interest in this perplexing word.

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[20] Note the accidental omission of the words *ic hit forstód 7 swàe* in my edition of Hatton (p. 102), taken care of, however, in the translation on p. 103.

Proverbs and Proverbial Sayings From Scottish Writings Before 1600

Part One. A-L

B. J. WHITING

> He . . . that intendis to compile ane verk to content euerye man, he suld fyrst drynk furtht the occean sea (*Complaynt* 12, 20-22).

I. *INTRODUCTION*

STUDENTS of Scottish proverbs have been well served by collectors and compilers. Even before David Fergusson's pioneer collection,[1] prepared anterior to his death in 1598, though not published until 1641, there had been a rimed proverb poem to which brief reference will be made later. In the seventeenth century someone made an enlarged manuscript copy of Fergusson which is printed in the Scottish Text Society edition.[2] From the eighteenth century we have the collections of James Kelly (1721), who indulged in fairly systematic verbal anglicization, but enlivened his text with interesting, if not always completely cogent, comments, and of Allan Ramsay (1736), who clung to Scots, but did not annotate. The nineteenth century saw the appearance of the collections of Henderson (1832), with a long and somewhat verbose introduction by William Motherwell,[3] of Hislop (1868), and of Cheviot (1896). Since Cheviot no new compilations of Scottish proverbs have appeared, but Fergusson has been admirably edited by Erskine Beveridge (1924), and the editions of Scottish texts, especially those published under the auspices of the Scottish Text Society, have often annotated, sometimes exhaustively, the proverbs in individual passages. It must not be overlooked that English collections of proverbs, from Ray to Apperson and the *Oxford Dictionary*, have been generous in the inclusion of Scottish proverbs, although the editors, for the most part, have depended on Scottish collections rather than on a reading of Scottish texts.

The compiler of the present article has attempted to bring together the proverbial material scattered through Scottish writings from the mid-fourteenth century to, approximately, 1600. It is unlikely that any compilation of this kind can be exhaustive. Apart from the fact that no two people, no matter how paroemiologically minded, can ever agree in every particular, there are two main reasons for omissions, neither perhaps completely exculpative. Some texts may have been overlooked, and even in the texts considered, while reading through the not infrequent wastes, the willing senses are sometimes numbed by a gentle melancholy which may lead to the involuntary exclusion of an item. There are certain works of some length, notably the prose vernacular translations of Latin chronicles of Scottish history, which seemed to contain no proverbial material worthy of quotation. Some of the Scottish anthologies, such as the Bannatyne and Maitland manuscripts, include a number of English poems turned into Scots. When the English authorship was obvious these works have been ignored, but no doubt proverbs have been excerpted from a few short English poems because they are found in Scots in a Scottish manuscript.

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[1] For this and the following references to collections, see Bibliography (b) below.

[2] In this edition (p. 127) Mr. Bruce Dickens calls attention to another extensive manuscript collection, apparently still unpublished, which appears to be independent of Fergusson.

[3] Motherwell advanced a claim for the priority of John Maxwell, the younger, of Southbar, as a collector of Scottish proverbs. For the English origin of most of Maxwell's sayings, see M. P. Tilley, *Elizabethan Proverb Lore in Lyly's Euphues and Pettie's Petite Pallace* (University of Michigan Publications, Language and Literature, II, New York, 1926) 6, 357-82; for the source of Maxwell's Scottish sayings, see Whiting, "John Maxwell's *Sum Reasownes and Prowerbes*," *Modern Language Notes*, LXIII (1948), 534-6.

Not all of the sayings are truly popular. Those which are not fall into two groups. First, are the sententious remarks which, although frequently based on popular proverbs, are in the main moral reflections, fundamental if often lugubrious, peculiar to the individual authors, and second are those similes and comparisons which are consciously artistic rather than drawn from commonly shared observation. In either instance the precise line between popular and literary is hard to define, and the student is best served by an inclusive policy. Obviously in a collection such as this the user's discrimination is the final test, and no one can discriminate over an omission.

With a few exceptions our sayings are those which writers of longer works in many literary genres saw fit to incorporate in their productions. They have, then, both the advantage and disadvantage of being the result of selection for a special use in a particular literary situation, and have often been recast to meet the exigencies of meter and rime. In addition there are a few sayings which turn up as separate couplets or quatrains, and the rimed proverb poem to which reference has already been made. This piece consists of between sixty and seventy proverbs bound together by rime which, as the editor of the *Maitland Folio Manuscript* remarks, "has the peculiarity that the last word of each line rhymes with one in the middle of the next" (p. 96). The poem, if we may grace it with that designation, was long known from its appearance, in slightly varying versions, in the *Bannatyne Manuscript* (1568) and the *Maitland Folio Manuscript* (1570-85). An earlier example can now be identified as occurring in a manuscript made by Sir Adrian Fortescue, executed in 1539 and beatified in 1895, between 1532 and 1534. This manuscript, Bodleian *Digby* 145,[4] includes besides the proverb poem, copies of *Piers Plowman* and of a treatise by Sir Adrian's great-uncle, Sir John Fortescue, *The dyfference betwene Dominium Regale and Dominium Politicum et Regale*. The proverbs were printed in Thomas (Fortescue) Lord Clermont's *A History of the Family of Fortescue*,[5] and there they appear to have remained unused until the second edition of the *Oxford Dictionary of English Proverbs* (1948), in which they are frequently quoted. The editors of the *Oxford Dictionary* do not identify Fortescue's collection with the previously printed Scottish poem, but a comparison of the following lines makes the identity clear:

Mony man makis ryme and lukis to no ressoun
Ane king sekand Tresoun
he may fynd land // Trest not in the band
That is oft brokin / a fule quhen he hes spokkin
he is all done / he suld weir yrn schone
Suld byd a manis deid / quehen the falt is in the heid (Bannatyne III, 8, 1-6).

Many man makes Ryme and lokes to no Reason.
An king seikand tressoun he may find land
Traist nocht in the band þat is oft brokin
Quhen ane fule hes spokin he hes all done
The man suld haue Irne schone suld byd ane vther mannis deid (Maitland 159, 1-5).

Many man makes Ryme and lokes to no Reason.

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[4] W. D. Macray, *Catalogi Codicum Manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bodleianae* (Pars nona, Oxford, 1883), p. 143. Macray dates the manuscript in 1534, while Lord Clermont gives 1532 and 1534. Presumably the manuscript contains both dates.

[5] Second ed., London, 1880, 263-5.

A King sekant treason, shall fynde it in his lond.
Trow not to the bonde, that ofte hath ben broken.
A foole when he hath spoken, hath all don.
A budde have yron shoune, that bydes elke mans dedde (Fortescue 263, [1-51]).

Sir Adrian's copy has been modified in the direction of southern English, but there is a residue of Scottish forms and words. In a few cases the proverb in the Fortescue manuscript has been garbled beyond sense and elsewhere substitution has been made, but, it may be noted, the two purely Scottish versions differ in details and in neither do all the proverbs make obvious sense. Readily available accounts of Sir Adrian Fortescue's life suggest no apparent reason for a special interest in things Scottish, but by 1534 at the latest the proverb poem was in his library.

Because the writer plans to devote a future essay to Scottish proverbs and proverb collections, and also because of the length of this collection, the sayings must stand here on their own merits. It should perhaps be remarked that, despite the "modernity" of many of the documents, the nature of proverbs and incidentally of much of Scottish literature, insures that the collection illustrates an important facet of the later mediaeval mind.

The sayings are arranged alphabetically under key words, which have been selected by a simple system. Ordinarily the key word is the first noun important to the sense; in the absence of an important noun, the first important verb is used, and, in the rare cases where there is no important noun or verb, the first important adjective or adverb is used. When a saying is found in more than one work the quotations are arranged in a rough chronological order. The roughness is due to the frequent absence of exact dates and also to the selection of an arbitrary date, usually median, for an author of more than one work. All the pieces in such anthologies as the Bannatyne and the two Maitlands are given the date established for the compilation of the manuscripts, although all items are actually earlier and some earlier by more than a century. In the annotations references are made, wherever possible, to the Scottish collections, with the exception of Henderson, to the two standard English dictionaries, Apperson's and the *Oxford Dictionary*, and to NED and DOST. Other collections, including those made in America, are cited only where occasion seems to warrant, but Chaucer, because of his influence on many of the Scottish authors, and the present writer's *Proverbs in the Earlier English Drama*, because it covers the same cronological period, are referred to throughout. The references preceeded by "Cf." are to be considered only as suggestive of the sense or form, and frequently the suggestion is all too farfetched. A number of the best and most clearly popular proverbs have not been found outside the texts from which they are quoted. Collections of foreign proverbs have been purposely excluded from the annotations.

Because of the large number of references, and the cost of printing, the designations for page and line have been omitted and a system of punctuation as simple as is compatible with clarity has been followed. Where "p." appears it refers to a note on a later page of the edition being quoted. The purpose of the references is, of course, to permit anyone with the book cited or quoted before him to locate a particular passage, and that, it is hoped, can be done under the method followed here. The spellings of the key words are those of the NED. A few of the sayings contain regretably vulgar expressions, but by comparison with much in early Scots literature, the language and thought of the proverbs are commendably clean.

II. *BIBLIOGRAPHIES*

In the bibliographical lists, the documents are arranged alphabetically under the short titles by which they will be cited. Books referred to only once or twice are not included in the lists. Throughout EETS stands for the Early English Text Society (ES for Extra Series) and STS for the Scottish Text Society, with places of publication London and Edinburgh, respectively.

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III. *PROVERBS AND PROVERBIAL SAYINGS*

A PER SE

[Apersie, A per sie, Aperse, A perse, A per C] (Henryson 107,78; *Thre Prestis* 24,356, 46,1066; Dunbar 174,133, 177,1; *Clariodus* 258,2156, 375,-3004; Lindsay I,287,2962, II,109,903; Scott 34,33; Rolland, *Seages* 88,2641, 263,8629; *Ballatis* 147; Bannatyne III,243,36, 274,5, 309,4, IV,14,13; Rolland, *Court* 22,222, 99,571; Montgomerie C 115,lii,7, 137,42, 184,64, 216,14, 274,19; Colville 173). Apperson 1; DOST A-per-se; NED A,IV; Whiting, *ED* 333(379).

ABSALOM.

Wer I als fair as Jolie *Absolon* (Henryson 98,2842).

Or fair as *absolon* in visage or in corss (Bannatyne II,193,73).

Or fair of feir as *absolone* (Bannatyne IV,27,27). Vernon 465, 18. See SAMSON below.

ACCESS.

fore be withdrawine of *access*
Is slokit oft sic wantones (*Legends* I,374, 33-4). Cf. Apperson 475: Opportunity makes the thief; Jente 614; Oxford 478.

ACE.

(1) That his auld thrift settis on ane *es* (Dunbar 147,27).

(2) Quhat is weill said thai love nocht worth ane *ace* (Douglas IV,229,14). DOST Ace. Cf. NED Ace, 3, quot. 1737.

ACHILLES.

And cure ye wounds geuin with *Achilles* knyfe (*Philotus* 122,510). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* V(F), 239-40 and p. 824; Middleton IV,218; Oxford 612.

See HERCULES below.

ADAM.

(1) This prowerb planely for till preue,
That men and wemen, less and mair,
Ar cumd of *Adame* and of Eue (Scott 26,14-6).
Lo, all the wichts that in this valley wuns,
Are bretheren all. Are they not Adams suns?
Quhy suld a friend his friend and brother greeue,
Sen all are borne of a first mother Eue? (Hume 69-70,51-4).
Roxburghe VI,230,14; Whiting, *ED* 184, 212. Cf. Jente 778.

(2) the ewil and fleslie blynd lwiff of ald *adame* (Gau 20,26).
he wes of ald *adame* in ewil desiris (Gau 31,5-6). Oxford 2.

ADDER.
This day it stangis lyk ane *edder* (Dunbar 141,9). NED Adder, 2, quot. 1535.

ADVENTURE.
And *aventure* may oft availl,
And prowes puttis till perill,
And efter hope happinnis quhile (Wyntoun III,62,798-800).
For our awise til assayle.
Awenture oft may awaile,
And prowes pynys al perille
And eftyr hope hart hapnys qwhylle (Wyntoun III,63,793-6).

ADVISEMENT.
(1) *aduysment* dois no ill (Montgomerie S 36,497). Fergusson 96(802); *Generides*, ed. F. J. Furnivall (Roxburghe Club, Hertford, 1865) 151,-4870: Oft avisement mich goode dooth; Kelly 334(261); NED Advisement, 2, quot. 1794; Oxford 250.
(2) Sum man for erynes will trymbill,
Quhen he assayit is sodanly,
That with *awisement* is douchty (Barbour I,39,295-7).
Cf. Chaucer, *TC* ii,343: Avysement is good byfore the nede.

AFTERCLAP.
oft hastie porsewers do happen suche hape,
as may Judge the cause by *thafter clape* (*Sat. Poems* 21,543-4).
That cachitt we be not wt þe *eftir clap* (*Sat. Poems* 191,104).
That cachit we be nocht with thy *efte*[*r*]*clap* (Maitland 436,80).
NED Afterclap; Oxford 43-4; Whiting, *ED* 222, 267.

AFTERFLAW.
For feir of *efter flaw* (*Sat. Poems* 151,72).

AGE.
of wantoun ȝouth repentis ane panefull *aige* (Montgomerie S 211,26). Cf. Apperson 721: Youth riotously led, breedeth a loathsome old age.

AIR.
Trow weil the philosophuris word,
Than [That] sonar slais ill *air* na suord (*Ratis* 5,167-8). Oxford 314.

ALABASTER.
Ȝour snawisch cheiks lyke quhytest *Allabast* (*Philotus* 121,482). Pepys V,57,3. Cf. NED Alabaster, B b.

ALAN.
Nescimus quando vel qua sorte,
Na blind *Allane* wait of the mone (Dunbar 72, 11-2).
I vnderstude no science spirituall,
No more than did blynd *Alane* of the mone (Lindsay I,142,395-6).
DOST Blind, lc; Kissel 35(153).

ALL THING.
See EVERYTHING (2) below.

ALONE.
Better but stryfe to leif *allane* in le
Than to be matchit with ane wickit marrow (Henryson 101,2932-3).
Fergusson 24(199): Better be alone, nor in ill companie;
Hislop 56; Kelly 66(74); Ramsay 166(37).

ANGEL.
(1) Bricht as ane *angell* schyning in his weid (*Clariodus* 1,1). Whiting, *Ballad* 25.
(2) As glorious *angellis* thay gleimit on thair steidis (*Clariodus* 222,989).
(3) Maid thame glitterand, as thai war lik
Till *angellis* he, of [hewinis] rik (Barbour I,196,233-4).
(4) That richt as *angelis* schane brichtly (Barbour I,315,426).

As glorious *angill* schyning in his weid (*Clariodus* 79,898).
Inarmit schyning as ane *angell* cleir (*Clariodus* 375,3999).
Knightis . . . schone as *angellis* bright (*Clariodus* 343,1978).

ANSWER.

Ane meik *answer* slokins Melancolie (Rolland, *Seages* 15,213).
Oxford 602. Cf. Fergusson 17(154): Ane gentill ansueir pacifies wrath; Taylor 12.

ANT.

See EMMET below.

APE.

(1) as angrie as an *ape* (Montgomerie C 32,883).
(2) Lath ware myne Awthore to be maid thair *Aip* (*Clariodus* 199,254). NED Ape, 4; Whiting, *Chaucer* 178, ED 333(378).
See GOD (8) below.

APOLLO.

Bricht as *Apollo*, schyning in his weid (*Clariodus* 85,1102).
See PHOEBUS below.

APPETITE.

(1) That soucht [nane othir] salss thar-till
Bot *appetyt*, that oft men takys (Barbour I,71,540-1).
Apperson 318: Hunger is the best sauce, quot. c. 1375. Cf. Jente 389; Taylor 41; Whiting, *ED* 115.
(2) Tua *appetitis* vneith accordis with vther;
This likis the, perchance, and nocht thi brodir (Douglas II,220,17-8). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 82. See SOUR (1) below.

APPLE.

And ilk fair *apill* is not gude (Bannatyne IV,20,36). *Anglia*, XXXI (1908, 393,9; Pepys I,129,1; Whiting, *ED* 14.
See DAPPLE below.

ARISTOTLE.

Or wyiss as *aristotill* (Bannatyne II,194,75). *An Antidote Against Melancholy* (1661), ed. J. W. Ebsworth (Boston, Linc., 1876) 150.

ARMS.

For *armes* hes both happie tyme and chance (Douglas I,111,4).
Lydgate, *Fall* III,850,950-2; Whiting, *ED* 39, 42, 271, 281, 284, 291. See WAR below.

ARROW.

(1) the craige so heych of growth and tryme,
as ony *arrow* evin (Montgomerie S 24,322-3).
(2) Quhilk did furth swirk als swift as ony *arrow* (Dunbar 110,84).
Als swyft as . . . fedyrrit *arrow* fleis (Douglas III,298,16). Chaucer, *CT* IV(E),1672-3; Wilstach 411.
(3) Or as ane fleand *arrow* to land glaid (Douglas II,238,9).

ARSE.

(1) It is ane mirk mirrour,
Ane uthir manis *erss* (Henryson 160,90-1). Cf. Fergusson 10(70): A mirk mirrour is a mans minde, 11(67): other manis [mynd]; Cheviot 19; Kelly 36(218); Ramsay 158(62).
(2) considerand that it was bot the *erse* of the warld be wther contries (Pitscottie I,338,1-2). NED Arse, 2, quot. 1622.
(3) I trow he dois na mare sic thing
Than myn *eris* can musik sing (Wyntoun IV,142,173-4). [But, by a miracle, it did]. *An Alphabet of Tales,* ed. Mary M. Banks (EETS, 126-7, 1904-5) 26,8-9; J. Palsgrave, *The Comedye of Acolastus* (London, 1540) O.
See DIRTIN below.

ASK.

Saying, Monie *askis* the thing thay [may] not get (*Clariodus* 260,2201). *Altenglische Legenden*, ed. C. Horstmann (Paderborn, 1875) 232,522: Ne zern noght þat þou noght get may.

ASPEN.

Quaiking as *aspe* (*Clariodus* 133,640). Apperson 18; Chaucer, *TC* iii,1200; Oxford 15. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 304(9).

ASS.

(1) Or for to droup like a fordullit *as* (Douglas II,169,24). Cf. Lydgate, *Fall* III,676,52: Dulle as an asse.

(2) Let an *asse* be als well decked as may be with a lyon's skin, and yet will his long eares declare what he is (Fergusson, *Tracts* 36). Oxford 16; Taylor 13.

(3) Wemen takkis als grit plesour for to se
ane man of aige in amoris for to carp
As quhen thay heir ane *Ass* play on a harp (Bannatyne IV,100,61-3). Apperson 18-9; Chaucer, *TC* i,731, *Boece* i,p.4, 3; Erasmus, *The Praise of Folie*, trans. T. Chaloner (London, 1549) Div^{v}, I, O, R; J. Jones, *Ovid's Invective* (Oxford, 1658) 120; Nashe III,313,25; Oxford 16.

ASSAIL.

Rycht few may kep, quhar nayn is to *assaill* (Harry 246,336). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* III(D),271-2.

AVAIL.

Availl quhat may availl (*Clariodus* 82,987). See VAIL below.

AVANTER.

As hapnis oft ane *vanter* to be liear,
And ane greit braggar to be fund a fliear,
And ane gude rusar semdill ane gude rydar,
Ane mydding tulȝear in ane battell bydar (Stewart III,440,57214-7). Apperson 58: Boaster; Chaucer, *TC* iii,308-9; Cheviot 2: A boaster; Henderson 4; Kelly 36(215); Oxford 685; Ramsay 164(17).

AVARICE.

Into the eild, quhen all vice is maid les,
Than *auerice* begynnis till incres (Stewart I,444,13857-8).
. . . infectit wes of ald
With *auerice*, that baith to man and child,
The moir perfite it growis now in ild (Stewart III,75,44921-3). Apperson 118: Covetousness (7); Thomas Becon, *Catechism*, ed. J. Ayre (Cambridge, 1844) 373: this old saying, *Cum omnia vitia senescunt, sola avaritia juvenescit*; Middleton IV,23; Oxford 592: Sins. See COVETISE (2) below.

AYR.

As ony wench into the toun of *Air* (Lindsay II,317,3405).

BABY.

See BOYS below.

BACK.

And wee sall never sleip ane wink
Till it be back or eadge (Lindsay II,63,403-4). Apperson 21; NED Back, 4d; Oxford 188; Whiting, *ED* 343(536).

BAIRN.

(1) A brynt child mayr sayr the fyr will dreid (Harry 88,456).
For brint *barne* the fyre ay dreids (*Sat. Poems* 217,137).
And namelie ane wha had bene brunt
and myndit not to hazard twyss (Maitland Quarto 254,33-4).
Brunt *barne* with fyre the danger dreidis (Montgomerie S 30,388). Apperson 73; Bradley 65; Fergusson 6(26), 21(217); Hardie 461;

Kelly 55(4); NED Burnt, 3b, Child, 20; Oxford 70; Ramsay 169(14); Taylor 21.

(2) The *barne* is eith to busk that is unborne (Henryson 62,1764). DOST Busk, 3. Cf. Cheviot 243: Maidens' bairns are weel guided.

(3) Quhen *bairnis* and birdis thair willis ʒairnis no deill (Bannatyne IV,45,29). Cf. Apperson 95: Give a child all he shall crave; Kelly 112(1): Give a Bairn his Will; Oxford 237.

(4) And barnis ʒoung suld lerne at auld mennis sculis (Douglas I,109,12). Thocht ʒung oppressouris at the elderis leiris (Lindsay II,36,305). Kissel 21(86). See COCK (2) below.

(5) Fore sely *barnis* are eith to leire (*Consail* 69,121). Apperson 257: Good child; Chaucer, *CT* VII,512 (B 1702); Cheviot 119, 121, 299; Fergusson 6(20), 88(750); Oxford 590.

(6) I se, rycht weill, that prouerbe is full trew,
Wo to the realme that hes ouir ʒoung ane king (Lindsay I,34,1010-1).
I pray God, lat me neuer se ryng,
In to this realme, so ʒoung ane kyng (Lindsay I,44,153-4).
As the scriptures sayis vo be that cuntrie that hes bot ane *bairne* to rigne ovir thame (Pitscottie II,260,17-8). Apperson 342: Kingdom; *Ecclesiastes* x,16; *Isaiah* iii,4; Jente 762; Kissel 21(87); Oxford 338.

(7) Considder weill it wes no *barnis* pla (Stewart III,256,50951, 368,54748, 375,55005: no barnis gam, 420,56549, 427,56767, 453,57662). NED Bairn, *comb.*, Child, 18b; Whiting, *ED* 338(452).

See OLD MEN (1) below.

BAIT.

For all that tyme with falsheid he thame fed,
As quha wald set ane girne befoir ane gled,
Or on ane lyne ane plesand *bait* to mak
Vpoun ane huke the hungrie fische to tak (Stewart I,108,3638-41).
Ane luiring *bait* fond fischis to wirk tene,
Not spying deith till thay on lyne be fixt (*Sat. Poems* 161,24-5). Cf. Apperson 23: Bait hides the hook; Oxford 20.

BALE.

(1) Be blyith in *baill*, ffor that is best remeid (Henryson 21,521). NED Bale, sb.1,5, quot. *c.* 1450.

(2) In world there is no bale nor bliss,
Or whatsoever that it is,
But at the last it will overgang,
Suppose that many think it lang (*Eger* 283,1619-22). See JOY (3), MISCHIEF (3) below.

BALK.

Ʒe sal tak furtht ane grit *balk* furtht of ʒour auen ee, ande there eftir ʒe maye tak furtht ane litil strey furtht of ʒour nychtbours ee (*Complaynt* 138,17-20).

As Mathew sayis, euin sa now I mene.
Fra thy awin Ey first thow draw out the *balk*
To thy Nichtbour than peirtly thow may talk (Rolland, *Seages* 232,7562-4). Chaucer, *CT* I(A), 3919-20; *Luke* vi,41-2; *Matthew* vii,3-5; NED Balk, 10; Oxford 435; Whiting, *ED* 108. See MOTE (2) below.

BALL.

(1) Round as ane *ball* (Stewart III,396,55733).
round as ony *ball* (Bannatyne III,305,4). NED Round, 1, quots. 1290, 1583; Roxburghe II,130,110; Whiting, *Ballad* 26.

(2) That fro my quhele be rollit as a *ball* (*Kingis Quair* 42,172). Cf. NED Roll, 11, quot. 1786.

(3) And tyme turnis the warld suddanly as ane *ball* (Bannatyne II,211,92). Lydgate, *Fall* I,14,487, 201,43, *Troy* I,56,1506, 202,2027.

BALM.

And for that caus tha keipit it als cloiss,
As men wald keip *balme* riche in ane boiss (Stewart, II,513,35781-2).

BAND.

(1) For men may weile se, that ar wyss,
That wedding is the hardest *band*
That ony man may tak on hand,
And thryldome is weill wer than deid (Barbour I,12,266-9).
Bandis boyis or fetteris is nocht lyk maryage (Maitland 160,27 [Not in Bannatyne or Fortescue]). Cf. DOST Boyis; NED Boy, sb. 2.

(2) Trest not in the *band* that is oft brokin (Bannatyne III,8,3-4; Maitland 159,3; Fortescue 263,[3]).

BASE.

This taile is trew and surar nor ye *bas* (Maitland 314,71).

BASS ROCK.

More eith it war, he said, I bid nocht le,
To bring the *Bas* and May out of the se,
Na caus tha pepill, of nature sa nyce,
To trow in Christ (Stewart II,307,29323-6).
Quhen the *Basse* and the yle of Maye
Beis sett vpon the mont Senaye;
Quhen the lowmound besyde Falkland
Beis lyftit to Northhumberland;
Quhen kirkmen ȝairnis no dignitie,
Nor Wyffis no Soueranite;
Wynter but frost, snaw, wynd, or rane;
Than sall I geue thy gold agane (Lindsay I, 52,467-74). Cf. Archer Taylor, "Locutions for 'Never' ", *Romance Philology,* II (1948-9), esp. 103-6.

BATTLE.

. . . seine *battell* is bot aventure,
And seine that none may be of fortoune sure (*Clariodus* 31,953-4). Laud 58,1941: But for batayles ben euere in doute; Whiting, "Proverbs in the Writings of Jean Froissart", *Speculum,* X (1935) 308-10(227). See WAR (1) below.

BAUTIE.

Quhom *Bautie* byts, he deir than bargan byis (Montgomerie C 120,lxii,8). Ferguson 22(178): Bourd not with bawtie, 23(247): Bawtie wil byt yow; Cheviot 66, 87; Kelly 56(8); Oxford 59; Ramsay 169(13).

BAYARD.

but who, bolder then blinde *byarde*, the proverbe doth reveale (*Sat. Poems* 9,168). Apperson 28; Chaucer, *CT* VIII(G),1413; Gower, *CA* III,202,-1280-4; NED Bayard, 2c; Oxford 54; Whiting, *ED* 304(17). Cf. Ramsay 214(21): Naithing is balder than a blind mare.

BEAN.

(1) sa lyke as ane *beane* or nut is lyke to another (Knox III,187). Cf. Apperson 365-6: Like as one egg to another.

(2) And now I sett nocht by a *bene*
Hir bewty (Dunbar 103,57-8).
That all the lawis ar not sett by ane *bene* (Dunbar 152,28). NED Bean, 6a; Whiting, *ED* 334(392).

(3) In bed he is nought wirth a *bene* (Dunbar 84,23, 88,128). Apperson 456(2); Chaucer, *TC* iii,1167, *CT* IV(E),1263,1854; NED Bean, 6a; Whiting, *ED* 334(392).

BEAR.

(1) Ȝe sell the *Bear* skin on his bak,
bot bide quhill ȝe it get (Montgomerie S 47,637-8). Apperson 557; NED Bear, sb.1,1b; Oxford 573.

(2) With birning mynd furth braiding as ane *beir* (*Clariodus* 24,748).
birnand as baitit *bair* (Rolland, *Court* 36,611).

(3) . . . as at the stok the *bere*
Snybbyth the hardy houndis that ar ken,
So farith he (*Lancelot* 100,3384-6).

(4) Lettand at he suld *beris* bynd,
Mycht he on feild þe Scottis fynd (Wyntoun VI,340,917-8).
That with the strenth of my hand
Beres may bynd (Dunbar 170,7-8). Thomas Becon, *Early Works*, ed. J. Ayre (Cambridge, 1843) 202, *Catechism* (1844) 441; Skelton II,328,208-9 and III,416; Whiting, *ED* 28, 335(402).

BEAST.

(1) And syne sit doun abasit as ane *beist* (Dunbar 168,47). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 305(20): abiected.

(2) Blynd as brutale *best* Irressonable (Asloan II,227,1171).

(3) As blind feld *best* thay beft me all about (Bannatyne II,91,31).
Thow was beft bludy bair as *beist* (Bannatyne II,100,66). Cf. DOST Beft.

(4) As *beistis* small befor the wolfe rampire,
Alse faine they war his stroaks for to evaid (*Clariodus* 224,1070-1.

(5) the Scottis fled but order lyke *beistis* (Pitscottie II,101,25). *Kyng Alisaunder* 104,2478; Skelton II,321,12.

(6) Lik a wyld *best* that war fra reson rent (Harry 309,399). Cf. Gower, *CA* II,249,861-2.

(7) That alkyne kynd of lichory
He vsit als commonly
As he a *best* but wit had bene (Wyntoun III,338,1823-5).
Into sic daffing putting ȝour delyte,
As brutell *beist* that followis appetyte (Stewart I,449,14027-8).
Lyke brutell *besitis* thair appetit fulfill (Stewart II,202,26179, 430,33195, 533,36442).
Lyke brutell *beistis* takand ay thair will (Stewart II,213,26526, 228,26946: desyre).
Bot as a brutall *best,*
He sall be so (Scott 78,19-20). Gower, *CA* II,69, 1240-1.

(8) bot leif furth as the *bestis* wyld (*Ratis* 41,1460).
Thei lieved as *beastis*, and as beastis thei dye (Knox I,265). Chaucer, *CT* IV(E),1281-2; Gower, *CA* III,334,3491-2; Whiting, *ED* 305(20).

(9) I count a man na better nor ane *beist,*
That rynnis on heid and lukis to na ressoun (Rolland, *Seages* 316,10527-8). Gower, *CA* II,296,2598; Whiting, *ED* 305(20).

(10) The peple beryt lyk wyld *bestis* in that tyd (Harry 154,457).

(11) For thai, that dredand war to de,
Rycht as *bestis* can rair and cry (Barbour I,96-7,417-8).

BEAUTY.

(1) Sen *bewte* may nocht duel alway,
be sykire of bownte gyf þou may (*Ratis* 37,1300-1).
Bewty but bonty is not wirth a prene (Bannatyne IV,75,42). Apperson 32; Fergusson 22(197); Henderson 3; Kelly 68(89).

(2) Fore *bewte* lestis bot a quhill,
and ȝet oft-tyme It *prowys* Ill (*Ratis* 19,665-6). Whiting, *ED* 149, 185, 248. Cf. Apperson 31.

(3) ane *beutiful* persoun is lustie aneuch in ane sobir rayment (Winzet I,II,11-12). Cf. Kelly 1(2).

BEE.

(1) The quhilk that tyme wes blyth as ony *be* (Stewart II,450,33833).
. . . wes blyth and letabund,
[As] ony *be* that biggis into hyfe (Stewart II,505,35508-9).
Als blyth he wes as ony *be* in hyfe (Stewart III,53,44249).
Austin Dobson, *Poetical Works* (Oxford, 1923) 340.

(2) I think to work als besie as ane *Be* (Henryson 71,2046).
Als bissie than that tyme as ony *beis* (Stewart I,13,437, 17,564, II,445,33685, 544,36783).
And sa thay did, and clam, belyfe,
As busie *Beis* dois to thair hyfe (Lindsay I,176,1127-8).
No thyng thay sparit thare laubouris,
Lyke besy *beis* vpone the flouris (Lindsay, I,249,1705-6).
als bissy as ony *beis* (Bannatyne III,40,40). Apperson 73, 74; Chaucer, *CT* IV(E),2422-3, VIII(G),195; Hardie 469; NED Bee, 1b; Oxford 71; Wilstach 41.

(3) Solistand wer as *beis* thik (Dunbar 79,107). Chaucer, *TC* ii,193-4, iv,1356; Whiting, *ED* 305(21).

(4) And he that dronis ay as ane *bee* (Dunbar 32,8). NED Drone, v.1. Cf. Chaucer, *CT* V(F),204: murmureden.

(5) Thay hyve abowt the houss lyk *beis* (Bannatyne II,334,28).

(6) Kest buikis like *beis* in all proces of Law (Rolland, *Court* 110,927).

(7) In vane he laubouris as ane *be* (Maitland 209,54).

(8) As *beis* takkis walx and honye of þe floure (Scott 4,105).

(9) Off Edinburch the boyis as *beis* owt thrawis (Dunbar 11,217). NED Throw, v.1, 44o.

(10) Quhat bern be thou in bed, with heid full of *beis* (Douglas III,146,12). Apperson 33(9); Fergusson 54(461), 58(717); NED Bee, 5; Oxford 284; Whiting, *ED* 305(21), 334(395). Cf. Cheviot 132; Kelly 321(152); Ramsay 182(22).

BEETLE.

as doume as a *bitle* (Knox I,164).
bot was allis dwme as ane *bittill* in that matter (Pitscottie II,71,21-2). NED Beetle, sb.1, 2. Cf. Apperson 54: Blind (12), 138: Deaf (1); Cheviot 42: Blunt; Oxford 161: Dull.

BEG.

they ar mair wordie to *beg* nor to bruik (Melvill I,11).

BEGIN.

(1) quhat ned þe to *begyne* þe thing
þat þu mycht nocht bring til ending (*Legends* II,277,197-8).
Jente 140; Oxford 41; Palsgrave 352, 377, 469.

(2) A work weill *begon* hes the bettir end (Bannatyne III,8,22-3; Maitland 160,22; Fortescue 264,[18]). Apperson 674; Gower, *CA* II,6,86*-8*; Oxford 700; Taylor 14. Cf. Fergusson 14(136).

(3) The thing *begwn* is þe sonere endit (*Thre Prestis* 4,62). Cf. Fergusson 14(136), 17(165); Oxford 700; Ramsay 153(1).

BEGINNING.

(1) For gude *begynnyng* and hardy,
And it be followit vittely,
May ger oftsiss vnlikely thing
Cum to full [conabill] endyng (Barbour I,121,263-6).
Breton II,h, 22: a good beginning, with a better proceeding, promiseth a blessed ending. Cf. Kelly 50(320); Oxford 250; Ramsay 156(5).

(2) Thus eftir a rude *begynnyng*
Thai maid a soft and gud ending (Wyntoun VI,266,27-8).
H. P[arrot], *Laquei ridiculosi* (London, 1613) H3^{v}: Bad beginnings may haue better endings. Cf. Cheviot 12; Kelly 47(300).

BELL.

(1) yhe birdis, blyth as *bellis* (Harry 24,223).
The Tod lap on land, als blyith as ony *bell* (Henryson 83,2421). NED Blithe, A 2.

(2) Sytholl, psalttrie, and voices sweit as *bell* (Douglas I,20,25). Whiting, *Ballad* 26.

(3) Into Britane that tyme scho buir the *bell* (Stewart II,230,27007; Rolland, *Seages* 1,20, 151,4798, 177,5669, 233,7584; *Sat. Poems* 65,5, 136,141, 234,223-4; Bannatyne III,325,22; Rolland, *Court* 84,114; Maitland Quarto 218,60; Maitland 442,44; Montgomerie C 220,liii,11; Montgomerie S 142,148). Apperson 30; Chaucer, *TC* iii,198-9; DOST Bell, 2; NED Bell, sb.1, 7; Oxford, 32; Taylor 14; Whiting, *Ballad* 35, *ED* 334(393).

(4) That borne was in burgoyne, by buke and by *belle* (*Awntyrs* 119,30).
And gart thame sweir, bayth on *bell* and buke (Stewart I,154,5102).
And gart thame sweir on mony *bell* and buke (Stewart I,347,10938).
And Drewedes with bibill, *bell* and buik, . . .
Witht cruell cursing (Stewart I,429,13403-5).
Also thai swoir on mony buke and *bell* (Stewart I,588,18282).
Syne gart thame sweir on mony *bell* and buike (Stewart I,640,19778).
Tha suld be sworne all by the sacrament
In sanctuar, be euerie *bell* and buik (Stewart II,27,20944-5).
syne sueir on *bell* and buik (Stewart II,201,26168).
Ȝe salbe curst and gragit with buik and candill (Lindsay II,339,3718). Apperson 37; DOST Bell, 1b; NED Bell, sb.1, 8; Oxford 32; Taylor 14; Whiting, *ED* 340(489).

(5) With clarions cleir bemand lyke ony *bell* (Stewart III,435,57048).

(6) I burne als a *belle* (*Awntyrs* 131,188).

(7) The clarions cleir clinkit as ony *bell* (Stewart I,305,9638).

(8) And mak my tung to ring as dois ane *bell* (Maitland 53,123). Chaucer, *TC* ii,1615, *CT* VI(C),331; Whiting, *ED* 305(25).

(9) Be glaid, Ene, thy *bell* is hiely rong (Douglas IV,228,8). Chaucer, *TC* v,1062; Gower, *CA* II,238,452; NED Ring, v.2, 6, *fig.*

BELLY.

(1) Ouirlait is till lament,
Ffra *belly* dow not lane (Scott 20,21-2). Cf. Jente 6: When the belly swells, the dallying is known; NED Belly, 7, quot. 1602: My belly did not blab.

(2) The *bellie* hes none earis (Knox II,129). Apperson 37-8, 181: Empty (1); Thomas Becon, *Catechism*, ed. J. Ayre (Cambridge, 1844) 601; [R.C.], *A World of Wonders* (London, 1607) 302, 356; Cundall 17; Gayton 194; Kelly 30(174); Oxford 310; Mathew Stevenson, *Occasions Off-spring* (London, 1654) 73.

(3) [The King of England] vald be rycht glaid sa that euerye scottis man hed ane vthyr scottis man in his *bellye* (*Complaynt* 104,23-4).

BERRY.

Bery broune wes the blonk (*Golagros* 19,551).

Of cullour soyr, and sum deill brovn as *berry* (Douglas IV,81,3). Apperson 70; Chaucer, *CT* I(A),207; Taylor 17; Whiting, *Ballad* 26, *ED* 306(28); Wilstach 38.

BERWICK.

That all trew folk from *berwik* to balquhidder (Maitland 33,39). Cf. Apperson 38-9; Chaucer, *CT* I(A),692; Oxford 34-5.

See BURRIAN below.

BERYL.

(1) . . . brightir of browes
Thene *berelle* or Brangwayne, þes burdes so bolde (*Awntyrs* 126,144-5 and p.340).
Moir blith and bricht na is the *beriall* schene (Dunbar 180,34).
Against Phebus bright birned as *bereall* (*Clariodus* 222,988).
With breistplait, birny, as the *buriall* brycht (Stewart I,140,4674, 305,9635, 305,9662, 380,11895, 394,12327, 407,12707, 585,18175, II,56,21797, 363,-31080; Lindsay I,381,6203; Bannatyne II,228,9, III,277,25, 291.9). NED Beryl, 3b; Whiting, *ED* 305(27).

(2) In curage cleir as ony *buriall* bricht,
As lamp or lanterne with ane hevinlie lycht (Stewart I,432,13477-8).
ane fresche reueir as cleir as *berial* (*Complaynt* 37,15-6). NED Beryl, 3b.

BIRD.

(1) I hard sic a lessoun, better to haue in hand
A *bird* in possessioun, nor twa in wod fleand (Rolland, *Seages* 60,1691-2).
I leuir haif euer
In hand ane foull or twa,
nor seand ten thowsand
abone my heid all day (Montgomerie S 32,440-3). Apperson 48; Bradley 62; Fergusson 20(172); Hardie 461; NED Bird 6; Oxford 44-5; Ramsay 154(27); Taylor 15; Whiting, *ED* 155, 172, 221.

(2) In lak of thame quha can say ony thing,
That fowll his nest he fylis (Dunbar 83,22-3).
Brocht in ane *bird* to fyll the nest (Lindsay I,48,306).
Ane auld prowerb said is in inglische
That *bird* or fowll is full dishonest
quhat evir he be and hald full churliche
That vsis to defoull his awin nest (Bannatyne IV,55,183-6). Apperson 323; Bradley 62; Cheviot 209; Fergusson 90(758); Green 26; Hardie 463; Jente 677; Kelly 220(341); NED Bird, 6; Oxford 314; Ramsay 199(13); Taylor 15; Whiting, *Ballad* 23.

(3) now blyth as *bird* on breir (Henryson 101,2941; Asloan II,57,1797; Stewart II,505,35508; Scott 7,206; Bannatyne II,241,206; Maitland 252,29).
And als so blyth as *bird* in symmer schene (Douglas I,85,8).
Was neuer *bird* sa blyith to licht on blome (Rolland, *Seages* 273,8963).
Sa blyith as *byrd* my God to fang (*Ballatis* 139). NED Blithe, A, 2a, quot. 1754; Whiting, *Ballad* 26.

(4) The Lyttle *birde* do warne vs bewayre
that fllickereth oft from tree to tree,
mystrustinge eche bushe for dread of the snare;
The movse shones the bayte that pleaseth ye eye,
Dreadinge the trape endaunger to dye:
Thes showes what harmes often do lye
in suche sewgred bate as deceyveth the Eye (*Sat. Poems* 21,524-30). Cf. Nashe I,124,15-6: Hoe Ball hoe, I perceiue the fellowe is bird eyed, he startles and snuffes at euery shadow, and IV,74.

(5) And I am left as *Byrd* allone (*Sat. Poems* 119,52, 236,318; Maitland 422,112,115, 423,125). DOST Birdalane.

(6) Like to the *bird* that fed is on the nest,
And can noght flee (*Kingis Quair* 6,14).

(7) For thay, lyke *byrdis* in tyll ane cage,
Ar keipit ay vnder thirlage (Lindsay I,230,1067-8).
My muse sal now be cleyn contemplatyve,
And solitar, as doith the *byrd* in cage (Douglas IV,223,15-6).
sitting in the castle lyke a *bird* in the caige (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 122). Laud 486,16503; Pepys IV,195,12; Roxburghe III,68,129-31; Whiting, *ED* 306(29).

(8) With gild of pepile sa thay brocht thame doun,
As *birdis* but plumis, spuliȝeit of the nest (*Sat. Poems* 269,217-8). Cf. Bagford I,492*,74: For Birds unfledged, never safely Fly.

See BUSH (4) below.

BIRD-LIME.

Ȝour lippis ar lyk *burd lyme* (Scott 87,70). NED Bird-lime, a, quot. 1863. Cf. Middleton V,401: they stick To a man like bird-lime.

BIT.

the Regent is als cauld as the *bitt* in my horse mouth (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 4).

BLACK.

Thai luf nocht to mak of *blak* quhyt (*Foly* 56,155).

And mak syne *blak* of that was neuer blew (Rolland, *Seages* 90,2709). Cf. Gower, *CA* III,292,2187-8; Oxford 48; Skelton I,203,17-9; Whiting, *ED* 335(406).

BLADDER.

It buft lyk ony *bledder* (Bannatyne II,265,96). DOST Buff,v.

BLANKET.

Alwayis vpon his awin *blanket* he spittis (Rolland, *Seages* 232,7549). Cheviot 142; Fergusson 48(416); Kelly 367(59). Cf. Apperson 596: Spit (5): You spit on your own sleeve.

BLAS.

A *blase* I set nocht by ȝow baith (Wyntoun IV,282,2024).

BLAZE.

& visage as *bles* of fyre (*Legends* I,264,296).

BLANCH FLOUR.

In bour is no so brycht . . . *blench flour* (Bannatyne III,291,9). DOST Blench flour.

BLIND MAN.

(1) That ane *blynde man* is led furth be ane uther (Dunbar 168,35).
Na maruell thocht the peple slyde,
Quhan thay haue *blynd men* to thare gyde (Lyndsay I,358,5362-3).
and thare, (no doubt), whare ane *blynd man* is guyd, mon be ane fall in the myre (Knox I,51).
for then were I but a *blynde guyde* leadyng the blynd headlinges to perdition (Knox III,323).
that is the wracke to worldlie welthe where *blinde* doth lead ye blynde (*Sat. Poems* 9,170).
for quhair the *blind* the blind dois gyde,
Na wounder baith ga wrang (*Ballatis* 204). Apperson 56; Hyamson 51; Kissel 22(90); Oxford 51; Whiting, *ED* 98, 101.

(2) As *blynd men* blundered of colouris to dispute (Asloan II,234,1368).
For *blynd men* (as I haue feill)
Can nocht decerne fair colours weill (Lauder, *Tractate* 16,451-2).
How sould ane *blind man* colouris estemie (Bannatyne II,222,64). Apperson 54; Chaucer, *TC* ii,21; Fergusson 8(67); Gower, *CA* III,15, 2489-90; Henderson 4; Kelly 74(136); Oxford 51; Ramsay 169(9). See BLUE (2) below.

(3) I haif hard sa And sa haif ȝe
this proverb oft in sport & play
God wait the *blind* Eitis mony a fle (Bannatyne IV,20,21-3). Apperson 55-6; Fergusson 25(301); Oxford 50; Taylor 15; Whiting, *ED* 50.

(4) Ȝit I am lyik þe *blind* that blamis the licht
as thocht in him thair wer no want of sicht (Maitland Quarto 243,11-2). Cf. Chaucer, *TC* ii,862-4.

(5) Bot as ane *blindman* wauerand on the yse (Bannatyne II,244,64).

BLINK.

bot wanischit away as he had bene ane *blink* of the sone or ane quhipe of the whirle wind (Pitscottie I,259,5-7). DOST Blink, *n.*, 2. Cf. NED Blink, 3, Whip, 10.

BLISS.

See BALE (2) above.

BLITHENESS.

See JOY (1) below.

BLOOD.

(1) With a suerd as *blude* als rede (Wyntoun II,22,119).
And þe mone als reide was seyn,
Bludlyk as it al *blude* had beyn (Wyntoun IV,381,783-4).
His gear was red as any *blood* (*Eger* 275,1501).
Ane steid . . . wes reid as *blude* (Douglas I,110,18).
The rampand lyoun, reid as ony *blude* (Stewart I,304,9627).
Ziur sinnis be reid as *blwid* (Gau 63,28).
. . . and of hew
Is *blude* rede (Wyntoun II,69,779-80; *Alexander* III,248,5023; Douglas III,213,14). Apperson 526; Oxford 535; Taylor 56; Whiting, *Ballad* 26, *ED* 306(31); Wilstach 315.

(2) And so for *bluide* sall haue ane bludie end (*Sat. Poems* 253,160). Oxford 52; Whiting, *ED* 263, 281, 284, 291.

BLOSSOM.

(1) Alse bricht of bewtie as the *blossume* scheine (*Clariodus* 96,1456). Whiting, *ED* 306(32).

(2) About hir snow quhyte throte, as *blossome* cleire (*Clariodus* 290,289).

(3) Addressit hir in hir freschest aray,
As is the freschest *blossome* into May (*Clariodus* 264,2335-6).

(4) A saill, als quhite as *blossum* upon spray (Dunbar 114,51).
. . . ane hat alse quhyte
As is the Mayis *blossome* of delyte (*Clariodus* 239,1537-8). Chaucer, *CT* I(A),3324; NED White, 1c.

(5) In bewtie blumit as *blossome* on the ryce (*Clariodus* 243,1651).

BLUE.

(1) In the takinnyng of treuth and constance kend,
The colour of asure, ane hevinliche hewe (*Howlat* 62,430-1).
He and his servandis ar cled in levoray *blew*,
In tokine that he salbe ever trew (*Clariodus* 242,1639-40).
In till ane mantill of lusty *blew*
It sett hir weill as semit me
Sayand scho wes ane luvar trew (Bannatyne III,308,10-2).
Behoung with gold, and all of cullour *blew* . . .
In signe he was ane lufer traist and trew (Rolland, *Court* 18,84-7).
The *blew* is trew (J. Stewart 170,9). Apperson 648; Berry 434.4, 861.5; Chaucer, *Against Women Unconstant* 7, *Anel.*, 330-2, *TC* iii,885, *CT* V(F),644-5; Hardie 472; Hyamson 54; NED Blue, 1e, 6b; Kelly 303(18); Oxford 672; Partridge 69; Ramsay 237(20).

(2) To by richt *blew*, that nevir ane hew had sene (Douglas I,109,18). See BLIND MAN (2) above.

BOAR.

(1) He was borlich and bigge, bold as a *bare* (*Pistill* 182,226; Barbour I,36,233; Stewart I,35,1186, 142,4739, 145,4814, 299,9484, 326,10295, 328,10351, 402,12547, 435,13571, II,96,22993, 119,23706, 361,30987, 401,-32260, 508,35631, 692,41538, 713,42212, III,177,48285, 224,49857, 256,-50940). *Torrent of Portyngale*, ed. E. Adam (EETS ES, 51, 1887) 55,1576; Whiting, *Ballad* 26.

(2) Bernes batalland on burde, brym as a *bair* (*Howlat* 73,775).
Then waxt he brim as any *bare* (*Eger* 275,1506).
Als brim as ony *baris* woid (Dunbar 157,58).
As brym as he had bene ane *Beir* (Lindsay I,160,518).
Than come ane sort, as brim as *beiris* (Lindsay I,180,1301). NED Breme, 5b; Whiting, *Ballad* 26, *ED* 306(33).

(3) Als wod wes as ane wyld *boir* (Stewart II,290,28815).

(4) And as a *boare* abraiding out of band,
He spurrit forward (*Clariodus* 223,1012-3).

(5) He farith as . . . o *beyre* (*Lancelot* 98,3331).

(6) As foaming *boares*, in thair melancholie (*Clariodus* 3,71).
fuming at the mouth lyk ane *bair* (Pitscottie II,60,29). NED Foam, 1; Oxford 212; Whiting, *ED* 306(33).

(7) As two wyld *boaris* irouslie thay faught (*Clariodus* 354,2325). *Guy of Warwick*, ed. J. Zupitza (EETS ES, 25-6, 1875-6) 96,3370: He faght, as a wylde bore.

(8) As twa bald *Bairs*, togidder baith thay ran (Rolland, *Seages* 289,9534). Lydgate, *Troy* I,255,3857-8.

(9) They smote at uther as *bairis* wode and kene (*Clariodus* 52,33). Chaucer, *CT* I(A),1658: As wilde bores gonne they to smyte; *Merlin*, ed. H. B. Wheatley (EETS, 10, 21, 36, 112, 1865-99) 461: he smote a-monge hem Irous as a wilde boor.

(10) And oft he turned appartly,
Richt as it war ane baittit *bair* (*Alexander* I,90,2852-3). *Huon* 515,21-22: he stode at a baye lyke a wylde bore baytyd with houndis.

BOARD.

Sa we mon rin vpon ane vther *burde* (Rolland, *Seages* 159,5056). NED Board, 15.

BOIL.

Now sall the *byle* all out brist, that beild has so lang (Dunbar 89,164).
A *byle* þat is lang beilit breikis at þe last (Bannatyne III,9,51-2; Maitland 161,52; Fortescue 264,[44]). DOST Byle, *fig.*

BO-KEIK.

Thay play *bokeik* evin as I war a skar (Lindsay II,168,2363). DOST Bo-keik; NED Bo-keik. Cf. Scar, a, Scare, sb.2,3; Whiting, *ED* 358(778): bo-pepe.

BONE.

(1) Difficill is, tha said that tyme ilk ane,
Bring throw the flesch that bred is in the *bane* (Stewart II,386,31773-4).
Rycht hard it is, other for boist or blame,
Bring fra the flesche that is bred in the *bane* (Stewart II,651,40203-4). Apperson 66; Bradley 63; Fergusson 60(480); Green 34; Kelly 179(26); Oxford 63; Ramsay 201(61); Taylor 16; Whiting, *ED* 122.

(2) the Frenche men had gottin the *bone* for the which the dog barked (Knox I,219). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 157, 271.

(3) Vpone ane stede als quhyte as *bane* (*Alexander* IV, 398, *cont.*, 9769). A doghter quhyte as ony *bane* (Makculloch 117,26). Chaucer, *TC* ii,926. See WHALEBONE below.

(4) Halding opinioun der of a borit *bane* (Douglas II,169,21). DOST Borit. Cf. Laud 249,8446; I ȝeue not of the a bone.

BORN.

(1) al nakit as þai vare *borne* (*Legends* I,253,155). Oxford 442; *Reliquiæ* II,15.

(2) Bair vnabulȝeit as scho *borne* wass (Bannatyne II,228,8).

BOSOM.

In at *bosum*, and sine out at ȝour sleif (Rolland, *Seages* 245,8007 and p. 334.

BOSS.

In rottin *bosses* no balme liquor lyes (*Sat. Poems* 347,24). DOST Bos.

BOUGH.

And leivis thame bair As ony *bewch* (Bannatyne II,161,29).

BOW, SB.

(1) Forther mair, ane *Bow* that is ay bent
Worthis unsmart, and dullis on the string (Henryson 3,22-3).
Bend not thy *bow* bot quhair that thow may schute (Bannatyne II,189,4).
A *bow* þat is lang bent It will wax dull (Bannatyne III,10,60-1; Fortescue 264,[53]; not in Maitland). Apperson 62; Jente 104,I; Kelly 33(194); Oxford 59.

(2) That so had skaipit betuix the *bow* and string (*Clariodus* 61,325).
and eschaiped with thair lywes narrowlie betuix the *bow* and the string (Pitscottie II,122,27-8). DOST Bow, *n.*1, 1a, *fig.*

(3) I langit in cupiddis *bow* to schuit,
bot wist nocht quhat it menit (Montgomerie S 12,163-4).
Chaucer, *TC* ii,861. Cf. Apperson 535: Many talk of Robin Hood that never shot in his bow; Oxford 611. See WORLD (2) below.

(4) In your awin *bow* ȝe are owre-schot,
Be mair than half ane inch (Montgomerie C 39,1101-2). Oxford 481.

(5) And in bauldnes hir *bow* all bent (Rolland, *Seages* 115,3533).
Rutit in sturt and stryfe, thy *bow* was euer bendit (Rolland, *Seages* 322,10737). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 336(413).

BOW, VB.

To *bow* at bidding, and byde not quhill thow brest (Henryson 69,1998). Apperson 42; Chaucer, *TC* i,257-8; Fergusson 22(184); Kelly 73(131); Oxford 39. See BUXOMNESS below.

BOYS.

Quhairin tua naikit *boyis* resorts,
Quhais countenance good hope reports (Montgomerie C 184,31-2). Apperson 21: Babies; NED Baby, 3; Oxford 383.

BRASS.

Ffor quhy as bricht bene birneist *brass*
As siluer wrocht at all dewyss (Scott 27,29-30). Breton II,g,7: thinking her brasse good siluer; G. Gascoigne, *Complete Works* (2 vols., Cambridge, 1907-1910) I,130: And sometimes saye that brasse is bright as Gold.

BREW.

Syne in that breth oft-tyme thai *brew*
quhilk eftirwart ful sare thai rew (*Consail* 67,45-6).
As ye have *brewd,* so shal ye drink (*Eger* 327,2384).
Syne drank efter of that that tha had *browin* (Stewart III,417,56434).
Drink now as ye have *browen* (Knox I,458).
And drink þat thow hes *brewit* (Scott 57,64).

For as ȝe *brew* sa sall ȝe drink (Rolland, *Seages* 152,4820).
Now dryven to drinke as I did *brewe* (*Sat. Poems* 14,324).
As ye haif *browne,* now drink ye that (*Sat. Poems* 126,137).
They sall drink as þei *brew* (*Sat. Poems* 178,126).
As thay haue *brouin* yt bargane, sa thay drank (*Sat. Poems* 262,15).
They sall drink as thei *brew* (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 90).
as they haue *brewen,* so let them drink (Melville 153).
wha drank a bitter coupe of his awin *brewing* (Melvill I,198).
For thow sall drink of that quhilk thow did *brew* (Melvill II,431). Apperson 67; Cheviot 49; Fergusson 67(864); Kelly 186(78); NED Brew, ld, Drink, v.1, 10d; Oxford 64; Ramsay 163(58); Whiting, *Ballad* 23, *ED* 19, 70, cf. 194, 228, 273.

BRIER.
(1) The rute is bitter, scharp as ony *brier* (Douglas I,105,28).
With spurris als scherp as *breires* (Scott 9,18). Chaucer *CT* IV (E),1825; DAE Brier, 2; Wilstach 342.
(2) Those that bluntlie runs may Light in the *breres,*
and put to thir plunge where no dangere apperes (*Sat. Poems* 20,522-3). Cf. Apperson 358; NED Brier, 4; Oxford 359; Whiting *ED* 336(419). See BUSH (4) below.

BROCK.
(1) Bot I lay braikand lyk a *brok* (Lindsay II,78,1725 and IV,180). DOST Braik, v.2; Kissel 37(171a); NED Brake, v.6.
(2) Thir stewats stinks as thay war *Broks* (Lindsay II,241,2489). Apperson 69; Cheviot 205; Kissel 37(171b); NED Brock, sb. 1, 1.

BUCHAN.
To kiss his loif on *Buchone* wyis (Scott 24,50 and p. 134).

BUCK HOOD.
So day be day scho plaid w^t me *buk hud*
W^t Mony skornis and mokkis behind my bak (Bannatyne IV,30,57-8). Fergusson 56(686): He playes buck hood in my cood; NED Buck, sb.1,3.

BUCKET.
Lyke draw-well *bukkets* dowkand vp and doun (*Sat. Poems* 326,16). Bagford II,835,146; Chaucer, *CT* I(A),1533; Oxford 67.

BUD.
Bud and reward that gydis euerie thing,
Hes causit thame for ony dreid of feid,
This Wortimer to poysoun (Stewart II,170,25224-6). DOST Bud, *n.*
See GIFT (5) below.

BULL.
(1) That ladis may bait him lyk a *buill* (Dunbar 5,27). Nashe I,319,33.
(2) Quhen thay had berit lyk baitit *bulis* (Bannatyne II,267,181). NED Bere. Cf. Wilstach 17.
(3) For, lyke an boisteous *Bull,* ȝe rin and ryde (Lindsay I,103,47).

BUR.
(1) And fast lyke *burris,* thay cleif baith ane and all (*Ballatis* 104). Apperson 102: Cleave(2), 601: Stick(2), quot. 1510; NED Bur, 1b; Oxford 97; Whiting *ED*, 307(43).
(2) Bat ȝe sall find me byding lyk a *bur,*
Quhilk lichtlie will not leiv the grip it gettis (Montgomerie C 121,lxv,-9-10). NED Bur, 1b.

BURGESS.
To ȝow I haue ane questioun to Declare,
Quhy *burgess* barnis thryffis nocht to the thrid aire,

Bot castis away it þat þar eldaris wan (*Thre Prestis* 6-8,93-5, 12,173,182, 16,248).

I wait weill ȝe will never thryfe,
Farther nor the fourth air (Lindsay II,365,4086-7).

the preist of peblis speris ane questione in ane beuk that he conpilit, quhy that *burges* ayris thryuis nocht to the thrid ayr: bot he mycht hef sperit as veil, quhy that the successours of the vniversal comont pepil baytht to burght & land, thryuis nocht to the thrid ayr (*Complaynt* 143,2-7). DOST Burges, 3. Cf. Apperson 324; Kelly 190(100); Oxford 315; Ramsay 198(17).

BURN.

Als copius thair blude ran in the streit,
As ony *burne* efter ane schour of weit (Stewart II,422,32943-4).
Thair blude like birnis rynnand on the grene,
That all the strandis neirby quhair tha stude,
Lyke ony *burne* abundit all with blude (Stewart II,611,38912-4). NED Burn, sb.1, 1.

BURRIAN.

That no bird was him lyke,
Fro *Burone* to Berwick (*Howlat* 77,895-6 and p. 315).

BUSH.

(1) Hir hair . . .
Is lyk ane *buss* þat birnys in þe fyre (Bannatyne III,305,8-10).

(2) About the *busk* with wayis thocht thow wend (Henryson 69,1996).
They may not go about the bus (Montgomerie C 38,1069). Apperson 31: Beat(4); DOST Bus, lb; Kelly 204(216); NED Bush, sb.1, lb; Oxford 27.

(3) Sa bissely to *busk* I boun,
Ane vþir eitis the berry doun
That suld be myn (Scott 48,47-9).
Nor beir þe blame quhair wþeris takis the pryce,
Nor beitt þe *busse* thatt wþeris Eit the berreiss (*Sat. Poems* 192,119-20). DOST Bus, lb.

(4) The Bird he bruiks not, thocht he beit the Breir (J. Stewart 11,24). Apperson 31; DOST Bus, lb; Gower, *CA* II,194,2355-6; Kelly 275(64); Oxford 28; Ramsay 160(28); Whiting, *ED* 25.

(5) Dois wag about aye as the *busse* it wags (Lauder 5,76). Cf. Kelly 140(108): He'll wag as the Bush wags with him.

(6) Because the rysche *bus* kepis his kow (Lindsay I,51,408).
Than mycht the Rasche *bus* keip ky on ye bordour (*Sat. Poems* 91,312).
The quhilk may gar þe rasche *busk* keip þe kow (Maitland 329,47).
the gude Iosias quha vald caus the rasch *buss* keip the kou (*Catholic* 164,3-4). NED Bush, sb.1, 2; Oxford 553.

BUT.

For to bring *but* its Ill thats not thair ben (Rolland, *Seages* 7,165). Fergusson 62(504); Kelly 194(236); NED But, B, 1b, quot. *a* 1646; Ramsay 201(64).

BUTCHER.

That men on far micht heir the knokkis,
Like *boucheouris* hakkand on thair stokk[i]s (Lindsay I,182,1359-60).

BUTT.

and clearlie understood the *butt* whairat the Quene and hir flatteraris schot (Knox II,310). DOST But, n.2, 2; NED Butt, sb.4, 2b.

BUTTER.

(1) Of thair counsell I reid anis in ane taill,

It is comparit to *butter* into Caill (Rolland *Seages* 202,6493-4). DOST Butter, 1.

(2) I will get riches with that rent
Eftir the day of dome,
Quhen, in the coilpottis of trannent,
Butter will grow on brome (Lindsay II,180,2474-7 and IV,198).

BUTTERFLY.

The *Butterflie,* hir self for to distroye,
Upone the nycht to flie Scho dois nocht stint
Unto the candle (Lauder 39,1-3).
Sum se now, In me now,
the *butterfle* and candill.
As scho delyttyth in the low,
So was I browdin of my bow,
As ignorant as scho:
And as scho fleis quhill scho be fyrit,
So, with the dairt that I desyrit,
My handis hes hurt me to (Montgomerie S 12,153-9). DOST Butterfly; Oxford 212: Fly; Whiting, *ED* 313(124): Fly.

BUTTON.

(1) Sa that nouther scheld nor blassone
Auaillit him of ane *buttoune* (*Alexander* I,33,1045-6). NED Button 1b.

(2) I set nocht by þat a *buttone* (Wyntoun IV,292,2198). NED Button, 1b.

(3) Saying, þat luve wt witt inclusit
ȝit is not worth a *buttoun* (Scott 77,27-8). Apperson 456(3); NED Button, 1b; Oxford 72.

(4) a *buttoun* for the braggyne of all the heretikis (Knox I,173). NED Button, 1b; Whiting, *ED* 336(427).

BUXOMNESS.

And *bowsumnes*, þat, as þe wyse
Sayis, is better than sacrefice (Wyntoun II,7,67-8). See BOW, VB. above.

BUY.

(1) . . . I deuysit that dance
Of Glasgow Castell, gat it *bocht* and sauld (*Sat. Poems* 197,115-6). Apperson 61; NED Buy, 11; Whiting, *ED* 336(428).

(2) In *bying* & selling Is mony fals aith (Bannatyne III,10,67-8; Maitland 161,64; Fortescue 265,[60]: grete othe). Cf. W. Horman, *Vulgaria* (London, 1519) 235^{v}: Byenge and syllynge nedeth nat many wordis.

BYGONES.

and all *byganis* to be byganis (Pitscottie II,43,3).

Then *byganes,* byganes, fareweil he (Montgomerie C 42,1209). Apperson 76; Cheviot 233; Bradley 64; Hyamson 69; NED Bygone, B, 1c; Oxford 74; Ramsay 206(33).

CABLE.

when the Lord haid stryped him naked and bear of all these things warldlie, and of a *cable* maid a twynde thride to go in at the narow ei of that neidle (Melvill I,117). Cf. *Matthew* xix,24.

CAKE.

Thi schore compt I noght ane *caik* (*Golagros* 4,103).

All ȝoure unkyndnes compt I not a *kaik* (Bannatyne IV,22,3).

Scho countis not all ȝour cunning worth a *caik* (Rolland, *Seages* 245,8000).

CAMMOCK.

My bak þat sum tyme brent hes bene

Now cruikis lyk ane *camok* tre (Maitland 206,35-6). Cf. Apperson 122; DOST Cam(m)ock; Skelton I,134,30, II,280,114; Taylor 18.

CANDLE.

In-to the nycht as *candil* clere (*Legends* I,4,109).
Arthour and Merlin, ed. E. Kölbing (Leipzig, 1890) 92,3204; Chaucer, *Romaunt B* 3199-200.

CARBUNCLE.

And of religioun haldin ay the rois,
As the *charbokill* of all stonis the chois (Stewart III,326,53341-2).

CARD.

Bot scho may cast hir *Cartis* in at the Cleik
Of the same sort (Rolland, *Seages* 232,7560-1). Cf. DOST Cleke, 2: a haul or sweep at cards.

CARRICK.

Thair is na Monks from *Carrick* to Carraill (Lindsay II,315, 3396 and IV,224).

CARVER.

it war better for the Ministers to be thair awin *carvers* (Melvill II,453). Behn II,218; Middleton VI,194; NED Carver, 4.

CASE.

Vnknawin *caicis* causit oft greit dreid (Stewart I,363,11390). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* V(F),220-4.

CASTLE.

Ȝe big gay *Castellis* in the air (*Sat. Poems* 307,400). Apperson 84-5; Chaucer, *Romaunt B* 2573; Kelly 393(305); NED Castle, 11; Oxford 82; Taylor 19.

CAT.

(1) Hay, as ane brydlit *catt* I brank (Lindsay II,68,741 and IV,177).
Syne lyk ane brydlit *catt* þai brank (Maitland 441,130). DOST Brank, v.1, 2, Bridlit.

(2) It makis a perte mowss ane vnhardy *catt* (Bannatyne III,9,37-8; Maitland 160,38: wantoun mouss; Fortescue 264,[32]: wanton). Fergusson 10(92): A bleat cat makes a proud mouse; Cheviot 2; Kelly 25(148); Oxford 49; Ramsay 153(3).

(3) for ȝe tua ar lyike *cattis* and doggis berkkand on vthirs (*Complaynt* 159,36-160,1, 166,12). Cf. Apperson 88(64); Hyamson 77; Oxford 6; Partridge 132.

(4) Sum like wyld *cattis* in thair hair than clam (Stewart I,637,19698).

(5) I can nocht fische, ffor weiting off my feit (Henryson 70,2001).
thay ar conditionat lyke the *catt*—
thay wald nocht weit thair feit (Montgomerie S 46,617-8).
Apperson 88(57); Chaucer, *HF* 1783-5; Gower, *CA* II,331,1108-9; Fergusson 112(904); Kelly 307(44); NED Cat, sb.1,15; Oxford 84; Ramsay 208(23), 227(12); Taylor 20; Edwin W. Teale, *Days Without Time* (New York, 1948) 45-50.

CAT HARROW.

Thay gan to draw at the *cat harrow* (Lindsay I,48,308).
But all togidder draw,
Not in *Cat* harrowis lyke cankrit marrowis,
For feir of efter flaw (*Sat. Poems* 151,70-2). Cheviot 362; DOST Cat-harrow; Kelly 329(216); Kissel 36(161); NED Cat, 18; Oxford 156.

CAUSE.

(1) Cut aff the *cause*, the effect maun fail (Montgomerie C 47,1367). Apperson 617: Take(10); Chaucer, *TC* ii,483; Oxford 86.

(2) Ane vnjust *caus*, as it is rycht weill kend,
On force man mak bot ane vnhappie end (Stewart I,141,4711-2). Cf.

Middleton II,305: a just cause is strong.

CENSE.

Mysty vapour . . . sweit as *sens* (Douglas IV,81,20). DOST Cens(e); Whiting, *ED* 325(283).

CHAFF.

(1) As quheill vnstabill and *caffe* befoir the wind,
And as the wod consumit is with fyre (*Ballatis* 106).
It gois away as *calf* dois w^t þe wind (Bannatyne II,192,30).

(2) he randers *calf* for my gud solid graine (Maitland Quarto 210,57). Gower, *CA* II,28,844,

(3) And clenge the *calfe* out fra the corne (Rolland, *Seages* 50,1383). Lydgate, *Albon* 112,81, *Fall* I,2,24. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 27, 74. See CORN(1) below.

CHALK.

The *chalk*-quhite ermyn (*Kingis Quair* 39,157).
a turture quhite as *c[h]alk* (*Kingis Quair* 43,177). Chaucer, *CT* V(F),409; Taylor 67; Wilstach 471.

CHANCE.

(1) "quha pances quhat *chancis,*"
quod he, "na wirschip wynnis" (Montgomerie S 58,803-4).
DOST Chance; NED Panse. See PERIL(2) below.

(2) Bot take the *chance* that godis will ws send (Stewart, I,142,4731,4740). See GOD(5) below.

CHANGE.

Changeis ar sueit (Dunbar 86,53). Thoms 912. Cf. Cheviot 75; Kelly 77(7); Ramsay 170(11). See FACE(2) below.

CHARYBDIS.

ffleand *Charibd* be war in Scyll to fall (*Sat. Poems* 190,81).
For, from *Carybdis* vhill I flie,
I slyde in Sylla (Montgomerie C 202,61-2). NED Charybdis; Oxford 568.

CHASE.

Quhyle men chaissis and quhyle chaissit is (*Alexander* II,177,2754). See WAR(2) below.

CHAUCER.

Sic Christianis to kis w^t *Chauceris* kuikis
God gife þe grace aganis þis gud new ʒeir (Scott 5,127-8).
thourt *Chaucers* cuike (Montgomerie C 63,113). DOST Cuke, 1b, *fig.*

CHECKMATE.

Help now my game, that is in poynt to *mate* (*Kingis Quair* 41,168).
till deth say to the than *chakmait* (Dunbar 75,21).
How may ane fule ʒour hie honour *chekmait*? (Douglas I,37,22).
With a twme scheith ʒe stand nocht þan *chekmat* (Asloan II,217,832).
mack thy self *chek-meat* to the King (Knox I,12).
thow than sall haif *chekmait* (Bannatyne II,135,75).
quhill thow be evin *chakmait* (Bannatyne III,21,93).
Sic grace he gaif, bot thame all maid *chak mait* (Rolland, *Court* 55,254).
Sen sa he is conuict and maid *chakmeit* (Rolland, *Court* 122,334).
nou thou art *chekmait* (Montgomerie C 136,12). Chaucer, *TC* ii,754; NED Checkmate Ab, B, 1b, c; Whiting, *ED* 337(449).

CHERRY.

(1) hir *chirry lippis* (Bannatyne III,308,23). Whiting, *Ballad* 26. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 307(59); Wilstach 236.

(2) And sett nocht by this warld a *chirry* (Dunbar 2,22, 142,42). NED Cherry, 1b; Whiting, *ED* 338(450). Cf. Apperson 456(4).

CHERRY-STONE.

He pryses him nocht worth a *chirrie-stane* (*Alexander* I,4,106). *Guy of Warwick*, ed. J. Zupitza (EETS ES, 42, 49, 59, 1883-91) 552,203,7; NED Cherry-stone, 1b.

CHICKENS.

That he gert feill fall at his feit
Sprewland, as þai *chekinnis* ware (Wyntoun V,430,3572-3).

CHIEFTAIN.

& be assay men ma wele kene
þat gud *chiften* makis [gud] men (*Legends* II,89,708-9). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 47.

CHILD.

And he is maid on mold meik as ane *child* (*Golagros* 13,350). Whiting, *ED* 308(60). Cf. NED Meek, 1d. See BAIRN above.

CHOP.

Nor ȝit leif chaste, but *chop* and change þair cheir (Scott 3,62).
To *chope* and chainge and to sell men (*Sat. Poems* 245,36).
bot also *choppis* and changis the neu testament (*Catholic* 86,12).
the *choppers* and chaingers of the Bible (*Catholic* 224,7).
al *chopping* and chainging of the same (*Catholic* 229,17-8,26).
wha reidis the Bible *choppit* and changit (*Catholic* 229,19-20).
al thame wha *choppis* and chaingis (*Catholic* 245,12-3). DOST Chop, v.2; NED Chop, v.2, 4; Oxford 94.

CHRYSOLITE.

Crysp haris, brycht as *chrysolite* (Douglas IV,81,13).

CLAN.

He þat cumis of evill *clan* wyiss men suspeckis (Bannatyne III,9,34-5; Maitland 160,35; Fortescue 264,[29]).

CLEG.

and it wes cant as ony *cleg* (Bannatyne II,305,69). DOST Cleg.

CLERKS.

The greitest *Clerkis* ar not the wysest men (Henryson 39,1064; Knox I,39). Apperson 273; Chaucer, *CT* I(A),4054-5; Fergusson 98(857); Hislop 280; Jente 288; Kelly 7(37); Oxford 97; Ramsay 229(50).

CLIMB.

(1) And namelie thay quhilk *clymmis* up maist hie,
That ar not content with small possessioun (Henryson 16,371-2).
Nor *clym* so hie, quhill he fall of the ledder (Henryson 89,2614).
Clym nevir our hie, nor ȝit to law thow lycht (Douglas III,205,16).
As suith is said, be exempill we se
The hiear ay men *clym* in till ane tre,
Bot he be wyiss and warlie wirk with all,
In his discence far sarar is the fall (Stewart I,416,12987-90).
Quho *clymmis* to hycht, perforce his feit mon faill (Lindsay I,58,73).
Quho *clymith* moist heych moist dynt hes of the woder,
And leist defence aganis the bitter blast
Off fals fortune (Lindsay I,67,355-7).
I pray ȝow that ȝe nocht pretend ȝow
To *clym* ouer hie (Lindsay I,95,109-10).
He'l *climb*, I fear, to high (*Sat. Poems* 81,364).
Quha heichest *clymmis* the soner may thay slyde (*Sat. Poems* 161,46).
quho hiest *clymmis* most suddanly discendis (Bannatyne II,183,5).
Be nevir or hie for dreid thow eftir fall (Bannatyne II,224,14). Apperson 102, 301: High(5), 645; Hislop 281; Jente 187, 291; Kelly 319(135); Kissel 19-20(80-1); NED Highest, C, 1; Whiting, *ED* 44, 75, 125.

(2) Bettir it is to suffer fortoun and abyd

Than haistely to *clym* and suddanly to slyd (Bannatyne II,187,1-2, 324,7-8),
And suddan fall may thaim InIuir
Quho *clymmyng* vp dois suiftlie sprent (J. Stewart 116,5). [R.C.], *A World of Wonders* (London, 1607) 81.
(3) Gif we not *clym* we tak no fall (Dunbar 145,29). Apperson 102: Climb(1); Oxford 449.

CLOAK.
(1) be changeing of cullouris and turning out ye other side of his *cloik* (Buchanan 45). Fergusson 50(430). See COAT(3) below.
(2) and change our not, with the *clok* on the uther shoulder (Melvill II,460). Cheviot 133; Kelly 151(190); Ramsay 182(29).

CLOCK.
(1) And maid hir cleir as ony *clok* (Bannatyne III,15,6).
(2) Scho compt him not twa *clokkis* (Bannatyne II,263,33). DOST Clok, n.2; NED Clock, sb.3.

CLOD.
Sic justice is not worth ane *clod* (Dunbar 36,39). DOST Clod, n.1.

CLOTH.
(1) *Clayth* is not Haldin at þe first pryss (Bannatyne III,246,35).
(2) Commounly gud *cleth* is best cheip (Bannatyne III,10,68-9; Maitland 161,65; Fortescue 265,[61]). Cf. Apperson 39(19): The best is best cheap; Oxford 35.
(3) The *cleth* was of ane vþir hew
That I wend had bene reid was blew
That semit ane syiss was bot ane tray
Bot perrellis may no man eschew (Bannatyne IV,20,28-31). NED Cloth, 10, quot. *c* 1430. Cf. John Bradford, *Writings*, ed A. Townsend (Cambridge, 1848) I,60: the covetousness of England is of another cloth and colour.

CLOTHES.
See HONOR(2) below.

CLOUD.
Blak as ane *cloud* (Stewart II,149,24580).

COAL.
(1) the pikky smok *cole* blak (Douglas II,264,30, IV,127,22; Montgomerie C 99,xxi,3). Apperson 51; Chaucer, *CT* I(A),2142, 2692, 3240; Gower, *CA* II,248,808, III,116,6204; NED Coalblack; Whiting, *Ballad* 27, *ED* 308(65).
(2) curage, kindling lyk a *cole* (Montgomerie C 93,viii,6).

COAT.
(1) Cutt outt þai *cott* according to þai claithe (Montgomerie S 211,21). Apperson 131; Green 22; Hardie 462: sail; Hyamson 90; Oxford 126; Partridge 161; Ramsay 171(41).
(2) Speid hand, or I sall paik thy *cote* (Lindsay II,16,88). Cf. NED Coat, 13, Paik.
(3) alleging that he had chengit his *coit* (Melville 263).
example in thy selff thow seis,
how he can turne his *coit* (Montgomerie S 56,755-6). NED Coat, 13, quot. 1576; Pepys IV,84,4, 89,12; Oxford 676. Cf. Apperson 651: tippet. See CLOAK(1) above.

COAT-TAIL.
Still on his owne *cott taill* he satt (*Sat. Poems* 374,650). Cheviot 142; Kelly 198(165); NED Coat-tail; Ramsay 195(53); Cf. Apperson 575: To sit on one's skirts.

COCK.
(1) as kein as ony *cok* (*Sat. Poems* 329,125). Cf. *Ancren Riwle*, ed. J. Morton (London, 1853) 140: þet coc is kene on his owune mixenne.
(2) It hes bene said, as mony men weill knaw,
The ȝoung coc leiris as the ald cok craw (Stewart II,536, 36541-2). Apperson 719(17); Cheviot 48; Fergusson 8(68); Kelly 13(70); NED Cock, sb.1, 1b; Oxford 470; Ramsay 162(37). See BAIRN(4) above.
(3) Cry *cok*, or I sall quell the (Dunbar 12,248).
And by consent cry *cok*, thi deid is dycht (Douglas IV,5,14). Chaucer, *CT* VII,3277 (B 4467) and Skeat's note, V,256; DOST Cok, n.2; NED Cock, sb.1, 7b.

COLD.
yf any be *acolde* lett hym warme hym at others ffyres (*Sat. Poems* 3.

COLT.
Ane *colt* of ane gud stude happynnis to be best (Bannatyne III,8,20-1; Maitland 160,20: oft happinnis best; Fortescue 264,[16]: proves oft).

COMB.
Becaus thay ar sa kittill of the *Came* (Rolland, *Seages* 245,8005). Cf. DOST Came, 2.

COME.
Be not our prowde of thy prosperitie,
For as it *cumis*, so will it pass away ("Good Counsel" in *Kingis Quair* 52,8-9).
Tharfor þat lychtly *cummis* will lichtly ga (*Thre Prestis* 16,223). Fergusson 72(586); Kelly 231(16); Oxford 529; Ramsay 207(6).

COMMONS.
Sa fayris [it] ay commounly:
In *commownys* may nane affy (Barbour I,46,500-1).
For Lordis and Lairdis ar nather Just,
Nor ȝit the comounis to be trust (*Sat. Poems* 241,23-4). Lydgate, *Fall* II,390,2197-8,2203. Cf. Chaucer, *CT* IV(E), 995-1001.

COMPANY.
(1) Fore be thar *cumpany* men may knaw
To gud or Ill quhethir at thai draw (*Consail* 66,9-10).
Sic art thow callit as is thy *cumpany* (Dunbar 75,28). Apperson 394: Man (17); Jente 127; Kelly 289(36); NED Company, 4b; Oxford 106.
(2) gud *cumpany* gud men makis (*Consail* 66,5).
(3) O sentence suthe: I say for to conclude,
'Ill *companie* corrupteth maners gud" (Hume 78,345-6). E. Ward, *Mars Stript of his Armour* (London, 1709) 62: Evil company, they say, corrupts good manners; Oxford 180: Evil communications.

COMPARISONS.
Sic *comparisonis* . . . are verray unsaverie (Knox II,344). Apperson 110; Bradley 66; Fergusson 26(219); Kelly 49(313); NED Comparison, 6; Oxford 106. [All read *odious*].

CON.
Than Kyttoke thare, als cadye as ane *Con* (Lindsay I,278,2657). DOST Cady, Con, n.1; NED Cadye, Con, sb.3.

CONCORD.
Into *concord* rycht small thing eikis and growis,
And in discord rycht mekle wastis and flowis (Stewart III,431,56936-7. Breton II,n,13: It is an old saying, and euer true, *Concordia parvæ res crescunt, discordia maxima dilabuntur.*

CONSUETUDE.
See CUSTOM below.

CONTRARY.

Contrare suld he helit with contrare (Asloan II,35,1104). NED Contrary B.3, quot. 1398.

COP-OUT.

Ane thristis, ane uther playis *cop out* (Dunbar 27,13).

Drynkand and playand *cop out*, evin (Dunbar 74,101).

the Freiris playit *cop owt* (Dunbar 191,387).

I wil nocht say that ilk man plaid *cop out* (Douglas II,64,16).

At euirilk draucht tha playit ay *cop out* (Stewart II,631,39550).

For he and I sall play *cop owt* (Lindsay II,72,812 and IV,178).

Bot lat ws play *cop owt* (Lindsay II,140,892). DOST Cop, 1b; NED Cop, sb.1, 1b.

CORBIE.

"How *Corby* messinger," quoth he, "with sorowe now syngis" (*Howlat*, 75,812).

Schir *Corbie* Ravin wes maid Apparitour (Henryson 43,1160).

He send furth *Corbe*, messingeir (Lindsay I,242,1478).

his Maieste alleging that I wes *corbe* messenger (Melville 351). DOST Corby, 1b; Fergusson 49(596); Kelly 385(219); NED Corbie, 2.

CORN.

(1) Thy words war nather *corne* nor caiff (Lindsay II,325,3531). See CHAFF(3) above.

(2) And sa it hes bene in all ages
That all the *corne* of the Countrie
Be kempis hes not bene schorne, we se (*Sat. Poems* 304,274-6). Cheviot 32; Fergusson 6(38); Henderson 4; Kelly 4(17); Ramsay 158(47).

COUNCIL.

Thai [fools] cum wncallyt to *consaill* (*Foly* 62,359, cf. 174,14).

Thair is a sentence said be sum,
'Let nane uncalld to *counsell* cum,
That welcum weins to be' (Montgomerie C 38,1079-81). Fergusson 26(220); Kelly 80(28); Oxford 103; Ramsay 171(19).

COUNSEL.

(1) All thing thai wyrk with wyss *consaill* (*Foly* 59,251).

Quhairfoir I say heir, schortlie to conclude,
Quha vsit *counsall* of sic men of guide,
Seyndill is sene, vse he sic counsall lang,
In ony mater that he sould ga wrang (Stewart III,445,57384-7).

Wyrk with *counsail*, so sall thow neuer rew (Lindsay I,37,1113).

But gude *counsale* may no Prince lang indure:
Wyrk with counsale, than sall thy work be sure (Lindsay I,65,300-1). Chaucer, *CT* I(A),3530, VII,1000-5 (B 2190-5; Kissel 21(88); Whiting, *ED* 136, 284. Cf. Jente 644. See KING(2) below.

(2) Grit fule is he, that will not glaidlie heir
Counsall in tyme, quhill it availl him nocht (Henryson 65,1862-3). Cf. Oxford 251.

(3) A man þat will his awin *counsale* discure
How suld ane vþir man it keip (Bannatyne II,207,41-2). Oxford 112; Whiting, *ED* 53. Cf. Apperson 115: The counsel thou wouldest have another keep, first keep thyself.

(4) . . . sen I vnderstand
That *counsall* can be na command,
I haif na mair to say (Montgomerie S 42,569-71). Apperson 115; Chaucer *CT* III(D),67; Fergusson 27(317); Kelly 76(2); Oxford 112; Ramsay 171(34).

COURT.

This Proverb, it is of verite,
Quhilk I hard red in tyll ane letter,
Hiest in *Court*, nixt the weddie,
Without he gyde hym all the better (Lindsay I,97,149-52). Cheviot 167, 262; Fergusson 82(651); Kelly 126(7); Kissel 18(75); Oxford 295; Ramsay 192(4).

COURT HOLY WATER.

after that the *holy watter* of the *Court* be sprinckled upoun you (Knox II,275).
not temperat with the *halie watter* of the *Court* (Knox III,176).
Court holye watter (Melvill II,524). Apperson 116; NED Court holy water, Oxford 113.

COVET.

He that of ressoun can not be content,
Bot *covetis* all, is abill all to tyne (Henryson 75,2189-90).
He þat *cuvatis* all Is abill to tyne (Bannatyne III,9,57-8; Maitland 161,58: hable all to tyne; Fortescue 264,[50]: able all). Apperson 5: All cover all lose; Kelly 365(38); NED Covet, 1; Oxford 7.

COVETISE.

(1) Inne the which dame Aueryce
Festenede hyre rotes at devyce,
þat moder is of alkyne wice (*Troy* 240,395-7).
For *Cowatice* is rut of al evill (*Consail* 73,261).
. . . *Cowatice*
That is modir of ilk wyce (*Ratis* 36,1252-3).
Radix omnium malorum est cupiditas (Irlande 53,27).
. . . *Cuvatyce,*
Rute of all evill and grund of vyce (Dunbar 121,55-6).
Greit *couatice* I mene, of this was all the caus.
As hes bene red and sene, into auld doctouris sawis.
Cupiditas est radix omnium malorum. Timot. vj. (Rolland, *Seages* 60, 1703-4).
avarice . . . "the route of all ewill" (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 56).
Radix malorum est cupiditas (Maitland 314,72). Apperson 117-8; Chaucer, *CT* VI(C),334, 426; NED Covetousness, 1.

(2) bot ay the eldar that þow bee,
The mar the vyce (*covetise*) encouerys the (*Ratis* 39,1376-7, cf. 47,1655-6). Apperson 118; Chaucer, *CT* I(A),3883-5; Oxford 592; Whiting, *ED* 76, 80. See AVARICE above.

(3) Throuch *cowatys* sum losis gud and lyff (Harry, 126,521).

(4) Quho had all riches unto Ynd,
And wer not satefeit in mynd,
With povertie I hald him schent;
Off *covatyce* sic is the kynd (Dunbar 144-5,6-9).
For quho in warld moist *covatus* is
In world is purast man, I wis,
And moist neidy of his intent (Dunbar 145,31-3). Whiting, *ED* 242, 247. Cf. Henderson 9; Whiting, *Ballad* 37. See GATHERING below.

COW.

(1) Quhilk had no knawledge mair no had ane *kow* (Stewart II,426,33077). Cf. Ramsay 182(24): He has nae as muckle sense as a cow can haud in her falded nive. See HIGHLAND COW below.

(2) wer I in your grace steid, I sould gang betwixt the *kow* and the corne (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 9.

(3) For startling hald the *kow* fast be the taill (*Sat. Poems* 182, 67). Cf. Cheviot 150: He that's aught the cow gangs nearest the tail.

CRACK.

quhan ȝe haif done, it is tyme to *crak* (Montgomerie S 46,633). DOST Crak, 4. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 122, 187.

CRAG (1).

(1) My *craig* will wit quhat weyis my hippis (Lindsay II,300,2847 and IV,-222). DOST Crag, n.2. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 353(691): If we should chance to look through an hemp Windowe, and our arse brake our necke.

(2) Quhais *craig* ȝoiks fastest, let tham sey thame sell (Montgomerie C 101,xxvi,3 and p. 339: "your neck is youlking," you are ripe for hanging). DOST Crag, n.2; NED Yuke.

CRAG (2).

. . . scho stud stil
As a *crag* (*Legends* II,394,255-6).

CREDENCE.

Haistie *credence* oft tymes brewis baill, thir twa forbeir (Rolland, *Seages* 173,5519). Cf. Jente 317.

CREED.

Quhilk maner having is suyth, as is the *creid* (Douglas III,307,17).
trew as the *creid* (Bannatyne II,127,7).
To trest it as ȝe do ȝour *creid* (Bannatyne IV,3,30). Gower, *CA* III,26,2912; Whiting, *ED* 308(76).

CREEL.

Bot put ȝour hand by haȝard in the *creill*;
Ȝit men hes mater vharvpon to muse,
For they must draue ane adder or ane eill (Montgomerie C 178, 70-2). Kelly 278(13); Oxford 527; Ramsay 219(26).

CROCODILE.

and faune vpon the comon gest wth craft of *crocodile* (*Sat. Poems* 8,132). Cf. NED Crocodile, 2; Oxford, 118; Taylor 24; Whiting, *ED* 309(79).

CROESUS.

Or riche as *cryses* out of kynd (Bannatyne IV,27,28). Apperson 530; Hyamson 102; Oxford 540.

CROOKED.

The *cruikit* leidis the blinde (*Sat. Poems* 128,6). *Reliquiæ* II,238: For now the bysom ledys the blynde; Roxburghe VIII, 376. Cf. Jente 243.

CROSS.

Cast *crosse* or pyle, vha sall begin the play (Montgomerie C 213,30). Apperson 123; NED Cross, 21; Oxford 119; Whiting, *ED* 339(481).

CROW.

(1) With a foull laik, als blak as ony *craw* (Douglas III,24,11). Apperson 51; Berrey 32.7; Chaucer, *CT* I(A),2692; Green 21; Hardie 466; Hyamson 48; Oxford 47; Whiting, *Ballad* 27, ED 309(80); Wilstach 20.

(2) Ȝit by my self, I fynd this proverb perfyte:
The blak *craw* thinkis hir awin byrdis quhite (Douglas III,207,23-4). Apperson 124; Cheviot 200: Ilka man thinks his ain craw blackest. Fergusson 94(786): fairest, 95(1256): whytest; Kelly 91(6): bonniest; NED Crow, sb.1, 3; Oxford 120; Ramsay 174(29): whitest; Whiting, *ED* 153.

(3) Quhat wenis thou, frend, the *craw* be worthin quhite,
Suppose the holkis be all ourgrowin thi face? (Douglas II,117,5-6). Cf. Apperson 124-5; Whiting, *ED* 113.

(4) Pluk at the *craw*, thay cryit, deplome the ruik (Douglas I,26,2).
To play with hym, pluke at the *crawe* (Lindsay I,46,230).
I traist in God that anis sall cum the day,
Pluk at the *Craw* quhē barnis sal with yis bird (*Sat. Poems* 162,57-8).

gif thai cal him anis a munk, and imagin thame to rug of his clathis, as thai war playng with him,—pluk at the *craw* (Winzet II,81,23-5). DOST Craw, n.1, 2; Skelton I,148,48, II,267,389. Cf. Apperson 124; Fergusson 108(885); Kelly 397(19); NED Crow, sb.1, 3b; Oxford 120; Taylor 24.

(5) Throw Albione that tyme forsuith it flaw
Ouir all the landis as . . . [a] *craw* (Stewart, I,235,7575-6).

CRUELTY.

Now to conclude, as richt weill ma be kend,
Crudelitie with cruelnes dois end (Stewart III,500,59212-3).

CRUMB.

For feind a *crum* of the scho fawis (Scott 66,8). DOST Crum, 2; NED Crumb, 2.

CRYSTAL.

(1) Of watere, clere as *cristel* (*Legends* II,319,541; *Clariodus* 222,987; Stewart I,21,710, 415,12953, 631,19518; Lindsay I,88,1095, 206,280-1, 377,6060-1; Bannatyne III,291,18). Apperson 101; NED Crystal, 2b; Taylor 22; Whiting, *Ballad* 25, *ED* 309(78).

(2) The sone, as *cristall* sa cleyne (*Golagros* 17,478).
With purifyit water as of the *cristall* clene (Douglas I, 54,22). Whiting, *ED* 309(78).

(3) as *Cristall* wer his Ene (Henryson 111,176).
Thy *Cristall* Ene (Henryson 117,337, 140,355, 205,22; Montgomerie C 180,26, 183,28, 204,57; Montgomerie S 203,42, 217,6).
Her plesand ene syne as the *cristell* stone (Stewart II,671,40875). NED Crystal, 4b.

CUMBER.

bot the end of a *cummer* salbe the beginning of ane vther (Fergusson, *Tracts* 76). See MISCHIEF(1), VICE below.

CUP.

(1) Quhen *cuppe* is full, then hold it evin (Montgomerie C 134,46). Apperson 129; Fergusson 106(708); Kelly 346(52); Oxford 123; Ramsay 241(14).

(2) Bot, wolf, thow waistis in *cop* and Can (Montgomerie S 142,161). Apperson 129; NED Cup, 12; Oxford 123; Whiting, *ED* 226.

CUPID.

the blydn[e] god *Cupide* (*Kingis Quair* 24,94).
blind *cupid* (Maitland Quarto 208,20). Whiting, *ED* 238, 251, 288, 289, 292, 296. See LOVE(3) below.

CUSTOM.

Forthy haldis clerkis by þare saw
That *custom* is þe toþer law (Wyntoun V,200,561-2).
The secund natur Is callit conswetud
Quhilk lichtly levis nocht þe ald vsage (Asloan II,197,289-90).
Be conswetud than come one law (Lindsay I,262,2115).
Ane consuetude against the common weill
Sould be na law (Lindsay II,201,2015-6). Apperson 130; Kelly 83(51); Oxford 125. See USE(1) below.

CUTE.

Wordis w^{t}out werkis availȝeis no^{t} a *cute* (Scott 4,109).
I cair the not a *cute* (Montgomerie C 161,9).
For Uenus game cure not a *cuit* (*Philotus* 114,297).
Ȝour crakkis I count thame not ane *cute* (Lindsay I,154,294).
Quod he, I compt thame not ane *cute* (Lindsay I,155,337).
I count ȝour cunning is not worth a *cute* (Montgomerie C 112, xliv,11).
I count not of my lyf a *cute* (Montgomerie C 200,13). DOST Cute, 2; NED Coot, sb.2, 3.

DAINTY.

Wald ȝe be made of, ȝe man mak it nyce;
For *dainties* heir ar delicat and deir,
Bot plentie things ar prysde to lytill pryce (Montgomerie C 195,17-9). Cf. Apperson 133: Dainty makes dearth, 502: Plenty is no dainty; Chaucer, *CT* III(D),521-2; Oxford 507.

DAME.

Thi *deme* has beyne japyt or thow was born (Harry 115,154).

DAMSEL.

ther is ane ald prouerb that says, that ane herand *damysele,*
and ane spekand castel, sal neuyr end vith honour (*Complaynt* 108,12-4). Apperson 84; Cheviot 40; Fergusson 17(175); Oxford 96: City.

DANCE.

and amangis ladyis hes lernit to *dance,* as the Devill list to pype (Knox III,177). Apperson 134; Oxford 128.

DAPPLE.

Apon a hors of Trace *dapill* gray (Douglas II,257,19, III,213,12, IV,173,26).
His steed was all of apple-gray (*Roswall* 22,613). Chaucer, *CT* VII,884 (B 2074); DOST Dapill-; NED Dapple-grey; Whiting, *Ballad* 25-6. See POMMEL below.

DATE.

Thy mannace dreid I nocht ane *dait* (*Alexander* IV,411,10191).

DAY.

(1) Als like ȝe bene, as *day* is to the nyght;
Or sek-cloth is vnto fyne cremesye;
Or doken to the fresche dayesye (*Kingis Quair* 28,109). Cf. Lean II,860.

(2) The *day* befoir the suddane nichtis chaice
dois not so suiftlie go
Nor hair befoir the ein and grewhoundis face
With speid is careit so
as I with paine
for luif of ane (Maitland Quarto 106,89-94).

(3) Efter ane euill *day* to haue ane mirrie nicht (*Rauf* 86,135). Cf. Fergusson 98(855): They had never an ill day that had a good evening; Kelly 282(1); Oxford 19.

(4) For at þe evin of the faire *day*
Men prysis it the suth to say,
And quhen the lif of man tais end
Than is it tyme him to commend (Wyntoun III,36,417-20). Apperson 509-10; Cheviot 288; Fergusson 86(732); Kelly 282(1); Oxford 515; Ramsay 220(19); Taylor 25. See PARTING below.

(5) For douchty men ar shent, Perfay,
That dreidis ouermekill for ane *day* (*Alexander* I,10,305-6). Cf. Kelly 385(221): You are fear'd of the Day you never saw; Ramsay 249(27). See DOOMSDAY below.

DAY-STAR.

(1) He schynit as dois the bricht *day-star* at morrow (*Clariodus* 2,22). Mirk 221,31: þe leues dytdẏn schyne as þe day-ster.

(2) As the *day star* full of benignitie
Surmuntis everie star situat
In the illuminus hevinis stellat (*Clariodus* 92,1314-6).

DEAD MAN.

In luve to keip allegance,
It war als nys an ordinance,
As quha wald bid ane *deid man* dance
In sepulture (Dunbar 101,21-4).

DEATH.

(1) The hour of *deth* and place Is uncertane (Henryson 205,12). Whiting, *ED* 7, 299.

(2) For all men fleis the *deid* richt fayn (Barbour I,211,90).

(3) *deith* on the fayest fall (Henryson 62,1767). Whiting, *ED* 289.

(4) "Lordingis," he said, "swa is it gane
With me, that thar is nocht bot ane,
That is, the *ded*, withouten dreid.
That ilk man mon thole on neid" (Barbour II,177,167-70).
Sen for the *deid* remeid is none (Dunbar 23,97).
aganis his (*death's*) dynt thow may not stand ane pow (Bannatyne II,192,39). Apperson 527; Kelly 317(115); Henderson 10; Oxford 537; Whiting, *ED* 72, 298.

DEBATE.

Debait makis destanie (Rolland, *Seages* 76,2219). DOST Debate, 1; *Modern Language Notes* LXIII(1948),536(180).

DEBT.

That hym worthit neyd to pay the *det*
That na man for till pay may let (Barbour II,146,209-10). Apperson 140: Debt(5); Lydgate, *Troy* III,867,3310-2; NED Debt, 4b.

DEED.

(1) Than lat ws sing, O fukand flok! ȝo^{r} *deid* is not lyk ȝo^{r} say (*Sat. Poems* 202,30).
Lat ay ȝo^{r} *deid* follow ȝo^{r} saw (Bannatyne II,129,93). Lydgate, *Troy* I,88,2559; Whiting, *ED* 78, 185. Cf. NED Deed, 2. See WORD(3) below.

(2) Auld gude done *dedis* ar quyte forȝet (Lauder 28,55). See UNKINDNESS below.

(3) thus vngracious *deeds* without mending
can neuer Scape without an ill endinge (*Eger* 282,1089-90).

DEER.

(1) Tha bar[t]nit thame lyke ony bludie *deir* (Stewart II,431,33228). Laud 268,9107-8.

(2) he spowted forward as he had beene a *deere* (Eger 242,652).

DELAY.

Delay in love is dangerous indeed (Montgomerie C 110,xlii,11). Apperson 141-2; Fergusson 29(353); Head 63; Henderson 11; Kelly 90(46); Oxford 136; Ramsay 172(13); Roxburghe VI,75,85. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 148.

DESPAIR.

Bot I haue herd ofttymes say
That *dispaire* giffis hardyment (Wyntoun V,408,3242-3). Cf. Apperson 142: Despair gives courage to a coward; Oxford 137.

DESTROY.

It is esiar to *distroy* befer nor till big (Bannatyne III,9,44-5; Maitland 160,45; Fortescue 264,[37]: yt is not good to stryve, wth to farre nor to bigge). Cf. Apperson 174: Easier to pull down than to build up; Oxford 523.

DEUCE ACE.

Ȝe ma percaiss cas *daweiss ess*
And swa be lothit sone (Bannatyne III,19,19-20). Chaucer, *CT* II(B), 124; NED Deuce 1, 5; Whiting, *ED* 340(496).

DEVIL.

(1) And as vsis to be said in ane commone prouerb, Ane *deuil* dois ding another (*Catholic* 154,11-2). Cheviot 233; Fergusson 37(457); Kelly 234(38); Oxford 139.

(2) The *devill* is a bissie Bischope, and goes about lyk a roaring lyon (Melvill II,451). Apperson 146(53): The devil is a busy bishop in his own

diocese; Fergusson 96(814): Henderson 12; Kelly 338(301); Oxford 139.

(3) It hes na thing ado therwith, God wait,
Nor na mair like than the *devill* and Sanct Austyne (Douglas II,7,28-9). Cf. Oxford 433: More like the devil than St. Lawrence.

(4) Thow art the *Deuillis* dam (Rolland, Seages 115,3550).
War thow the *deuill*, and als the deuillis dam (Rolland, *Seages* 207,6681).
I gat, ȝe may sie be my clouris
A *Deill* vnto my Dame (*Philotus* 148,1223-4). Apperson 145(40); DOST Devil, 1; Oxford 138; Whiting, *Ballad* 35, *ED* 340(497).

(5) 'Heir lyis the *Devyll*' (quod he) 'deid in ane dyke (Henryson 72,2063). Apperson 144(33); Cheviot 216; Fergusson 88(744); Kelly 230(6); Oxford 572; Ramsay 202(72); Whiting, *ED* 19.

(6) I say to ȝow for schort conclusioun:
Come neuer a gude byrde of the *Deuillis* eg (*Sat. Poems* 112,119-20). DOST Bird, 1a. Cf. Cheviot 263: Ne'er gude egg nor bird; Kelly 262(48).

(7) The *Deuyll*, with all the craft he can,
Quhen he persauis ane ydill man,
Or woman geuin to ydilnes,
He gettis eaisalye entres (Lindsay I,236,1265-8). Hugh Latimer, *Sermons and Remains*, ed. G. E. Corrie (Cambridge, 1845) II,64: when the devil findeth them idle, he entereth with them. Cf. Apperson 148(84); Cheviot 197; Kelly 221(353); Oxford 139.

(8) |Thai dred him as the *deuill* of hell (Barbour II,46,533).

(9) And bid thame mend, In the twenty *deuil* way (*Kingis Quair* 16,56).
A twenty *devill* mot fall his werk at anis (Douglas II,11,18).
Sche bad him downe in þe *devill* way (Asloan II,46,1444). Chaucer, *LGW* 2177, *CT* I(A),3134, 3713, 4257, III(D),2242, VIII(G),782; NED Devil, 19; Whiting, *ED* 341(499).

DEW.

(1) Thik as ony *dew* (Stewart I,75,2558, II,233,27100, III,257,50988).
And fedderit flanis wald flie weill aneuche,
Als thik thai flaw as ony *dewis* drop (Stewart I,407,12714-5).
Sa mony freik fell into deidlie swoun,
Als thick as *dew* dois of the berrie doun (Stewart I,434,13553-4).
Als thik as *dew* discendis in the daill (Stewart II,411,32581).

(2) The he lord fro þe hevin abone
As *dew* discendit in þe dovne (Bannatyne II,72,17-8). Cf. Carleton Brown, *English Lyrics of the XIIIth Century* (Oxford, 1932) 146,28: deawes donkeþ þe dounes; Pepys IV,104,10, 185,10: fall . . . like dew.

(3) Hir lustie visage all with teiris weite,
As bricht *dew* dropis on the lillie sweit (*Clariodus* 137,777-8).

DIAMOND.

(1) Cler aspre eyn, lik *dyamondis* brycht (Harry 295,1930). Cf. Roxburghe VII,43,45: Her eyes like sparks of diamond clear.

(2) The dew as dyamontis did hing (Montgomerie S 6,57).

DICE.

(1) I fynd ȝour fenȝeit tho^{t}
Vncertane as þe *dyce* (Scott 61,29-30). NED Die, sb.1, 2.

(2) |Gud win at the dyiss riches not þe air (Bannatyne III,8,18-9; Maitland 160,18; Fortescue 263,[14]: Money gotten . . . riketh).

DIE.

(1) Far erar is in just battell to *de*,
No for to leif withoutin libertie (Stewart I,628,19440-1). Lydgate, *Fall* I,105,3795; Whiting, *ED* 39.

(2) Rycht suth it is that anys we mon *de* (Harry 187,173).
We mon all *de,* quhen we haif done (Dunbar 72,10).
All men on mold ar markit for to *de* (*Sat. Poems* 103,94). *Torrent of Portyngale*, ed. E. Adam (EETS ES., 51, 1887) 36,993; Taylor 27; Whiting, *ED* 10, 13.

(3) Think ay þat thow mon *de* and thow sall not glaidly syn (Bannatyne III,9,30-1; Maitland 160,31; Fortescue 264,[26]). Whiting, *ED* 97.

DINNER.

Bot thai ar nocht, withouten wer,
Half-deill ane *dyner* till vs here (Barbour II,9,187-8).

DIRT.

Sayand, adew, for *dirt* partis cumpany (Lindsay I,116,66). Cheviot 89; Fergusson 28(239); Kelly 88(28); Kissel 13(54).

DIRTIN.

Dirtin bedreidis, the Prouerb sayis of auld (*Sat. Poems* 162,64). DOST Dirtin; Fergusson 29(359): Dirtin ars dreadis ay; Kelly 85(8); Ramsay 172(18).

DISCRETION.

For best is ane *discretioun* moderat,
For everie thing aucht to be temperat (*Clariodus* 103,1673-4).
Discreccioune sall mak the diuersitee,
Wich clepith the moder of al vertewis (*Lancelot* 57,1916-7). Cf. Apperson 153; Oxford 147.

DO.

(1) owdir *do* or de (Harry 67,593, 76,63, 297,12; Henryson 99,2886; Burel 32; *Clariodus* 124,362; Rolland, *Seages* 76,2220). Davidoff 90; NED, Suppl. Do, 16.

(2) Bot that þow pres to *do*, my sone,
rycht as þow wald to the war done (*Ratis* 10,337-8).
And *do* to me as ȝe wald be done to (Douglas II,19,9).
Do tyll ilk wyght as thou done to wald be (Douglas III,205,13).
For, out of doubt, quhat so ȝe *do,*
Resaiv the lyk ȝe sall (Montgomerie C 134,51-2). Fergusson 28(229); Kelly 90(43); Oxford 148; Whiting, *ED* 285.

(3) Giff he weill *dois,* let hym veill ta (Barbour I,297,643). Fergusson 28(230): Do weill and have weill; Hazlitt I,188, 108-9; Kelly 90(41); Oxford 149.

(4) He *dois* weill that dois for him self (Pitscottie I,271,23-4). Cf. Apperson 156(35); Kelly 265(64); Oxford 690: Want; Taylor 67.

(5) Na thing is *done* quhill ocht remanis to do (Douglas III,79,2). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 165.

(6) that quhilk is *done* can not be brocht againe (Maitland Quarto 212,119). Whiting, *ED* 41, 50, 78. Cf. Apperson 468: Once done is never to be undone, 625: Things done cannot be undone; Fergusson 101(1362): The thing that is don is not to do; Oxford 650; Ramsay 231(108); Snapp 103(35); Taylor 28.

DOCK.

See DAY(1) above.

DOE.

(1) And syn sittis drowpand lyk ane *daa* (Maitland 252,18). Cf. NED Droop, 3, quot. *c.* 1420.

(2) I sall the gyf .ii. gude grew houndis
Ar dwn as ony *da* (Makculloch 123,209-10). Cf. NED Dun, 1, quot. 1820.

DOG.

(1) Lyke *doggis* all he maid thame for to de (Stewart II,66,22116, 88,22760).
Bot lyke ane *dog* tha maid him for to de (Stewart II,74,22347).

. . . or than like *dogis* die (Stewart II,305,29254).
Like *doggis* all tha dang thame to the deid (Stewart II,433,33280).
Like *doggis* all tha put thame all to the deid (Stewart III, 336,53658).
And ȝoung and ald, without ony discretioun,
Moir none ane *dog* that tyme tha sparit nane (Stewart II,602,38638-9).
Gat na mercie mair nor ane *dog* did than (Stewart III,412,56270).
ane *doggis* deid þow will die (Montgomerie S 138,99). NED Dog, 15d; Oxford 144; Partridge 219; Pepys IV,181,8; Roxburghe VII,71,88; *Sege of Jerusalem*, ed. G. Steffler (Marburg, 1891) 10,779; Whiting, *Ballad* 27; Wilstach 91.

(2) evin sic as suld leid filthie *dogis* to thair vomit agane (Knox III,182).
to have returnit to thair vomit (Knox III,345).
Veneriall pastoris, in vomiting thair fayt,
Lyk to ane tyke returning to it agane (*Sat. Poems* 347,9-10).
Turnand as Tykis vnto thair vomatyue (Lauder 9, 203).
And be not lyk þe *doge* þatt sell
His womett lik maist schamfulie (Montgomerie S 235,85-6).
vyle *dogs* turning to thair vomit (Melvill I,175). Bradley 70; NED Dog, 15m; Oxford 152; *II Peter* ii,22.

(3) for, beat as you will, as a dog I must still fawn (Colville 208). See SPANIEL below.

(4) As a dog lay þe emperour (Wyntoun III,262,736).

(5) It is an auld Dog, doutles, that thow begylis (Henryson 70,2009). Cf. Apperson 158(16): An old dog will learn no new tricks; Jente 576; NED Dog, 15i: to be old dog at, to be experienced in; Oxford 645.

(6) At every *dowg* þat berkis Men suld not be movit (Bannatyne III,10,63-4; Maitland 161,60; Fortescue 265,[56]: At every dogge . . . anoyd).
Men may nocht ding all *doggis* þat barkis (*Sat. Poems* 66,45). Cf. Apperson 158(21): At every dog's bark seem not to awake; Oxford 152.

(7) ffor brawle *doggis* at þe dure
All settis on the sory hound (Bannatyne IV,286,135-6). DOST Brawl, v.1.

(8) Bot as the *doggis* feir the batons quhairby thay vse to be dung (*Catholic* 119,4-5).
See CAT(3) above, HOUND, TYKE below.

DOLE.
Bot *dule* mycht mak nane amending
As of his deid (Wyntoun VI,166,5829-30).
Bot playnt, na *duyl*, na ȝit menynge
Micht helpe noucht (Wyntoun VI,167,6025-6).
Quhar gret *dulle* is, bot rademyng agayne,
Newyn off it is bot ekyng off payne (Harry 116,195-6). Cf. *Sir Cleges* in *Middle English Humorous Tales in Verse*, ed. G. H. McKnight (Boston, 1913) 42,127-9: ȝe se wele, sir, it helpys nouȝht, To take sorow in ȝour thouȝht; Ther-for I rede ȝe stynte. See MOURN and REHEARSE below.

DOLOUR.
Since *dolour* pays nae det (Montgomerie C 45,1312). Apperson 589: Sorrow will pay no debt; Oxford 606.

DOOMSDAY.
I will get riches with that rent
Eftir the *day of dome* (Lindsay II,180,2474-5 and IV,198). Apperson 136; Archer Taylor, "Locutions for 'Never' ", *Romance Philology*, II(1948-9) 110-1.

DOOR.
Now in bigging sum takis sa greit plesure

Quhill at the last biggis him self to the *dure* (Rolland, *Seages* 130,4048-9). DOST Big, 5; NED Door, 5.

DOVE.

Throw Albione that tyme forsuith it flaw,
Ouir all the landis as . . . [a] *dow* (Stewart I,235,7575-6).

DRAFF.

a helandman blak as ony *draff* (Bannatyne III,84,6).

DRAG.

Than better sone to *drag* nor lait to draw (*Sat. Poems* 234,256).

DRAGON.

(1) They seamit as two *dragounis* wode and keine (*Clariodus* 53,52).

(2) As fearce as *dragouns* wood and violent (*Clariodus* 87,1143). Roxburghe VII, 505,13).

(3) As dreidfull *dragonis* thay togidder drave (*Clariodus* 2,47).

(4) And as a *dragone* haittit him to the deid (Stewart I,598,18574).

(5) And raid at uther . . .
Right as two *dragonis* that war fearce and wod (*Clariodus* 354,2319-20). Hazlitt I,237,482: And rode oute of the wodde, lyke a wylde dragon.

DRAKE.

out of sicht thowse be dicht lyk a *draik* (Montgomerie S 186,816).

DREAM.

it wanissis and wauers as ane *dreyme* (Gau 31,12-3).

DRINK.

The moir thai *drink* the moir thai haif of drouth (Stewart I,444,13866).

The moir scho *drank*, the moir hir drouth did grow (J. Stewart 226,107). Lydgate, *Fall* II,433,3733: The mor thei drynke the mor thei thruste in deede. Cf. Fergusson 28(240): Drink and drouth comes sindle together; Oxford 157.

DROPS.

Ma commendationis wᵗ humilitie
I send vnto hir faytfull womanheid
Than þair is *dropis* of wattir in Se
sternis in þe hevene flouris in þe meid (Bannatyne III,278,1-4).

DROUGHT.

Wes nevir sic *drowth* bot anis come rane (Dunbar 146,19). Jente 538; NED Drought, 2β, quot. *a* 1500; *Reliquiæ* I,323; Whiting, *ED* 87.

DRUGGERY.

Efter the perrell for to seik remeid,
As quha wald gif ane *drogarie* to the deid (Stewart I,135,4495-6). DOST Drogarie, b. Cf. Chaucer, *TC* v,741-2).

DUMYGRANE.

And gar it glanss lyk *Dumygrane* (*Sat. Poems* 400,76). DOST Demigrane, e.

DUST.

Bot thay sall go lyk *dust* and stro
Bene vaneist wᵗ the wind (Scott 91,19-20).

EAGLE.

(1) As *eagle* swift (*Roswall* 24,273).
Thay go alse swift as *aigill* in the aire (*Clariodus* 199,258).
And ower the fluid [then] freschlie did he fair,
Alse swift as dois the *Eagill* in the air (*Clariodus* 363,2601-2). *Altenglische Legenden*, ed. C. Horstmann (Heilbronn, 1881) 495,210: swift as an erne.

(2) for þocht þe *eyrne* fle heyeste,
and þe sone seis clerlyaste,
Ȝet mon of fors he cum done
to þe law ȝerd, & þer suiorne (*Legends* I,123,495-8, cf. I,238,75-80).

Perses the sone with thar sicht, selcouth to herd (*Howlat* 58,318). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 311(106).

(3) whase ingyne and judgment past me als far in the wholl course of philosophie, as the *aigle* the howlet (Melvill I,25).

EAR.

(1) sett by the *earis* (Knox I,111; *Sat. Poems* 369,495).

I dreid ȝe ly lang by the *eiris,*
Or thay think time to end the weiris (*Sat. Poems* 217,142-3).

the soner sall we ly by the *earis* (Colville 122). Apperson 76; NED Ear, sb.1, 1d; Oxford 576; Whiting, *ED* 343(518).

(2) & til hym len a def *ere* ay (*Legends* II,101,92). NED Ear, sb.1, 3d. Cf. Apperson 139: To be deaf of that ear.

EEL.

(1) But als ferce and waldin than as an *eill* (Stewart II,195,25978).

Fers as ane *eill* war new tane in the rane (Stewart III,257,50983).

(2) Gart thame grow fresche as ony *eill* agane (Stewart I,382,11976). Apperson 235; Whiting, *ED* 311(108).

(3) I am not lyk ane *eill,*
To slippe, nor ȝet to slyde (Montgomerie C 159,45-6).

EGG.

(1) As euer ane *eg* was lyke ane vther (*Ballatis* 181). Apperson 365-6; NED Egg, 4b. See BEAN(1) above.

(2) Whyt as the *egg* (Bannatyne III,238,5,6,8). R. Herrick, *Poetical Works,* ed. F. W. Moorman (Oxford, 1915) 139.

(3) He can nocht wirk be craft to wyn ane *eg* (*Thre Prestis* 16,245).

(4) It is nocht worth ane *eg* into his sicht (*Thre Prestis* 47,1078). Apperson 458(36).

ELD.

(1) for in *elde* suld wit be socht (*Legends* II,103,142). Chaucer, *CT* I(A),2448; Lydgate, *Troy* I,126,3852-3).

(2) This proverb now I mon propone
Exempill is said als sweit als sour
Welcome *eild* for ȝouth is gone (Maitland 206,22-4). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* III(D),469-76).

EMMET.

(1) Lyke as the littill *Emmet*, Haith hir gall (Bannatyne III,241,1). Apperson 220: Fly(2), quot. 1646; Oxford 211; Whiting, *ED* 163.

(2) No thyng thay sparit thare laubouris,
Lyke . . .
. . . *Emottis* trauelling in to Iune (Lindsay I,249,1705-7). DOST Emot(t). Cf. *Poor Robin*, 1696, C5^{v}: In Summer labour with the painful Ant.

ENCLUME.

whom He hes most miraculuslie sett for a constant and firm *enclume* to brek all the hammeris of his enemeis (Colville 110).

END.

(1) Menis or thay began Suld think on the *end* (Bannatyne, III,8,11-2).

Ane man quhen he began suld think on the *end* (Maitland 159,11; not in Fortescue).

Begin na thing butt ane eye to þe *end* (Montgomerie S 211,27). Apperson 626: Think(13); Oxford 384; Whiting, *ED* 72, 81, 93.

(2) Grit fule is he, that hes na thing in thocht
Bot thing present, and efter quhat may fall,
Nor off the *end* hes na memoriall (Henryson 65,1864-6). Cf. Apperson 223: Fool(9): A fool looks to the beginning, a wise man regards the end; Whiting, *ED* 124, 133.

(3) He was richt wyis that knew befoir

The cairfull *end* of every fray (Bannatyne IV,21,45-6). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 172.

(4) Bot he tynes his mekill prys
That at the *end* dois fantys.
Quha dois best at the ending,
Thay haue pryse and maist louing (*Alexander* I,78,2477-80).
Sen euirilk thing is prysit be the *end* (Stewart I,142,4732). *Sir Tristrem,* ed. E. Kölbing (Heilbronn, 1882) 13,406-7: Of þing, þat is him dere, Ich man preise at ende. Cf. Apperson 182: End(3); Whiting, *ED* 155. See DAY(4) above and PARTING below.

(5) Persave then, ȝe haif then
The warst *end* of the trie (Montgomerie C 42,1203-4). Whiting, *ED* 343(528). Cf. Kelly 157(233); Oxford 171.

ENDING.

(1) Thar-for I trow that gud *ending*
Sall follow till our begynnyng (Barbour I,305,189-90). Apperson 257: Good beginning; Oxford 250; Whiting, *ED* 127.

(2) And fell þare a schamefull *ending*
For his wickit and euill liffing (Wyntoun III,282,1029-30).
Princis, for wrangus conquessing,
Doith mak, oft tymes, ane euyll *ending* (Lindsay I,284,2847-8).

ENEMY.

(1) Neuer traist thy *enemie* (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 304). Oxford 673: Trust not a new friend nor an old enemy.

(2) Wisemen suld dreid þar *innemyss* (Wyntoun V,406,3202). Cf. Jente 651; Oxford 673.

(3) Tharfor said Scipio þe wiss
That men suld gif þar *innemyss*
Laysere to fle (Wyntoun V,408,3249-51). Vegetius, *Epitoma Rei Militaris,* ed. C. Lang (Leipzig, 1885) 111,11-2(iii,21). Cf. Oxford 249: Golden. See FOE below.

ENGLISH.

It is of *Inglis* nacioune
Þe comon kynd conditioune
Off trewis þe wertu to foreȝet,
Quhen þai wil þaím fore wynnyng set,
And rekles of gude faithe to be,
Quhare þai can þare awantage se (Wyntoun VI,413,2599-604). Nashe I,82,5-6: *Traistre Angloi,* the English man is a Traytor. See SCOT(1) below.

ENOUGH.

(1) *Anwch* is evin a feist (Bannatyne III,18,16). Apperson 184-5; Bradley 73; Fergusson 12(104); Hardie 462; Kelly 93(13); Oxford 174; Ramsay 174(33); Whiting, *ED* 120, 192, 241.

(2) He has *aneuch* that is content (Dunbar 144-5,5,10, etc.).
The prowerbe plaine doith vs assuir
Thay haif *aneuch* that ar content (J. Stewart 116,5). *The Mysteries of Love & Eloquence* (3d ed., London, 1685) 175: He hath enough that's pleas'd; Oxford 175: He hath enough who is contented with little.

(3) Quha hes *aneuch,* of na mair hes he neid (Henryson 16,375). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 123, 139.

(4) *Eneuch* is nocht half fyll (Douglas III,145,11). DOST Eneuch, 2. Cf. Fergusson 42(368): Half aunch [glossed as "empty"] is half fill, 43(539): Hav is aneugh. See HAVE below.

ENTRY.

(1) An Ill *entrie* for commoun is Ill endit (Rolland, *Seages* 323,10748).

(2) Wyn anis the *entress* & the house is ȝowris (Scott 17,48).
Bot mell with madenis quhen thay play the huir:
Win anis the *entrie*, and than the house is ȝouris (*Sat. Poems* 267,167-8).

ERNE.
See EAGLE above.

ESCAPE.
Quha *chaipit* anis, and past againe
Still ay in stouth for to remaine,
Quhilk all men suld forbeir (Rolland, *Seages* 103,3137-9). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 145.

EVERYTHING.
(1) *Euerie thing* quhen it is new,
then it is fresche and fair (Montgomerie S 241,125-6). Apperson 193: Every thing new is fine; Oxford 180. See NEW (2) (3) below.
(2) "All thing has tyme," thus sais Ecclesiaste (*Kingis Quair* 33,133).
al thing has tyme wald men tak heid (*Consail* 76,353).
euere thyng hes ane tyme (*Complaynt* 21,23). Apperson 192; Chaucer, *TC* ii,989; *Ecclesiastes* iii,1; Kelly 95(26); Oxford 180.
(3) ffor *every thing* Bot for ane sessone is (Bannatyne II,13,141). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 223.

EVIL.
(1) for the auld saying is trew "wha *evill* speikis evill heiris" (Knox VI,626). Cf. *Certaine Sermons or Homilies* (London, 1625) I,93: he that speaketh evill, should be answered accordingly.
(2) to cheis the leyst of tua *euillis* (*Complaynt* 102,15).
There for sen it is neid forse to cheis ane of tua *euyllis* . . . ȝe suld cheis the smallest of thir tua euillis (*Complaynt* 163,14-9).
Zit not the les quhair twa Illis dois approche
I think it best fra the greitest to foche (Rolland, *Seages* 280,9218-9). Apperson 654; Chaucer, *TC* ii,470; Fergusson 84(671); Kelly 271(24); Oxford 181; Ramsay 217(20); Taylor 31; Whiting, *ED* 155, 257.
(3) Off *euill* cummis war, off war cummis werst of all (Henryson 30,805). Cf. Kelly 201(189): Ill comes often upon worse Back.
(4) thinkand that all *ewill* was guid of frist (Pitscottie I,225,25). Kelly 32(192).

EXAMPLE.
Thar ben bot few *example* takis of vther,
Bot wilfully fallis in the fyre, leif brother (Douglas II,167,13-4). Cf. Chaucer, *TC* i,203.

EXPERIENCE.
(1) Think on: *Experience* warnis (*Sat. Poems* 220,228). Cf. Apperson 195: Experience is the mother of knowledge; Oxford 182; Taylor 31.
(2) to lait *experience* dois teich—
The School-maister of fooles (Montgomerie S 15,173-4).
The maistres sharpe of fuiles *Experience* (Hume 71,104). Apperson 195; Fergusson 30(255); Kelly 91(4); NED Experience, 5; Oxford 182-3, 194-5; Ramsay 175(47).
(3) the erly embrassing of vnbocht *experience* be the stombling errours of vthers (Melville 4).
"Leist," quod *Experience*, "at last
Ȝe buy my doctrine deir" (Montgomerie C 44,1279-80). Apperson 194: Experience is good, if not bought too dear; Kelly 91(3); Oxford 182.

EYE.
(1) at *E* nocht seis, hart nocht ȝarnis (*The Thewis off Gud Women* in R. Girvan, *Ratis Raving and Other Early Scots Poems on Morals* [1939]

92,190). Apperson 196(19); Fergusson 104(704); Kelly 341(15); Oxford 183; Taylor 31.

(2) Tharewith hir lordis *E* scho blerit (Wyntoun II,242,1352; Henryson 71,2041; Dunbar 73,79; Stewart I,473,14742, III,268,51326, 490,58903; Lindsay II,44,450, 366,3163; Scott 4,86; *Sat. Poems* 162,77; *Ballatis* 184,205; Bannatyne II,91,30,52, 237,86, III,20,63, 72,60, IV,52,105; Melvill I,260). Chaucer *CT* I(A),3865, IX(H),252; Cheviot 63; DOST Blere, v^1,1; NED Blear, v^1,3; Whiting, *ED* 335(408).

(3) I shall lodge all the men-of-ware into me *eae*, that shall land in Scotland (Knox I,119). Apperson 196(20); Cheviot 31; Kelly 37(223); NED Eye, sb.^{1}, 2a; Oxford 8.

FACE.

(1) Within ane hude he hes ane dowbill *face*,
Ane bludy tung, undir a fair pretence (Henryson 216,53-5). Apperson 654; Kelly 152(194); NED Face, 1d, 2; Oxford 679; Ramsay 191(96); Whiting, *ED* 368(920).

(2) For new *faces* prouokis new corrage (Lindsay I,81,868). Kissel 10(41). Cf. Apperson 444: New meat begets a new appetite; Oxford 451. See CHANGE above, NEW(3) below.

(3) Gloir and brag out and tak a *face* of bress (Maitland 53,131). Apperson 198; Fergusson 48(414).

FAGGOT.

The sparkis flew in the feild, as *fagottis* of fire (*Golagros* 34,1001).

FAIRNESS.

ane vthyre thing als is sene,
þat gud accorde seldine has ben
betwene *farnes* & chastyte (*Legends* II,215,19-21). Cf. Oxford 28: Beauty and honesty seldom agree. See WOMAN(5) below.

FALCON.

(1) As ony *falcone* forcie to the flicht (Stewart I,142,4738). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 311(110).

(2) For both their hearts they were so light,
As ever *Falcon* was of flight (*Eger* 335,2519-20). *Sir Degrevant*, ed. K. Luick (Vienna, 1917) 100,1555-6).

(3) As *falcoune* swift desyrouse of hir pray (Dunbar 114,54).
As swift as *falcon* of his flight,
Upon a bird when he doth light (*Roswall* 24,667-8).
Alse suift as *falcoun* he sprang upon his steid (*Clariodus* 79,897). Laud 235,7964-5.

(4) Back to the woods like *falcons* flight (*Roswall* 24,269).
And fuire ower fluide as *falcon* fair on flicht (*Clariodus* 365,2676).

(5) As *falcone* that wald haue fude ful fain
Come lansand to the lure agane,
Sa come the douchty duke to the fecht (*Alexander* I,60, 1903-5). Whiting, *ED* 311(110).

(6) Quhilk ma be liknit, as it semis to me,
As quha wald hunt ane *falcone* till ane fle (Stewart I,211, 6835-6). Cf. Apperson 173: The eagle does not catch flies; Oxford 163.

FALSEHOOD.

Out on all *falsheid* the mother of euerie vice (Douglas I,67,15).

FALSET.

Bot I trow *falsat* euirmar
Sall haue vnfair and euill ending (Barbour II,28-9,122-3).
Bot sekirly *falsat* and gyle
Sall euir haue ane euill ending (Barbour II,34,244-5, 289,122).
and *falset* sal neuir mak fare end (*Consail* 70,172).

Falset is ay a fained friend,
And it cometh ay at the last end (*Eger* 299,1903-4).
For *falset* failyeis ay at the latter end (Henryson 23,568).
Falset will failye ay at the latter end (Henryson 69,1997).
Sone efter that, as it wes rycht weill kend,
Thair grit *falset* come till ane foull euill end (Stewart I,589,18313-4).
As plesis God, till all men weill is kend,
Falsheid come neuir till ane better end (Stewart II,262,27987-8).
Ffor quhy, *Falsett* maid nevir ane better end (Lindsay II,374,3299). Cheviot 103; Fergusson 32(263); Kissel 6(23); NED Falset 1; Oxford 189; Whiting, *Ballad* 37: Falsing neuer doth well.

FAMILIARITY.

For, as the most philosephur can duclar,
To mych to oyss familiaritee
Contempnyng bryngith one to hie dugre (*Lancelot* 51,1698-1700). Apperson 203; Oxford 190; Taylor 32; Whiting, *ED* 156. See OVERHOMELY below.

FAR(-FETCHED).

Till fair full *far* that hes bene socht,
And daintie disches deirly bocht,
That Ladies loues to feid on (*Philotus* 110,190-2). Apperson 203; Cheviot 85; Fergusson 32(272); Kelly 84(4); NED Far-fetched; Oxford 133; Ramsay 172(8); Whiting, *ED* 87, 140.

FART.

I will not gif for ȝour play nocht a fulis *fart* (Lindsay II,194,1021, 195,1956: sowis fart). Whiting, *ED* 344(540). DOST Fart. Cf. NED Fart, 1b.

FAS.

Pasis thair wecht als lychtlie as a *fas* (Douglas II,248,4).
Sik gouvernance I call noucht worth a *fasse* (Henryson 190,47; Douglas II,169,22; Bannatyne III,6,3). DOST Fas, 2; NED Fas, 2.

FASHION.

so that now it is ane common prouerb in Scotland, gif ony man asketh of ane uther how he doeth, to answer in the new *faschione*, that is to say, nather trew nor kynd (*Catholic* 252,25-7).

FAST.

and than playit lowis or *fast* (Lindsay I,136,196). Apperson 500; Kissel 36(165); NED Fast and loose, b; Oxford 504; Whiting, *ED* 344(541).

FAULT.

(1) Thair is na man vithe out sum *falt* may vret (Hay 23). Apperson 189; Cheviot 360; Fergusson 96(813); Oxford 178.

(2) Rycht mony one reprovis other sare
Of the same *falt* thame self can nocht be ware (Stewart I,516, 16064-5). See BALK above.

(3) Efter ane *falt* thair followis sone ane vther (Stewart I, 318,10048). See CUMBER above and MISCHIEF(1) below.

FAVEL.

that curre *favell* in the court might retche to higher rowme (*Sat. Poems* 9,144). Arber IV,87; NED Curry, 5a; Taylor 25. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 344(544).

FAWN.

Syme flew als fery as a *fowne* (Scott 11,71). DOST Fowne.

FEATHER.

(1) Except God make me lichter nor ane *fedder* (Lindsay II,325, 3527). Apperson 364; Green 19; Hardie 468; Hyamson 222; Oxford 366; Partridge 481; Whiting, *Ballad* 27, *ED* 311(112); Wilstach 234.

(2) Nor quhair but *fedder* for to fle (Bannatyne II,172,45). Apperson 221: He would fain fly, but wanted feathers. Cf. Chaucer, *TC* iii,1263: Lo, his desir wol fle withouten wynges; Cheviot 258: Nae fleeing without wings.

FEN.

far fowlar than ane *fen* (Dunbar 8,84). NED Fen, sb.[1], 2, quot. 1340.

FEUD.

Pairte nevir at *feid* fra hame wᵗ thy wyfe (Bannatyne III,9,39-40; Maitland 160,40 [Not in Fortescue]).

FIELDFARE.

(Quod scho) that is past, gude nicht now *feldifair,*
Fair on fond fuill, thow gettis heir no fauour (Rolland, *Court* 134,718-9). Apperson 204; Chaucer, *Romaunt* B 5510, *TC* iii,861; NED Farewell, int., 2b; Oxford 191; Taylor 32.

FIFE.

Ane sowtar sir, nane better into *Fyfe* (Lindsay II,295,3140).

FIG.

(1) Sueet as the *fegg* (Bannatyne III,238,6). *Anglia,* XXXI (1908) 388,109. Cf. NED Fig, sb.[1], quot. *a* 1225.

(2) Tush, a *feg* for the fead (Knox I,173). NED Fig, sb.[1], 4; Whiting, *Ballad* 35, *ED* 344 (553).

(3) To Crucifie Christ that compts not a *feg* (*Sat. Poems* 112,118). Cf. Apperson 456; Berrey 21.3; NED Fig, sb.[1], 4; Oxford 200; Partridge 128, 274; Whiting, *ED* 345 (554).

See SPADE below.

FIGHT.

To *fecht* is mensk and schame to fle (Wyntoun VI,208,6369).

FILLY.

[An harreage] he mycht say he had gud,
þat had sic a *filly* in his stude (Wyntoun V,377,3049-50). Of Edward II's queen; NED does not give filly as woman before 1616.

FINGERS.

sa that they all luked throw ther *fingers* to se his fall (Melville 266). Apperson 381 (25); Oxford 383.

FIRE.

(1) The nar the *fyre* I go
The grittar is my heit (Bannatyne III,339,23-4). Chaucer, *TC* i,449; Fergusson 102 (1378); Jente 802; Oxford 203; Taylor 33. See FLAME below.

(2) For men sais [oft], that *fire*, na pryd,
But discoueryng, may no man hyd.
The pomp of pryde ay furth shawis,
Or ellis the gret bost that it blawis;
And thair may no man fire sa covir,
[Bot] low or reyk sall it discovir (Barbour I,86,119-24). Apperson 213.

(3) In breithfull stoundis rasit brym as *fyre* (Douglas IV,65,6). NED Breme, 5c.

(4) Als fast as *fyre* . . . out of ane gleid (Stewart II,713,42223).
As *fyre* that fleis fra the flynt, thay fechtin sa fast (*Golagros* 26,758).
Tha fled als fast as *fyre* dois out of flynt (Stewart II,96,23014, 259,27892).

(5) the fecht fell as *fyre* (*Alexander* IV,396,9714). NED Fell, 3; Skelton II,285,246.

(6) Alse ferse as the *fyre* (*Golagros* 32,945; Rolland, *Court* 9,220).
feryt als fers as *fyr* (Harry 38,165, 268,1050, 290,1772; Stewart I,75,2557, II,78,22469).
Arowys thai schot, als fers as ony *fyr* (Harry 205,767; Henryson 111,185; Stewart I,246,7917, 328,10355, 378,11836).
Als ferce to fecht as *fyre* out of the flynt (Stewart I,379,11874).
Als fersly fled as *fyr* dois off the flynt (Harry 178,1216, 259,746).

The sparhalk to the spring him sped,
Als fers as *fyre* of flynt (Dunbar 69,79-80; Stewart II,43,21422-3, 57,21819, 78,22473, 233,27101; Bannatyne II,265,107).

Quhilk flew als ferce as *fyre* dois of the gleid (Stewart II,410,32566). Cf. NED Fierce, 4; Whiting, *Ballad* 27.

(7) As *fyr* on flynt it feyrryt thaim betweyne (Harry 158,574; Henryson 14,328).

(8) with breist hait as *fire* (Douglas II,137,13, 251,9, III,40,2, 112,27, 212,26, 224,22, 299,19, IV, 38,20, 63,19, 91,10, 97,1-2, 118,3, 157,13-4, 200,26; Lindsay II,60,645).

And Turnus tho als hote as ony *fyre* (Douglas III,330,12; Stewart I,64,2162, 477,14864, 640,19786, II,50,21632, 216,26610, 218,26650, 219,26683, 228,26945, 276,28408, 422,32926, 493,35168, 518,35948, 520,36014, 608,38843, 639,39814, III,27,43364, 173,48155, 389,55480).

Heit as þe *fyre* (Bannatyne IV,99,18). Apperson 315, cf. 338; Chaucer, *PF* 246; Gower, CA III,172,210, 409,846; Hyamson 191; Partridge 408; Whiting, *ED* 312(115).

(9) And a suerd as *fire* all rede (Wyntoun II,23,125; *Clariodus* 31,945; Montgomerie C 210,188). Apperson 526; Chaucer, *TC* iii,1633, *CT* I(A),624, 2164; Hymason 290; Whiting, *ED* 312(115); Wilstach 316.

(10) ȝit hir bewtie, resplendand as the *fyre* (Lindsay I,16,412).

(11) the rais, rynning swyft as *fyre* (Douglas II,184,29; *Clariodus* 366,2712).

(12) Dire, wikkit as *fyre* (Douglas IV,158,15). NED Wicked, 2b, quot. *c.* 1440.

(13) thocht thow war wod as *fyr* (Harry 348,492).

(14) I brynt as *fyre* (*Legends* I,323,929, II,138,493, 160,285; Wyntoun II,248,1434; *Alexander* I,47,1482, IV,431,10826; *Howlat* 61,418; Harry 301,143; *Ratis* 24,826; Douglas II,25,5; *Clariodus* 2,38, 31,967; Stewart I,482,15008, III,401,55904; *Ballatis* 118; Pitscottie I,283,2; Montgomerie C 161,41, 227,39-40).

Throw a blynde fulische desyre
That þare hartis as birnand *fyre*
Ameved (*Troy* 275,1671-3).

. . . with birnand ene reid,
Like tua *fire* blesis fixit in his heid (Douglas III,28,15-6).

And, as the *fyre*, all byrnand schayn the feildis
Of brycht armour (Douglas IV,55,21-2).

Becauss the luve brunt me lyk þe bald *fyre* (Bannatyne IV,29,56). Chaucer, *Romaunt B* 2548, *TC* iii,425, *LGW* 1751; Gower, *CA* III,88,5212; Whiting, *Ballad* 27, *ED* 312(115).

(15) Sua our twa loves for evir sall indure,
Conjoynd in ane, as *fyr* is in the flint (Montgomerie C 180,37-8).

(16) Thyn ee consumes me lyk a flamming *fyre* (Montgomerie C 109,xl,9).

(17) The frekis freschly thai fure, as *fyre* out of flynt (*Golagros* 23,676).

(18) Fra Phebus face, that flammit as the *fyre* (Stewart I,304,9630, 379,11892, 401,12518, 473,14724, 494,15385,15392, II,56,21791, III,118,46361; Lindsay I,17,444, II,52,558). Whiting, *ED* 312(115).

(19) Tha fled like *fyre* and lukit neuir behind thame (Stewart I, 117,3939).

Fersly thai fled, as *fyr* dois out off flynt (Harry 259,746).

The sparkis flaw in the feild, as *fyre* out of flynt (*Golagros* 29,857, 33,978; Henryson 22,552; Stewart I,69,2337, 206,6681, 222,7163, 311,9850, 495,15416, 566,17625, II,418,32812). *Guy of Warwick*, ed. J. Zupitza (EETS ES 25-6, 1875-6) 83,2898; Whiting, *Ballad* 27.

(20) And from the vissage of the ardent syre
The sparkis glydis as the hayt *fyre* (Douglas IV,99,25-26). *Kyng Alisaunder* 179,4323.

(21) Ene glowand as *fyre* (Henryson 133,122). NED Glow, v.1, 2a.
(22) Aganis this Childe, as ony byrnand *fyre* (Rolland, *Seages* 49,1336).
(23) Enflammyt agannis hym as *fyre* (*Legends* I,16,314, 168,630, 201,387; Douglas II,187,27). *Huon* 165,9-10.
(24) And grete balas lemyng as the *fyre* (*Kingis Quair* 13,46). NED Leam, v.1.
(25) And ran togidder as ferce *fyre* and flynt (*Clariodus* 86,1138).
(26) Speirs sprang like sparks as *fyre* dois of ye flynt (Rolland, *Seages* 289,-9536). Lovelich I,134,543: And Owt he sprang As fyr Offe brond.
(27) The rody sterres twynklyng as the *fyre* (*Kingis Quair* 3,1; *Clariodus* 335,1724). NED Twinkle, v.^{1}, 1.
(28) quhat force hes [forces] *fyre* out of the flint
bot als hard mache agane? (Montgomerie S 36,480-1).
See FLOOD(2) below.

FIRE-AMEL.
hir nek, quhite as the *fyre amaille* (*Kingis Quair* 14,48). NED Fire, B, 5.

FIREFLAUGHT.
(1) Als ferss as ony *fyrflawcht* fell (Bannatyne II,267,174).
(2) The ane agane the vther rade
As *fyreflaucht* that is fell to feill (*Alexander* IV,354,8359-60).
(3) As *fyreflaucht* haistely glansyng,
Discend sall the most heuinly kyng (Lindsay I,363,5556-7). NED Fireflaught, quot. 1552.
(4) Girdand so fast as ane *fireflochtis* glance (*Clariodus* 80,925). DOST Fireflaucht.

FISH.
(1) deid as ane bishe (? for *fishe*) (Pitscottie II,71,n.1) Cf. NED Dead, 32b.
(2) and leue als dum in Godis cause, as ony *fische* in the watter (Winzet I,12,22-3). Apperson 434: Mute.
(3) Sa þat it semyt þat þai were set
Amangis þare fais, as *fische* in net (Wyntoun V,408,3239-40).
Lyk to ane *fysche* fanggit in þe net,
In deid-thraw vndeceist (Montgomerie S 20,271-2).
(4) The folk that hardy was and gude,
That better luffit fecht than *fisch* the flude (*Alexander* III,333,7751-2).
(5) Thow art not tane in cumpany
Bot thair be sum *fisch* in thy nett (Bannatyne II,206,53-4). Cf. Apperson 6: All is fish that comes to net; Kelly 13(71); Oxford 207.
(6) the ald prouerb is treu that sais it is as onpossibil to gar an auaricius man be faythtful, as it is onpossibil to gar ane *fische* of the depe flude speik hebreu or greik (*Complaynt* 111,24-7).

FISH,VB.
Swa thow *fy[s]che* nocht within my boundis (Lindsay I,45,191).
See NET and WATER(7) below.

FITCHE.
Now full as *fitche* (Henryson 101,2946). [Vetch, fitchew, or fish ?].

FLAME.
The nar the *flamb* the hettar fyre (Bannatyne III,337,25). See FIRE(1) above.

FLAUGHTER FAIL.
fell doun lyk *flawtir failis* (Bannatyne II,267,186). NED Flaughter, quot. *a* 1550.

FLEA.
(1) for they had "a *flea* in their hose" (Knox II,522). Cheviot 355; Kelly 327(197). Cf. Berry 288.1,5, 398.1, 412.1: To have ants in one's pants.
(2) And cairis nocht by þai feid ane ble (? for *fle*) (Montgomerie S 200,54).
(3) His dart Oxin I compt thame not ane *fle* (Henryson 82,2402; Stewart I,161,5324, III,552,60901).

(4) Quhais flyting I feir nocht ane *fle* (Lindsay I,122,173).

(5) I wald not gif ane flane *fle*
For ȝour tresour (Lindsay II,48,489-90, cf. 49,212: sillie flie). Cf. Oxford 209: Flay a flea.

(6) . . . ȝow had nouther . . .
Curage nor will for to haue greuit ane *fla* (Douglas I,73,11-2). NED Flea, 1b.

(7) In to thir dayis, he is not worth ane *fle* (Henryson 71,2045, 78,2286; Dunbar 25,33; Stewart II,349,30645, 504,35467, 675,41008, III,472,58313; Rolland, *Seages* 182,5837). Apperson 456(12); NED Flea, 1b. Cf. NED Fly, sb.¹, 1d.

(8) And set nocht by my lif a *fle* (Wyntoun III,60,771; Douglas I,29,3).

(9) There is one sorte, watand, lyke houngre fleis (Lindsay I,85,1008).

See FOE(2) below.

FLEE.

That is ane kynd alsueill of fortitude,
To *flie* in tyme, and men haif grace to dude,
As for to byde and tak thair aduenture,
Haiffand apperance for to wyn honour (Stewart III,335,53637-40). Cf. Apperson 211: He that fights and runs away; NED Flee, 1a; Oxford 200-1.

FLINT.

(1) As he on cace was fleand fers as *flynt* (Douglas III,310,16, IV,58,14; Stewart I,470,14644).
Als fers as *flynt* that fleis fra the fyre (Stewart I,328,10342). NED Fierce, 5, quot. 1513.

(2) & for ȝoure hartis ar herd as *flynt* (*Legends* II,21,707; Eger 233,838; Stewart III,204,49167). Apperson 284; Green 19; NED Flint, 1b; Oxford 278; Whiting, *Ballad* 27, *ED* 312(120); Wilstach 193.

(3) Men herd nocht ellis bot granys & dyntis,
That slew fire, as men dois on *flyntis* (Barbour I,323,35-6).
. . . dyntis,
That kest fyre as men dois *flyntis* (*Alexander* II,236,4635-6).

FLOOD.

(1) Myn ee most lyk a *flood* of teirs do run (Montgomerie C,109,xl, 10).

(2) As furious *fluidis* wᵗ gritter force ay flowis,
And starkar stevin, quhen stoppit ar þe stremis,
And gorgit waters ever gritter growis,
And forcit fyris wᵗ gritter gleidis out glemis (*Sat. Poems* 255,17-20).
See STREAM(2) below.

FLOWER.

(1) vapnis that war bricht as *four* (*Alexander* I,28,881). *Landavall*, ed. G. L. Kittredge, *American Journal of Philology*, X(1889) 22,69.

(2) Fayr of fell and of face as *flour* vnfild (*Golagros* 13,352).
Chaucer, *LGW* 2425-6; Whiting, *Ballad* 27, *ED* 313(123).

(3) But als fresche of his forme as *flouris* in May (Dunbar 87,87).
Als fresch as *flouris* that in May up spredis (Dunbar 114,59).
And lustie Ladies alse fresche as Mayis *floure* (*Clariodus* 291,318). Apperson 235; Gower, *CA* III,188,767-8; Oxford 225; Whiting, *ED* 313(123).

(4) And hawbrekis, that war quhit as *flour* (Barbour I,196,232; *Alexander* I,24,756, 39,1214; Makculloch 135,525-6, 151,[11]; Douglas III,149,2; *Clariodus* 238,1515; Montgomerie C 167,18). Chaucer, *Romaunt A* 356, CT I(A),238; NED White, 1c.

(5) Of all fairheid scho bur the flour (Henryson 173,9). NED Flower, 6b; Whiting, *ED* 334(393).

(6) Sall feid as dois the somer *flouris* (Dunbar 150,26).
Zit man, as *flowre*, thow sall faid (*Ballatis* 166).
[Bot h]e sall faid as lely *floure* (*Ballatis* 166). NED Fade, v.^{1}, 1; Whiting, *Ballad* 27, 37, *ED* 313(123). Cf. Fergusson 35(423): Fairnes is a faiding floure.

(7) For bontie bewtie trewth and womanheid
springyth in ȝow as *flouris* in þe meid (Bannatyne III,274,6-7).

(8) Quhair thou was callit of Eirdlye wichtis *flour* (Henryson 120,435, 126,608; Douglas I,68,1). NED Flower, 7; Whiting, *Ballad* 35.

See DROPS above.

FLUKE.

I'se fell the lyk ane *fluik*, flat on þe fluir (Montgomerie S 138,105). Apperson 218: Flat as a flounder, quot. 1788; Oxford 209: Flat as a flounder, quot. 1611. Cf. *Morte Arthure*, ed. E. Björkman (Heidelberg, 1915) 32,1088: Flatt-mowthede as a fluke.

FLY.

Off that honour I rak nocht worth ane *flie* (Stewart I,239,7691; Maitland 53,129; Montgomerie C 98,xix,4). Apperson 456-7; NED Fly, sb.^{1}, 1d; Oxford 211; Whiting, *ED* 345(561). See FLEA(5) above.

FOAM.

fare & quhyt, as vatir *fame* (*Legends* I,444,105).

And Ladies quyet as any *fame* (*Eger* 327,2371; Makculloch 133,458, 135,501, 141,710). Chaucer, *CT* I(A),1659; *Emare*, ed. A. B. Gough (London, 1901) 17,497, 27,818.

FOE.

(1) for is nane, I vndir-ta,
sa paytener, na sa fellone *fa*,
as is mast hamely, gyf þat he
vil wikit man or tratour be (*Legends* II,328,849-52). Chaucer, *CT* IV(E), 1793-4. See TREASON(2)(3) below.

(2) lat nocht lichtly of a lytill *fa*
For gret men war desauit swa (*Consail* 75,331-2).
He is not sa waik a *fae* bot he may quhylome noy (Bannatyne III,9,43-4; Maitland 160,44: He is nane so lytill fa; Fortescue 264,[36]: Ther is not so litell a flea, but somtyme he will nye). Oxford 172: There is no little enemy. Cf. Jente 651.

(3) Now I persawe, he that will trew
His *fa*, it sall him sum tyme rew (Barbour I,40,326-7). Cf. Henderson 7; Kelly 317(113); Oxford 646; Ramsay 226(22). See ENEMY(1) above.

(4) Ald *feyis* ar sindle faythfull [freindis] fund (*Sat. Poems* 189,54). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 300.

(5) Than feinȝeit freind better is open *fa* (*Thre Prestis* 49,1148). Apperson 221; Cheviot 56; Ramsay 166(23); Whiting, *ED* 151. Cf. Apperson 183: Enemy(5).

See ENEMY above.

FOLKS.

Diuers *folkis* ar geuin to diuers thingis (Rolland, *Court* 8,182). See HEAD(1) below.

FOLLY.

And Catone sayis ws, in his wryt,
"To fenyhe *foly* quhile is wyt" (Barbour I,15,343-4). Cato 607(ii,18); Erasmus, *The Praise of Folie*, englished by Sir Thomas Chaloner (London, 1549) Q^v; NED Folly, sb.^{1}, quot. 1375.

FOOL.

(1) Bot oft failȝeis the fulis thocht (Barbour I,24,582, 272,21; Wyntoun IV,343,241). Apperson 227(67); Cheviot 31, 254; Fergusson 8(51);

Kelly 243(2); Oxford 422; Ramsay 158(45), 211(33).

(2) a *fule* quhen he hes spokkin he is all done (Bannatyne III,8,4-5; Maitland 159,4; Fortescue 263,[4]). Apperson 224(18); Fergusson 10(80); Kelly 40(250), 303(19).

(3) Thow art ane *fule* gif thow with fulis dalis (Maitland 21,15). Apperson 227(70); Fergusson 40(330); Kelly 146(156).

(4) Ane *fulis* bolt is sone on flicht (Bannatyne II,207,35). Apperson 224(24); Fergusson 4(11); Kelly 303(19); NED Bolt, sb.^{1}, 1a, Fool, sb.^{1}, 1d; Oxford 216; Ramsay 155(46); Whiting, *ED* 228, 267.

(5) A *fule* bidis job furth and hes baith spur & wand (Bannatyne III,9,32-3). Ane *fule* biddis Ioy furth and is bayth spur and wand (Maitland 160,33). The *fole* byddes go furthe, & hath beth spore and wande (Fortescue 264,[28]). Cf. NED Job, sb.^{2} (not before 1627), Wand, 5, quots. 1529, 1587.

(6) Preiss not to spend our mekle on a *fule* (Bannatyne III,8,23-4; Maitland 160,23: spend meikle; Fortescue 264,[19]: Pase not moche to spend over mokill on a fole).

(7) Quhan *fulis* are fow, than ar thay fane (Lindsay II,376,1356 and IV,234).

(8) he that wattis quhen he is full he is na *fule* (Bannatyne III,10,61-2; Fortescue 265,[54]; not in Maitland).

(9) and returned, as they confessit, graitter *fulles* nor they cam a-field Melvill I,72). Apperson 228(91); Jente 217; Oxford 216; Whiting, *ED* 138.

(10) The king þan maid him þis answare:
"Now may ȝe se at a *fule* sone
Heire a foly deid has done" (Wyntoun V,272,1622-4, 273,1660-1 [Cotton Ms.]: þe kynge þan made hym þis anssware: "A ce fow fel my tel foly [fettis]?").

See HASTE[1], WORD(2) below.

FOOT.

(1) the Lard of Monquhany . . . laubored at *foote* and hand (Knox I,183). Cf. NED Foot, 26b.

(2) he gart his *feit* defend his heid (Bannatyne II,266,140).

(3) And we tway meit agane this nicht,
Thy *feit* sall be wirth fourty handis (Lindsay II,164,2341-2). Kissel 15(63).

FOOT-HOT.

And in hand has thame tane, *fut-hat* (Barbour I,340,454; *Legends* I,62,1164, 101,160, 104,247, 215,250, 221,459, 298,69, 395,782, 452,388, II,158,230, 334,1047, 338,1205; *Alexander* II,150,1861; Douglas II,12,13, 90,26, 216,9, 222,2, 230,20, 243,7, 245,25, 264,5, III, 18,17, 55,5, 83,5, 116,11, 123,23, 126,18, 162,15, 324,19, IV,74,19, 141,21, 145,16, 188,3, 202,3). Chaucer, *Romaunt B* 3827, *BD* 375; Gower, *CA* II,391,3350; NED Foot-hot; Whiting, *ED* 345(565).

FORCE.

All *fors* in wer do nocht but gouernance (Harry 62,437). Cf. Apperson 229: Force without fore-cast is of little avail; Kelly 106(40); Oxford 219; Ramsay 177(49). See MULTITUDE, ORDINANCE below.

FORD.

Euin as ȝe find the *furde* sa ruse it, quhat euer ȝe be (Rolland, *Seages* 181,5817). Apperson 229-30; Cheviot 234; Fergusson 86(731); Kelly 283(9); NED Ford, 1; Oxford 516; Ramsay 220(18).

FORGIVE.

Syne all injure *forgevin* and forȝet (Stewart II,166,25106). Apperson 230; Oxford 220; Whiting, *Ballad* 36.

FORTUNE.

(1) He said, "certis, I may weill se

That it is all gret certante,
That vre helpis ay hardy men" (Barbour I,136,15-7).
A hardy man, that is lykly with all,
Gret fawour will off *fortoun* till him fall (Harry 217, 1139-40).
the proverb is, "*Fortoun* helpis the hardie" (Pitscottie I,86,21).
I haif oft hard suyth men say,
As we may sie oure selffis,
that *fortoun* helpis þe hardie ay,
and pultronis plane repellis (Montgomerie S 26,352-5). Apperson 231; Cheviot 108; Henderson 8; Kelly 101(2); Oxford 221. See HAP(1) below.

(2) Whidder that *fortoun* be my friend or fa (*Clariodus* 84,1071).
And thus fals *fortoun* is my fo (Bannatyne III,293,41). Chaucer, *TC* i,837; Nashe I,294,18-9; NED Fortune, 1.

(3) To fecht with *fortoun* is no wit (Dunbar 33,44). NED Fortune, 1. Cf. Lydgate, *Troy* I,239,3307-8: But Fortune wil haue hir cours alwey, Whos purpos holt, who seyth ȝe or nay.

(4) Bot *fortoune*, þocht scho fald sickerly,
Will nocht at anys all mischeiffis fall (Wyntoun VI,90,4786-7).

(5) Vhat *fortun* will, may no man flie (Montgomerie C 155,15). Kelly 108(53); Oxford 210.

(6) And oft gude *fortune* flourish with gude wit (*Kingis Quair* 33,133). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 40.

(7) [*Fortune* is false and inconstant; the goddess and her wheel are ever changing, but more often from good to bad than from woe to weal. Because of the direful monotony of the generalizing passages only the references are given]. *Awntyrs* 137,270-2; Barbour I,346-7,632-5, 347,651-9; *Legends* II,78,301-4, 83,493-4; Wyntoun V,418,3400-2, VI,172,5887-90; *Kingis Quair* 5,9, 37,150, 39,159-42,172; Harry 22,144, 52,145, 53,152, 85,365-6, 113,89-90; Henryson 101,2939-47; Makculloch 13,5-7; Dunbar 143,7-8; *Clariodus* 129,506-28, 173,1922-4; Stewart I,257,8261-4, 395,12351-8; 414-6,12947-90, 481,14966-73, 516,16058-9, 541,16848-55, 625,19343-9, 652,20135-40, II,5-6,20305-16, 170,25215-7, 275,28368-9, 310,29423, III,171,48069-80, 393,55625-6, 461,57948-57, 462,57968, 482,58639-49, 484,58714-23, 555,60987; *Sat. Poems* 325-332; Bannatyne II,169,1-2, IV, 45,31; Maitland 239,9-12, 342,8; Maitland Quarto 245,23; Pitscottie I,84,9-11, 112,24-5; J. Stewart 124,9-10). Apperson 231; *Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature*, XVIII(1935) 263(435); NED Fortune, 1; Oxford 221; H. R. Patch, *The Goddess Fortuna in Mediaeval Literature* (Cambridge, Mass., 1927); Ramsay 165(10); *Reliquiæ* II,7-9; *Romanic Review*, XXVII (1936) 217-8(172); *Speculum*, X(1935) 314-5(307); Whiting, *ED* 15, 35, 37, 41, 84, 87, 120, 124, 135, 137, 236, 238, 239, 243, 252, 253, 265, 287, 288, 289, 291, 301, 302.

FOUNDED.

For lo, the werk that first Is *foundit* sure,
May better bere a pace and hyare be
Than othir wise, and langere sall endure
Be monyfald (*Kingis Quair* 33,131).

FOWL.

(1) My hairt is blyth as ony *fowll* to fle (Bannatyne III,273,41). *Le Morte Arthur*, ed. J. D. Bruce (EETS ES, 88, 1903) 46,1576 and p. 129. Cf. NED Blithe, 2a, quot. 1754.

(2) Tha fled alss fast as ony *foule* that flew (Stewart I,586,18208). *Guy of Warwick*, ed. J. Zupitza (EETS ES, 25-6, 1875-6) 294,10253-4).

(3) And of speide he is mare licht
þan ony *foule* is apon flicht (Wyntoun II,69,783-4).
(4) He war expert culd fynd me termes tua,
Quhilkis ar als rife amange clerkis in scule
As euir *fowlis* plungit in laik or puile (Douglas II,15,10-2).
(5) With bludie sydis alse soft as *foull* in schaw (*Clariodus* 24,740).
(6) suifter than is *foull* of flicht (*Alexander* I,15,463).
Flaw furth swyft as a *fowle* vp towart hevin (Douglas IV,66,26, 179,2). NED Swift, 1a; *Sir Ferumbras* in *English Charlemagne Romances*, Part I (EETS ES, 34-5, 1879) 121,3863.
(7) Oft fair *foullis* ar fundin faynt, and als freuch (*Rauf* 99,523). NED Frough, 1, quot. *c.* 1475. See THING(1) below.
(8) Ay fairast feddiris hes farrest *foulis* (Dunbar 42,21).
Thocht farlandis *fulis* seme to have fedderis fair (*Sat. Poems* 188,44).
Far *foullis* hes ay fair fethers, sum will say (Montgomerie C 177,38). Cheviot 101; Fergusson 32(260); Kelly 102(9): Fat Fowls; Oxford 190; Ramsay 176(16).
(9) Lyke ony *foull* out of the feild he flew (Stewart I,473,14736).
On hors that semyt ryn as *fowle* doith fle (Douglas IV,130,6). Laud 194,6579.
(10) Tharfor he slepit as *foul* on twist (Barbour I,169,188). NED Fowl, 1.
See BIRD(2) above.

FOWLER.

For as the *foulere* quhistlith in his throte
Diuersely, to counterfete the brid,
And feynis mony a suete and strange note
That in the busk for his desate is hid,
Till sche be fast lokin his net amyd (*Kingis Quair* 34,135). R. Braithwaite, *The Lawes of Drinking* (London, 1617) 20; R. Linche, *Diella* in Sidney Lee, *Elizabethan Sonnets* (2 vols., London, 1904) II,312; Oxford 222.

FOX.

(1) "Now find I weill this prouerb trew" (quod he),
"Ay rinnis the *ffoxe*, als lang as he fute hais" (Henryson 31,826-7).
Wyvis thus makis mokkis
Spynnand on rokkis;
"Ay rynnis the *fox*
Quhill he fute hais" (Dunbar 66,45-8).
so that the Scotesh proverbe was trew in hym, "So long rynnis the *fox*, as he fute hes" (Knox I,116). Cheviot 46; Fergusson 4(8); Kelly 21(123); NED Fox, 1c; Oxford 382; Ramsay 162(25).
(2) With schame and sclander lyke ane hundit *fox* (*Sat. Poems* 269,216).
(3) That kirk or kirkmen gat of thame no girth,
Moir nor the *fox* that rynnis in the firth (Stewart II,593,38349-50).
(4) And lurkit lyk a wyly *fox* (Lindsay II,162,2330).
(5) that a preast standing at the altare saying Masse, was lyik a *fox* wagging his taill in Julie (Knox I,156; Pitscottie II,64,11-3).
(6) she posted that same nycht to Stryveling, with Monsieur Dosell, who was als fleyed as "a *fox* when his hole is smoked" (Knox I,213-4). Cf. NED Fley, Smoke, 6b, quots. 1593, 1829.
(7) In Striuiling toun, out of his dowie den,
Maist lyke a *fox* thay fyrit him in his nest (*Sat. Poems* 330,171-2).
(8) It is sum wyfis malisone, I trow,
For pultrie pyking, that lychtit hes on yow (Henryson 72, 2068-9). Cf. Cheviot 83: Curses mak' the tod fat, 347; Kelly 331(231): The Tod never fares better than when he's ban'd; Oxford 223; [H. Parrot],

The Mastive (London, 1615) E: Though like the Foxe 'canst not escape from curses; Whiting, *ED* 121, 161.

See TOD below.

FOX-TAIL.

Then tak me with the *foxis taill* a flap (Montgomerie C 133,48). Apperson 218: NED Flap, 1b, Foxtail, 1; Oxford 208; Whiting, *ED* 346(569).

FREEDOM.

A! *fredome* is a noble thing! (Barbour I,10,225). Fergusson 32(264); Hislop 100; Kelly 107(44); Oxford 225.

FRIEND.

(1) For quha is gude *freind* in laute,
At ane myster men may se (*Alexander* II,206,3659-60).
and falȝeis euir thar *frend* at neid (*Foly* 64,438).
The tother twa his *freindis* war indeid,
As he thocht quhen that he had ony neid (*Thre Prestis* 45,1027-8).
A *frend* Is kend in gret necessite (Asloan I,129,1466).
Most kyndlie is, withoutin ony dreid,
That euerie *freind* suld help vther in neid (Stewart III,510,59550-1).
And to ȝor *freind* in every neid be kynd (Bannatyne II,174,17).
Thair is no *freind* except ane freind in neid (J. Stewart, 113,3). Apperson 237; Bradley 76; Fergusson 14(142), 96(815); Hardie 461; Kelly 46(294), 261(40); NED Friend, 1b; Oxford 227; Taylor 34; Whiting, *ED* 28, 92, 135, 148, 233).

(2) it is ane auld saying in Scotland, "I may weill sie my *friend* neid bot I will not sie him bleid" (Pitscottie II,157,13-4). Apperson 439; Fergusson 14(141), 47(580); Kelly 16(88); Oxford 570; Ramsay 159(69).

(3) Quhen *freindis* meitis hairtis warmes,
Quod Iohnne that frely fude (Lindsay II,80,1744-5, 81,644: Iok, and IV,180). Fergusson 106(728); Kelly 340(8); Kissel 12-3(51); Ramsay 241(4).

(4) & said, "parting is a priuye payne,
but old *freinds* cannott be called againe" (*Eger* 326,1341-2). Cf. Apperson 238(17): Friends must part; Oxford 228; Whiting, *Ballad* 38.

See FOE(4)(5) above.

FRIENDSHIP.

(1) On athir side no *frendschip* was to feill (Harry 67,612, 76,62).

(2) Sic *frendschip* I hald fair, that forssis thair dedis (*Golagros* 8,202). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 233.

FROG.

The gouldin lyn, helas, quhy dois thow lois
To catche ane *frog* . . . ? (J. Stewart 72,67-8). Apperson 217: He has well fished and caught a frog; Oxford 205; Whiting, *Ballad* 35.

FROST.

He sall hounger in *frost* In heit þat will not wirk (Bannatyne III,8,25-6; Maitland 160,25; Fortescue 264,[21]). Apperson 318; Kelly 207(234); Oxford 310.

FRUIT.

(1) Sa be thar werkis men may see
That gud *fruyt* cumys ay of gude tre (*Foly* 54,73-4).
And be exempill sindrie tymes we se
That rycht gude *fruct* cumis of ane gude tre (Stewart I,165,5441-2). Apperson 263; NED Fruit, 2d. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 109. See TREE(2) below.

(2) Wo wirth the *fruct* wald put the tre to nocht (Dunbar 83,9).

See TREE below.

FUEL.

As quha wald fell doun fewall to the fyre (Stewart II,97,23022). NED Fuel, 1b. Cf. Apperson 240-1: Fuel to the fire.

GAIN.

See GOOD(1) below.

GALL(1).

(1) Bitter as *gall* (Henryson 24,609; Knox II,378; Rolland, *Court* 36,615). Apperson 50; Hyamson 47; Wilstach 19.

(2) thy gansell sour as *gall* (Henryson 15,345). Whiting, *ED* 314(135).

GALL(2).

(1) The Paip is the Fox, Rome is the Rox,
That rubbis vs on the *gall* (*Ballatis* 175).

He movit the Provest, with sear rubbing of the *ga* of his conscience (Melvill I,125). Apperson 540; NED Gall, sb.^{2}, 1c; Whiting, *ED* 361(809).

(2) Yf the *gald* will kicke the world will wyttnes It (*Sat. Poems* 3).

Bot ȝit ye knaw it is ane commoun thing,
For, weill I wait, ye haue sene mony sic:
Tuiche anis the *gaw* & yan the hors wil fling,
Fra tyme ye spur and hit him on the quik (*Sat. Poems* 185,165-8). Apperson 242; Chaucer, *CT* III(D),940; NED Galled; Oxford 550; Whiting, *ED* 230.

GALLOWS.

for sickerly thair is no differance
Betuix the *gallowis* and the spowsing claith (Bannatyne IV,37,39-40). NED Spousing, 1c. Cf. Apperson 403-4: Marriage and hanging go by destiny; Oxford 276; Whiting, *ED* 189, 190, 222.

GAME.

And said eftir a litill thraw,
That he suld wenge in hy thar blude;
Bot othir wayis the *gammyn* ȝude (Barbour I,163,34-6).
That [how] sa euir the *gammyn* ga,
His fayis is plenȝe sall mater haf (Barbour I,284,319-20). See GLEE below.

GANYIE.

(1) Als swyft as *ganȝe* (Douglas III,298,16). Cf. Wilstach 412: As swift as an arrow.

(2) Perseing my brow as ony *ganyie* (Dunbar 3,4).

GATE.

(1) the clergie had almost past to the *gait* with it var nocht the better help (Pitscottie II,232,30-1). NED Gate, sb.^{2}, 2.

(2) And than till ernist turnit all hir mowis,
That scho forthocht that scho ȝeid by the *gait* (Stewart III,402,55926-7). Cf. NED Gate, sb.^{2}, 2.

GATHERING.

for in old prouerbe we sing
Cumis littill gud of *gaddering*
quhair wrechit awerice birnis (Bannatyne IV,282-3,19-21). Oxford 373: Little good. Cf. NED Gathering, 1b. See COVETISE(4) above.

GEAR.

Suppois thay spend, It is unkend,
Thair *geir* is nocht the les (Dunbar 98,31-2). Cf. Apperson 565: Shive; Cheviot 29: A whang; NED Gear, 9b; Oxford 582; Taylor 60.

See HOLD(2) below.

GENTLEMAN.

He may be callit a *gentill man*,
That vertu and faire haiffing can (Wyntoun III,152,2009-10). NED Gentleman, 3. Cf. Chaucer, *CT* III(D),1170, 1175-6).

GENTLENESS.

Gentilnes is kythed be noble deidis,
As kyndly trees ar knawen be ther fruitis (Melville 272). Apperson 244: Gentle is that gentle does; Chaucer, *CT* III(D),1168-70; Oxford 235. Cf. Cheviot 113: Gentle deid maks gentle bleid. See TREE(2) below.

GET.

gett and saif // and thow sall haif
len and grant // And thow sall want (Bannatyne III,43,3-4).

GHOST.

(1) That as ane *gaist* I glour and grane (Dunbar 54,19).
he granit lyk ony *gaist* (Bannatyne II,266,148). NED Groan, 1, quots. 1500-20, *a* 1550, Glower, 1.

(2) Grislie and grym lyke ony *gaist* he grew (Stewart II,512,35759). Cf. NED Ghost, 5c, quots. 1377, *c.* 1420; Whiting, ED 314(138).

GIFT.

(1) Fore lytil *gift* drawis mekil luf (*Consail* 76,364). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 248. See HEN(5) below.

(2) And is thair oucht (sayis thou) frear than *gift*? (Henryson 78,2268). Apperson 235; Cheviot 260; Kelly 267(85); Oxford 463; Ramsay 214(19).

(3) Quha giffis sic *giftis* he is wiss (Wyntoun VI,198,6258). Cf. Apperson 697: Wise(28).

(4) for as the sowre sent the swete tast do spill,
So are the good *gwyftes* corrupted wth ill (*Sat. Poems* 16,389-90).

(5) Seis thow not Buddis beiris Bernis throw,
And *giftis* garris crukit materis hald ffull evin? (Henryson 80,2322-3). See BUD above.

GIRN.

For all that tyme with falsheid he thame fed,
As quha wald set ane girne befoir ane gled (Stewart I,108,3638-9). NED Girn, sb.^{1}, quot. 1535.

GIVE.

(1) The prowerb now is trew I se
quha may not *gife* will littill gett (Bannatyne II,205,29-30). Ramsay 239(47). Cf. Cheviot 298, 389; Kelly 293(61); Ramsay 223(3).

(2) It þat I *gife* I haif // It þat I len I craif //
It þat I spend is myne / It þat I leif I tyne (Bannatyne III,43,1-2). Apperson 595: Spend(8); Oxford 613.

GLAIKS.

They will bot get þe *glaikis* (*Sat. Poems* 178,110: Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 89).
I se they haue playit me the *glaiks* (Lindsay II,187,1871).
scho enterit in ye gayme of ye *glaiks* (Buchanan 30). NED Glaik.

GLADNESS.

Without *glaidnes* availis no tressour (Dunbar 148-9,8,16, etc.).
See JOY(2) below.

GLAIVE.

As *glauis* glowand on gleid, grymly thai ride (*Golagros* 19,558).

GLASS.

(1) Brukkill as *glas* (Henryson 125,569; Bannatyne II,182,2, 193,61). *Ancren Riwle*, ed. J. Morton (London, 1853) 164; NED Brickle, 2. Cf. Apperson 68: Brittle; Hyamson 64; Whiting, *ED* 314(140).

(2) And he of nature clene as ony *glas* (Stewart III,280,51753). NED Clean, 1a, quot. 1398; Whiting, *ED* 314(140).

(3) Fals and fragell as the *glas* (Lauder 26,3).

(4) Gude faith is flemyt, worthin fraellar than *glas* (Henryson 190,45).

(5) The stonis than thai brak als smal as *glas* (Stewart I,300,9508).

(6) with cristell corps translucent as þe *glas* (Maitland 353,6). Cf. Wilstach 431: As transparent as glass.

(7) Agane the sone like to the *glas* it schone (Douglas I,50,14). Chaucer, *HF* 1289, CT I(A),198; Whiting, *ED* 314(140).

(8) Baith hilt and hand all glitterand lik the *glas* (Harry 142,78).
Wᵗ glowrane evne as glitterand *glass* (Bannatyne II,283,193).

(9) And als gud drinking out of *glass*
As gold, thot gold gif grittar pryss (Scott 27,31-2).
It is als guid drinking out of *glas,*
as gold in ony wayis (Montgomerie S 32,438-9). See GOLD(2) below.

GLEAM.

. . . as the *gleym* doith gleit,
From thens scho went away (Douglas IV,219,10-1). *Le Morte Arthur,* ed. J. D. Bruce (EETS ES, 88, 1903) 106, 3493; NED Gleam, 1, Gleit.

GLEDE.

Than new Desyr, als gredie as ane *glede* (Douglas I,98,27). NED Glede, β, Greedy, 1d. Cf. Apperson 318-9: Hungry as a kite; Cheviot 44: As gleg as a gled.

GLEE.

Bot othir wayis the *gle* is gane (Barbour II,31,176, 235,701). NED Glee, 1c. See GAME above.

GLEED.

(1) Turnus hym self, als fers as ony *gleid* (Douglas IV,47,9). NED Gleed, 1b.

(2) birnyng hait as *gleid* (Douglas II,179,9). Chaucer, *TC* iv,337; Lydgate, *Troy* I,35,796, III,634,2404; NED Gleed, 1b.

(3) His eine thay brint and flamit as ane *gleid* (*Clariodus* 161,1553).

(4) Of bricht gold gleimit as ane *gleid* (*Clariodus* 2,32; Stewart I,394,12330).

(5) With goldin gullis glitterand as ane *gleid* (Stewart I,203,6599, 308,9745, III,231,50108). NED Gleed, 1b; Whiting, *Ballad* 27.

(6) |Hir eghne . . .
Glowand als *gledis* (*Awntyrs* 125,116-7,118; Douglas II,78,3, III,200,1). NED Gleed, 1b; *Reliquiæ* II,8.

(7) Vnglaid I gloir as *gleid* // sen my gud luf was gone (Bannatyne III,291,21). *Altenglische Legenden*, ed. C. Horstmann (Heilbronn, 1881) 122,311: His eghen glored als any glede.

GLORY.

Heir may we haif ane generall conclusioun,
That warldlie *gloir* is no thing bot illusioun;
And lestis nocht bot for ane lytill tyme,
And mony one it lampis in the lyme.
Sic vanitie is all bot variabill;
Syne quhene ane man trowis he be most stabill,
Or euer he wit it gevis him ane fall,
Makand of him ane subject and ane thrall (Stewart I,107,3620-7).

GOAT.

(1) And thus tha strave about [ane] wnbocht *gait* (Stewart II,451,33861). Cheviot 412; Kelly 388(249); NED Unbought, 1, quot. 1535.

(2) Thay squeilit lyk ony *gaitis* (Bannatyne II,262,17). NED Goat, 1, quot. *a* 1550.

GOD.

(1) He thinkis not how wysmen said beforne
God sendis a thrawart cow a schort horne (Bannatyne II,115,62-3). Apperson 118(10); Cheviot 38; Fergusson 10(93); Kelly 11(61); NED God, 5b; Oxford 125; Ramsay 159(9); Taylor 24; Whiting, *ED* 192, 226.

(2) Bot quhar *god* helpys, quhat may withstand? (Barbour I,19,456, 280,203). Apperson 251-2; Cheviot 400; Fergusson 106(723); Kelly 357(146); Oxford 246.

(3) For thingis þat are for to be
To wit is *Goddis* prevate;
And forthy thareof þe certane
Is nane can tell bot he allane (Wyntoun III,32-4,373-6). Chaucer, *CT* I(A),3164,3454,3558.

(4) He þat dowttis not *god* Sall not faill to fall (Bannatyne III,9,56-7; Maitland, 161,57: sall nocht fair weill; Fortescue 264,[49]: dredes not). Cf. *Reliquiæ* I,92: For the begynnyng of wysdom is For to drede Goddys ryʒtwysnes; "Wise Man's Proverbs," *Englische Studien,* XXIII(1897) 443,39: God is good for to drede.

(5) Taking the warld as *God* wald send it (*Sat. Poems* 386,994). Cf. Kelly 47(297): All is good that God sends; Whiting, *ED* 32: Take the grace that God wol send, 114: Take what God shall send, 226: And takt as god doth send it. See CHANCE(2) above.

(6) *God* helpis his man (Harry 30,378). Cf. Jente 357: God visiteth his own.

(7) Bot *God* is Iust, howbeit he thoill a time (Rolland, *Seages* 252,8234). Cf. Apperson 254: God's mill grinds slow but sure; Jente 358; Mirk 89,15-6: þagh God abyde longe, at þe last he smytyth sore, 142,18-9; Oxford 247.

(8) When *God* takis away the greine tries, lat the widdered bewar! (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 185).

(9) And ʒour trew seruandis silly *goddis* apis (Douglas II,164,21).
O hald ʒour pece, ʒe verray *goddis* apis (Douglas III,1,11). Chaucer, *TC,* i,913; NED Ape, 4, quot. 1513. Cf. Fergusson 53(646): He is ane sillie Gods gook.

GOLD.

(1) Als suith it is as ships saillis ouer watters
And weil I wait al is not *gold* that glitters (*Thre Prestis* 49,1149-50).
Oft tymes hes it bene red and told
Be vitty men that vndirstude
All glittrand thing is not of *gold* (Bannatyne IV,20,33-5).
Ʒit I now deny now
That all is *gold* that gleits (Montgomerie C 45,1287-8).
All is not *gold* that gleitis (Montgomerie C 134,42).
For ʒe mon grant, all is not gold that gleits (Montgomerie C 177,24). Apperson 6; Bradley 77; Cheviot 33; Fergusson 12(98); Hardie 461; Kelly 4(16); NED Glister, b, Glitter, 1b, Gold, 3b, Shine, 2a, quot. c 1230: Oxford 249; Ramsay 157(42); Taylor 36; Whiting, *ED* 122, 134, 215.

(2) He had the glemyng of gold, and wes bot glase fundin (Dunbar 89,202).
All growss in glass that semit *gold* (Bannatyne IV,49,23). NED Gleaming, vbl. sb., quot. 1508. Cf. Oxford 60: Brass for gold. See GLASS(9) above.

(3) Full of quaking spangis bryght as *gold* (*Kingis Quair* 13,47, 38,152; Douglas IV,83,24, 201,21). Chaucer, *CT* I(A),2141; Whiting, *Ballad* 27; Wilstach 34.

(4) Cleane as *gold* befoir men (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 16).

(5) With girss gaye as the *gold* (*Howlat* 48,28). Whiting, *ED* 314(146).

(6) And vthir glemyt as *gold* and gowlis so gay (*Golagros* 2,21; Henryson 32,868; Stewart I,278,8869, 308,9745). NED Gleam, v.^{1}.

(7) In curage cleir glitterand as ony *gold* (Stewart I,470,14639; Bannatyne III,277,35). Head 133; Whiting, *Ballad* 28. Cf. NED Glitter, 1b, Gold, 3b.

(8) Fore hare schenand as *gold* scho hade (*Legends* II,204,19).
Hir hare, that to fyne *gold* is feir (*Alexander* II,166,2398).
With hair as *gold* (*Alexander* IV,437,10995; Henryson 112,222; Douglas I,19,12; *Philotus* 121,481).
With hair detressit, as threidis of *gold* did hing (Dunbar 138,43).
Lyk burning *gold* thair glistering hair (Montgomerie C 143,35). Chaucer, *BD* 858, *HF* 1386-7, *CT* III(D),304; Whiting, *ED* 314(146).

(9) Hir uther garmentis as the reid *gold* did schyne (Dunbar 186,140). Chaucer, *CT* I(A),3314, V(F),1247; Whiting, *Ballad* 27, *ED* 314(146). Cf. NED Shine, 2a.

(10) Fore men are prewyt be thar wertews
As goldsmyth *gold* in furnas dois (*Consail* 77,399-400).
For God vith trubill dois his chosin try,
As *gowld* be fyre is brychtlie birnist cleine (J. Stewart 114,5). Whiting, ED 314(146).

(11) Quhair *Gold* is skant, siluer mon vs content (Rolland, *Seages* 7,174).

(12) *Gold* is so glittis, as ȝe knaw and ken,
Quhilk of befoir hes causit mony men
To tak on hand, and rycht pertlie persew,
The thing efter that maid thame for to rew (Stewart II,521,36037-40).

(13) *Gold* may be gayn, bot worschip is ay new (Harry 209,888).

GOLD WIRE.

Hir hed was ȝolow as *wyre*
Of *gold* fyned wiþ fyre (*Pistill* 180,192-3).
Rynsid hir tressis like the *goldin wyre* (*Kingis Quair* 3,1).
So glitterit as the *gold wer* thair glorius gilt tressis (Dunbar 85,19; Douglas III,198,15; *Clariodus* 96,1434, 222,1007; Stewart I,304,9631; Lindsay I,171,-948, II,58,615; Bannatyne III,305,8; Maitland 360,10). NED Wire, 11; Whiting, *ED* 314(146).

GOLDEN RINGS.

Hir curling loks, lyk *golden rings* (Montgomerie C 183,19).

GOLDEN THREADS.

Hir brouis ar brent: lyk *golden threads*
Hir siluer shyning brees (Montgomerie C 183,25-6). Whiting, *Ballad* 27.

GOLIATH.

See HECTOR below.

GOOD.

(1) Euill gottin gaine is ane vngracious ground,
Quhairon to found ane welth and weill assurit (*Sat. Poems* 252,143-4).
Gud ma not lang lest that is evill win (Bannatyne III,8,21-2; Maitland 160,21; Fortescue 264,[17]: Good cannot bringe lest).
Of wrangus *gude*, no better man can fair (Lauder 20,559).
Ewill gottin *guddis* lestyis never Lang (Maitland 23,77). Apperson 324: Ill gotten goods thrive not; NED Ill-gotten, Evil, adv., 8c, Good, C, 7b; Oxford 315.

(2) Sen fristed *goods* ar not forgiven (Montgomerie C 134,45). Fergusson 34(415), 94(782); Kelly 305(28); NED Frist, 2; Oxford 229; Ramsay 231(109).

(3) Auenture *gude* and haue ay gude (Rolland, *Seages* 76,2219). *Modern Language Notes,* LXIII(1948) 536(178).

GOOD WILL.

(1) The prouerb is, *gude will* sould be payment,
Becaus the toung can nocht keip vnitie
As wald the hart (Rolland, *Court* 25,310-2).
Ȝe knaw Madame, *gude will* suld be payment (Rolland, *Court* 133,706). Cheviot 123; Fergusson 36(443); Kelly 117(36).

(2) Ane modicum is mair ffor till allow,
Swa that *gude will* be kerver at the dais,
Than thawin vult and mony spycit mais (Henryson 11,236-8). Cf. *Proverbs* xv, 17: Better is a dinner of herbs where love is, than a stalled ox and hatred therewith.

GOODYEAR.

that be thair and heir be *guid ȝeir* (Bannatyne, Memoriales 12). [Let whatever (*i.e.*, perhaps trouble) be there and let a good year (*i.e.*, prosperity) be here].

GOOSE.

(1) Thy *guse* is gude, thy gansell sour as gall (Henryson 15,345). Fergusson 16(145): A good goose indeed, but she has an ill gansell; Kelly 30(179).

(2) to mak the said secretair a steall *guse* to draw Grange out of the castell (Melville 218). NED Stall, sb.², 1.

GORBET.

the quhilk he gaped for as a *gorbet* (Melvill I,135). Cf. NED Gorbet.

GOVERNOR.

Bot be this way we may weill considder
Off *governouris* quha hes the authorietie
Oft tymes thay find that seit most slidder (Pitscottie I,151,1-3). Cf. Oxford 295: Highest branch; Whiting, *ED* 300: The safest seate is not on highest hill. See HIGH(1) below.

GOWK.

I laif the *Goik*, quhilk hes no sang bot one (Lindsay I,88,1102). Apperson 128(25); Cheviot 133; Fergusson 112(905); Kelly 362(16); Oxford 63: Breed; Ramsay 244(7); Whiting, *ED* 272.

GOWN.

Nor thair is nane, I wait in all this toun
Except he haue it, that can put on ane *goun* (Rolland, *Seages* 7,166-7).

GRACE.

(1) bot na *grace* was to be fund at a graceless man's hand (Melvill I,276). Cheviot 411; Fergusson 112(899); Hislop 345; Kelly 364(33); NED Graceless, 3, quot. *a* 1658; Ramsay 249(35); Oxford 571; Whiting, *Ballad* 37. [All face for hand].

(2) For heir thair is na *grace* but geld him! (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 13).

(3) for want of *grace* & good gouerninge
may loose a Kingdome & a King (*Eger* 234,595-6, cf. 235, 847-8: For a man of evil guiding, May tine a kinrick and a king.

GRASS.

(1) the drinke shee gaue mee was *grasse* greene (*Eger* 202,291).

Thair mantillis grein war as the *gress* that grew in May sessoun (Dunbar 85,24).

Als grene as *gerss* (Douglas I,97,6). Apperson 273-4; Berrey 150.3.6, 165.5, 258.3.9; Hardie 467; Hyamson 168; Taylor 36; Whiting, *Ballad* 28; Wilstach 187.

(2) For of grene *gress* sone cumis wallowit hay ("Good Counsel" in *Kingis Quair* 52,11). Cf. Gayton 286: Grasse and Hay, we are all mortall; William Lichfield, "The Complaint of God to Sinful Man," *Anglia*, XXXIV(1911) 509,55-6: ffyrst a man growyth as grassse And after welkyth as flourys or haye.

(3) . . . ma wormis hes thow beschittin
Nor thair is *gers* on grund (Dunbar 11,195-6). Chaucer, *HF* 1350-3, *CT* III(D),773-4.

(4) Sum greuis quhill the *gers* grow for his gray meyr (Douglas III,143,23). Cf. Apperson 269: Grass(6): While the grass grows the steed starves;

Jente 26; NED Grass, sb.[1], 1b; Oxford 262; Ramsay 243(19); Whiting, *ED* 112,256.

GREEDINESS.

For *gredynes* of gold that was his end,
Quhilk at his deid ane myte micht not him mēd (Rolland, *Seages* 167,5336-7).
See COVETISE(3) above.

GREEN.

All that was *grene*, to ʒow it suld seme gray (Rolland, *Seages* 125,3891).

GRICE.

And scho to gruntill as a *gryiss* (Bannatyne III,27,27). NED Gruntle, 1, quot. *c* 1400. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 315(152): grone grysly as a gryse.

GRIP.

Graip or thow slyd, and creip furth on the way ("Good Counsel" in *Kingis Quair* 52,19, cf. 51,19: Stramp or thou slyd, and crep furth one the way).

GRIZEL.

Grissall wes nevir so pacient
As I am for my lady gent (Scott 53,7-8). NED Grizel; Oxford 490.

GROUND.

(1) And, as ʒour maisters *grund* is laid,
Lyk so the vallis and bigging be (*Sat. Poems* 335,35-6). NED Ground, 4, quot. 1581.

(2) All growis nocht that in the *ground* is set (Henryson 62,1765). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 246.

(3) and yitt thei maid hott skarmisching, as in thair awin *ground*, in such fates, thei ar most experte (Knox I,86). Cf. Apperson 105: Every cock is brave on his own dunghill; NED Ground, 13b.

GUIDE.

Thai *gyde* nocht ill þat governis weill þame sell (Scott 4,99).

HAD-I-WIST.

Tak tent in tyme or ʒe be put in thrist,
Sone efter syne or ʒe sa, *had I wist*
So suld haue bene, I had far lever bene deid,
Thairfoir bewar quhill ʒe ma mak remeid (Stewart II,548,36917-20).
and *Had I wist* was me to latt (Bannatyne IV,21,43).
bewar of *had I wist* (Maitland Quarto 243,17; Montgomerie S 211,18). Apperson 277; Fergusson 22(198); Kelly 131(42); NED Had-I-wist; Oxford 270; Ramsay 180(2); Whiting, *ED* 18, 74, 86, 126, 162, 257.

HAG.

Than stryk ane *hag* in to the post (Lindsay II,390,1524 and IV,235: "a proverbial expression meaning, record such a transaction, as extraordinary").

HAIL.

(1) . . . the fedderit flanis flaw,
Scharpe as the *haill* (Stewart I,15,500-1).
As schairp as *haill* (Stewart I,75,2558, 278,8870-1, 305,9640-1, 566,17626, II,149,24580, 605,38722). Lovelich I,290,456.

(2) . . . with arrowis braid
Schott thikker weill than *hale* or snaw (*Alexander* I,52,1648-9).
The glettering teris als thik as ony *haile* (*Quare* 197,102; *Lancelot* 25,840; Douglas II,154,28, III,139,15, 334,2; *Clariodus* 147,1092; Stewart II,13,20548, III,256,50956). Apperson 623; Chaucer, *LGW* 655; Green 20; Hyamson 340; Whiting, *Ballad* 28, *ED* 315(157); Wilstach 420.

(3) As in grit wynd dois *haill* and snaw,
Sa come thay on (*Alexander* I,10,311-2).

(4) The braid arrowis, like ony schour of *haill* (Stewart II,78,22471).
A cloud of arowis as *hayle* schour lousit thay (Dunbar 117,178). Pepys V,164,9.

HAILSTONE.

(1) . . . flanis,
So thik as ony schour of scharp *hailstanis* (Douglas IV,114,23-4). NED Hailstone, quot. 13 . . . Cf. Whiting, *ED* 315(157).

(2) Quharon thair shaftis and sharpest shottis,
Lyk *hailstanes* aff ane studie stottis (Montgomerie C 172,27-8).

HAINAULT.

The Scottismen maid myrth and play,
And oftsyss wald amang þaim say,
Lattand a crak, þat mony mycht heire,
In hething: "Take a *Henhald* heire" (Wyntoun V,404,3193-6, cf. V,405,3408: In heythynge: "Tak a Bewmonde her").

HAIR.

(1) He wanted noȝte to be slayne
Þe brede of ane *hare* (*Awntyrs* 160,584-5). NED Brede, sb.2, quot. 1562, Hair, 5, quot. c 1420, Hairbreadth, Hair-brede, Hair's-breadth.

(2) I compt nocht all thare schore ane *hare* (*Alexander* II,182,2895).
For it wes done he countit nocht ane *hoir* (Stewart II,342,30406). Cf. NED Hair, 5.

(3) Think one the *har* is in thi nek,
and be weil war quhome of þou spek (*Consail* 71,199-200). NED Hair, 8f; Oxford 271.

(4) Him self was aiged his houss hang be a *hair* (Maitland 422,113).
Ȝit houp hings be ane *hair*,
Houping aganis all houp (Montgomerie C 279,25-6). NED Hang, 8b.

(5) The quhilk at last sall nocht help ȝow ane *hair* (Maitland 33,27). NED Hair, 5, quot. 1377.

(6) Wald nocht haue hauldin his lyff ane *hair* (Pitscottie I,245,6). Cf. NED Hair, 5.

(7) For ma vices thair rang into his cors,
Nor thair wes *hairis* on his grittest hors (Stewart II,300,29105-6). Chaucer, *HF* 1389-90; Roxburghe IX,859.

(8) never ane *hair* the war (Pitscottie II,86,16). Cf. NED Hair, 5.

(9) All that he prysit nocht ane *hare* (*Alexander* III,308,6961). Cf. NED Hair, 5.

(10) He culd nocht brek wirth ane *hair* of thair will (Stewart I,322,10191).
This ilk Vter wald nocht brek of his will
Nocht worth ane *hair* (Stewart II,205,26268-9). Apperson 457(18); Oxford 270. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 347(599).

HALL BENCHES.

Bewar in welth, for *Hall benkis* ar rycht slidder (Henryson 89,2608).
For wit thow weil *Hal binks* ar ay slidder (*Thre Prestis* 32,614). Cheviot 123; Fergusson 40(335); Kelly 133(54); NED Bink, 1; Oxford 272; Ramsay 180(1).

HALSE.

And held me in the *hals*
To lufe vnluffit agane (Scott 63,23-4).
With mony flattering taill and fals
He held that bischop in the *hals* (*Sat. Poems* 379,782-3). NED Halse, 5.

HAMMER.

Thay straik at him so thik and fast withall
As dois the *hammeris* on the studie fall (*Clariodus* 318,1185-6).

HAND.

(1) With emptie *hand* na man suld Halkis lure (Henryson 80,2335).
For freindis lyk halkis dois soir frome emptie fist (Montgomerie S 211,20). Apperson 291; Chaucer, *CT* I(A),4134, III(D),415; Fergusson

108(877); Hislop 322; Jente 512; Kelly 21(120); Oxford 170; Ramsay 164(12).

(2) At *hand*, like pickpurse still before (*Sat. Poems* 74,151). Middleton VIII,27; Oxford 17; Whiting, *ED* 295.

(3) the *handis* of our Lordis so liberallie war anoynted (Knox I,102). Apperson 270: grease; NED Anoint, 3b; Oxford 263; Whiting, *ED* 347(593).

(4) Men beir eik wemen vpone *hand* (Bannatyne IV,58,274).
Sanct Iames did beir the Iewis in *hand* (Montgomerie S 239,73). NED Bear, v.^{1}, 3e; Whiting, *ED* 334(392a).

(5) Till thai had gottyn the ovir *hand* (Barbour I,256,452; Wyntoun VI,335,910; Douglas IV,176,20; Winzet I,50-1[margin]). NED Get, 5b; Whiting, *ED* 356(745).

(6) the Quene and hir Frenchemen have the upper *hand* (Knox I,343-4, 436, II,475; *Sat. Poems* 47,30; *Ballatis* 206; Fergusson, *Tracts* 73; Pitscottie I,103,10, 117,1-2, 329,4-5, II,157,25; Maitland 320,81; Melvill II,425,495; Hume 117,14; *Philotus* 142,1068). NED Get, 5b; Whiting, *ED* 369(926).

(7) bot for gredienes and thair awin libertie laid bak thair *hand* frome the pleugh (Pitscottie II,111,31-3). *The Writings of John Bradford*, ed. A. Townsend (Cambridge, 1853) II,91: never pull your hand from the plough. Cf. NED Plough, 1d.

(8) Hald thame in *hand*, quhilkis may ȝow help at neid,
And hecht thame giftis, howbeid ȝe gif thame nocht (Scott 17,33-4). NED Hold, 29c.

(9) Bot Mester George was a stoik philosopher, and loked not far before the *hand* (Melville 262).

(10) The kyng of ingland playit vitht baytht the *handis* (*Complaynt* 89,13-4).
he was spyed and tane with the wreittingis and sufferit for the samyn for he played with baith the *handis* (Pitscottie II,237,19-21).
becaus thay had ovir meikill familiaritie with the castell syd and played with bayth the *handis* (Pitscottie II,275,5-6). Apperson 500: Play on both hands; NED Hand, 40.

(11) Twa *handis* ay trawalyt fore ane toung (Wyntoun VI,434,3167).

See HEART(2) below.

HANG.

Quha evir beis *hangit* in this cord
Neidis nevir to be drownd (Lindsay II,206,1160-1). Apperson 60; Cheviot 349; Fergusson 101(1365); Henderson 11; Kelly 158(242). 304(22); Kissel 7(29); Oxford 56-7; Ramsay 186(4), 231(118); Whiting, *ED* 190, 250.

HANK.

Ʒe tyne þe thank man hald ane *hank*
or all be past away (Bannatyne III,19,23-4). Cheviot 128: Haud the hank in your ain hand; Handerson 6; Ramsay 180(5).

HAP.

(1) *Hap* helpis hardy men, be myne advys (Douglas III,301,13). Chaucer, *LGW* 1773; NED Hap, sb.^{1}, 4; Oxford 221: Fortune. See FORTUNE(1) above.

(2) Thocht it bene better, as sayis the wyse,
Hape to the court nor gude seruyce,
I wate thow luffit me better, than,
Nor, now, sum wyfe dois hir gude man (Lindsay I,42,101-4).
Bettir *hap* to court nor gud seruiss (Bannatyne II,249,5,10,15.
Bot sen I sie this proverbe to be true,
"Far better *hap* to court, nor service good" (Montgomerie C 103,1-2).

Cheviot 58; Fergusson 22(182); Kelly 65(68); Kissel 18(73); Ramsay 167(57).

(3) Becauss þar faderis purely can begyn
With *hap* and halfpenny & a lam skyn (*Thre Prestis* 12,183-4). Apperson 283: Hap and a half-penny are world's gear enough; Fergusson 44(374); Henderson 8; Hislop 112; Kelly 133(60); Oxford 277; Ramsay 181(19).

HARDIMENT.

Lo! how *hardyment* tane suddanly,
And drivin syne till end scharply,
May ger oft-siss vnlikly thingis
Cum to richt fair and gud endingis (Barbour I,232,632-5).

HARDINESS.

Full *hardines*, quhilk neuir had ȝit gude chance,
Cumis alway of ill considderance;
And fals presumptioun, cumis of thame bayth,
Oft in this warld hes done rycht mekle skayth (Stewart II,440,33517-20).

HARE.

(1) The Husband than woxe angrie as ane *hair* (Henryson 77,2242). Fergusson 57(712). Cf. Apperson 389: Mad; Chaucer, *CT* III(D),1327: wood; Oxford 396; Whiting, *ED* 316(159).

(2) Als swyft he wes as ony *hair* (Stewart II,455,33976, 659,40505-6).

(3) Lyke as befor the hund wyskis the *hair* (Douglas IV,152,8).
"Traist weill," he said, "the *hair* dreid neuir the hound,
No ȝit the scheip the wolf, in to na stound,
Quhen scho is put till all hir grittest speid,
So soir befar this da as tha ws dreid" (Stewart II,117,23632-5).
And fled als fast as fra the hund dois *hair* (Stewart II,454,33954). Cf. Laud 207,7009: Thei fledde him as hare doth hound. Whiting, *ED* 316(159). See DAY(2) above.

HARROW.

hippit as ane *harrow* (Dunbar 10,179). NED Hipped, 1, quot. 1508.

HART.

It ran als swift as ony *hart* (Stewart II,67,22120). Whiting, *ED* 316(161).

HASTE.

(1) For quhilk It happinnis oft, god wate,
And is richt suth withoutine dreid
That of fule *haist* cummis no speid (*Troy* 275,1680-2).
"Oftymes," he said, "it preues weill to [reid],
That ouir greit *haist* cumis hulie [speid] (Stewart I,34,1145-6).
Sen *fuilhaist* cummis not greatest speid (Maitland Quarto 214,13).
fulis *hast* cums huly speid (Montgomerie C 44,1283).
fuill *haist* ay, almaist ay,
ouresyllis the sycht of sum,
quha luikis nocht, nor huikis nocht,
quhat efterwart may cum (Montgomerie S 30,398-401). Apperson 225(38): Fool's haste is no speed; Fergusson 32(266); Kelly 102(6); NED Hooly, B; Oxford 216. Cf. Apperson 427; Cheviot 244, 259; Fergusson 94(776); Jente 372; Kelly 313(81); NED Haste, 6; Oxford 281, 433; Ramsay 177(39); Taylor 62; Whiting, *ED* 178, 199, 217.

(2) abyde thy tyme; for he that can bot *haste*,
Can nought of hap, the wise man It writ (*Kingis Quair* 33,133).

HAT.

My *hatt* is ȝouris of proper dett
And on my heid scho cowth it sett (Bannatyne III,27,31-2) [The context

shows that this is an agreement to sexual intimacy].

I sall gif him this hat upon my heid (*Clariodus* 217,837, cf. 226,1133-4, 232,1307 ff., 311,951-3) [Meliades vowed on the peacock to give her hat to the worthiest knight; as she vowed "scho wox a litill reid"].

HATRED.

And auld *hatrent,* as men sais,
Beris ane new deid aluais (*Alexander* III,299,6660-1). Cf. Lydgate, *Fall* III,735,2266: Of old hatreede to kyndle newe envie.

HAVE.

For *haif,* ȝe heir, is haldin half a fill (Montgomerie C 195,11). NED Have, sb., 1, quot. *a* 1605. See ENOUGH(4) above.

HAY.

For my grene ȝewt is lyk þe withering *hay* (Bannatyne III,310,17). Cf. *The English Works of John Fisher,* ed. J. E. B. Mayor (EETS ES, 27, 1876) 148,8-10: I . . . am . . . wydred as hey.

HAYSTACK.

giff Mr. James Lawsone's head war als grait as a *haystak* (Melvill I,167).

HEAD.

(1) How many *hedis* als feil consatis bene (Douglas II,220,16). Apperson 586; Cheviot 47; Fergusson 8(66); Jente 46; Kelly 299(115); Oxford 418; Ramsay 162(29); Whiting, *ED* 128, 132, 136, 245. See FOLKS above.

(2) Ane seik *heid* in a skarlet huid
Oft haiss it bene this we heirsay (Bannatyne IV,21,37-8).

(3) Maugre his *hede* (*Alexander* II,173,2610; Douglas II,190,15, IV,206,23). NED Head, 60; Whiting, *Chaucer* 185-6, *ED* 348(613).

(4) they hold It hopeles of thie bodye dead,
except they see hym cut shorter by the heade (*Sat. Poems* 20,501-2). Whiting, *Ballad* 36: hood, *ED* 362(838).

(5) Ane *hed* Dow nocht on body stand allane
fforowt memberis to be of mycht and mane
ffor to wphald þe body & þe hed,
And sekerly to gar It stand in steid (*Thre Prestis* 8,105-8 and p.62).

Thocht he was the *heid* they war the airmes and the spetiall defence of the haill body (Pitscottie I,276,20-2).

For-quhy ane seiknes that is into the *heid,*
Without the soner that it get remeid,
To caus the seiknes fra the heid to slaik,
The memberis all will rycht sone tyne and traik (Stewart I,423,13223-6).

For, quhen the *heddis* ar nocht delygent,
The membris man, on neid, be necligent (Lindsay I,30,881-2).

Gif in the *heid* greit vertew dois auance
Sa in members I think siclyke suld be (Rolland, *Seages* 1,3-4).

For, quhen the *heid* is seik, the Prouerb is,
That all the members be the worse, I wis (*Sat. Poems* 229,79-80).

Quhen the falt is in the heid the menbaris ar seik (Bannatyne III,8,6-7; Maitland 159,6; Fortescue 263,[6]: membre is ofte).

Is said in stories of antiquiteis
The *heid* the membris followis grit & small (Bannatyne II,242,7-8). Apperson 293; When the head acheth all the body is the worse; Kissel 20(84); Oxford 284; Whiting, *ED* 177. Cf. Jente 33.

HEADLESS.

Giff ȝe do weill, gar thame daunce *heidles* (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 6).

HEART.

(1) Quhome that he luifit als tender as his *hart* (Stewart I,130,4360, III,203,-49127, 428,56804). See LIFE(3) below.

(2) "Now find I weill this proverb trew," quod he,

"*hart* on the hurd, and handis on the soir;
Quhair Luve gois, on forss mone turne the E" (Henryson 142,408-10 and p.262). *Partonope* 163,4480-1: For þer þe sore ys, þe fynger woll be, And where thy loue ys, þyne ey ys to se; *Ancren Riwle*, ed. J. Morton (London, 1853) 96: euer is þe eie to þe wude leie, þerinne is þet ich luuie and *Speculum,* IX(1934) 219. Cf. Apperson 639: The tongue is ever turning to the aching tooth; Oxford 663.

(3) And fra the *hart* be discumfyt,
The body is nocht worth a myt (Barbour I,58,197-8, 305,187-8).
It semis weill quhair *hartis* failʒeis,
The laif of lymmes lytle vailʒeis (*Alexander* II,136,1421-2).

(4) Quhay þat saw It, & pyte had nane,
his [*hart*] was hardare þane þe stane (*Legends* I,447,227-8).
Your musing waild perse ane *harte* of stane (Dunbar 54,40).
The grundin dairtis scharp, and bricht to se,
Wald mak ane *hart* of flint to fald and fle (Douglas I,89,8-9).
So him to heir with monie sob and grone,
It wald have thirllit ony *heart* of stone (*Clariodus* 176,2007-8).
So grislie gronis with mony schruikis skrill
Wald mak ane *hart* baith for to grow and grile,
Suppois it be als hard as ony stone (Stewart I,638,19723-5).
It wald vpross ane *hart* of stone,
To se me lost for lufe of one (Scott 47,26-7).
quhilk wald haue movit ane *heart* of stane to commiseratioun (Pitscottie I,123,22-3). Chaucer, *TC* iii,114; Cheviot 206: melt; **NED** Stone, 4b; Whiting, *ED* 348(617).

(5) He said, "now may we cleirly se,
That nobill *hert,* quhair-euir it be,
Is hard till ourcum throu mastry;
For quhar a hert is rycht vorthy,
Agane stoutnes [it] is ay stout;
And, as I trow, thair may na dowt
Ger it all out discumfit be,
Quhill body liffand is all fre" (Barbour I,175-6,352-9).
Ane hardie *hart* is hard for to suppryis (Henryson 73,2109). Cf. Oxford 252: Good heart conquers ill fortune.

(6) Of wicked *hart* cumis wicked will (*Alexander* III,298,6639).

(7) Thair *hart* waitis nocht quhat thair mouth sayis (Lindsay II,335,3664). Kissel 30(128); Whiting, *ED* 45. Cf. Fergusson 19(209): A womanis heart and her tonge ar not ay relatives. See GOOD WILL(1) above, WORD(9) below.

(8) For noble *hart* wil have no dowbilness (*Lancelot* 37,1256).

HEATHER.

Thay pluck the puir as thay war powand *Hadder* (*Thre Prestis* 33,622).

HECTOR.

Moir strong than *hector* / sampsone or golias (Bannatyne II,95,12). Whiting, *ED* 316(165): Hector, 325(280): Sampson. See HERCULES below.

HEEL.

The thing þat ʒe sett at ʒour *heill*
I will no moir sett at my harte (Bannatyne IV,21,67-8). Apperson 295: Heart(8). Cf. Cheviot 203: It gangs as; Kelly 198(166); Oxford 355: Lay sorrow.

HEIFERS.

Also ther was a grait plat leyed, and a mikle ado usit, (plewing alwayes with our *hiffers*!) whow to gett a Moderator meit for the purpose (Melvill

II.415). [R. Head], *The Floating Island* (London, 1673) 15; *Judges* xiv,18; NED Heifer, 1b; Oxford 508.

HELL.

(1) A laithly smok he ȝiskis blak as *hell* (Douglas III,167,32). Apperson 51; Whiting, "The Devil and Hell in Current English Literary Idiom," *Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature*, XX(1938) 230.

(2) Ane vgly pit, [was] depe as ony *helle* (*Kingis Quair* 40,162). Whiting, (*as above*) 231.

HEN.

(1) Quhen I was Hird the scheip was in ane snair,
Lyke till ane folk of *hennis* befoir ane Tod (*Sat. Poems* 196,111-2). Cf. Laud 198,6720: Thei fle fro him, as hen doth fro the fox.

(2) for I wes lyik þe *hen* that skrepis the knyfe
ȝit Ignorant it sould bereve hir lyfe (Maitland Quarto 243,19-20). Aleman III,332: Scraping, like the hen, to her owne hurt.

(3) Quham gadtherit I wald haif to gidder, . . .
. . . as the *Hen* gadderis her byrdis
Under hir wyngis, tenderlye (Lindsay I,313,3851-4). NED Hen 1a.

(4) That hurtis yow nought worth a *hen* (Dunbar 91,269). Apperson 457(20); Chaucer, *Romaunt* C 6856, *CT* III(D), 1112; NED Hen, 1b.

(5) Sumtymis ane hen haldis ane man in ane Kow (Henryson 80,3224). See GIFT(1) above, KUIF below.

HERCULES.

Thot thow be sterk as *Herculess*
Sampsone Hector or achilless (Bannatyne IV,27,16-7). Whiting, *ED* 316(168); Wilstach 395. See HECTOR above.

HERD.

Ane dyn I hard . . .
As *heird* of beistis stamping with loud cry (Douglas I,9,26-8).

HEREAFTER.

heirefter comes not ȝit (Montgomerie S 43,588). Apperson 299; Cheviot 164; NED Hereafter, C, 1; Oxford 293.

HEW.

The man that *hewys* ower hee
The spaile will fall in his E (Makculloch 119,64-5).
Quhen thai war weill preissand to *huif* ouir hie,
Quhill that the spail fell into thair ee (Stewart I,654,20189-90).
Now quho so evir *hewis* to hie
I heir men say and swth it is
The spailis will fall and hurtis Ee (Bannatyne IV,21,49-51).
To lait I leirnit, quha *hewis* he,
the spaill sall fall into his ey (Montgomerie S 14,169-70). Apperson 300; Cheviot 146; Fergusson 38(317); Kelly 128(24); NED Hew, 1c, Spale, sb.², 1b; Oxford 293-4; Ramsay 188(47).

HID.

Thair is nothing *hyd* bot it salbe reveiled (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 52). Cf. Fergusson 82(661): Nothing comes sooner to light, then that which is long hid; Hislop 233; Kelly 260(30).

HIGH.

(1) Quho sittith moist *hie* sal fynd the sait most slidder (Lindsay I,66,352). Kissel 20(81). Cf. Apperson 574: He sits not sure that sits too high; Oxford 593; Whiting, *ED* 300. See GOVERNOR above.

(2) and alse as vincentius says in his 34 beuk, the mair eleuat that ane person be in superfleu digniteis, his fal & ruuyn sal be the hauyar. quanto gradus altior, tanto casus grauior (*Complaynt* 170,28-31).

Quha fallis *heichast* gettis the grittest faw (Stewart II,6,20316).

Bot we may sie quhen men standis in hieest degre . . . they ar neirest ane fall (Pitscottie I,392,7-9).

The *hicher* set, The sooner low (J. Stewart 119,5).

Bot ay the suyfter And moir *hich* thay brall,
Moir low And suddane cums thair feirfull fall (J. Stewart 155,13-4). Apperson 301: Higher standing; Fergusson 98(839); Kelly 319(135); Oxford 295; Ramsay 229(53).

(3) Quha hopped *highest* oft tyms comes behind (Montgomerie C 130,45). Cf. Chaucer, *TC* ii,1107.

HIGH GAIT.

Bettir is the *hie gait* nor the by rod (Bannatyne III,9,55-6; Maitland 161,56: leif never the hie gait for þe by rode; Fortescue 264,[48]: Bett^r is).

and if I peris, I shall be found, God willing, dead in the *hye,* not in the by *way* (Colville 208). Fergusson 74(964). Cf. Oxford 295: Highway.

HIGHLAND COW.

That he had na mair grace to guyde him
Nor it had bene ane *hieland quow* (*Sat. Poems* 377,714-5). See cow(1) above.

HIGHLANDMAN.

Sua he keipit ane *Hielandman's* promes, in respect he sent the gaird to convoy him out of Scottis grund; bot yai wer not directit to pairt wt: him, bot to fetch him bak againe (*The Diarey of Robert Birrel* in John G. Dalyell, *Fragments of Scotish History* [Edinburgh, 1798],60).

HIGHT.

Oftymes fair *hechtis* makis fuillis fane (Stewart I,33,1108, 201,6522, III,23,-43229, 24,43271-2; Montgomerie C 44,1284). Apperson 200(37); Fergusson 32(261); Kelly 102(8); NED Hight, sb.^{1}, 2; Oxford 188; Ramsay 176(3).

HILL.

(1) Heich as an *hill* the jaw of watter brak (Douglas II,28,13).

(2) That wawys wyd [that] brekand war
Weltryt as *hillys* her and thar (Barbour I,77,699-700).

(3) The highest *hillis* mair thretnit ar with thunder;
And tallest trees with tempest ofter tryde
Nor hillocks small, or bramble bushis vnder:
Vnworthie things ar aluay leist invyde (Montgomerie C 192,50-3).

HIP.

vpon my *hip* I haue ane clout
Quhilk is nocht pleysand for my prow (Maitland 245,13-4). [The speaker is referring to his wife.]

HIRED.

Fure furt as thay war *hyrit* (Bannatyne III,40,31,35).

HO.

(1) Come on hastely but ony *haw* (*Legends* II,330,910).

Þis bischope said, and þar made *ho* (Wyntoun IV,239,1375).

Thai stampe þai dwnt þat he couth haue no *ho* (Asloan I,91,329).

Foroutin schame richt haistelie but *ho* (Stewart II,203,26208, 289,28764, 569,37605).

Till hyr awin hous with outyn ony *hoo* (Harry 26,265; Stewart I,232,7492, 614,19013, II,58,21852, 460,34111, III,326,53322; Scott 64,15). Apperson 303; NED Ho, sb.^{3}, B; Oxford 480.

(2) The wolf, that of the murthir noght say[is] *"ho"* (*Kingis Quair* 39,157; Bannatyne IV,45,34; Maitland 364,151).

And auerice that no tyme will cry *ho* (Stewart I,69,2328, 444,13856, 543,16902, II,394,32055; *Philotus* 112,245). NED Ho, int.^{2}, A.

HOLD.

(1) Quhy wald thow *hald* that will away? (Dunbar 26,27).

Quhat hand may *had* that will away (Bannatyne IV,20-2,8,16, etc.). Apperson 682; Fergusson 106(718); Kelly 352(98); Oxford 299; Ramsay 239(41).

(2) As it is said in mony suithfull saw,
Far ethar is to *hald* nor for to draw (Stewart I,179,5837-8).
Thairfoir it is bettir *hald* nor draw
gar nocht thy awin geir stryve w^t the (Bannatyne II,203,17-8). Cheviot 44, 60; Fergusson 6(35), 7(34); Kelly 23(133), 55(3); Ramsay 167(52), 168(87).

(3) Oft tymes is bettir *hald* nor len (Bannatyne II,202,1). See LEND below.

HOLLY.

Qui nunquam fabricat mendacia,
Bot quhen the *holyne* growis grene (Dunbar 73,63-4). Apperson 305; Cheviot 140; Fergusson 48(411); Kelly 174(372); Ramsay 184(67).

HOLY.

All ar not *halie* that heifis thair handis to hevin (Henryson 80,2325). Cf. Apperson 5: All are not saints that go to church; Kelly 328(207): They are not all Saints, that get Hally Water; Ramsay 182(20): He has muckle prayer but little devotion.

HOME.

(1) quhen he sal cum til his lang *ham* (*Legends* I,2,32; Wyntoun V,118,3204; Douglas III,18,27). Apperson 379; NED Home, sb.^{1}, 4; Oxford 381.

(2) He þat can not gang *hame* is a pure man (Bannatyne III,8,10-1; Maitland 159,10; not in Fortescue.

HOMELY.

Bot not so welcome thair as *hamelie* (*Sat. Poems* 357,136). Cheviot 244; Kelly 251(58); Ramsay 209(3).

HOMEWARDS.

ther headis wer *hamewartis*, and ther hartis wer hyn (Melville 34). [Of soldiers running from battle].

HONEY.

(1) Me think that hennis ar sa *honie* sweit (Henryson 27,700; Asloan II,22,691; Stewart I,250,8064, 257,8247).
My hairt, sweit as the *hunye* (Dunbar 54,15; Bannatyne IV,24,18). Apperson 614; Green 31; Hyamson 334; NED Sweet, 1b; Oxford 635; Whiting, *ED* 316(173); Wilstach 410.

(2) Thay *hony* lippis ze did persew,
Grew gall, I ges (*Ballatis* 210). Cf. Apperson 307: No honey without gall; Breton I, b, 14: Her honey, gall; Oxford 301.

HONOR.

(1) And hono^r oft syis chengeis hewis (Bannatyne II,187,6). Apperson 308: Honours change manners; Oxford 302; Whiting, *ED* 108, 114.

(2) For *honore* is nocht gevyne for claithis (*Foly* 55,116). Bradley 66: You can't judge a man by his clothes. Cf. Aleman III,343: For, as a mans apparell is, so is his esteeme; Apperson 13: Apparel; Bradley 66; Oxford 12; Taylor 22, 80.

(3) all those that clyme to *honors* seate, there state may not endure (*Sat. Poems* 29,783). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 97. See CLIMB(1), HIGH above.

HOOD.

Not wirth ane *hude* (Bannatyne II,301,38).

HOOK.

(1) by *hooke* & by croke (*Complaynt* 234). Apperson 308-9; NED Hook, 14; Oxford 303; Taylor 39; Whiting, *ED* 349(631).

(2) On kitlest *huiks* the sliest baits they are (Montgomerie C 205,87). See BAT above.

HOPE.

(1) and slip na certantie for *hoip,*
quha gyddis the bot be ges (Montgomerie S 34,445-6). NED Hope, sb.^{1}, 1a, quot. 1597; Oxford 529. Cf. Apperson 90: Certainty.

(2) Had nocht bene *hope* bair hym sic companye,
He had bene stranglit be malancolye (Lindsay I,72,561-2). Cf. Apperson 309: If hope were not heart would break; Kelly 340(3); Oxford 304; Ramsay 238(15).

(3) for *hope* gude hap hes heichte (Montgomerie S 37,498). Cf. G. Gascoigne, *Complete Works* (2 vols., Cambridge, 1907-1910) I,370: Since hope had never hap.

(4) Quhen *houp* & hap & weill & health bene hiest
then Wo & wrack diseis & neid bene niest (Maitland Quarto 259,1-2). Whiting, *ED* 299. Cf. *Reliquiæ* II,120.

HORN.

(1) hard as *horne* (Dunbar 11,212). Apperson 284.

(2) I hald ȝe want bot *hornis,*
As bukkis in belling tyme (Scott 87,71-2).
And sa betuix þame twa I gat þe *horne* (Bannatyne IV,28,12).
Scho thinkis no schame
ffor to bring hame
the laird a *horne* (Bannatyne IV,32,28-30).
And syn bringis hame the laird the *horne* (Maitland 193,15).
Plat on his head ane *horne* (*Philotus* 114,300). NED Horn, 7; Taylor 40; Whiting, *ED* 349(633). Cf. Apperson 310-1; Oxford 304.

(3) The furious mars wes blawin to the *horne* (Bannatyne II,3,16). NED Horn, 14.

(4) Sone efter syne quhen that he did retorn
Out of his swoun, he stude lang in ane *horn* (Stewart II,525,36163-4). [Queried in Glossary; not in NED. Donegild had only pretended to swoon].

HORSE.

(1) Ane scabbit *hors* will feill quhair he is sair (*Sat. Poems* 162,65). Apperson 552; Fergusson 97(1288); Kelly 326(190); NED Scabbed, 1d; Oxford 550; Ramsay 237(17); Whiting, *ED* 52, 230.

(2) bot now mony passis the bakwart way, fra the monastik life to the weris, fra the *horssis* (as is the prouerb) to the assis (Winzet II,17[margin]).

(3) Quha had gud *horss*, gat best avay! (Barbour I,218,279).

(4) Sum hert hait brenyng as ane vnbridillit *hors* (Douglas II,168,11).

(5) Als swift of fit as ony *hors* wes he (Stewart II,455,33974).

(6) and wicht as ony *hors* (Stewart I,499,15522). NED Wight, *a.*, 3, swift, speedy. Cf. Apperson 312: As strong as a horse; NED Horse, 25a; Oxford 627; Partridge 406, cf. 172: come it.

(7) Come berand lyk a bagit *hors* (Dunbar 122,80).

(8) And he will draw about lyke ony *hors* (*Clariodus* 174,1958).

(9) Thay rin lyk wyld vndantit *horss* (Scott 76,11). NED Undaunted, 1, quot. *c* 1560.

(10) That samyn *horss* is my awin meir (Lindsay II,84,1775 and IV,181).

See GALL(2) (2) above.

HOSE.

With thy fals taillis of tene, thow trowis to win the *hois* (Rolland, *Seages* 233,7580).

hes he nocht win the *hoiss* worthelie (Winzet I,58).

HOST.

bot he that counttis without his *ost,*

oftymes he counttis twyss (Montgomerie S 46,629-30).
He counts againe, that counts without his *host* (Hume 71,98). Apperson 525-6; Fergusson 42(356); Hyamson 191; Kelly 170(337); NED Host, sb.², 2b; Oxford 535; Partridge 408; Ramsay 187(15).

HOT.

Quha sittis *hate*, and feld nevir cauld ane hour,
Quhat wedder is thairout vnder the luge
How suld he wit? (Douglas I,109,15-7). Cf. Fergusson 74(600): Little kens the wife that sits by the fire, how the winde blowes cold in hurle burle swyre; Kelly 229(2); Oxford 373-4.

HOUND.

(1) For gentil *hund* gyrnis or he byt (*Consail* 70,162). Apperson 158(29).
(2) now hungrie as ane *Hound* (Henryson 101,2946). Green 19; NED Hound, sb.¹, 7; Oxford 310: dog.
(3) I hatit him like a *hund* (Dunbar 91,273). NED Hound, sb.¹, 1, quot. 1508.
(4) He huntit them with [sik] ane feirfull cheire,
Right as the awfull *hundis* dois the deire (*Clariodus* 319,1193-4). Whiting, *ED* 317(177).
(5) He hunted the knights here and there,
Even as the *hound* doth hunt the hare (*Roswall* 22,593-4). Whiting, *ED* 317(177). See HARE(3) above.
(6) Our men ar slayne, that pete is to se,
As bestiall *houndis* hangit our a tre (Harry 148,269-70).
See DOG above.

HOUR.

Get ȝe ane golden *hour* to glak thame (Scott 37,33). NED Glaik, 2a, Golden, 4b, quot. 1646.

HOWLET.

Than fleis thow lyk ane *howlat* chest with crawis (Dunbar 11,219).
See OWL(3) below.

HUNGER.

fore It is sad in elderys saw:
"full harde is *hungyre* in hale maw" (*Legends* I,169,653-4).
For hym thoucht þat ane hard thraw,
Hungyr þan in till hail maw (Wyntoun II,159,199-200). Cheviot 175: hale man; Fergusson 44(370); Kelly 127(17); Ramsay 192(17): Hunger's hard upo' a hale heart.
See APPETITE(1) above.

HUNTER.

Thay cum to thair cummunione as to ane *huntaris* bankat (*Catholic* 167,30-1). Cf. Apperson 318: Hungry as a hunter; NED Hunter, 5d: hunter's mass; Oxford 310.

HURT.

The *hurt* of ane happie the uther makis (Henryson 39,1065).

ICE.

(1) lyk *yce* scho is als cauld (Montgomerie C 161,41). Apperson 106; Fergusson 117(1637); Whiting, *Ballad* 28.
(2) In flendris flaw . . .
As brukkyll *ice*, in litill pecis lap (Douglas IV,150,13-4).
(3) Nor latt thy selff be led vpoun the *yce* (*Sat. Poems* 192,116). Cf. M. Förster, "Die mittelenglische Sprichwörtersammlung in Douce 52," *Festschrift zum XII. allgemeinen Deutschen Neuphilologentage in München, 1906* (Erlangen, 1906) 48: He was neuer wyse þat went on þe yse.

IDLENESS.

Catone sais, þat suthfaste thing is,

þat *Idilnes* giffis novrysingis
to vicis (*Legends* I,1,1-3).
& welth had and *Idilnes,*
þat drew hyme in-to wantones (*Legends* II,313,311-2).
Than Lichery, that lathly cors,
Come berand lyk a bagit hors,
And *Ydilnes* did him leid (Dunbar 122,79-81).
Sick *ydilnes* [as] that ma nocht weill lest,
Bot insolence and vther vices mo (Stewart II,202,26174-5).
ȝe knaw gret cheir, gret eais, and *Ydelnes*
To Lychorie was mother and maistres (Lindsay I,84,967-8).
I traist (quod he) that wyckitnes
Generith, throw sleuthfull *ydilnes* (Lindsay I,236,1263-4).
To sleip at morrow in slummering *ydilness*
Quhilk of all vicis is the cheif portaress (Bannatyne II,180,67-8).
For *Idilnes* is Mother Radycall,
Of all vicis, and font originall (Rolland, *Court* 10,235-6).
As *Ydilnes* is mother of all vyce,
And Sluggishnes the very sone of shame (Montgomerie C 213,1-2).
Sene vyce oft tyms dois breid be *ydle* thocht (J. Stewart 10,1). Apperson 322: Idleness is the parent of all vice, Idleness is the root of all evil; Cato 597(i,2); Kissel 5(18); Oxford 313; Taylor 42; Whiting, *ED* 80, 104, 119, 146, 183, 212, 247.

INCH.

(1) And for ilk *ynch* he wyll the quyte a spane ("Good Counsel" in *Kingis Quair* 51,7,21). Cf. Kelly 113(11): Give you an Inch, and you'll take a Span; NED Inch, 2, quot. *a* 1350; Ramsay 179(21).

(2) Drie furth the *inch* as thou hes done the span (Montgomerie C 136,1). Cheviot 90; Fergusson 28(235); Kelly 84(6); NED Dree, 5, quot. *a* 1605; Oxford 158; Ramsay 173(36).

IND.

Quho had all riches unto *Ynd* (Dunbar 144,6).
Nane culd me saif, from thyne till *ynde* (*Ballatis* 61).
Is none so hable ar onto *Inde* (Maitland 238,29). Chaucer, *Romaunt A* 624, *CT* VI(C),721-2.

IRE.

. . . I pray ȝou, sir,
þat þu be nocht ourcumyne with *Ire*;
for Ire distroblis sa the thocht,
þat suthfastly deyme ma it nocht,
þocht he war neuire sa wyse a kyng,
as cattowne sais in his teching (*Legends* II,448,211-6). Cato 605 (ii,4). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* III(D), 2005 ff.; Oxford 10: Anger and haste.

IRON.

(1) He hit the *yron* quhyle it was het,
In case it sould grow cauld (Montgomerie C 44,1253-4). Apperson 605-6; Bradley 80; Chaucer, *TC* ii,1276; Fergusson 106(721); Green 31; Hyamson 199; Jente 25; Kelly 299(117); NED Iron, 9a; Oxford 626; Ramsay 225(48); Taylor 42; Whiting, *ED* 230, 244.

(2) having sa many *yrnes* in the fyre alredy (Melville 64).
Manie *yrons* in the fyre, sum will cull (Melvill II,481). Apperson 328; Hardie 469; Hyamson 199; Kelly 255(93); NED Iron, 9a; Oxford 405-6; Partridge 427; Ramsay 213(28).

IVORY.

quhois plesant hals is qyhytter than the *Evir* (Bannatyne III,305,18).

ʒour teith lyik *yuore* baine poleit (Maitland Quarto 116,89).
Qyhyt *ivory* hand (Montgomerie C 108,xxxix,5). Apperson 680; NED Ivory, 8b; Whiting, *Ballad* 28; Wilstach 472.

JACK.

(1) *Jak* in the bokis, for all thy mokis (*Sat. Poems* 163,78). Apperson 329; NED Jack-in-the-box, 1; Oxford 323.

(2) And *Jak* on baith the sydis will neuer do gude (*Sat. Poems* 55,100).
played prettelie the part of *Jak* on bathe the sydes (Melvill I,174). Apperson 330; Oxford 323. See HAND(10) above.

JANUARY.

ffor fresche Maii, and cauld *Ianuarye*
Aggreis nocht vyone ane sang in Iwne (Maitland 61,12-3). Apperson 332; NED May, sb.^{3}, 1d; Oxford 413.

JAY.

The gentyll *Ia* (Lindsay I,77,725). NED Jay, 1; Whiting, *ED* 317(185).

JET.

als blak as *Iet* (Montgomerie S 170,558). Apperson 51; Green 21; NED Jet, sb.^{1}, A, 1; Whiting, *Ballad* 28; Wilstach 21.

JOB.

Now pure as *Job* (Henryson 101,2944). Apperson 505; Fergusson 50(438); NED Job, sb.^{4}, 1; Oxford 510; Wilstach 298.

JOHN.

(1) For all the buddis of *Johne* Blunt (Dunbar 88,142).
Iok blunt (Montgomerie S 186,817). NED Jock, 1, John, 4; Oxford 326. Cf. Apperson 333: Joan.

(2) Fra drounkin schir *Iohne latynelesse* (Lindsay I,126,76). Cheviot 299; Kissel 37(169). Cf. NED Lack-Latin.

(3) God gif ye war *Johne* Thomsounis man (Dunbar 38-9,4,8,etc.).
Or efterwart ʒe sall repent
Quhen ʒe ar maid *Iohne* Thomsounis man (Rolland, *Seages* 152,4824-5 and p. 332). Cheviot 57, 222; Fergusson 54(459); Kelly 72(122); NED John, 4; Oxford 327.

(4) In contemplatioun of these articles arose this proverb: "Gud day, Sir *Johne*, whill Januar." "Welcum, Sir Johne, quhill Januar," &c. (Knox I,378, margin).

JOY.

(1) All eardlie *joy* for ane quhile dois bot lest (*Clariodus* 106,1767).
Na joy thair is in erth that ay will lest (Stewart I,69,2321).
I haif hard tell in mony jest and ryme,
All erthlie blythnes lestis bot ane tyme (Stewart III,134,46900-1).
ffor warldly *joy* lestis bot ane quhyle (Bannatyne II,179,55).
for eirthelie *Ioy* can nocht remane (Maitland 444,101).

(2) For it is nought new certanly
llast *Joye* þat sorow occupye (*Troy* 247,671-2).
Yit efter *joy* oftymes cummis cair,
And troubill efter grit prosperitie (Henryson 13,290-1).
Quhen men dois fleit in *joy* maist far,
Sone cumis wo, or thay be war (Dunbar 53,50-1).
All erdly *joy* returnis in pane (Dunbar 145-6,4,8, etc.)
Heir verifeit is that proverb tuiching so,
All erdly glaidnes fynysith with wo (Douglas II,67,22-3).
Temporall *joy* endis with wo and pane (Douglas II,171,28).
The poet sais, as it is richt weill kend,
Of erthlie *joy* displesour is the end;
Efter blythnes and greit tranquillitie,
Succeidis wo and greit miseritie (Stewart I,516,16060-3).

Of warldlie *Ioy* it is weill kend,
That sorrow bene the fatall end (Lindsay I,177,1183-4).
And diuers times it hes bene hard and sene,
That efter most *Ioy* followis aduersitie (Rolland, *Court* 27,373-4). Apperson 3: After joy comes sorrow; Kissel 2(6); Lydgate, *Fall* I,97,3517-8, *Troy* II,516,4230, III,746,6222-3); *Proverbs* xiv,13; Taylor 43.

(3) For in the warld ȝe wait thair is no pane,
Nor ȝit na *joy* at all tyme will remane (Stewart I,9,308-9). See BALE(2) above.

KALE-LEAF.

In it he left nocht scant worth ane *kaill leif* (Stewart III,412,56288).

KENTISH MAN.

you that haif wissit me to be ane *kentys man*, quylk in a manner is ane centaure half man, half beast (Buchanan 57). Apperson 338; Oxford 333.

KEY.

and hart cald as a *key* (Douglas I,26,25).

And left my corps als cold as ony *kie* (Montgomerie C 109,xli,6). Apperson 106; Fergusson 117(1635); Gower, *CA* III,173,244-6; NED Key, sb.[1], 1b.

KID.

With mony schout ay squeilland like a *kid* (Stewart II,525,36172).

KIN.

A man may be of grit *kin* and rycht littill worth (Bannatyne III,9,31-2; Maitland 160,32: of gud kyn and be lytill; Fortescue 264,[27]: good kynne).

KIND.

(1) "Now is anis," said the Coilȝear, "*kynd* aucht to creip" (*Rauf* 86,126). Apperson 385: Love (34); Cheviot 226; Fergusson 70(555): Kindnesse; Jente 621; Kelly 226(8); Oxford 336; Ramsay 204(20); Whiting, *ED* 18, 93.

(2) for, as we vse to say, thay had it be *kynd* and coft it not (Fergusson, *Tracts* 63). Cheviot 135, cf. 226; Fergusson 47(585); Kelly 152(198); Oxford 336.

KINDNESS.

See UNKINDNESS below.

KING.

(1) Ane *king* sekand tresoun he may fynd land (Bannatyne III,8,2-3; Maitland 159,2; Fortescue 263,[2]: shall fynde it in his lond).

Ane *kyng* seikand treasone, may find land! (Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 9).

(2) Forsuith ane *King* suld wirk nathing, but auisement (Rolland, *Seages* 170,5439). See COUNSEL(1) above.

(3) yea, to the Prince also, give perhappes my naked narratives, and bitter objurgations agans Byschopes cum to his long eares (Hume 182,-649-50). Fergusson 70(562); Henderson 39. Cf. Oxford 339.

(4) A king but letteris lykynnit Is in deid
Vnto a crovnit ass þat no gud can (Asloan I,101,632-3). Apperson 341; NED Ass, 1c, quot. 1868.

KINGDOM.

See GRACE(3) above.

KINSH.

I can not chuse; my *kinsh* is not to cast (Montgomerie C 107,xxxvii,7).

For I hawe leirnid to countt my *kinch* (Montgomerie S 199,32). NED Kinch 3. See STOT below.

KIRK.

Obey weill to þe *kirk* And thow sall fair the better (Bannatyne III,8-9,26-7; Maitland 160,26: haly kirk; Fortescue 264,[22]: the good kirke).

KITCHEN.

bot mair cure had of the *keching* nor of the queir (Winzet I,11). Cf. A. Hamilton Thompson, ed., *Visitations of Religious Houses in the Diocese of Lincoln* (Lincoln Record Society, 21, 1929) III,236.

KNET.

The faster *knet*, the harder throw (J. Stewart 119,7).

KUIF.

"The *kuif* is weill wairit þat twa home bringis,"
This proverb, peild pellet, to þe is applyit (Montgomerie S 150,259-60). NED Ware, v.², d, quotes this passage, reading "cuff", but gives no help under that word. Cf. Apperson 490-1: The penny is well spent that gets the pound. See HEN(5) above.

LABOR, SB.

grit *lawbor* and cure Makis a man auld (Bannatyne III,10,65-6; Maitland 161,62; Fortescue 265,[58]: care, garres).

LABOR, VB.

Qui non laborat non menduceth,
This bene in Inglis toung to treit,
Quho *labouris* nocht he sall not eit (Lindsay II,250,2649-51 and IV,213-4). Apperson 711: Work(1), quot. 1633; Kissel 34(151); Oxford 730; Taylor 69; Whiting, *ED* 195.

LAKE(1).

the Ladies white as *lake* (*Eger* 225,723, 241,981, 333,2497, 335,2511, 345,2687).
Hir lillie lyre as þe *Laik* (Bannatyne III,286,14).
quhytter than the *laik* (J. Stewart 50,92). NED Lake, sb.⁵; Whiting, *ED* 318(196).

LAKE(2).

Quhen þe lele man in þe *lak* will ly (*Thre Prestis* 20,284).

LAMB.

(1) Meik in Chalmer, lyk ane *lame*;
Bot, in the Feild, ane Campioun,
Rampand lyke ane wyld Lyoun (Lindsay I,152,234-6).
gentill and meak lyk a lamb in the house, bot lyk a lyon in the feildis (Melville 257). Apperson 348-9; Cheviot 232.

(2) Mek as a *lame* scho has þe send (*Legends* II,371,103; Stewart II,449,33788; Rolland, *Seages* 150,4774). Chaucer, *CT* VIII(G),199; Oxford 234; Whiting, *ED* 318(197).

(3) tame lyk ony *lammis* (Dunbar 59,17).
God tamde him lyk a *lamb* (Melvill I,135). *Jacob's* Well, ed. A. Brandeis (EETS, 115, 1900) 268,23; Thoms 189.

(4) Semdill is sene, quhair euir men ryde or saill,
An *lamb* to haif ane fraudfull fox[is] taill (Stewart II,617, 39115-6). See WOLF(3) below.

(5) lyk as ane *lambe* led they him to sacrefice (Pitscottie II,59,3-4). J. Audelay, *Poems*, ed. Ella K. Whiting (EETS, 184, 1931) 55,7-8; Skelton I,166,25. Cf. Chaucer, *CT* II(B),617-8).

LAMBER.

And fand hir madinnis, sweit as *Lammer* (Lindsay I,172,1008, II,22,152, 72,804). NED Lamber¹.

LAMP.

As lucent *lamp* so leimit he of licht (*Clariodus* 2,20).
Lucent as *lampe* and leming in his weid (*Clariodus* 79,885).
Thir Knichts as two *lampis* leiming licht (*Clariodus* 80,917).
Sir Charles . . . as ane *lamp* schyning (*Clariodus* 343,1974).

LANCE.

Scharp as ane *lance* (*Clariodus* 119,181). Roxburghe IV,63,5: Her eyes like sharp Launces late gave me a wound.

LAND.

(1) That is full euill wyn *land*
To have quhill thow ar leuand,
Sine at thine end hell (*Rauf* 112,918-20).

(2) And larg[e]ly emang his men
The *landis* of Scotland delt he then.
Of othir mennis landis large wes he (Barbour I,277,146-8).
They ar beusier dealinge the Protestantis *landis* heir, nor the King is in dealinge of thers (Colville 262).

LANTERN.

(1) With gude girgettis as ane *lantren* lycht (Stewart I,140,4673, 309,9777, 407,12700, 495,15402). C. Brown, *English Lyrics of the XIIIth Century* (Oxford, 1932) 148,21-2: Hire lure lumes liht Ase a launterne a-nyht; Skelton II,149,696-7.

(2) Lyk till *lawntryns* it illumynyt so cler (Harry 371,1255).
With mony baner brodin wes full bricht,
Lyke ony *lanterne* kest ane aureat lycht (Stewart II,320,29729-30).
. . . and with birneis bricht,
Lyke ony *Lanterne* lemit all of licht (Stewart III, 232, 50121-3).
That lyk a *lanterne* schynit to thame suir (Maitland Quarto 281,36).

LARK.

Nor ȝit the *Lark*, in fresche morning of May [so blithe] (Rolland, *Seages* 273,8965). Williams 194, 249; Wilstach 24.

LAST.

. . . rekis nocht a *laste*
hou foule ore vnfaire we be (*Legends* II,207,102-3). NED Last, sb.[1], 1.

LATE.

Bettir *late* thrive then never thrive (Knox I,127).

Far better *late* than never thryve (Montgomerie C 30,814). Apperson 44; Bradley 81; Fergusson 20(159); Hardie 462; Kelly 55(2); Oxford 40; Ramsay 167(63); Taylor 44.

LAUREL.

A birde, yat was as ony *lawrare gren* (*Lancelot* 3,82). Cf. Chaucer, *CT* IV(E), 1465-60.

LAVE.

Omnis consummacionis I saw þat ende,
Þe prophet said, lik to commende:
Al the *laif* gud, and sa gud ende,
In all statis I þat commende.
Al the laif gud, and sa gud fyne,
Makis al þe sowme gud, said Hendyne (Wyntoun VI,257,1-6). Cf. Karl Kneuer, *Die Sprichwörter Hendyngs* (Weilheim, 1901) 16: Well is him þat wel ende mai *and* God beginning makeþ god endyng.

LAW.

Men glosiss the *law* oft aganis the pure (Bannatyne III,8,8-9; Maitland 159,8: Mony man; Fortescue 263,[8]: Many one). Cf. Cheviot 341: The poor man is ay put to the warst; Huc de Rotelande, *Ipomedon*, ed. E. Kölbing and E. Koschwitz (Breslau, 1889) 142,8404: Ke povres hom n'at en curt lai; Kelly 314(90); Oxford 353: Law for the rich; Ramsay 230(91).

LEAD.

(1) With bakkis blewe as *lede* (*Kingis Quair* 38,153). Whiting, *ED* 318(201).

(2) Calder nor þe *leid* (Bannatyne IV,99,18; *Philotus* 113,282). Fergusson 117(1636).

(3) Harland his wery lymmis dolf as *leid* (Douglas II,252,5, IV,35,18, 38,9). Cf. NED Dowf, A.

(4) Haw as the *Leid* (Henryson 114,257; Douglas I,19,27; Stewart I,20,666, II,534,36459; J. Stewart 39,329). NED Haw.

(5) for þai hewy ware as *lede* (*Legends* I,473,530; Harry 27,309).
My hairt is lyk the *lead* (Montgomerie C 151,24). Apperson 296; Green 19; Hardie 467; NED Lead, 1c; Taylor 39; Whiting, *Ballad* 28, *ED* 319(201); Wilstach 198.

(6) Ar leyn and lauchtane as the *leid* (Maitland 206,15). NED Lauchtane.

(7) With heuy cheir, and cullour paill as *leid* (Lindsay I,18,475). C. Horstmann, *Sammlung Altenglischer Legenden* (Heilbronn, 1878) 180,521; Roxburghe VI,662.

(8) Sad as the *leid* (Dunbar 128,20). NED Sad, 7, quot. *c.* 1638. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 319(201).

(9) Rollit our the ryver cullorit as the *leid* (Douglas III,29,32). Lydgate, *Troy* III,608,1526.

(10) his lyre was lyke the *Leid* (Henryson 110,155, 140,351).

(11) Hir hew was wan and wallowed as the *leid* (Dunbar 128,25). Chaucer, *CT* VIII(G),728; Whiting, *ED* 319(201).

LEAF.

(1) bair as *leife* on lind (Bannatyne II,192,32).

(2) Now grene as *leif* (Henryson 113,238).

(3) Yit sall be licht as *leif* of the lynd lest,
That welteris doun with the wynd, sa wauerand it is (*Golagros* 10-1, 289-90).
His heart was light as *leaf* on tree (*Roswall* 21,571; Henryson 153,66).
Leicht as ane *leif* (Stewart I,381,11939).
Syne vp and doun, als lycht as *leif* of lynd (Stewart II,525,36169, III,267,-51307; Bannatyne IV,26,8). Apperson 368; Chaucer, *CT* IV(E),1211; NED Light, *a.*^{1}, 1; Whiting, *Ballad* 28, *ED* 319(202). See LIND below.

(4) . . . ma wormis hes thow beschittin
Nor thair is . . . *leif* on lind (Dunbar 11,195-6). Chaucer, HF 1945-7. Cf. Laud 287,9737.

(5) Quaikand for dreid as ony *leif* of tre (Stewart III,43,43872). Whiting, *Chaucer* 166, *ED* 319(202).

(6) Trymland for dreid As dois the *leif* on trie (Bannatyne II,125,22). NED Leaf, 1a, quot. 1413; S. Rowlands, *Complete Works,* ed. S. J. H. Herrtage (Hunterian Club, 1880) II, c, 46; J. Shirley, *Dramatic Works,* ed. A. Dyce (6 vols., London, 1833) I,248.

LEAP.

(1) Quha cuvattis farrest to *leip* mon quhylumis gang abak (Bannatyne III,10,69-70).
Quha preissis farrest to *leip* is able gang abak (Maitland 161,66).
He that wotes when to lepe, will somtyme loke a bak (Fortescue 265,[62]). Cf. Oxford 535: Recoil. See RAM(1) below.

(2) The Douglas said, he suld haif gart him *leip*
Thre lowpis in ane, and he had nocht bene than
Ane preist or freir (Stewart III,447,57477-9). NED Leap, 2, quot. 1535.

LEARN.

Fle alwayis frome þe snair;
Lerne at me to be ware (Scott 82,19-20). Cf. Oxford 40: Better learn, 718: Wise men learn. See LERE below.

LEAVE OFF.

Is nane sa gude as *leif of,* and mak na mair stryfe (*Rauf* 88,172). NED Leave, v^1, 14c(c), quot. c 1475.

LEDE.

in *lede* es noghte to layne (*Awntyrs* 123,83).
in *leid* nocht to layne it (*Howlat* 56,267).

LEEK.

(1) I cair thaim nocht a *leike* (*Sat. Poems* 177,87; Bannatyne, *Memoriales* 88). Cf. NED Leek, 3.

(2) I compt ȝow noᵗ a *leik* (Scott 13,146; Bannatyne IV,14,17; *Philotus* 123,550). Cf. NED Leek, 3.

(3) na gyfis nocht of þe a *leke* (*Legends* II,198,777). Laud 197,6664. Cf. NED Leek, 3.

(4) they raik not by a *leik* (Hume 42,27).

(5) Quhat is he now? No fallow wourth ane leik (Douglas I,119,20; Lindsay II,76,837; *Sat. Poems* 269,205: twa leikis; Bannatyne III,7,47, 35,30; Montgomerie C 47,1374; *Philotus* 114,307). Apperson 457(22); NED Leek, 3; Oxford 360; Whiting, *ED* 352(679).

LEND.

Quhen I *len* I am a freynd
And quhen I craif I am vnkynd
Thus of my freynd I mak a fo
I schrew me and I moir do so (Bannatyne III,43,7-10, cf. II,324,11-3). Apperson 678; Oxford 361; *Reliquiæ* I,208,259. Cf. Apperson 360: Lend(1); Kelly 240(90). See HOLD(3) above.

LEOPARD.

The erll of Carrik, schir Eduard,
That stowtar wes than ane *libbard* (Barbour II,1,1-2, 46,523-4). *Guy of Warwick*, ed. G. Schleich (Palaestra, 139, Leipzig, 1923) 209,6946.

LERE.

Quhen ȝe haif lost, it is too lait to *leir* (Montgomerie C 177, 39). Cf. Apperson 442: Never too late to learn; Oxford 450.

LETTERS.

Als mony abbais foundit he
As *letteris* ar in the A B C (Wyntoun IV,148,235-6). Cf. *Choyce Drollery* (1656), ed. J. W. Ebsworth (Boston, Linc., 1876) 45: She was as full of Leachery As letters in a book.

LEVEN.

(1) This Tarchon, ardent as the fyry *levin* (Douglas IV,66,25). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 319(204).

(2) . . . and dartis sevin
Alsammyn thai kest, forcy as fyry *levin* (Douglas III,304,25-6). Cf. Whiting, *ED* 319(204).

LEWTY.

(1) And in *lawtie* there is no lack (*Eger* 299,1908). See LOVE(7) below.

(2) *Leavte* to luff is gretumly;
Throuch leavte luffis men rychtwisly:
With a wertu [of] leavte
A man may ȝeit sufficyand be;
And but leawte may nane haiff price,
Quhethir he be wycht or he be wyss;
For quhar it failȝeys, na wertu
May be off price, na off valu,
To mak a man sa gud, that he
May symply gud man callyt be (Barbour I,16,365-74).
For it is said in Proverb: "But *lawte*
All uther vertewis ar nocht worth ane fle" (Henryson 78,2285-6). Apperson 456(12).

LIE.

(1) I saie no more, but, *Mendacem oportet esse memorem*: He that should tell a *lye*, had nede to haue good memory (*Complaynt* 224). Apperson 361: Liar(4); Cheviot 235; Fergusson 6(17); Kelly 50(323); NED

Liar, a; Oxford 363; Ramsay 157(38); Whiting, *ED* 166.

(2) for I fynd suthfastnes,
þat al men sais, is nocht *les* (*Legends* II,105,205-6).
All may not be *leiss* That every man sayiss (Bannatyne III,9,41-2; Maitland 160,42: mony; not in Fortescue). NED Lie, sb.[1], 1a, quot. 1820. Cf. Apperson 647(15); Fergusson 62(508); Kelly 187(83); Oxford 672. See TRUE below.

LIFE.

(1) To euirilk man as it is rycht weill kend
Ane vicious *lyfe* makis ane wickit end (Stewart I,167,5506-7).
Thair wickit *lyfe* suld make ane rycht euill end (Stewart I,352,11086).
The wyss man sais that it is rycht oft kend,
Ane wickit *lyfe* man mak ane wickit end (Stewart I,522,16250-1).
That vicious *lyfe* makis oft ane euyll endyng (Lindsay I,37,1107). Apperson 193(12); Fergusson 8(59); Kelly 50(324); Kissel 6(22); *Matthew* xxvi,52; Oxford 316; *Proverbs* xi,5; *Psalms* xxxiv,21; Ramsay 160(17).

(2) he hes a gratius *lyfe* That can be content. (Bannatyne III,10,59-60; not in Maitland; Fortescue 264,[52]: blessid lyef . . . holdes him). Cf. Apperson 112: Content; W. Horman, *Vulgaria* (London, 1519) 67: He is a foole / that can nat holde hym selfe cōtent when he is well at ease; Pepys III,214,4: If there be content, there will comfort be seen.

(3) . . . my wyf,
Þat I haf lowyt as my *lyfe* (*Legends* I,384,383-4, II,93,836-7; *Clariodus* 30,917, 44,1373; Stewart II,249,27573, 518,35956, III,390,55514; Lindsay I,279,2695. II,56,594; Rolland, *Seages* 200,6424; Bannatyne II,174,20). Gower, *CA* III,107,5886-7; Whiting, *ED* 319(206). See HEART(1) above.

LIGHT.

We sat ouir far into oure awin *licht* (Stewart II,73,22316). Apperson 599-600; Oxford 618: Stand.

LIKE.

for *lyk* to lyk accordis wele (*Legends* I,23,543).
& in proverbe I haf hard say
þat *lyk* to lyk drawis ay (*Legends* I,226,133-4).
So is the natuir baith of puir and ryik,
As wysmen sayis, ay *lyke* drawis to lyke (Stewart III,6,42656-7).
"*Like* will to like," the proverb sais:
You know the old said sa (*Sat. Poems* 74,155-6). Apperson 367-8; Cheviot 237; Fergusson 72(571); Henderson 7; Jente 365; Kelly 231(18); NED Like, C, 2; Oxford 368-9; Ramsay 207(8); Taylor 45; Whiting, *ED* 122, 127, 128, 273.

LILY.

(1) And scho als fresch as is the *lillie* floure (*Clariodus* 240,1566). Lydgate, *Troy* I,256,3921-2.

(2) Louelich and *lilie* whit (*Pistill* 173,16; Douglas II,17,19, 26,17; Lindsay I,119,58, II,52,557).
quhyte as *Lillie* flour (Henryson 118,373; Stewart I,109,3680).
whill that hir hyd as lustie *lillie* quhyt (*Claridous* 136,723).
hir halse as *lillie* quhyte (*Clariodus* 201,323).
. . . hir face, that was alse quhyte
As the illustar *lillie* of delyte (*Clariodus* 228,1189-90).
Hir deasie colour, rid and vhyte,
Lyk *lilies* on the laik (Montgomerie C 143,41-2). Apperson 680; Hyamson 359; NED Lily, 1; Whiting, *Ballad* 28-9, *Chaucer* 167, *ED* 320(210).

(3) My lyre as the *lely* (*Awntyrs* 129,162; Bannatyne II,262,22, III,291,8). Hir *Lilly* lyre (Henryson 140,351; Montgomerie C 275,65). Lyke the quhyte *lyllie* wes hir lyre (Lindsay I,171,947). ȝour *lillie* lippis (Montgomerie S 195,29). NED Lily, 1; Whiting, *ED* 320(210).

(4) Was set a Quene, as *lyllie* sweit of swair (Douglas I,10,18).

(5) Over uther flouris as dois the *lilie* faire (*Clariodus* 144,990). See FLOWER(6) above.

LIME.

And mony one it lampis in the *lyme* (Stewart I,107,3623).
Thinkand he sould be lampit in the *lyme* (Stewart III,355,54326, 433,56985). See BIRD-LIME above.

LIND.

Licht as the *lynd* (Dunbar 171,16; Douglas III,284,31-2).
Als licht as *lyn* or ony leif of tre (Stewart I,359,11275). Whiting, *ED* 320(212). Cf. Apperson 368. See LEAF(3) above.

LINE.

(1) Ewyn as a *lyne* fra est to west (Wyntoun II,75,864). Whiting, *ED* 320(213).

(2) Thair veyage furth contenand richt as *line* (Douglas I,32,26). Apperson 531; Whiting, *ED* 320(213).

(3) als straught as ony *lyne* (*Kingis Quair* 37,151; *Clariodus* 2,45). Apperson 604-5; Chaucer, *TC* ii,1461; Green 31; Oxford 624; Wilstach 392.

LION.

(1) Let us nocht say with the slugart, "Ther is a *lyon* in the way" (Melvill I,287). NED Lion, 2b; Oxford 370; *Proverbs* xxvi,13.

(2) For as the awfull *lyoun* beirs the croune,
I meane of beists, as terrestriall campioun;
So is he alse stronge of all etheriall myndis (*Clariodus* 226,1115-7).

(3) His hede he bair as ane *lyoun* (*Alexander* I,22,670).
His corage grew in ire as a *lyoune* (Harry 39,173).
he rydeth feircely out of the towne
as he were a wild *Lyon* (*Eger* 244,663-4).
like a *lyon* in his woodest time (*Eger* 274,990).
In his wodnes like till ane wyld *lyoun* (Stewart II,126,23905).
. . . thairfoir lyke ane *lyoun*
To keip his cors that tyme he tuke na cuir (Stewart III,449,57529-30).
Lyke wod *Lyonis*, cairfullie cryand (Lindsay I,12,265).
And, lyke wyld *Lyounis* furious,
Thay layd ane seige about the hous (Lindsay I,162,629-30).
That he was like ane wyld *Lyoun* (Lindsay I,163,647).
With luik lyke *Lyounes* (*Sat. Poems* 268,190). NED Lion, 3; Whiting, *Chaucer* 166, 269, *ED* 320(214).

(4) And to his fa awfull as ane *lyoun* (Stewart III,161,47756).

(5) Lyke ony *lyoun* he wes als brym and bald (Stewart II,461,34142). NED Breme, 5b.

(6) sua he dois seme mair cruell in this caice
then fers *lyounis* (Maitland Quarto 211,78-9). Chaucer, *LGW* 627; NED Cruel, 2.

(7) fell as the *lyoun* (Rolland, *Court* 9,220). Chaucer, *CT* I(A),2630; NED Fell 1.

(8) als fers as a *lyoun* (Harry 21,113; *Clariodus* 52,48, 125,390, 148,1114; Stewart II,290,28817; Montgomerie S 219,10). Chaucer, *CT* I(A),1598; NED Lion, 1a; Whiting, *ED* 320(214); Wilstach 139.

(9) As fresshe as a *lyone* þat fautes þe fille (*Awntyrs* 158,574; *Eger* 245,1035).

Guy of Warwick, ed. J. Zupitza (EETS ES, 25-6, 1875-6) 232,8078. Cf. NED Fresh, 10, 11a.

(10) As furious *lyounis* eiger to the field (*Clariodus* 2,39).
He was in fight furious as ane *lyoun* (*Clariodus* 147,1104, 161,1552, 318,1168, 352,2276). Lydgate, *Fall* II,466,4915, *Troy* II,546,5246.

(11) Mars maid me hardie like ane feirs *lyoun* (Lindsay I,190,69). Chaucer, *TC* v,830.

(12) For scho was as ane *lyoun* alse keine (*Clariodus* 60,294). Cf. NED Keen, 2c.

(13) As *lyoun* licht and as ane boir als bald (Stewart I,309,9781). *The Sege of Jerusalem*, ed. G. Steffler (Marburg, 1891) 10,759. Cf. NED Light, *a.*^{1}, 15.

(14) As . . . *lion* wight (*Roswall* 24,273).

(15) Him to behold, quhilk as ane *lyoun* wod
Never seicit to sched his foes bluid (*Clariodus* 124,369-70).
He fairis alse wode as *lyoun* in ane rage (*Clariodus* 345,2035; Stewart II,585,38108). Gower, *CA* III,101,5684; NED Wood, 3.

(16) For he berit as ane *lyoun* in rage (*Alexander* II,221,4140). Cf. NED Bere, Lion, 1a, quot. *a* 1687; Wilstach 326.

(17) Thay brayit on utheris lyke *lyounis* and bairis (*Clariodus* 344,2015).

(18) Defendand him as ane *lyoun* (*Alexander* III,249,5053). *Guy of Warwick*, ed. J. Zupitza (EETS ES, 25-6, 1875-6) 54,1890, 97,3379, 140,4895.

(19) As swift *lyouns* desyrous of thair pray (*Clariodus* 148,1109).

(20) And skaillit them full wyde before his face,
As the fearse *lyoun* dois small beistis chase (*Clariodus* 319,1195-6). Laud 259,8776-7; *Merlin*, ed. H. B. Wheatley (EETS 10, 21, 36, 112, 1865-99) 663.

(21) He farith as o *lyoun* (*Lancelot* 98,3331).

(22) And like an *lyoun* in that feild he fuir (Stewart I,635,19621, 19646-7, II,216,26611, III,165,47882). *Altenglische Legenden*, ed. C. Horstmann (Heilbronn, 1881) 98,104, 171,594; Robert of Gloucester I,447,6142.

(23) faucht lik ane *Lyoun* (*Alexander* II,234,4558; *Eger* 281,1584). *Guy of Warwick*, ed. J. Zupitza (EETS ES, 42, 49, 59, 1883-91) 209,3600; NED Lion 1a; Whiting, *Ballad* 29. Cf. Chaucer, *CT* I(A),1656.

(24) As *lyoune*, for falt of fude, faught on the fold (*Golagros* 33,961). *Seege* 110,1403-4: As an wod lyoun ferde he Þat hadde fast dayes þreo.

(25) Lyk to o *lyone* into the feld he gais (*Lancelot* 32,1095).

(26) Than lowry as ane *lyon* lap (Bannatyne II,264,91). Whiting, *ED* 320(214).

(27) Evin as ane *lyoun* lowsit out of band (Stewart II,594,38399).
Than, lyke ane *Lyone* lowsit of his Caige,
Out throuch this realme I gan to reil and rage (Lindsay I,134,153-4).
As houngrie *Lyou*[*n*], lousit out of a band,
Sum benefice I bocht or euer it vaikit (*Sat. Poems* 196,90-1).
to raige as ane *lyone* that war lowsit of his band (Pitscottie II,8,16-7).

(28) Out throw the feild he playit the *lyoun* (*Clariodus* 353,2294). Chaucer, *TC* i,1074; Lydgate, *Siege of Thebes*, ed. A. Erdmann and E. Ekwall (EETS ES, 108, 125, London, 1911-30) I,172,4200.

(29) Thar he begynyth in his fers curag

(30) As furious *lyoun* raiging ferce and fell (*Clariodus* 24,749).
Ran rageand lyke one wylde *Lyoun* (Lindsay I,252,1784).

(31) . . . na is nocht crouss
To ramp as *lyone* in thar houss (*Foly* 57,195-6). Chaucer, *CT* III(D),1989; *Ecclesiasticus* iv,30.

(32) and rampand as a *Lyoun* rewanuss (Henryson 133,121; *Clariodus* 3,67.

52,33-4; Stewart II,361,30987, III,148,47347; Lindsay I,152,236). Laud 418,14197; Lydgate, *Siege of Thebes* (as in [28] above) I,91,2197.

(33) As wood *lyons* they wrought that time (*Eger* 275,1512).
Than, as wod *lyoun*, ruschyt he in the fycht (Douglas III,319,8).

See LAMB(1) above.

LIONESS.

out of wyt for wa scho ferd,
as a *lyones* come ful thra,
þat men had tane þe quhelpis fra (*Legends* I,453,436-8). Cf. NED Lioness, quot. 1813. See WOMAN(4) below.

LIPS.

Sic *lipps*, sic lattouce; lordis and lownes (*Sat. Poems* 367,433). Apperson 366; Like; Fergusson 88(741); Kelly 241(91); NED Lettuce, 2; Oxford 371; Whiting, *ED* 129.

LITTLE.

(1) For I of *lytill* wald be fane (Dunbar 31,87). Fergusson 14(123): A poore man is fain of little.

(2) Ȝe may consaue be this twich
That oft of *littill* cumis mich (Bannatyne IV,296,475-6). Apperson 398: Many a little, quot. *a* 1225; Kelly 254(86); Oxford 404. Cf. Jente 760; Kelly 253(78); Ramsay 212(26); Whiting, *ED* 149.

(3) ffor littill mair or less Mak thow na debait (Bannatyne III,9,54-5; Maitland 161,55; Fortescue 264,[47]).

LIVE.

(1) Richt so as he *leuit* siclike endit he,
Richt full of malice and of greit dispyte (Stewart III,213,49482-3). Cf. Apperson 374: Live(17), 396: Man(47); Mirk 194,22: Thus algatys a curset lyfuyng schewythe a fowle end; Whiting, *ED* 99. See LIFE(1) above.

(2) He that wold *leif* most lerne to dy (Bannatyne II,47-50,8,16, etc.).

LOAN.

For *lane*, tha sa, suld ay cum lauchand hame (Stewart II,720,42469). Apperson 376; Fergusson 6(29); Kelly 6(31); Oxford 572: Seldom; Ramsay 153(8).

LOCK.

quhairof serwis the *lok* and the theif in the houss (Bannatyne III,9,36-7; Maitland 160,37; Fortescue 264,[31]).

LOOK.

Atend ye, and mend ye,
That loups befoir ye *luke* (Burel 49).
advysedlie sould *luik* then loup (Maitland Quarto 246,2).
I wiss we *lukit* or we lap (Montgomerie C 48,1395).
Proud ee, that *looked* not befor thou lap (Montgomerie C 167,71).
I wald ȝe *lookit* or ȝe lap (Montgomerie C 178,55).
Luik quhair thow lycht befoir thow loip (Montgomerie S 34,444).
And raschnes ruid, louping or he did *luik* (J. Stewart 240,163). Apperson 380; Bradley 83; Cheviot 147; Fergusson 42(357), 47(584), 75(988); Hardie 464; Hyamson 226; Kelly 147(165), 230(5); Oxford 383; Ramsay 209(40); Taylor 45; Whiting, *ED* 129, 139.

LOOSE.

keping thame selfe as the auld Erll of Angus said, to be *loos* and levand (Colville 50). Cheviot 241: Loose and living, and bound to no man; Kelly 400(5).

LORD.

(1) |Na wicht can serue twa *Lordis* I wis (*Ballatis* 83). Apperson 449; Bradley

84; Fergusson 83(1095); Hyamson 311; Oxford 455; Whiting, *ED* 232.

(2) For quhylis I fair alsweill as ony *Lord* (Henryson 10,221). Cf. NED Lord, 8b; Wilstach 238.

(3) That euery man, als frie as ony *lard* (Stewart III,322,53194).

(4) Sen ellis thow art vnknawin,
To make me *Lord* of my awin (*Rauf* 86,127-8). Cf. NED Lord, 2b.

LOST.

See LERE above.

LOVE.

(1) The prouerb sayis, "als gude *lufe* cummis as gais" (Henryson 21,512; Lindsay II,175,1726; Bannatyne IV,21,63, 22,8).
Als gud *luve* cūis as gaiss,
  Or raþir bettir (Scott 72,29-30).
Adew, as gude *lufe* cūis as gaiss,
  Go chuss ane vdir and forȝet hir (Scott 74,22-3).
For ȝe saw nevir so fair a caik
of meill þat miller mais
bot ȝit ane man wald get the maik
As gud *luve* cumis as gais (Bannatyne IV,8,45-8). Fergusson 17(170); Kissel 10(42); NED Love, 8a; Oxford 389.

(2) Thow [*Cupid*] loviss þame þat lowdest leis,
And followis fastest on þame fleis (Scott 83,19-20).
For, folou *love*, they say, and it will flie.
Wald ȝe be lovd, this lessone mon ȝe leir;
Flie vhylome love, and it will folou thee (Montgomerie C 195,22-4).
Thus sayit, "flie *luif* and it will fallow the" (Montgomerie S 221,10). Apperson 222; Fergusson 32(277); Kelly 106(41); Oxford 213. Cf. Chaucer, *CT* III(D),515-20.

(3) *luiffe* is blind (Montgomerie S 202,26). Apperson 384; Bradley 83; NED Love, 8a; Oxford 389; Taylor 45; Whiting, *ED* 222, 251, 288, 289, 296. See CUPID above.

(4) Ȝit I must say, as sooth men oft hes said:
Love maks the choyce, bot Fortun maks the cha[nce] (Montgomerie C 176,xxxii,7-8).
Love maid my chose, bot Fortun maid my ch[ance] (Montgomerie C 192,36).

(5) Quhyle hett, quhyle cald [in *love*] (Scott 79,24).
Hir licherous *luife*, quhilk kindlit ouer hait,
Cauld hes it cuild (*Sat. Poems* 40,28-9).
Cauld cauld culis the *lufe* that kendillis our het (Bannatyne III,343-4,4,8, etc.). Apperson 315; Cheviot 74, 166; Fergusson 26(223); Kelly 81(33); Oxford 307; Ramsay 170(10), 209(50); Whiting, *ED* 103, 122, 142, 215.

(6) For *lufe* hes non at feid
Bot fulis þat can not fle (Scott 85,7-8).
Mak this a maxime to remane,
That *Love* beirs nane bot fools at feid (Montgomerie C,140,x,3-4).

(7) thay say *lufe* hes na lak (Rolland, *Seages* 271,8895). Apperson 384; Fergusson 69(909), 72(576), 75(992); Kelly 240(85); Oxford 390. See LEWTY(1) above.

(8) And *lufe* oft turnis hir feiris to tray and tene (Rolland, *Court* 27,375). Cf NED Tray, sb.^{1}; Whiting, *ED* 268.

(9) Ȝit neuirtheles lordschip hes sic ane law,
Quhair euir it be that it desyris aw,
He said full suith and neuir ane word did rave,

That *lufe* and lordschip wald na fallow have (Stewart I,500,15560-3). Apperson 384; Cheviot 242; Oxford 388; Ramsay 209(44).

(10) Some be ane proverbe fane wald prove,
Quha skantly nevir sau the scuills,
That *love* with resone is no love,
Nor constance, vhare occasion cools (Montgomerie C 141,25-8).
Quhair *luife* dois Reule No Resone may refraine (J. Stewart 53,1). Cf. Apperson 384: Love and knowledge live not together. See BUTTON(3) above.

(11) Boece said of poyettis þt wes flour
Thot *lufe* be sweit oft syiss it is full sour (Bannatyne III,32,47-8). J. C., *Alcilia* in Arber IV,274: he that loves, must taste both sweet and sour; Oxford 390: Love is sweet in the beginning but sour in the ending.

See DEAD MAN, HEART(2) above, SUN(1), SWEET(3) below.

LOVE,VB.(1).

(1) but all men in *louing* shall neuer be wise (*Eger* 256,798).
Thair is no ma[n], I say, that ca[n]
Both *lufe* and to be wyiss (Scott 81,17-8). Apperson 387: Love(14); Oxford 388. See WISEST below.

(2) Syk as þow lufis, syk art þow lyk (*Consail* 66,26). Oxford 368: Like loves like. See COMPANY(1) above.

(3) The man that *loves*, and als is leel,
Is worthiest to keep counsel (*Eger* 231,795-6). Cf. Fergusson 17(162): A leall hairt lyed never.

(4) A man weill *luvit* he is not pure (Bannatyne III,10,64-5; Maitland 161,61: He þat is; Fortescue 265,[57]: He that is). Cf. Roxburghe VII,98,53: True love is better than Gold or Treasure.

LOVE,VB.(2).

(1) For first to *lofe* and syne to lak, Peter! it is schame (*Rauf* 85,87).
they *loif* it, they lak it (Montgomerie S 166,516). NED Love, v.², 1b.

(2) This auld proverb amang ws lang rycht couth,
Saying, the *loving* in ane mannis mouth,
Maid of him self, stinkis lyke ony fen
Into the eiris of all vther men (Stewart III,440,57224-7). Apperson 396(44); Oxford 621. Cf. Whiting, *ED* 242.

See PRAISE below.

LOVERS.

(1) For *louers* desyres to haue louing (*Alexander* III,259,5366). Cf. Apperson 387: Lovers live by love; Oxford 393.

(2) To love and serve quho may *loveris* let? (*Clariodus* 260,2202). Cf. Lydgate, *Fall* I,163,5801-3.

LOW.

(1) The heid wes gold, vhilk brynt lyk ony *lou* (Montgomerie C 179,12). NED Low, sb.², 1a.

(2) Quhair lilies lyk *lou* is (Montgomerie C 193,11).

LUCERNE.

Bricht as *Lucene*, and fair as dame Flora (Stewart I,127,4259). Lydgate, Fall III,755,2984.

LUCIFER.

See PRIDE(4) below.

LUCK.

Als, seindle tymis *luck* foloues long delayis (Montgomerie C 127,15). Cf. Kelly 52(339): After a delay comes a let. See DELAY above.

——TO BE CONCLUDED IN VOLUME XII——

The Old Norse Homily on the Dedication

G. TURVILLE-PETRE

THE homily *In Dedicatione Tempeli* (*Kirkjudagsmál*) is one of the most interesting of early Norse homilies. It is preserved in three manuscripts:

N° 237, folio, in the Arnamagnean Collection; here called *L*.[1]

N° 15, quarto, in the Royal Library of Stockholm; here called *S*.[2]

N° 619, quarto, in the Arnamagnean Collection; here called *N*.[3]

L and *S* were both written in Iceland, while *N* was written in Norway. The text of *L* is defective and portions of it are missing at the beginning and at the end. The manuscript in which *L* is contained is perhaps the oldest surviving one written in Icelandic. It is believed that it was written about 1150.[4] Since there are so few Icelandic manuscripts of comparable age, such dating has only limited value.

S is generally known as the Stockholm Homily Book. It was written about the end of the twelfth century or early in the thirteenth.[5] It is a collection of fifty-six homilies intended for different feasts of the year. *N* is probably of slightly later date than *S*, but it is evident that the Norwegian scribes who wrote it were copying older originals throughout.[6] *N* is a collection of homilies comparable with *S* and eleven identical homilies, or parts of them, are found in both of these books.

The difference between the three texts of the Dedication Homily are slight. Their relationship will be considered at the end of this paper. For the present, the readings of *N* will be made the basis of discussion, unless otherwise stated.

In this homily the different parts of a church building are enumerated and a symbolical meaning is given to each of them. The altar is said to symbolize Christ, the bells the preachers, the chancel the saints in Heaven and the nave the Christians on earth. But not only do the different parts of the church represent the different members of whom the spiritual Church is composed; every Christian is said to be the living temple and, consequently, the parts of the church building may be said to represent the different virtues present in a good Christian.[7] The symbols used in the homily are thus divided into two series: the concrete and the abstract.[8] In the second series, the altar is said to symbolize love, the altar-cloth good deeds, and the floor humility.

Most of the symbols used in this homily can be found in European texts of various ages and it is plain that the Norse homily is derived from foreign models. K. Vrátný[9] threw valuable light on its sources. He suggested that it was based upon books and treatises of Honorius Augustodunensis, who probably worked in Germany during the first half of the twelfth century. Vrátný considered that the main source of the homily was to be found in Book I of the *Gemmae Animae*,[10] one of the chief works attributed to Honorius.

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[1] Published in *Leifar fornra kristinna frœða íslenzkra*, ed. Þorvaldur Bjarnarson (Copenhagen, 1878), pp. 162-5.

[2] Published in *Homittu-Bók*, ed. Th. Wisén (Lund, 1872), pp. 98-103. A facsimile of this text is contained in *Corpus Codicum Islandicorum Medii Aevi* VIII (Copenhagen, 1935), with an introduction by F. Paasche.

[3] This text has been published three times: in *Gammel norsk homiliebog*, ed. C. R. Unger (Oslo, 1864); in *Codex A.M. 619 Quarto*, ed. G. T. Flom (University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, 1929). References in this paper apply to the edition of G. Indebrø, *Gamal norsk homiliebok* (Oslo, 1931), pp. 95-9.

[4] See H. Spehr, *Der Ursprung der isländischen Schrift und ihre Weiterbildung bis zur Mitte des 13 Jahrhunderts* (Halle, 1929), p. 167.

[5] Cf. A. Holtsmark, *En islandsk scholasticus fra det 12 århundre* (Oslo, 1936), pp. 49 ff.

[6] See Indebrø, *op. cit.*, Introduction, pp. 38-9.

[7] Cf. Rabanus Maurus, *De Universo* XIV, xxi; PL 111, 397D: si ergo ille templum Dei per assumptam humanitatem factus est, et nos templum Dei per inhabitantem spiritum ejus in nobis efficimur.

[8] A similar distinction may be observed in homilies ascribed to Hugo of St. Victor, PL 177, 901A f. and 903D f.

[9] *Arkiv för nordisk filologi*, XXIX (1912), 174 ff. and XXXII (1916), 31 ff.

It is clear that the Norse homily is closely related to passages in the *Gemmae*, as well as to passages in other works assigned to Honorius, e.g. in the *Sacramentarium*,[11] in the Commentary on the Song of Songs,[12] and in the *Sermones in dedicatione*.[13]

It is not improbable that the Norse homilist knew these works of Honorius. It can be shown that the *Lucidarius* and other works ascribed to this author were known in Iceland and in Norway in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.[14] But if the Norse homilist knew the works of Honorius, he probably knew other expositions of architectural symbolism as well. A great proportion of the symbols used by Honorius had already been used by earlier writers, often in the same words as Honorius used. Honorius frequently copied older writers, just as younger writers copied him.

The practice of using parts of a temple or of a church as symbols of men and their qualities had its roots in antiquity. Examples of it are found in the Old Testament and, even more, in the New Testament. Christ is the corner-stone of the building (*Eph.* ii, 19-20); He is the temple (*John* ii, 19); He is the gate (*John* x, 9) and His followers are living stones (*I Peter* ii).

Isidore and Bede were among the early exponents of architectural symbolism. Amalarius of Metz (died 850) should also be mentioned. The fullest exposition of architectural symbolism written in the earlier Middle Ages is, perhaps, that contained in Book XIV of the *De Universo* of Rabanus Maurus, Bishop of Mainz (died 856).

During the twelfth century, many of the intellectual fashions of past ages were revived. Symbolism flourished in that century as never before and many writers used the parts of church buildings to symbolize religious objects or truths which were felt to be more lasting and more real than the building itself. Among the symbolists of the twelfth century should be mentioned Hugo of St. Victor (died 1141), Honorius Augustodunensis, Johannes Beleth (died 1202), Ivo of Chartres and Sicardus (died 1215). The most detailed account of symbolism of this kind is contained in the *Rationale divinorum officiorum* of Durandus, Bishop of Mende (died 1296).[15]

A considerable modern literature has been devoted to the study of symbolism of this kind among medieval theologians and mention should be made of the works of Neale Mason and B. Webb,[16] of H. O. Taylor[17] and especially of that of J. Sauer.[18] Without the assistance of such books as these, this study of the Norse Dedication Homily would not have been undertaken.

In his work on the Dedication Homily, Vrátný compares the following passage:

Honorius, *Gemmae* I, Ch. CXXXVIII: Ostium . . . est Christus, qui, . . . fideles aditum ostendendo per fidem introducit;[19]	*N* 96/20: Dyrr kirkjunnar merkja trú rétta, þá er oss leiðir inn til almennilegrar kristni.

The similarity between these two passages is not close, because Christ is not precisely *trú* (faith). *Ostium* is not the only possible equivalent in Latin of the Norse *dyrr* (doorway).

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[10] PL 172, 541 ff.

[11] PL 172, 737 ff.

[12] PL 172, 347 ff.

[13] PL 172, 1099 ff.

[14] I have discussed the influence of Honorius on early Icelandic literature in a short book which I hope to publish soon.

[15] *Rationale divinorum officiorum*, ed. I. Dura (Naples, 1859).

[16] Neale Mason and B. Webb, *The Symbolism of Churches and Church Ornaments* (Leeds, 1843).

[17] H. O. Taylor, *The Mediaeval Mind* II (London, 1925), Book V.

[18] J. Sauer, *Symbolik des Kirchengebäudes* (Freiburg in Breisgau, 1902).

[19] PL 172, 587C.

Passages reminiscent of that quoted from the Norse homily can also be found in Book XIV of the *De Universo* of Rabanus Maurus. Rabanus wrote:

> Vestibulum autem aliquando significat fidem, per quam intratur in ecclesiam;[20]

and again:

> Potest quoque per vestibulum fides intelligi. Ipsa quippe est ante gradus et portam: quia prius ad fidem venimus, et postmodum per spiritualium donorum gradus cœlestis vitæ aditum intramus . . .[21]

In other passages, Rabanus expounds the symbolical meaning of *ostium* and it is plain that his words are related to those of Honorius, even though it is not necessary to conclude that the symbolism of Honorius is based directly on that of Rabanus.

The symbolical interpretation of *ostium* depends largely on the etymology accorded to the word. The basis of this etymology was given by Isidore:[22]

> ostium est per quod ab aliquo arcemur ingressu, ab ostando dictum (sive ostium, quia ostendit aliquid intus). Alii aiunt ostium apellari, quia ostem moratur, ibi enim adversariis nos obicimus . . .

These three etymologies run through the symbolical literature of the Middle Ages. They are quoted in the works of Rabanus,[23] Honorius,[24] Sicardus,[25] Durandus.[26] It can be seen how the Norse homilist adapted them to his own needs when he wrote:

> *N* 96/21: Hurð fyrir durum merkir skynsama menn, þá er hraustliga standa á móti villumǫnnum ok byrgja þá fyrir útan kristni guðs í kenningum sínum (*S* adds: en veita inngǫngu trúǫndum).

Similar sentiments were expressed by Rabanus when he quoted the etymologies of Isidore[27] and again in a later passage:

> Ostium vero in porticu doctores, qui cæteris lucem vitæ, januamque intrandi ad Dominum pandebant, exprimit.[28]

The walls of the church were symbolized in various ways, according to whether they were considered to be two or four. In the Norse homily, the walls were thought of as two and were said to represent the Jews and the Gentiles, who were united in one faith:

> *N* 96/28: Tveir kirkjuveggir merkja tvinnan lýð kominn til einnar kristni, annan af gyðingum en annan af heiðnum þjóðum.

Similarly Rabanus wrote:

> Parietes enim templi Dei, fideles sunt ex utroque populo, hoc est, Iudaico et Gentile, ex quibus Christus ædificavit Ecclesiam suam.[29]

Suchlike symbols were also used by Bruno of Segni[30] and by Durandus.[31]

In the Norse homily, the frontwall (*brjóstþili*), which joins the two side walls, was asserted to represent Christ, who unites the two peoples in one faith:

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[20] PL 111, 398D.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] *Isidori Hispalensis Episcopi Etymologiarum* XV, vii, 4, ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford, 1911).

[23] PL 111, 399B.

[24] PL 172, 587C.

[25] PL 213, 21B.

[26] *Op. cit.*, I, 1, 26.

[27] PL 111, 399B.

[28] PL 111, 399D.

[29] PL 111, 401C.

[30] PL 164, 318D.

[31] *Op. cit.*, I, 1, 9.

> *N* 96/30: Brjóstþili, er samtengir báða veggi í einu húsi, merkir dróttinn várn, er samtengir tvinnan lýð í einni trú, ok er sjálfr brjóst ok hlífskjǫldr kristni sinnar.

Rabanus used this same symbol for the corner between the two walls:

> Angulus, quod duos parietes in unum conjungit . . . intelligitur Christus, eo quod duos parietes conjungat in unum, credentes, videlicet ex Iudæis et Gentibus.[32]

The four corner-posts of the church were stated by the Norse homilist to signify the four Gospels (*N* 97/8). Comparable symbols were used by continental writers for the four walls.[33] Rabanus[34] wrote in one passage: *Columnae enim sunt Apostoli et doctores Evangelii.* When he used abstract symbols, the homilist said that they signified the four cardinal virtues (*N* 98/15) and this symbol was also used by continental writers for the four walls.[35]

The roof of the church was symbolized in various ways. Since it faces downward, it was said to signify the active life. Thus, in a passage attributed to Hugo of St. Victor: *Tectum sunt activi . . . res terrenas administrantes.*[36] But since the roof also faces upward, it was said to signify the contemplative life, and Rabanus wrote:

> Tectum intentionem cœlestis operationis signat, id est vitam contemplativam in Evangelio . . .[37]

These latter sentiments were echoed by the Norse homilist:

> *N* 97/10: Ræfr kirkju merkir þá menn, er hugskotsaugu sín hefja upp frá ǫllum jarðligum hlutum til himneskrar dýrðar, ok hlífa svá kristninni í bœnum við freistni, sem ræfr hlífir kirkju við regni . . .

These last sentences might also be compared with another passage by Rabanus, although the similarity is somewhat remote:

> Significant ergo tigna prædicatores sanctos, quorum et verbo et exemplo structura ejusdem Ecclesiæ, ut subsistere possit, continetur: quia suæ robore doctrinæ turbines hereticæ impulsionis, ne eam dejiciant, arcent.[38]

The passage, last quoted from the Norse homily, is but distantly related to that in which Honorius[39] and, with little difference, Sicardus[40] and Durandus[41] spoke of the roof-tiles:

> Tegulæ tecti, quæ imbrem a domo repellunt, sunt milites, qui Ecclesiam a paganis et ab hostibus protegunt.

It need hardly be said that the church, whose parts the Norse homilist used for his symbols, was built of timber, although this is not to say, precisely, that it was the kind of church which modern writers would describe as a stave or mast church. Since the church was built of timber, some of the favorite motives of the European symbolists could not be used. Christian men, who formed living stones of which the church was built, were not mentioned in this homily. Instead of a floor of stone, the homilist alludes to one of boards:

> *N* 96/3: Gólfþili í kirkju merkir lítilláta menn, þá er sik lægja í allri virðingu

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[32] PL 111, 401D.

[33] Honorius, *Sermo in dedicatione;* PL 172, 1103B; Durandus, *Rationale*, I, 1, 15.

[34] PL 111, 404A.

[35] Durandus, *op. cit.*, I, 1, 17.

[36] PL 177, 901.

[37] PL 111, 403A.

[38] PL 111, 402C.

[39] PL 172, 586B.

[40] PL 213, 22C.

[41] *Op. cit.*, I, 1, 36.

> ok veita því meira upphald ǫllum lýð, sem þeir verða meir fyrir allra átroða (*L* reads undir fótum troðnir).

These words find their closest parallel in the work of Honorius,[42] from whom Sicardus[43] and Durandus[44] hardly differ:

> Pavimentum, quod pedibus calcatur, est vulgus cujus labore Ecclesia sustentatur.

When he used abstract symbols, the Norse homilist said that the floorboards signified humility, obedience, patience:

> *N* 98/17: gólfþili merkir lítillæti ok hlýðni ok þolinmœði, þá er eigi skammisk at þola lægning ok vanrétti af mǫnnum.

Rabanus wrote in similar terms:

> Pavimentum intelligitur humilitatio atque afflictio animæ . . . humilitas fidelium doctrinam sanctorum patienter suscipientium . . .[45]

The foundation of the timber church is called the *syllustokkr* (groundsel). It represents, in the first series of symbols, the apostles, who are the basis of faith:

> *N* 96/21-2: Syllustokkar kirkjunnar merkja postula guðs, en (*v.l.* er) undirstokkar eru all(r)ar kristni.

When abstract symbols are used, the groundsels signify faith, the basis of all good works:

> *N* 98/2: Syllustokkar þessar kirkju merkja trú, því at yfir þann grundvǫll ok undirstokk skulum vér smíða ǫll góð verk . . .

Similarly, European symbolists claimed that the foundation signified Christ or the Apostles[46] and Rabanus wrote:

> Fundamentum enim allegorice Christus intelligitur, vel fides ejus catholica, super quam fundata est ecclesia.[47]

The timber church, like many stone churches, was divided into chancel (*sǫnghús*) and nave (*kirkja*). The chancel signified the saints in Heaven, and the nave the Christians on earth:

> *N* 96/12-13: Sǫnghús merkir helga menn á himni, en kirkjan kristna menn á jǫrðu.

The chancel and the nave were sometimes said, by European symbolists, to signify the contemplative and active life,[48] but Rabanus signified them in these words:

> Sanctum autem, quod velo suspenso a sanctuario separatum est, significat praesentem Ecclesiam, quæ peregrinatione istius mundi versatur; sanctum autem sanctorum illam, quæ in cœlis est.[49]

These sentiments may be compared with those expressed by Honorius: *Duo chori psallentium designant angelos, et spiritus justorum . . .*[50]

The altar was stated by the Norse homilist (*N* 96/14) to symbolize Christ, for sacrifices offered to God were sanctified only over the altar. This motive was also used by Rabanus, Honorius, Hugo of St. Victor, Durandus and by most symbolists from the ninth century to the end of the thirteenth century.[51]

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[42] PL 172, 586D.

[43] PL 213, 20A.

[44] *Op. cit.*, I, 1, 28.

[45] PL 111, 403B-C.

[46] Cf. J. Sauer, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

[47] PL 111, 400D.

[48] Cf. J. Sauer, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-9.

[49] PL 111, 393D.

[50] PL 172, 588A.

The altar cloth was said by the Norse homilist (*N* 96/16) to signify the saints, a thought which finds close parallels in the *Gemmae* and the *Sacramentarium* of Honorius.[52] When he used abstract symbols, the Norse homilist (*N* 97/29) said that the altar cloth signified good deeds. Rabanus[53] asserted the same of the vestments worn by the priest.

Other parallels between the Norse homily and the expositions of European symbolists could be quoted without looking further afield. Enough has been said to show that nearly every thought expressed in the homily is derived from a foreign source, although the homilist has adapted symbols originally designed for a church of stone to his church of wood.

The form of the Norse homily bears a certain resemblance to dedication homilies ascribed to Honorius[54] and to Hugo of St. Victor.[55] Most of the symbols used by the Norse homilist are to be found in many continental works, some of which, like those of Sicardus and Durandus, are much younger than the Norse homily. But the closest resemblance in motives appears to be between the Norse homily and Book XIV of the *De Universo* of Rabanus. It is, however, improbable that the Norse homilist had access directly to the *De Universo*. It is more likely that he used an early homily based upon that book. Alternatively, it is possible that the Norse homilist used several sources and, in that case, the *Gemmae Animae* may have been one of them. If this paper should lead one, better acquainted than I with the Latin literature of the Middle Ages, to identify the sole or chief source of the Norse homily, it will have achieved its purpose.

In conclusion it may be worth considering whether the parallel passages in Latin can throw any light on the relationship between the three texts of the Norse Dedication Homily. The three texts were compared in detail by G. Indrebø,[56] whose work the reader should consult. Indrebø concluded that, except in a few instances of scribal error, the readings of *N* were closer to the original than those of the other two.

It was said above that the differences between the three texts were slight. Few of them have any material significance. On the whole, *L* and *N* resemble each other so closely that they could be considered as one text. *S* stands somewhat apart. This is surprising, because the disparity of age between *L* and *N* appears to be greater than that between *L* and *S*. Considering the great age of *L*, it is probable that the text *LN* represents the original more faithfully than *S*.

I have noted about one hundred and twenty instances of difference between the texts of *N* and *S*. The text of *L* is extant in about seventy of these instances and, in nearly all of them, *L* resembles *N*. The following examples will serve to illustrate this:

A word, or even a sentence, found in *L* and *N* is omitted in *S*:

N (96/31), *L* (162/11) í einu húsi; *S* (100/18) omits.
N (96/34), *L* (162/15) dróttinn sjálfr; *S* (100/21) dróttinn.
N (97/3) tvá veggi, þat er tvinna lýði einni trú (sic); *L* (162/19) tvá veggi, þat es tvinna lýða í einni trú; *S* (100/25) tvinna lýði í einni trú.
N (98/28), *L* (163/32) svá sem hann þetta mælti: lúk upp þú munn minn, þá es betr gegnir at mæla en þegja, en þú byrg hann þá er betra er þagat en mælt; *S* (101/22) omits.

Occasionally, *S* has a word or a phrase not to be found in the other two:

S (100/10) en veita inngǫngu trúǫndum (Cf. *N* 96/28, *L* 162/4).

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[51] Cf. J. Sauer, *op. cit.*, pp. 159 f.
[52] PL 172, 587A and 745D.
[53] PL 111, 397.
[54] PL 172, 1099 ff.
[55] PL 177, 901 ff., and 903 ff.
[56] *Op. cit.*, Introduction, pp. 51 ff.

N (96/25), *L* (162/5) því meira; *S* (100/12) þeir því meira.
N (96/32), *L* (162/12) trú; *S* (100/19) trú sinni.

In other instances, similar words are used in *LN* and *S*, but in different order:

N (97/6), *L* (162/22) sjá má ǫll tíðendi; *S* (100/27) ǫll tíðendi má sjá.
N (97/9), *L* (162/25) kenningar þeira; *S* (100/30) þeira kenningar.
N (97/13), *L* (163/11) þá er bera píslarmark Krists; *S* (101/4) þá er píslarmark Krists bera.

Here and there, *LN* use one word and *S* another:

N (97/18), *L* (163/7) þeim trjóm; *S* (100/38) dvergum.
N (97/23), *L* (163/12) sik; *S* (101/5) hold sitt.
N (97/29), *L* (163/19) klæði; *S* (101/10) búningr.
N (98/7), *L* (163/30) Davíð mælti í sálmi; *S* (101/21) sálma skáldit mælti.

I note only about thirty instances in which the text of *L* differs from that of *N*. In such instances, the readings of *S* generally resemble those of *N*. This is also remarkable, since *N* is a Norwegian manuscript, while *L* and *S* are Icelandic. The differences between *N* and *L* may consist in word-order:

N (96/35), *S* (100/23) kirkju ok sǫnghúss; *L* (162/16) sǫnghúss ok kirkju.
N (97/32), *S* (100/13) guðs elska (elsku *N*) ok náungs; *L* (163/21) elska guðs ok náungs.

Sometimes different words are used in *L* and *N*:

N (96/26), *S* (100/25) samtengir; *L* (162/20) sem tengir (scribal error ?).
N (97/13), *S* (100/33) við regni; *L* (163/1) við élum ok skúrum.
N (98/15), *S* (101/27) hornstafir; *L* (164/4) hornsteinar.
N (99/4), *S* (102/12) góðir brœðr; *L* (164/4) góð systkin.

Here and there, *L* contains a word or a phrase not found in the other two:

N (97/29), *S* (101/11) góð verk; *L* (163/19) merkja góð verk.
N (98/26), *S* (101/37) ——; *L* (163/16) meðan vér lifum.
N (99/9), *S* (101/16) í tárum; *L* (163/35) iðranar tárum.

There are a number of instances in which different grammatical forms are used in *L* and *N*:

N (97/12), *S* (100/33) ræfr; *L* (162/28) ræfrit.
N (97/13), *S* (100/33) kirkju; *L* (163/1) kirkjunni.

Although small, these examples of similarity between *S* and *N* are sufficient to show that *S* bears a closer resemblance to *N* than to *L*, and that *S* and *N* have some relationship which is not shared by *L*. The few instances, in which *S* and *L* have the same readings and *N* differs, should probably be explained as errors or spontaneous alterations made by the scribe of *N*:

L (162/12), *S* (100/19) hann sjálfr; *N* (96/32) sjálfr.
L (162/17), *S* (100/23) fyr(ir) trú Krists; *N* (97/2) fyrir Krist.
L (162/21), *S* (100/26) í einni ást; *N* (97/5) einni ást.
L (162/20), *S* (101/12) yfir altara; *N* (97/13) yfir altari.
L (163/35), *S* (101/23) ór; *N* (98/11) í.
L (163/35), *S* (101/24) en; *N* (98/12) ok.
L (164/5), *S* (101/27) vitra; *L* (98/16) vizka.
L (163/22), *S* (102/4) of; *N* (98/32) um.
L (164/29), *S* (102/11) þjónustu; *N* (99/3) til þjónustu.

There are few instances in which all three texts differ and they can have little significance:

> *N* (96/35) er á milli kirkju ok sǫnghúss er;
> *L* (162/16) es á miðli es sǫnghúss ok kirkju;
> *S* (100/23) þat er es á miðli kirkju ok sǫnghúss.
>
> *N* (97/1) um fyrir Krist í kristnina;
> *L* (162/17) inn fyr trú Krists í kristnina;
> *S* (100/23) inn í kristnina fyr trú Krists.
>
> *N* (98/1) því síðr guðs gata þrǫng;
> *L* (163/24) því síðr þrǫng gata guðs;
> *S* (101/16) því síðr þrǫng vera guðs gata.

Comparison of the three texts of the Dedication Homily shows that *L* and *N* often resemble each other and contrast with *S*, although, on some occasions, *S* and *N* resemble each other and contrast with *L*. The relationship between the three might be expressed by either of the following schemes:





Either of these schemes would be consistent with the conclusion that the text *LN* represents the original more faithfully than does *S*. If the first alternative is accepted, it is implied that readings shared by *S* and either *L* or *N* were probably in the homily in its original form. There are some slight indications that this was not always the case.

In one passage *N* (96/23) reads:

> Gólfþili í kirkju merkir lítilláta menn, þá er sik lægja í allri virðingu ok veita því meira upphald ǫllum lýð, sem þeir verða meir *fyrir allra átroða.*

In this passage the reading of *S* (100/11) differs little from that of *N*, but, instead of the words italicised, *L* (162/6) reads: *undir fótum troðnir.* The difference is not material, but the phrasing of *L* accords more closely with that used in parallel passages in Latin. Honorius, from whom Sicardus and Durandus hardly differ, wrote:

> Pavimentum, quod pedibus calcatur, est vulgus cujus labore Ecclesia sustentatur.[57]

This example may suggest that, in some instances, *L* preserves the original text more faithfully than either of the other two. In another passage *N* (97/10) reads:

> Ræfr kirkju merkir þá menn, er hugskots augu sín hefja upp frá ǫllum jarðligum hlutum til himneskrar dýrðar ok hlífa svá kristninni í bœnum við freistni, sem ræfr hlífir kirkju *við regni.*

The italicised words are identical in *S* (100/33) but, instead of *við regni, L* (163/1) has *við élum ok skúrum.* In this case the reading of *N* (and *S*) might be supported by the words of Honorius, with whom Sicardus and Durandus agree closely:

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[57] Honorius, PL 172, 586D; Sicardus, PL 213, 20A; Durandus, *Rationale* I, 1, 28.

> Tegulæ tecti, quæ imbrem a domo repellunt, sunt milites, qui Ecclesiam a paganis et ab hostibus protegunt.[58]

But in this Latin passage, the roof-tiles are considered as symbols of active churchmen, not of contemplative, as the roof is considered in the Norse homily. The *él ok skúr* may reflect the *turbines hœreticœ impulsionis,* of which Rabanus wrote in the passage quoted on p. 209 above. At least, there are not sufficient reasons to accept Indrebø's assertion that, in these cases, the readings of *L* are younger than those of *N*.

It is possible that *S* may preserve some features of the original which have been obscured in the other two. In one passage *N* (96/19) reads:

> Syllustokkar kirkjunnar merkja postula guðs, en (sic) undirstokkar eru all(r)ar kristni.

The corresponding passage of *L* has been lost, but *S* (100/5) reads:

> Syllustokkar kirkjunnar merkja postula guðs ok spámenn, er undirstokkar eru allrar kristni, sem Paulus mælti: Er eruð smíðaðir yfir grundvǫll postula ok spámanna.

In this instance *S* appears to be following the original text of the homily more faithfully than *N*, which has probably been shortened. Durandus,[59] who was doubtless following an established tradition, wrote:

> Hæc est domus Domini, firmiter ædificata, cujus fundamentum est angularis lapis Christus, super quo fundamento positum est fundamentum apostolorum et prophetarum.

A few lines below, *S* (100/10) reads:

> Hurð fyrir durum merkir skynsama menn, þá es hraustliga standa í gegn villum mǫnnum ok byrgja þá fyr útan kristni guðs í kenningum sínum, *en veita inngǫngu trúǫndum.*

In this passage the readings of *L* (162/1) and of *N* (96/21) differ little from that of *S*, but both *L* and *N* omit the the words italicised above. It is, however, possible that these words were in the homily in its original form. Evidence of this might be seen in the following passage of Rabanus:[60]

> Ostium vero in porticu doctores, qui cæteris lucem vitæ januamque intrandi pandebant, exprimit.

The passage last quoted from the Dedication Homily is rather more distantly related to that of Honorius,[61] with which it has, nevertheless, something in common:

> Ostium . . . est Christus qui per justitiam obstans infideles a domo sua arcet, et fideles aditum ostendendo per fidem introducit.

It might be suggested that the words *en veita inngǫngu trúǫndum* were in the original Norse Homily, but were omitted independently from *L* and *N*, since they were felt to be unnecessary. But the evidence available to me is too slight to permit of conclusions about the relationship of the three texts.

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[58] Honorius, PL 172, 586; Sicardus, PL 213, 22C; Durandus, *Rationale* I, 1, 36.

[59] *Rationale* I, 1, 9.

[60] PL 111, 399D.

[61] PL 172, 587C.

TRANSLATION[1]

KING SOLOMON first erected a temple to God and, when it was completed, he invited his people to hold a festival. Then Solomon stood praying and he spoke these words: "Thou didst hear, O Lord, the prayer of Thy servant, which I prayed to Thee when I fashioned the temple for Thee; therefore, bless and hallow this house which I did build in Thy name. Hear, O Lord, the prayer which Thy servant prays to Thee this day, that Thine eyes may be open and Thine ears listening above this house day and night. If Thy people shall transgress and turn to repentance and come to this temple, hear Thou their prayers in this place and deliver them from the hands of their enemies."

And when Solomon had ended his prayer, the Lord appeared and the whole people witnessed the magnificence of the Lord coming over the temple, and all present bowed down to God and praised the Lord.

From these origins, churches and all the celebration of dedication days began. And since, dear brethren, we are holding the feast of dedication today, it is of first importance that we realize how great is the grace we receive in the church. When a man first comes into the world, he shall be brought to church and shall there be baptized, and he then becomes the son of God, he who was until then the slave of sin. In the church, the flesh and blood of Our Lord shall be consecrated, and all Christians shall taste of It for their salvation. At this service, the heavens are opened and God's angels join with men in attending the service of the priest. In church, meetings of reconciliation are held between God and men, and all the prayers which we offer in church are those most pleasing to God.[2] If we fall into mortal sin and are in disagreement with God, we must go again to church and accept the penance imposed by the clerks and so be reconciled with God. And, when a man dies, his body shall be brought to church and buried there and the clerks shall commit his soul to God's keeping.[3]

Therefore, dear friends, we should take great care of our churches, for we go to them when we come into the world, and while we are in the world, and when we depart from it.

Now, since the church and the whole Christian community is denoted by the same name in books, we may explain how the church symbolizes the people and how the Christian people may be called the palace of God. For Paul the Apostle spoke in these words:[4] *You are the holy temple of God, who dwells in you.* As the church is constructed of many diverse objects assembled together,[5] so the people are assembled in one faith from diverse races and tongues. A part of the Christian community is in heaven with God and others are here on earth. Therefore, some parts of the church signify heavenly glory and some parts Christendom on earth. The chancel signifies the saints in heaven and the nave the Christians on earth. The altar signifies Christ, for just as no sacrifices offered to God are sanctified except over the altar, our words will not be acceptable to God unless they are sanctified in the love of Christ. The altar cloths are the saints who adorn Christ in good deeds, as Paul the Apostle said: *All of you who are baptized in Christ have adorned Christ.*[6]

The foundation timbers of the church signify the Apostles of God, who are the foundations of all Christendom.[7] The portal into the church signifies the true faith, through which we are led into the community of Christianity. The door before the portal signifies the wise who boldly resist the heretics in their teaching, and exclude them from God's Christianity.[8] The floor-boards signify the humble who lower themselves in all dignity and give greater support to the whole community the more they are trodden under foot. The benches in the church signify the merciful who relieve the sufferings of their weak brethren in their mercy, as the benches give comfort to those who sit upon them. The two walls of the church signify the two peoples joined in one Christendom, one of the Jews and the other of the heathen tribes. The front wall, which joins the two walls in the one house, signifies the Lord who joins the two peoples in one faith and is Himself the protection and shield of His Christendom. In this front wall, there is a doorway to go into the church and windows which light up the church, for the Lord Himself enlightens all who enter His faith. The rood-screen between the nave and the chancel signifies the Holy Ghost, for just as we enter Christianity by way of Christ, so also do we enter heavenly glory through the gate of mercy of the Holy Spirit. And just as Christ united the two walls, that is the two peoples, in one faith, so also does the Holy Spirit unite those two peoples in one love. In this rood-screen, there is a large doorway through which all that happens in the chancel may be seen from the nave, for every man who finds the doorway of the Holy Spirit may observe many celestial things with his spiritual eyes.

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[1] The Norwegian text of the homily is translated from Indrebø's edition (see above, note 3), since this is the most convenient text for general purposes. Some of the variant readings of *S* and *L* are translated in footnotes.

[2] *S* adds: although God hears our prayers wherever we pray from the depth of our hearts.

[3] *S* adds: with many prayers and invocations for his salvation (*sælusǫngum*).

[4] *S* omits: For . . . words.

[5] *S*: of many stones or timbers.

[6] The Vulgate reads: Quicumque enim in Christo baptizati estis, Christum induistis (*Gal.* iii. 27).

[7] *S* reads: of all faith, as Paul the Apostle said: you are built upon the foundation of the Apostles and prophets.

The four corner-posts in the church signify the four gospels, for the teachings contained in them are the stoutest supports of all Christianity. The roof of the church signifies those who raise their spiritual eyes above all earthly things to heavenly glory and thus shelter Christianity from temptation by their prayers, as the roof shelters the church from rain.[9]

The long-timbers of the church, that is to say the ridge-beams and the wall-plates,[10] which support and hold fast both the rafters and the wainscoting of the church,—these signify the rulers who are appointed to govern and to further Christianity, such as abbots who govern monks and princes who govern peoples.

The tie-beams, which uphold the wall-plates and strengthen those timbers which support the ridge-beams,[11] signify those Christians who make peace between[12] the worldly chiefs by their councils, for these support monasteries and holy places with their wealth.

The bells signify the clerks who make a beautiful sound before God and men in their prayers and preachings. The crosses and roods signify the ascetics who bear the marks of Christ's passion on their bodies when they weary themselves in fasting and vigils.

But just as we say that the church signifies the whole Christian people, so it may signify each Christian man who verily makes himself the temple of the Holy Spirit by his good works. For every man shall fashion a spiritual church within himself, not with timbers or stones, but rather with good works. The chancel of this church is prayer and psalm-singing. The altar signifies love and the altar-cloth good-deeds, which must accompany love. Just as all sacrifices are hallowed over the altar, so all good works are hallowed and made acceptable in love. And this love may be distinguished in two commandments, i.e. love of God and love of our neighbor. The front wall and the rood-screen of the church signify this two-fold love, the front wall love of our neighbor and the rood-screen love of God. In the rood-screen is a large doorway into the chancel, for the more deeply he loves God the less narrow will the path of God appear to every man. In the front wall, there are windows, for light is the command of the Lord, said the psalmist,[13] and it enlightens our eyes. The Lord Himself explained this clear precept more fully when He said: *It is My commandment that each of you love the other.*

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[8] *S* adds: but give entry to the faithful.

[9] *L* reads: from storms and showers.

[10] "Wall-plates" is perhaps not the precise equivalent of the O. N. *staflægjur*. This word appears to be used generally for horizontal beams supported by upright posts along the inside of the wall, but not touching it. The usual word for "wall-plates" is *vegglægjur*. See Valtýr Guðmundsson, *Privatboligen paa Island i Sagatiden* (Copenhagen, 1889), p. 118; also A. Nilsson in *Forntida gårdar i Island*, ed. M. Stenberger (Copenhagen, 1943), p. 296.

[11] *S* reads: The tie-beams which strengthen the wall-plates, and uphold the king-posts (*dvergum*) which support the ridge-beams.

[12] *S* reads: strengthen.

The doorway before the portal signifies control of the tongue, as David said in the psalm:[14] *Set a watch, O Lord, before my mouth, and a door to guard my lips,* and as he spoke in these words: *Open my mouth when it befits better to speak than to be silent, but close it when it is better to be silent than to speak.*[15] The door may further signify wisdom, which distinguishes good things from evil, so that we open our hearts to good things and shut out all evil fantasies. The foundation timbers of this church signify faith, for over this foundation and basis we shall fashion all our good works, so that we may become temples of God. The four corner-posts[16] signify the four cardinal virtues which are the stoutest supports of other good deeds,[17] i.e. wisdom and justice, fortitude and temperance. The floor-boarding signifies humility and obedience and patience, not being ashamed to suffer humiliation and injustice of men. The benches signify those works of mercy which bring comfort to the needy, as the benches give rest to those who sit upon them. The walls signify, all together, good deeds and all useful toil endured for the love of God and one's neighbor. The wall-plates which hold the wainscoting together signify steadfastness in good works. The roof above the walls signifies hope and the regard which we must have for God above all good deeds. The beams which support the roof-timbers signify patience which supports our hope, so that we shall not cease to expect the mercy of God. The tie-beams, which support the walls lest they fall before the storm, signify peace and concord which support and unite all our good works lest they fall before the storm of diabolical temptation. The crosses and roods signify mortification of the flesh, that is fasting and vigils. The bells signify the teachings which awaken us to good deeds, just as the bell awakens us to divine service.[18] The yard around the church signifies the custody of all these good qualities which have been enumerated here. For we may well take care of all these good qualities, if we contemplate the works of those who have passed from the world before us, so that good example may stimulate us to emulation and bad example warn us against sins. This thought is signified by the burial of bodies in the church-yard. It must be realized that everything needed for the adornment and service of the church may be fulfilled spiritually in us, if we live so purely that we are worthy to be called the temple of God. Therefore, it is necessary for us, dear brethren, when we celebrate this feast of dedication, to purify the churches of our hearts so that God shall not find in His temple, which we are ourselves, anything which may anger Him. And just as we like to appear finely dressed and washed on a feast day, so must we wash the stains of sin in tears[19] from our spirits within and adorn them with good deeds. And just as we feed ourselves with fine meats on feast days, so must we feed our spirits with festive food, that is the word of God; for it is unseemly that the body should be finely fed and clothed and the inner man be threadbare and go without food. It is of no avail if we come finely dressed to the outer church, if we neglect the feast of the inner church, that is persistence in good deeds; for it is for this reason that we celebrate feasts of dedication annually on earth, that we may celebrate an eternal day of dedication, which is true rejoicing of all the saints in heaven. And we may win that joy if we give manifold mercy to our neighbors in their needs. It is good to give alms to churches, but it is better to comfort our distressed neighbors in their needs. For churches pass away with the world, but spirits never pass away.

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[13] David, *S.*

[14] The psalmist said *S.*

[15] *S* omits: open . . . speak.

[16] Corner-stones (*hornsteinar*), *L.*

[17] *S* omits: which . . . deeds.

[18] *S* omits: just . . . service.

[19] In tears of repentance *L.*

If we wish to be temples of the Holy Spirit, we must show every mercy to our neighbors in need, as the church shows mercy to us. As the church conducts us to God by means of the baptismal font, so must we conduct our neighbors from transgression by means of the font of tears, in weeping for their sins, for tears purify sins like the baptismal font. And just as in church we submit to penance for our sins, so must we punish our neighbors for their sins. And just as we receive spiritual food in church, i.e. *corpus domini,* so must we give bodily food to those in need. And just as the church offers burial to the dead in its precincts, so must we offer prayers for their souls. If we celebrate temporal festivals with such devotion, then we shall win the eternal festival in heaven with our Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, who lives and rules as God with the Father and Holy Spirit *per omnia sœcula sœculorum. Amen.*

Mediaevalia

I. *The Sermo Finalis* of Robert Holcot

NOW that historians of medieval philosophy are directing attention more and more to the study of William of Ockham and of the men who, whether followers of Ockham or not, appear as leaders in the intellectual life of England in the fourteenth century, the writings of Robert Holcot will bear further investigation. As the author of a long and stimulating commentary on the *Book of Wisdom* Holcot became famous over night and his fame held throughout the next two centuries. Perhaps owing to the reputation he had won with the commentary on *Wisdom*, his commentary on the *Sentences* along with a selection of his quodlibet questions were printed no less than four times, first in 1497, last in 1518 and some of his opinions were weighty enough to merit discussion and comparison with those of Scotus and Ockham in a work of Jacques Almain which was printed in 1526.

In the course of efforts to locate and compare the manuscripts of Holcot's commentary on the *Sentences*, very few new biographical data have been uncovered and there was little enough know before. His birthplace was probably Holcot, a village near Northampton. It is certain that he was a Dominican and the old biographers agree in the information that he died at Northampton in 1349, during the plague. It is reasonable to assume that he was in that neighborhood at that time because the episcopal records at Lincoln note that he was given faculties to hear confessions in Northampton in 1348. There is no longer any doubt that Oxford rather than Cambridge was the scene of his scholastic activity as *sententiarius* and regent master. Moreover, the date of the commentary on the *Sentences*, which Fr. Michalski on good evidence put in or immediately before 1332, is confirmed by references which Holcot makes in his *Sermo Finalis* to the disturbances at Oxford preceding the Stamford schism of 1333. There is other evidence which would put the commentary as late as 1336, but it seems more probable that this date is connected rather with a revision of the commentary made by Holcot himself some years after his lectures and in which he added four questions, two of which are also found among his quodlibets.[1]

The lack of reliable biographical material for the Oxford masters is so well known that it may be helpful to note the men whom Holcot mentions by name. Besides frequent references to St. Thomas, Scotus and Ockham, Auriole, Campsall, Chatton and Fitzralph occur in the commentary on the *Sentences* as well as in the quodlibets. Burley, Crathorn, Hugh of Lanthony, Kilmington, Peter Rane, Ralph Pigas, Strelley and Wodeham all occur only in the quodlibets or in the supposedly later additions to the commentary. There is good evidence that Crathorn is the socius whose ideas Holcot discusses in the first three questions of the *Conferentiae*. Roger Gosford and Granton are mentioned in the *Sermo Finalis*.

The short text which follows is Holcot's *Sermo Finalis*. It speaks for itself and although Mr. DeWulf has seen in it a sign of a certain lack of seriousness in the fourteenth century attitude to the difficult problems of philosophy and theology, it seems fairer to regard it rather as further evidence of the lighter side of university life which is both traditional and natural to students of all ages who are sane enough to possess a sense of humour.

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[1] It is hoped that an opportunity will be offered to say more of the manuscripts of the commentary and quodlibets, and perhaps to publish some of the more important questions.

The Sermo Finalis *of Robert Holcot*

O—Oxford, *Ms. Oriel* 15, 204*b*-205*a*.
R—London, Brit. Mus. *Ms. Royal* 10. C. vi, 137*a*-138*b*.

Cursum consummavi fidem servavi, Tim. 4.[1] Sollicitudo scolastica studiosissima[2] circa[3] sacrae theologiae notitiam adquirendam comparatur amicitiae amatoris[4] qui per laboriosam militiam nititur quaerere sibi sponsam. Nam haec est figurativa responsio[5] et[5] locutio sapientis, *Sap.* 8.[6] *Hanc,* inquit, *amavi et exquisivi a iuventute mea, et quaesivi mihi <eam> sponsam assumere, et amator factus sum formae illius.* Solent ergo iuvenes animosi amore sponsarum periculis, laboribus, difficultatibus se exponere et tanto adeptas <magis> diligere quanto laboriosius quaesivissent. Huius[7] exemplum habemus, *Gen.* 24,[8] ubi dicitur quod *Iacob pro Rachel septem annis servivit et tamen videbantur ei dies pauci prae amoris magnitudine.* Eiusdem similiter exemplum habemus, *Gen.* 34, de Sichem, filio Emor, qui Dinam, filiam Iacob, tam ferventer amavit quod pro ea in uxorem habenda circumcisionis dolorosam turpitudinem tam in se quam in[9] populo suo toto fieri toleravit. Sic in historiis gentilium de infinitis milibus[10] enarrantur exempla, qui se pro sponsis adquirendis difficultatibus ingesserunt.

Sed ut ad sacrae theologiae conditiones descendam, et qualiter ipsa conquaeri in sponsam possit describam, quamdam historiam breviter recitabo quam refert Ovidius, *Methom.* lib. 10.,[11] quam dicit non esse fabulam sed rem gestam. Fuit enim, sicut[12] recitatur[12] ibidem, antiquis temporibus virgo quaedam forma corporis pulcherrima, motu currendi velocissima, nomine Atalanta. Ista ergo virgo consuluit deum Phoebum petens humiliter quatenus sibi praedicere dignaretur qualem virum in coniugium finaliter sortiretur. Phoebus sic respondit, quod numquam alicui nubere dignaretur nisi prius ab eodem cursus certamine vinceretur. Hac autem responsione divinitus sibi data, ipsa cum parentibus statuit talem legem, quod si quis veniens eam in coniugium peteret, fidem daret prius quod cum eadem currendo certaret, et si vinceret eam uxorem haberet, si vero vinceretur capite plecteretur. Hac dura conditione ubique terrarum divulgata inter procos et amasios[13] quos habuit, quidam[14] territi[14] recesserunt,[14] quidam <certamen> ineuntes et victi capita perdiderunt. Tandem iuvenis quidam dictus Hippomanes, tactus amore puellae cursus certamen inivit, fidem dedit, currit, et vicit, et puellam in[15] uxorem accepit. Isto modo, carissimi, in ecclesia militante de hac nobili puella, sapientia videlicet theologica, et his qui cum ea coniugium copulare desiderant, Phoebo, i.e., deo, revelante, statutum esse videtur, videlicet, quod nullus, quantumcumque studiosus existat, inceptionis nuptias contrahat cum eadem nisi fide data quod cum ea currat[16] et quattuor libros sententiarum lectione cursoria plene legat.

Ut ergo, carissimi, de me loquar,[17] licet inter ceteros debilior, sacrae theologiae dilectione[18] commotus, partim superioris ordinatione compulsus, partim huius virginis consideratione contractus, anno praeterito fidem dedi de faciendo cursus in dicto certamine cum eadem, dicens ei illud *Cant.* 2,[19] *trahe me post te; curremus simul in odore unguentorum tuorum.* Et re vera haec virgo, sapientia videlicet theologica, cum hoc quod ipsa est formosissima est[20] etiam[20] subtilitate velocissima, quia nunc tractat de deo, nunc de creatura, nunc de caelestibus, nunc de terrenis, et *attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter,*[21] *quia omnibus mobilibus mobilior est sapientia, Sap.* 7.[22] Hac ergo delectabiliter[23] alliciente et indefatigabiliter[24] concurrente, quae[25] prius fide praestita me facturum firmavi, dea quadam quae dea amoris dici potest favente, cui me[26] in[26] principio[26] cursus[26] mei recommendavi dicens, *ave gratia plena dominus tecum,*[27] hodie fideliter consummavi ut veraciter dicere valeam verba thematis praeassumpti, *cursum consummavi fidem servavi.*

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[1] *II Timothy* iv, 7.
[2] studiosi *O.*
[3] *Om. R.*
[4] amaturi *O R.*
[5] *Om. O.*
[6] *Wisdom* viii, 2.
[7] huiusmodi *R.*
[8] *Genesis* xxix, 20.
[9] *Om. R.*
[10] militibus *R.*
[11] Ovid, *Metam.* X, 560-680.
[12] *Om. O.*
[13] amasias *O.*
[14] *Om. O.*
[15] et *O.*
[16] concurrat *O.*
[17] loquor *O R.*
[18] delectatione *R.*
[19] *Canticle of Canticles* i, 3.
[20] et est *O R.*

In quibus verbis duplex mihi materia iocunditatis occurrit. Nam primo opus clauditur[28] consuetum, et[29] secundo[29] foedus[30] cernitur[30] adimpletum; opus clauditur consuetum quia cursum consummavi; foedus[31] cernitur[31] adimpletum[31] quia[31] fidem servavi. *Cursum consummavi fidem servavi*: corpus propter opus de cetero non frangetur quia cursum consummavi; animus propter foedus a modo non angetur quia fidem servavi. *Cursum consummavi*: opus consuetum sic fuit inquietum et ideo iam quiescam quia cursum consummavi. <*Fidem servavi*:> foedus adimpletum animum[32] facit laetum ut non erubescam quia fidem servavi.

Cursum consummavi fidem servavi: primo dico quod opus clauditur consuetum quod prius exstitit inquietum et ideo iam quiescam quia[33] cursum consummavi. Finivi primum, complevi secundum, pertransivi tertium et quartum. Hodie consummavi quantum in libro scriptum inveni, *Luc.* 28,[34] *consummabuntur omnia quae scripta sunt.* Et ideo isto die de me verificabitur illud psalmi, *omnis consummationis vidi finem, Ps.* 18.[35] Hoc est sabbatum requietionis[36] et[36] sabbatum[36] sanctificatum et sabbatum delicatum[37] de quo scribitur, *Gen.* 2,[38] *complevit deus die septimo opus suum quod fecerat, et requievit ab omni opere quod patrarat.*

Et licet de domo Praedicatorum[39] isto anno in lectura sententiarum cucurrerunt duo simul, ille tamen alius discipulus, qui Granton nominatur, usus favore,[40] quia[41] gratiam universitatis de cito terminandis lectionibus habuit, citius praecucurrit iuxta illud *Io.* 20,[42] *currebant duo simul, et ille alius discipulus praecucurrit citius Petro, et venit prior ad monumentum,* i.e., ad quiescendi tempus et locum. Ego autem communi potitus[43] iustitia, laboribus non peperci, statum tempus implevi, et multiplicem cursum feci inter omnes, ut aestimo, qui hic vel alibi cursu[44] consimili cucurrerunt.[45] Cucurri in municipio, cucurri in suburbio; cucurri in vicis civitatis, cucurri in campis seminatis; cucurri per cocos, per focos, caldaria, celaria;[46] per sutores, <per> carnifices, per piscatores; per odores pigmentorum, per fetores unguentorum; cucurri inter foveas et pavimenta; cucurri inter homines et iumenta, maxime diebus fori. Et *haec erat visio discurrens in medio animalium, Ezech.* 1.[47] Sic *viam mandatorum tuorum cucurri*[48] tamquam si[49] dictum mihi fuisset illud *Proverb.* 6,[50] *discurre, festina, suscita amicum tuum,* ut sic, quantum ad labores attinet, veraciter cum Paulo dicere possim[51] illud *Act.* 20,[52] *nihil eorum,* i.e., laborum, *vereor, nec facio animam meam pretiosiorem me, dummodo consummem cursum meum et ministerium verbi quod accepi.* Unde cursum consummavi.

In huius ergo cursus consummatione in primis deo devote regratior, recognoscens expresse quod non me volente neque me currente sed deo potius miserente victoriam obtinui cursus mei, *Ro.* 9,[53] *non est volentis neque currentis sed miserentis dei.* Et ideo sibi <dico> devote illud *Io.* 17,[54] *ego te clarificavi super terram; opus consummavi quod dedisti mihi ut faciam.* Secundo, toti reverendae comitivae regratior magistrorum dominorum et sociorum omnium qui cursui meo debili amicabiliter astiterunt,[55] sua<m> honestam praesentiam exhibuerunt, pauperem reverenter honoraverunt, insufficientem supportaverunt, et ad diversa loca ubi me legere urgentibus causis contigit[56] accesserunt, ne si eorum praesentia caruissem forte *in vacuum currissem, ad Gal.* 2.[57] Propter quae merito vobis opto quod Philippensibus optat Paulus, *ad Phil.* 2,[58] *<ut sitis> sine querela, et simplices filii dei, sine reprehensione in medio nationis pravae et perversae, inter quos lucetis sicut luminare in mundo, verbum vitae continentes ad gloriam meam in die christi, quia non in vacuum cucurri nec in vacuum laboravi.*

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[21] *Wisdom* viii, 1.

[22] *Wisdom* vii, 24.

[23] dilectabiliter *O R.*

[24] via fatigatur *R.*

[25] quo *O.*

[26] *Om. O.*

[27] Several manuscripts of the commentary begin with the Angelic Salutation.

[28] cluditur *O.*

[29] secundo et *O R.*

[30] fides servitur *O.*

[31] Om. *R.*

[32] annum *O.*

[33] quod *O.*

[34] *Luke* xviii, 31.

[35] *Psalms* cxviii, 96.

[36] *Om. O; Leviticus* xvi, 31; *II Esdras* ix, 14.

[37] *Isaias* lviii, 13.

[38] *Genesis* ii, 2.

[39] predictorum *R;* predicamentorum *O.*

[40] favorem *O.*

[41] qui *O R.*

[42] *John* xx, 4.

[43] positus *R.*

[44] cursum *O.*

[45] *Om. O.*

[46] *Om. O.*

[47] *Ezechiel* i, 13.

[48] *Psalms* cxviii, 32.

[49] mihi *R; om. O.*

[50] *Proverbs* vi, 3.

[51] possum *O R.*

[52] *Acts* xx, 24.

Sed quia cursus rebus inditus illud habet quod omnis natura sollicitatur[59] de fine, et omnis homo cum ad consummationem pervenerit de suo recogitat successore, ideo baccalarium reverendum et cursorem futurum,[60] qui mihi non in tenementis quae quasi ad firmam tenui,[61] sed in scolis Praedicatorum, quae mihi hereditarie[62] debebantur, succedet, specialiter recommendarem, ut tam de eo quam de me illud exponatur quod dicitur, *Act.* 13,[63] *Cum autem implevit*[64] *Ioannes cursum suum dicebat: "Quem me arbitramini esse? Non sum ego; sed ecce venit post me cuius non sum dignus calceamenta pedum solvere."*[65] In rei veritate quem <me> arbitramini esse? non sum ego, eo quod multi vestrum plus conceperunt[66] de me quam verificare possum. Sed ecce venit fortior cursor post me cuius non sum dignus calceamenta solvere, de quo possum exponere illud *Isai.* 2,[67] *cursor levis explicans vias suas* erit in vobis: cursor levis propter sapientiae sagacitatem, sapientes enim faciunt omnia levia quia *doctrina prudentium facilis, Proverb.* 13;[68] propter eloquentiae loquacitatem, quia linguam habet mundam et acutam, ut de eo verificetur illud *Ps.*,[69] *velociter currit sermo eius*; propter obedientiae vivacitatem, obedientes enim leviter et vivaciter movent se, unde *Sap.* 3,[70] *iusti sicut scintillae in arundineto discurrunt.*

Et certe quod actus et officium cursoris huic baccalario debeat congrue convenire potestis convincere specialiter ex duobus, viz., ex nominis expositione, et ex corporis dispositione. Nomen enim suum in vulgari est *Roger.* In quo quidem nomine duae bestiae designantur quae inter animalia communia inveniuntur cursui magis apta, viz., caprea et canis. *Ro* enim anglice latine[71] dicitur caprea, et ipsum totum vocabulum quod est Roger canibus convenit per appellationem. Erit ergo cursor iste velox sicut caprea, ut de eo exponatur illud *Re.* 2,[72] *Asael cursor velocissimus fuit quasi unus ex capreis in silvis.* Canis est etiam bestia bene velox, unde libentius praecurrit ante hominem quam sequitur, sicut dicitur, *Tob.* 11,[73] *tunc praecucurrit canis qui simul erat in via, et quasi nuntius adveniens, blandimento caudae suae gaudebat.*

Et[74] licet comparem eum cani iuxta nomen suum, non tamen canibus patriae suae. Est enim de quadam patria quae vocatur *Couplond*, in qua illud evangelicum semper servatur ad litteram, *non est bonum sumere panem filiorum et mittere canibus*[75] ad manducandum. Habent semper prae oculis illud exemplum psalmi de reprobis, *famem patientur ut canes, Ps.* 58.[76] Et ideo bona fide dicitur quod canes sunt ibi ita debiles prae defectu quod non solum non possunt currere sed non possunt latrare, sed de eis verificatur illud *Isai.* 56,[77] *universi canes muti non valentes latrare.* Sed certe cursor iste futurus est fortis canis et pinguis, in tantum quod si homines de Derham[78] eum pridie, quando agebatur de corpore christi, habuissent, eum pro pane paschali comedentes dixissent, *iste est panis quem dedit nobis dominus ad vescendum,*[79] quia ipsi mallent canem quam leonem iuxta illud *Eccl.* 9,[80] *melior est canis vivus leone mortuo.*

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[53] *Romans* ix, 16.

[54] *John* xvii, 4.

[55] constiterunt *O.*

[56] This remark seems to indicate that he did not deliver his lectures at Blackfriars. Perhaps there was building in progress at the priory. Cf. note 61.

[57] *Galatians* ii, 2.

[58] *Philippians* ii, 15-16.

[59] solitatur *O.*

[60] de futuro *O.*

[61] Cf. note 56.

[62] Cf. *Pontificale Romanum*, Ceremonial of Tonsure. *Dominus pars hereditatis meae.*

[63] *Acts* xiii, 25.

[64] *Om. R.*

[65] absolvere *O.*

[66] concipiunt *R.*

[67] *Jeremias* ii, 23.

[68] *Proverbs* xiv, 6.

[69] *Psalms* clvii, 15.

[70] *Wisdom* iii, 7.

[71] *Om. O.*

[72] *II Kings* ii, 18.

[73] *Tobias* xi, 9.

[74] The remarks about 'dogs of the north' and 'the dead lion' in this paragraph are echoed in a poem dealing with Fulk and a certain Roger who played a part in the disturbances between North and South at Oxford which preceded the secession to Stamford in 1333. Cf. H. E. Salter in *E. H. R.*, 1922, pp. 249-253.

Et licet de hoc nomine *Roger* nihil boni dicatur communiter, tamen volo ostendere quod in hoc nomine tota morum civilitas[81] implicatur. Est enim illud nomen duo verba latina, quia si legatur ordine recto, est coniunctivus modus huius verbi, *roger, -ris*; si vero legatur[82] ordine retrogrado, est prima persona huius verbi, *regor, regeris.* Et ecce *roger* et *regor* tota <morum civilitas.> Modo civitas[83] hominum divisione minima dividitur in duas partes, viz., in praelatos et subditos. Si ergo quaeratur de cursore futuro qualiter se habet ad praelatos, certe respondebit: "Regor per obedientiam"; si qualiter ad subditos, respondebit: "Roger", quasi diceret: "Si roger per benevolentiam, faciam iuxta potentiam". Est ergo nomen conveniens nomen cursoris *Roger.*

Sed notandum quod sicut currentes super terram impediuntur cum pervenerint[84] ad[85] aquam[85] et si natare[86] nesciant aliquando submerguntur, ita quidam qui aliquando in theologiae planis currunt in profundis difficultatibus demerguntur. Sed de isto cursore non poterit sic evenire, nam ipse ex una parte habet velocitatem capreae sive canis, et ex alia parte artem natandi aucae vel anseris. Scitis quod auca ad profundum vadum veniens faciliter transiet ubi fortis dextrarius mersus descendit. Ita iste cursor in profundis theologiae natabit sine[87] periculo et in planis curret sine offendiculo. Et hoc in suo cognomine denotatur. Dicitur enim de *Gosford,*[88] h. e., de vado[89] aucae. Sic ergo patet quod tam ex nomine quam ex cognomine inventus est idoneus ad currendum.

Idem patet ad oculum ex dispositione corporis. Licet enim *corpus quod corrumpitur aggravet animam* et deprimat, *Sap.* 9,[90] parva tamen corpora facilius moventur quam magna eo quod in eis est parva resistentia ad virtutem motoris. Et ideo cum iste[91] cursor sit[92] quotatus secundum capitula de parvis, cito et velociter praecurret cum Zachaeo qui cum esset statura pusillus ascendit in arborem ut videret Iesum, *Luc.* 19[93] Et parvus David cucurrit contra Golias et eum occidit, *Reg.* 17.[94] Hic est ergo cursor quem anno futuro habebitis deo dante.

Ego vero iam inclinato capite dicam illud *Io.* 19,[95] *consummatum est,* nam cursum consummavi, et[96] sequitur,[96] fidem servavi,[97] <fidem> videlicet pollicitam et doctrinam catholicam. Nec ideo tamen fidem catholicam me servasse confido quia omnia quae dixerim vera esse praesumo, sed quia de[98] dictis meis nihil pertinaciter defendo. Immo si sint aliqua deordinate dicta, illa retracto; si aliqua sint dicta in quemquam offensive, veniam peto, et vestrae benevolentiae me specialiter recommendo. Et si alicui vestrum valere potero, offero me paratum

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[75] *Matthew* xv, 26.

[76] *Psalms* lviii, 7.

[77] *Isaias* lvi, 10.

[78] Derham is mentioned in *Oxford University Medieval Archives* (Vol. 1) as a tenement in St. Ebbe's parish owned by the University.

[79] *Exodus* xvi, 15.

[80] *Ecclesiastes* ix, 4.

[81] *civitas O.*

[82] legitur *O.*

[83] civilitas *O R.*

[84] pervenerunt *O.*

[85] aliquam *O.*

[86] natari *O.*

[87] *Om. O.*

[88] A town in Cumberland in the diocese of Carlisle.

[89] *Add.* et *O.*

[90] *Wisdom* ix, 15.

[91] ille *R.*

[92] *Om. O.*

[93] *Luke* xix, 3-4.

[94] *I Kings* xvii.

[95] *John* xix, 30.

[96] *Om. O.*

[97] *Om. O.*

[98] *Om. O.*

pro semper. Et ut licentiam meam accipiam, more christi vos magistros et socios deo patri recommendabo devote[99] sicut ipse discipulos suos fecit sic dicens, *Io.* 17,[100] *pater sancte, serva eos in nomine tuo quos dedisti mihi*, et infra, *non rogo ut tollas eos de mundo sed ut serves eos a malo*[101] et ad vitam perducas aeternam. Amen.

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II. *Ms* Cambrai 486: Another Redaction of the *Metaphysics* of Siger of Brabant?

WHILE examining catalogues of manuscripts for commentaries on the works of Aristotle, my attention was aroused by the notice of a thirteenth century manuscript of Cambrai containing anonymous *Questions* on the *Metaphysics*.[1] Since the incipit (*Omnes homines natura scire desiderant, etc. In hoc libro est ens suppositum sive subiectum*) recalls the opening words of the first Question of Siger of Brabant's commentary on the *Metaphysics* (Munich *Ms*: *Primo, videtur quod ens debet poni pro subiecto huius scientiae*; Paris *Ms*: *Ens videtur esse subiectum Metaphysicae*),[2] it seemed advisable to study the manuscript to see if it has any relationship to Siger's commentary. A comparison of Book I gave little indication of any affinity; but a continuation of the comparison from Book II to the end revealed a striking similarity in the Questions proposed and their solutions.

The present note gives the results of this preliminary investigation, which, although incomplete, offers evidence that the Cambrai *Ms* is either another redaction of Siger's *Metaphysics* or the work of one of his followers.

The anonymous *Quaestiones supra librum Metaphysicae usque ad sextum*, contained in *Ms* Cambrai 486, fols. 42^r-88^r, are written on parchment, two columns to the folio which measures 257 x 180 mm. They are written in a thirteenth century bookhand by a professional scribe who wrote neatly and without excessive abbreviations. Unfortunately he has made numerous mistakes in copying his text. The reader has to be constantly on the watch for errors and take upon himself the hazardous task of emending them.

Like the Munich *Ms* of Siger's *Metaphysics* (=*M*), the matter treated by the Cambrai (=*C*) is the first five books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[3] If we compare the list of Questions in the two manuscripts we find an impressive similarity. Book II of *C* has 17 Questions and *M* has 19; 14 of those in *C* are found in *M*, and the material of one is contained in a *commentum* of *M*. Book III of *C* has 32 Questions and *M* has 28; 18 of those in *C* are in *M* and the material of 11 others is found in *M*'s *commenta*. Book IV of *C* has 25 Questions and *M* has 38; 19 of those in *C* are in *M*, and the material of 4 others is found in the *commenta*. Book V of *C* has 19 Questions and *M* 24; 13 of those in *C* are in *M*.

Equally striking is the fact that with only four exceptions the Questions of the two manuscripts are in the same order. Two of these exceptions are slight: in Book III, Questions 6 and 7 in *C* appear in *M* in reverse order; and in Book V, Question 15 of *C* is found in *M* in a slightly different position. The other two exceptions are more important. Question 1, Book I of *C*, on man's natural desire to know, is found in *M* as the second Question of Book II; and the principal Question on the distinction of essence and existence, which in *M* is Question 7, Book I, is Question 4, Book IV of *C*.[4]

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[99] *Om. O.*

[100] *John* xvii, 11.

[101] *John* xvii, 15.

[1] Cf. *Catalogue général des manuscrits des Bibliothèques publiques de France. Départements*, t. 17. *Cambrai*, ed. A. Molinier (Paris, 1891), p. 180.

[2] Cf. the edition of the manuscripts by C. Graiff, *Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la Métaphysique* (Philosophes Médiévaux I, Louvain, 1948).

[3] The Paris manuscript of Siger's *Metaphysics* has not been used in this study because it is more concise than the Munich and omits many Questions. For a description of these manuscripts, cf. C. Graiff, *op. cit.*, pp. x-xxi; F. Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant d'après ses oeuvres inédites* (Les Philosophes Belges XIII, Louvain, 1942), pp. 510-511.

The greatest difference in the lists of the Questions is in Book I. *C* devotes the greatest number to this Book: 43. Now, it is remarkable that this is the shortest Book in *M*, containing only 8 Questions. The possible significance of these differences will be discussed later.

If we compare in some detail several of the Questions in the two manuscripts, we find close resemblances. Let us consider Book I, Question 7 of *M* (*Utrum esse in causatis pertineat ad essentiam causatorum*) and Book IV, Question 4 of *C* (*Utrum in causatis differat esse a re sive ab essentia rei, ita quod esse non sit de essentia rei*).[5] In *M*, Siger gives ten objections to his own position. Nine of these, arranged in the same order, are in *C*, not word for word, but the objection is in each case essentially the same and the same authority is quoted. Below is a comparison of the texts of the first objection. A transcription of the whole Question in *C* is given in the Appendix at the end of this note so that the reader can compare it more completely with *M*.

M	*C*
Esse se habet ad illud quod est sicut vivere ad illud quod vivit; sed vivere non pertinet ad essentiam illius quod vivit, sed est aliqua dispositio ei competens; ergo esse non pertinet ad essentiam illius quod est, sed est dispositio accidentalis. Maior patet, quia vivere viventibus est esse. Minor patet, quia II *De Anima* dicit Aristoteles quod vivere est moveri secundum locum et appetere et sentire et intelligere: quae omnes sunt dispositiones accidentales; quare, etc. (Graiff ed., p. 11, ll. 13-20)	Et videtur quod esse sit additum ipsi rei sive essentiae rei, quia sicut se habet vivere ad viventia, sic esse ad entia. Sed vivere est aliquid additum essentiae viventis. Quod apparet quia vivere est sentire et moveri localiter secundum Philosophum libro *De Anima*. Ergo similiter esse erit aliquid additum ipsi rei sive essentiae rei. (fol. 74^{va})

C has three of the four arguments *contra* of *M*, with the same references to Aristotle and Averroes. Here is a comparison of the first of the arguments:

M	*C*
Contra: Averroes V° *Metaphysicae* dicit sic: dictio "homo est" uno modo est problema de genere, alio modo de accidente. Secundum quod praedicatur esse diminutum vel esse in effectu, sic est problema de accidente. Sed sic dictio "homo est", secundum quod praedicatur esse non diminutum, sed qualitativum vel quantitativum, sic <est> problema de genere. Sed in problemate tali est praedicatio essentialis. (Graiff ed., p. 13, ll. 68-74)	Oppositum arguitur, quia dicit Commentator quod dicendo "Hoc[6] est", vel ultra "Hoc est", uno modo est problema de genere et alio modo problema de accidente. Est problema de genere si per illud esse intelligatur esse verum quod est extra animam. Genus autem non est aliquid additum ipsi rei, sed pertinet ad rei essentiam. Ergo et esse quod est sicut genus. Si autem accipiatur pro esse diminutum quod est in anima, sic est problema de accidente. Accidit enim rei quod intelligatur. Et sic esse verum quod est extra animam non est aliquid additum ipsi rei. (fol. 74^{vb})

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[4] Fols. 74^{va}-76^{ra}. There is another shorter Question on essence and existence in *M*, III, 2; Graiff ed., pp. 85, 86.

[5] Fols. 74^{va}-76^{ra}.

[6] Perhaps the scribe intended to write 'homo'.

The sequence of ideas in the *solutio* is much the same in the two manuscripts. First St. Albert's doctrine is given, that in creatures *esse* is something added to essence.

M	*C*
Haec est opinio Alberti Commentatoris. Ratio sua est ista *Libro de Causis*, quia res habet esse ex suo Primo Principio; ipsum autem Primum est illud quod ex seipso est, et illud quod ex seipso est habens esse, et est illud quod est ex se; etiam essentia rei est ex se; quare res distinguitur ab esse. (Graiff ed., p. 14, ll. 89-94).	Et ratio eorum est quia essentia rei ex se est, esse autem rei est ab alio, et ex hoc patet differentia inter esse et essentiam. (fol. 75ra)

The reply is essentially the same:

M	*C*
Sed Contra: quicquid est universaliter in re est effectus Primi Principii, et nihil est eorum quae pertinent ad rem in re ipsa, neque essentialiter neque accidentaliter, quin reducatur in Primum Principium; ergo haec distinctio nulla est, scilicet inter essentiam rei et esse per hoc quod unum sit effectus Primi Principii et aliud non. (Graiff ed., p. 14, ll. 95-00)	Contra hoc statim contingit arguere quia non est aliquid in re, nec esse nec essentia, quod non dependeat a Primo Principio, et ideo non contingit distinguere quod esse rei sit ab alio et essentia ex se. (fol. 75ra)

The opinions of Avicenna and St. Thomas are then given and refuted in a similar manner. Note the similarity of the reply to the position of St. Thomas:

M	*C*
Etsi conclusio vera sit, modum tamen ponendi non intelligo, quia esse quod pertinet ad rem, aut est pars essentiae rei, ut materia vel forma, aut res ipsa composita ex his, aut accidens. Sed si sit accidens, tunc erit additum essentiae rei; quod est contra dictam opinionem proximam. Sed dicere quod esse sit aliquid additum essentiae rei, ita quod non sit res ipsa, neque pars essentiae ut materia vel forma, et dicere quod non sit accidens, est ponere quartam naturam in entibus. (Graiff ed., p. 16, ll. 25-32)	Si tamen alio modo intelligatur ista positio, tunc contingit arguere contra eam. Omne enim quod est aut est pars essentiae, ut materia et forma, aut ipsa essentia, aut est aliquid adveniens ipsi essentiae sicut accidens. Si igitur esse non est pars essentiae quia nec materia nec forma, si etiam non est aliquid additum ipsi essentiae sicut accidens, si etiam non est ipsa essentia, tunc erit ponere quartam naturam quae nec erit accidens rei, nec erit pars ipsius rei, nec erit ipsa res; quod est inconveniens. (fol. 75va)

The final solution is the same in the two manuscripts.

M	*C*
Primo pono quod in causatis ipsum esse pertinet ad essentiam causatorum, ita quod res et ens non significant duas intentiones. (Graiff ed., p. 17, ll. 40-43)	Et ideo dicendum quod esse in rebus causatis pertinet ad essentiam rei, ita quod esse rei et etiam res significant unam intentionem sub alia ratione, et convertuntur. (fol. 75va)

At the end of the second Book there is a group of three Questions in both manuscripts: *Utrum consuetudo audiendi falsa faciat ea credere esse vera*; *Utrum sensus possit errare consuetudine*; *Utrum homo qui credit opposita principiorum ex consuetudine possit redire ad cognitionem veritatis.*[7] Let us compare the way in which they treat the first of these. There are three objections to Siger's position in *M* which also appear in *C*. Here is the first:

M	*C*
Videtur quod non. In nobis non est opinari sic vel sic ut dicitur III *De Anima*; sed tamen imaginari est sic vel sic; sed si in nobis esset assuescere sic vel sic, et ista consuetudo faceret nos credere aliqua esse sic vel sic, tunc esset opinari sic vel sic; quare, etc. (Graiff ed., p. 75, ll. 7-11)	Videtur quod non, quia opinari[8] sic vel sic non est in nobis, secundum quod dicit Aristoteles in Moralibus. Ergo videtur quod consuetudo audiendi falsa non faciat illa falsa credere esse vera. (fol. 61^{ra})

The reply is as follows:

M	*C*
Ad rationes in oppositum dicendum quod in nobis non est opinari sic vel sic, hoc est sic intelligendum, quia virtus opinativa non operatur ad imperium voluntatis, sed imaginativa imaginatur ad imperium voluntatis; nihilominus tamen, licet in nobis non sit hoc, tamen voluntas hominis bene comparatur ad hoc vel hoc, ad hoc quod homo possit applicari tali vel tali; non tamen sicut est in imaginatione. (Graiff ed., p. 76, ll. 43-49)	Ad primam rationem cum dicitur in nobis non est opinari[8] sic vel sic, etc., dicendum quod illud dicitur quia virtus opinativa non opinatur ad imperium[9] sicut imaginativa imaginatur; nihil tamen prohibet ut voluntas cooperetur ad hoc quod aliquid consuetum opinetur, quia voluntas operatur ad consuetudinem et per consequens ad opinionem. (fol. 61^{rb})

In the *solutio* of *M*, Siger observes that the habit of hearing a falsehood taught, especially by a person of renown, gradually causes it to be held as true.[10] The repetition of the doctrine generates in the mind of the hearer a probability of its truth. Essentially the same point is made in *C*.[11] This manuscript also states that in human laws many falsehoods are found which are held to be true because of habit. This is not in the *solutio* of *M* but in the *commentum* which immediately precedes the Question.[12]

Again, let us compare *M*, Book II, Question 10 (*Utrum in causis moventibus contingat procedere in infinitum?*)[13] with *C* (*Utrum causae efficientes et moventes procederent in infinitum?*)[14]

There is only one objection in both manuscripts.

M	*C*
Videtur quod sic, quia causae generantes sunt causae moventes; et tales causae procedunt in infinitum, secundum Philosophum, ut iste generatur a	Et videtur quod sic, quia causae generationis sunt efficientes et moventes; sed istae procedunt in infinitum secundum Philosophum, quod homo gen-

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[7] In *M*, II, 17, 18, 19; Graiff ed., pp. 74-79; in *C*, fols. 61^{ra}-62^{ra}.

[8] Ms operari.

[9] Manuscript corrupt. The scribe seems to have mistaken the abbreviation stroke.

[10] Graiff ed., p. 75.

[11] Fol. 61^{rb}.

[12] Graiff ed., p. 74.

[13] Graiff ed., pp. 53-56.

[14] Fols. 58^{rb}-58^{vb}.

patre suo, ille ab alio; ergo etc. (Graiff ed., p. 53, ll. 6-8)

eratur ab homine in infinitum. (fols. 58^{rb}-58^{va})

The key to the solution is Averroes' distinction between essentially and accidentally ordered causes:

M	*C*
Ad rationem in oppositum respondet Commentator in V° *Physicorum*. Dicit enim quod in causis moventibus ordinatis essentialiter tenet illud, in causis tamen ordinatis accidentaliter vel secundum accidens contingit procedere in infinitum. (Graiff ed., pp. 53-54, ll. 13-16)	Averrois solvit istam quaestionem et dicit quod in causis essentialiter ordinatis non contingit procedere in infinitum; in causis tamen accidentaliter ordinatis contingit procedere in infinitum. (fol. 58^{va})

M then explains three meanings of the terms "essentially" and "accidentally ordered causes". The same distinctions are in *C*.[15]

In *M* there are numerous *commenta* or literal commentaries on Aristotle's text between the Questions. These are not in *C*, although in their place we sometimes find a Question dealing with the same problem. Thus in Book III of *M* between Questions 15 and 16 there is a discussion whether there is one form for all men.[16] Siger denies that this is true. In C this problem is treated in the same place in a distinct Question, at greater length, but with basically the same solution.[17] Again, in *M*, between Questions 16 and 17 of Book III there is a discussion on the use of symbolism in philosophy.[18] *C* has a distinct question at this place with the same solution.[19]

Although the questions in the two manuscripts are frequently similar to each other, we occasionally find differences. For example, where *C* has the Question: *Utrum verum scitur sine causa*,[20] *M* has *Utrum ad cognitionem sufficientem alicuius oporteat inducere usque ad cognitionem causae primae.*[21] So too the treatment of the Question: *Utrum veritas sit in rebus vel in intellectu*[22] is different, although the doctrine seems to be fundamentally the same.

It is safe to conclude, however, that *C* contains a commentary on the *Metaphysics* which in many respects resembles the one in *M*. A complete study of *C* and a detailed comparison of it with the edition of Dom Graiff is required before the exact extent of their similarity can be estimated. This much, however, is certain: *C* differs too much from *M* to be another reportation of the same lectures. In this respect it differs from the Paris manuscript. But the doctrine of *C* appears to be essentially the same as that of the known manuscripts of Siger, and the similarity of treatment of the subjects leads us to ask whether it is the work of a follower of Siger or another redaction of his *Metaphysics.*

Against the second hypothesis is the remarkable difference between the first books of the two manuscripts. Book I of *M* contains only 8 Questions, whereas *C* has 43. Now, the reason why Siger passed so quickly over Book I is that he thought this book was written by Theophrastus and not by Aristotle:

> I^{us} autem dicitur fuisse Theophrasti non Aristotelis, et hoc dicunt expositores graeci; et ideo ad II^{m} librum nos transferamus.[23]

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[15] Fol. 58^{va}.

[16] Graiff ed., p. 140.

[17] Fol. 68^{vb}.

[18] Graiff ed., pp. 146-148.

[19] Fol. 69^{va}.

[20] Fol. 56^{vb}.

[21] II, 6; Graiff ed., pp. 42-45.

[22] II, 9; Graiff ed., pp. 51-53; in C, fol. 57^{rb}.

[23] II, *Fragmentum commentarii*, Graiff ed., p. 27, ll. 41-43. St. Albert also remarks that the first Book was ascribed to Theophrastus: Et hanc probationem ponit Theophrastus qui etiam primum librum (qui incipit, *Omnes homines scire desiderant*) *Metaphysicae*

These words are not in C, and its lengthy treatment of Book I shows us that the author was not of this opinion. However, it is possible that Siger changed his mind on the point and altered the composition of the first Book in a second redaction. If that is true, it seems more likely that *C* represents the earlier redaction, for it is on the whole shorter than *M* and its doctrine is not as fully developed. We may suppose, on this hypothesis, that Siger later became convinced of the inauthenticity of Book I. In a second redaction (represented by the Munich and Paris manuscripts) he dropped most of the Questions of Book I, retaining as an introduction to his work only a few concerned with the nature of Metaphysics and its relation to the other sciences. The discussion on the natural desire to know, which is in its normal place in *C* at the beginning of Book I, was then shifted to the beginning of Book II. And the principal Question on the distinction of essence and existence, which in *C* is in its normal place in Book IV, was shifted to the Introduction, which was then completed with a new Question on the causality of being.

This, however, is only an hypothesis which a further study of *C* and the discovery of more manuscripts may either support or disprove. There remains the possibility that it is the work of a student or follower of Siger who copied his master very closely except in the composition of the first Book. What appears fairly certain is that it is either the work of Siger himself or of someone in his circle at the University of Paris who was strongly influenced by him.

APPENDIX

Cambrai 486, fol. 74^{va}.

Tunc quaeritur utrum in causatis differat esse a re sive ab essentia rei, ita quod esse non sit de essentia rei.[1]

Et videtur quod esse sit additum ipsi rei sive essentiae rei, quia sicut se habet vivere ad viventia, sic esse ad entia. Sed vivere est aliquid additum essentiae viventis. Quod apparet quia vivere est sentire et moveri[2] localiter secundum Philosophum, libro *De Anima*.[3] Ergo similiter esse erit aliquid additum ipsi rei sive essentiae rei.

Item. Esse est sicut actus entis. Actus autem differt ab eo cuius est actus. Ergo esse differt a re et erit aliquid additum ipsi rei.

Item. Illud ad cuius essentiam pertinet ipsum esse illud habet esse ex seipso sicut Primum Principium. Sed nullum causatum habet ea ex seipso sed ab alio. Ergo in causatis differt esse ab essentia rei, ita quod res habet esse per aliquid sibi additum et non per essentiam.

Item. Hoc idem arguitur auctoritate Avicennae. Dicit[4] enim Avicenna quod res cuius est esse et esse significant duas intentiones formaliter.

Item. Ex dictis[5] Avicennae nomina synonyma sic se habent quod ex uno non habet certitudo alterius. Si igitur esse et res cuius est esse sint nomina synonyma

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Aristotelis traditur addidisse: et ideo in Arabicis translationibus primus liber non habetur. *In Poster. Analyt.* II, II, 1, ed. Borgnet (Paris, 1890), 2, p. 22a. Alexander of Aphrodisias and Syrian imply that some ancient scholars rejected the book. Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (Oxford, 1948), p. 175.

St. Albert's statement that the first Book is not in the Arabian translations seems in need of qualification. About 1220 the *Metaphysica Nova* was translated from the Arabian. The first book of this version is Book II (little alpha) and the second book is Book I, beginning with chapter five (987a6). Averroes commented on the Arabian text arranged in this order and with this lacuna. Cf. G. Lacombe, *Aristoteles Latinus* I (Rome, 1939), pp. 64, 110;. M. DeWulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* (6^e éd., Louvain, 1936), 2, p. 39, note.

[1] The parallel text of Siger will be found in C. Graiff, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-22; also, with an historical analysis, in A. Maurer, '*Esse* and *Essentia* in the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant', *Mediaeval Studies*, VIII (1946), 68-86.

[2] Ms mori.

[3] Aristotle, *De Anima* II, 2, 413a23.

[4] Avicenna, *Meta.* I, 6 (Venice, 1508), fol. 72^{va}C.

[5] *Ibid.*

significantia idem, tunc non habeatur rei certitudo per esse; sed certitudo rei habetur per esse. Ergo videtur quod non sint nomina synonyma. Ergo esse est aliquid additum ipsi rei.

Item arguitur auctoritate Boetii.[6] Dicit enim Boetius quod in omni eo quod est citra[7] Primum differt quod est <et> esse, sive quod est et per hoc quod est. Ergo videtur quod esse sit aliquid additum ipsi rei et quod differat ab essentia rei.

Item. Omne quod est citra[7] Primum compositum est ex esse et essentia, et (fol. 74^{vb}) componentia differunt.[8] Ergo esse differt ab essentia.

Item. Alia a Primo Principio sunt entia per participationem, et ipsum Primum est ens per essentiam. In eo autem quod est ens per participationem differt participans et participatum. Sed esse est sicut participatum et res sive essentia rei sicut participans. Ergo esse differt ab essentia.

Item. Esse secundum quod huiusmodi non diversificatur. Unde si debeat diversificari, oportet quod diversificari per aliquid sibi additum et unitum, et esse diversificatum est in diversis. Ergo per aliquid sibi additum, et sic esse est aliquid additum ipsi rei.

Oppositum arguitur, quia dicit Commentator[9] quod dicendo "Hoc[10] est", vel ultra "Hoc est", uno modo est problema de genere et alio modo problema de accidente. Est problema de genere si per illud esse intelligatur esse verum quod est extra animam. Genus autem non est aliquid additum ipsi rei, sed pertinet ad rei essentiam. Ergo et esse quod est sicut genus. Si autem esse accipiatur pro esse diminutum quod est in anima, sic est problema de accidente. Accidit enim rei quod intelligatur. Et sic esse verum quod est extra animam non est aliquid additum ipsi rei.

Hoc idem vult Philosophus in littera.[11] Dicit enim quod idem est dicere "homo" et "homo ens", ita quod ens non est dispositio addita ipsi homini. Unde nihil diversum ostenditur per demonstrationem reciprocam.

Item arguitur sic ratione Commentatoris.[12] Si res habet esse, aut hoc est per se aut per aliquid additum. Si per se, habeo propositum. Si per aliquid additum, illud additum est ens; et si est ens, aut per se aut per aliquid additum. Si per se, eadem ratione fuit sciendum in primo. Si per aliquid additum, tunc illud additum erit ens, et sic erit processus in infinitum, vel erit dare quod res habet esse per se, non per aliquid additum (fol. 75^{ra}) essentiae rei. Et eodem modo arguit Commentator[13] de ente et uno, quod unum non est aliquid additum ipsi enti, quia si esset aliquid additum ipsi enti esset processus in infinitum.

Aliqui dicunt[14] ad istam quaestionem quod in causatis esse est aliquid additum ipsi rei, ita quod causatum habet esse per aliquid sibi additum. Et ratio eorum est quia essentia rei ex se est, esse[15] autem rei est ab alio, et ex hoc patet differentia inter esse et essentiam. Contra hoc statim contingit arguere quia non est aliquid in re, nec esse nec essentia, quod non dependeat a Primo Principio; et ideo non contingit distinguere quod esse rei sit ab alio et essentia ex se. Et ista probatio[16] prius posita confirmatur per rationem prius factam, scilicet, per istam rationem: illud ad cuius essentiam pertinet ipsum esse, illud habet esse ex seipso, et nullum causatum est ex seipso. Ergo ad essentiam causati non pertinet esse. Ista ratio non concludit, quia haec praepositio *ex* potest dicere circumstantiam causae formalis vel circumstantiam causae efficientis. Si dicat circumstantiam causae efficientis, tunc dico quod ista causata nec esse nec essentiam habent a seipsis effective sed ab alio. Si autem dico circumstantiam causae formalis, sic dico quod causata, quantum ad essentiam suam et quantum ad esse, habent esse ex seipsis formaliter et non ab alio. Primum enim non est causa formalis causatorum a se. Unde dico quod homo bene potest esse homo formaliter ex se, quamvis tamen effective ab alio habeat esse, quamquam tamen esse pertineat ad essentiam; nihilominus tamen nec illa essentia nec illud esse est ex seipso effective sed ab alio. Esse tamen habent ex se (fol. 75^{rb}) formaliter.

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[6] Boethius, *De Hebdomadibus;* PL 64, 1311 BC; *De Trinitate* 2; PL 64, 1250C.

[7] Ms circa.

[8] Cf. Boethius, *ibid.*

[9] Averroes, *In V Meta.* 7, 14 (Venice, 1574), fol. 117FG.

[10] Perhaps the scribe intended to write 'homo'.

[11] Aristotle, *Meta.* IV, 2, 1003b26-30.

[12] Averroes, *In IV Meta.* 2, 3, fol. 67 G.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Cf. St. Albert, *De Causis et processu universitatis* I, 1, 8; ed. Borgnet (Paris, 1891), 10, p. 377.

[15] Ms est.

[16] Ms potentia.

Alia est positio ipsius Avicennae,[17] qui dicit quod esse est aliquid additum ipsi rei, ita quod res habet esse in effectu per aliquid sibi additum. Non enim distinguit Avicenna inter nomina significantia diversas intentiones formaliter et inter nomina significantia eandem rem sub alia ratione. Immo cum unum nomen significet eandem intentionem quam aliud, et illam significet sub alia ratione et sub alio modo significandi, credidit Avicenna[18] talia significare et subicere aliam essentiam et aliam intentionem. Et ideo cum esse et res sub alia et alia ratione et alio modo significent, dixit quod non significant idem.

Alia est positio quod esse non est penitus idem cum essentia sive cum re, nec est etiam additum sive actus ipsi rei, sed est aliquid constitutum ex principiis essentiae.[19] Si intelligatur quod ipsum esse non[20] sit penitus idem cum essentia, immo aliquo modo diversum secundum rationem et secundum modum significandi, si etiam intelligatur quod ipsum esse non sit aliquid additum sicut accidens reale, sed sit solum differens ab essentia sive a re secundum rationem et secundum modum significandi, vera est positio alia quod sit solum additum secundum rationem et non aliquid reale additum. Et <sic> intellexit Avicenna.[21] Hoc patet quia ipse dicit quod de ente et uno quod ens et unum significant unam intentionem et essentiam et quod differunt sola ratione. Unde per hoc quod dicit, quod esse non est penitus idem cum ente et quod non est aliquid additum, sed ex principiis essentiae constitutum, per hoc innuit quod solum differunt secundum rationem et modum significandi et quod significat idem in esse et re. (fol. 75^{va})

Si tamen alio modo intelligatur ista positio, tunc contingit arguere contra eam. Omne enim quod est aut est pars essentiae, ut materia et forma, aut ipsa essentia, aut est aliquid adveniens ipsi essentiae sicut accidens. Si igitur esse non est pars essentiae quia nec materia nec forma, si etiam non est aliquid additum ipsi essentiae sicut accidens, si etiam non est ipsa essentia, tunc erit ponere quartam naturam quae nec erit accidens rei, nec erit pars ipsius rei, nec erit ipsa res; quod est inconveniens. Et ideo ille qui posuit istam positionem non potuit alio modo intelligere nisi quod ipsum esse est idem cum essentia secundum rem, differans tamen ab ipsa re quae habet esse secundum rationem et secundum modum significandi, nisi male intelligit.

Et ideo dicendum quod esse in rebus causatis pertinet ad essentiam rei, ita quod esse rei et etiam res significant unam intentionem sub alia ratione et convertuntur. Sed intelligendum quod aliqua convertuntur quia significant penitus unam intentionem et sub ratione una, sicut Marcus Tullius. Alia autem convertuntur quae significant intentiones diversas formaliter, ita quod una intentio est alteri addita, sicut risibile et homo. Tertio modo convertuntur aliqua eo quod significant unam intentionem sub alia ratione et sub alio modo significandi, sicut currere et cursus. Primo modo esse et res sive essentia rei non convertuntur, ita quod sint penitus nomina synonyma et quod sint penitus idem secundum rem et secundum rationem. Secundo modo etiam non convertuntur, quia esse non est aliqua dispositio addita rei. Sed esse et res convertuntur tertio modo, quia significant essentiam unam sub alia tamen ratione; nec ipsum esse addit rem aliquam supra ens sive essentiam sed solum rationem. Et istud videtur sentire Aristoteles (fol. 75^{vb}) tertio huius et in quarto,[22] ubi vult quod homo et ens, homo et unus homo idem sunt.

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[17] Avicenna, *Meta.* 1, 8, fol. 74^{ra}.

[18] *Ibid* Cf. also *Meta.* I, 6, fol. 72^{va}C.

[19] Cf. St. Thomas, *In IV Meta.* 2, ed. Cathala (Turin, 1935), 558.

[20] Ms nisi.

[21] This is rather Averroes' position. Cf. Avicenna's doctrine as stated immediately above. Averroes writes: Avicenna autem peccavit multum in hoc, quod existimavit quod unum et ens significant dispositiones additas essentiae rei. . . . Nos autem diximus quod significant eandem essentiam, sed modis diversis, non dispositiones diversas essentiae additas. *In IV Meta.* 2, 3, fol. 67BC. Cf. also St. Thomas: Unde ista tria, res, ens, unum, significant omnino idem, sed secundum diversas rationes. *In IV Meta.* 2; ed. Cathala, 553.

Aliqui[23] tamen crediderunt quod esse sit aliqua dispositio rei sive passio; hoc tamen est in tertio et in quarto contra Aristotelem.[24]

Et ideo dicendum est quod idem sunt esse rei et res, et quod esse non est aliquid additum ipsi essentiae rei.

Ad rationes dicendum ad primam cum dicitur quod unum est aliquid additum essentiae unitatis, ergo similiter esse erit aliquid additum rei sive enti, dicendum quod duplex est vivere: quoddam est vivere accidentale, sicut sentire et movere secundum locum; et tale est dispositio viventi; et de tali intellexit Aristoteles.[25] Est autem aliud vivere quod est esse primum et primus actus, et tale non est accidentale sed pertinet ad esse viventis. Et sicut istud ultimum vivere se habet ad viventem, sic esse se habet ad rem sive ad essentiam rei. Ideo non valet ratio.

Ad aliam rationem, cum dicitur esse est sicut actus entis, et actus differt ab eo cuius est actus, etc., dicendum quod actus potest comparari ad materiam[26] vel ad compositum. Si ad materiam, sic actus differt a materia. Si ad compositum comparatur actus, sic dico quod actus non differt a composito. Eodem modo esse totius compositi non differt ab essentia compositi. Vel potest dici quod quamquam actus differat a materia, non tamen oportet quod illud quod significat per modum actus differat essentialiter ab eo quod significat per modum habitus cuius est esse et essentia sive ens.

Alia ratio soluta fuit prius,[27] ista, scilicet, "Illud ad cuius essentiam pertinet ipsum esse, etc."

Quod arguitur postea, quod si essent idem et essent nomina synonyma, tunc unum non certificaret, etc., dicendum quod non sunt nomina synonyma ita quod idem significet sub una ratione penitus; in talibus enim unum non certificat alterum; tamen (fol. 76ra) sunt nomina synonyma sic quod idem significant sub alia et alia ratione, et talibus nominibus synonymis unum bene certificat alterum.

Ad aliam rationem, cum dicitur auctoritate Boetii quod in omni eo quod est citra Primum, etc., dicendum quod verum est differunt ratione; non tamen oportet quod differant essentialiter; et sic intellexit Boetius. Si autem aliter intellexit, male intellexit.

Quod arguis quod omnia quae sunt citra Primum sunt[28] composita secundum essentiam, non dicendum[29] quod omnia alia a Primo sint composita secundum essentiam. Immo si sint composita, haec est secundum rationem.

Quod arguitur ultimo, quod omnia alia a Primo sunt essentia per participationem, dicendum quod esse in communi non participatur ab aliquo quia nihil differt ab illo; esse tamen Primi participatur secundum imitationem; et verum est quod illud esse Primi differt ab aliis quae ipsum imitantur.

Ad ultimum, cum dicitur quod esse secundum quod huiusmodi non diversificatur, etc., dicendum quod esse non diversificatur in diversis per[30] aliquid quod sit diversum ab esse in essentia et realiter. Immo illud additum facit unum et idem cum esse, sicut animal diversificatur in diversis non per aliquid quod sit diversum realiter ab animali[31] et per aliquid quod non faciat idem in essentia cum animali; immo idem cum animali facit. Sic est in proposito, quod esse non diversificatur per aliquid diversum realiter, sed solum per aliquid diversum secundum rationem. Ideo, etc.

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[22] Aristotle, *Meta.* III, 4, 1001a19 ff.; IV, 2, 1003b26-30.

[23] Perhaps William of Auvergne, Cf. *De Universo* I-II, 3, (Orleans, 1674) I, p. 594.

[24] Aristotle, *ibid.*

[25] Aristotle, *De Anima* II, 2, 413a23.

[26] Ms *adds* vel ad componi.

[27] Cf. *supra*, p. 230.

[28] Ms secundum.

[29] Ms essendo.

[30] Ms et.

[31] Ms alio.

III. *CERT RÍG CAISIL:* The Right Of The King Of Cashel

PROBABLY no other country in Western Europe possessed a more complex stratified political structure than that which obtained in Ireland during the Middle Ages. Kingship, for example, was vested not in one king but in many kings of different grades, so that at one period more than a hundred kings ruled over the land. The supreme king, whose suzerain seat was at Tara, represented the highest grade; the kings of the various provinces, such as Munster, represented the intermediate grade; and the kings of the *túatha* or petty kingdoms, some of whom also might exercise authority over more than one *túath*, represented the lowest grade. Now just as the kings of the provinces ostensibly were bound in fealty to the supreme king, so in turn the kings of the petty kingdoms, even if their authority was not limited to their own kingdom, owed allegiance to the individual kings of the provinces. The status of their allegiance, however, was of two kinds: non-tributary and tributary. Some of these sub-kings, though they received gifts from their overking, were free in that they paid him no tribute, whereas most of them were unfree in that they were subject to fixed assessments by him. Since, as might be expected, the overking sought to extend his suzerainty by increasing the number of kings under his dominion, especially those that were unfree and therefore owed him tribute, it is natural that in the course of time the kingdoms which were subordinate to him should vary extensively. If he was successful in his policy of aggrandizement, his hegemony might extend to a score or more of petty kingdoms; conversely if he was unsuccessful, his hegemony might be even curtailed. In consequence, much variation occurs from period to period not only in the number of kingdoms under the sway of an overking but also in the amount of tribute payable by those kingdoms that were unfree.[1]

The foregoing statements regarding the status of kingship in mediaeval Ireland are based on documentary evidence derived principally from *The Book of Rights*;[2] but inasmuch as some of this evidence still remains unprinted, it will be germane to the present topic to publish and to translate here a hitherto unedited tract entitled[3] *Cert Ríg Caisil*, "The Right of the King of Cashel,"[4] which henceforth will be referred to as *CRC*. To the best of my knowledge,[5] the tract in question survives only in the following three manuscripts:

B: *Ms* 23.P.12 (The Book of Ballymote) in the library of the Royal Irish Academy, a manuscript compiled between A.D. 1384 and A.D. 1406, p. 189, col. b, l. 31—p. 190, col. a, l. 16.[6]

L: *Ms* 23.P.2 (The Book of Lecan) in the library of the Royal Irish Academy, a manuscript compiled about A.D. 1417, fol. 230^{v} col. b, ll. 18-50.[7]

H: *Ms* H.3.17 in the library of Trinity College, Dublin, a manuscript compiled probably not earlier than the sixteenth century,[8] col. 767, l. 5—col. 768, l. 7.

Of these three copies of *CRC*, *B* and *L* derive from the same exemplar.[9] That such is the case is evidenced by their close correspondence with respect to content[10] and also by the errors that they share in common. Both, for example, substitute *Haraib* (§6) for the correct dative plural form *Haradaib* in *H*, and both likewise have *rī* (§6) for the correct dative singular form *rīg* which H alone preserves. *B* and *L*, therefore, represent one branch of the stemma; *H*, on the other hand, is the sole survivor of another branch. Though all three descend ultimately from one and the same archetype, nevertheless *H* differs from *B* and *L* in that it springs immediately from a revised copy of this archetype, a copy which has introduced a series of changes in the original text. For even if the sections that are omitted[11] and the discrepancies in the amounts that are assessed[12] may be ascribed to the carelessness of the scribe of *H*, there nevertheless still remain other divergences which do not seem to be the result of faulty transmission, such as divergences in the actual wording[13] and to some extent also in the subject matter.[14] These can be explained only by assuming that *H* has undergone revision so that its line of descent differs from that of *B* and *L*.

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[1] For a more detailed account of the matters discussed in this paragraph, see Alice Stopford Green, *History of the Irish State to 1014* (London, 1925), p. 74 and ff.

[2] Ed. J. O'Donovan, Dublin, 1847.

[3] In *B*, the title occurs in the right-hand margin of col. b. In *L*, there is no title, whereas in *H* a later hand has written in the margin between cols. 766 and 767: *Ceart 7 Cíís Ríg Cassill.*

[4] Cashel was the traditional seat of the kings of Munster until approximately A.D. 1000.

[5] Apparently the tract entitled *Cíos Ríogh Caisil Anallód* in *Ms Egerton* 150 of the British Museum represents an excerpt from *The Book of Rights;* cf. R. Flower, *Catalogue of Irish Manuscripts in the British Museum* II (London, 1926), p. 404.

[6] See the facsimile edition of *The Book of Ballymote* (Dublin, 1887), by R. Atkinson.

[7] See the facsimile edition of *The Book of Lecan* (Dublin, 1937), by Kathleen Mulchrone. On p. xxxi of her "Introduction," Dr. Mulchrone states that the text "ends imperfect (230^{vb}) owing to a lacuna in the Manuscript." To judge, however, by the other copies in *B* and *H*, the present text is not deficient.

[8] Compare T. K. Abbott and E. J. Gwynn, *Catalogue of the Irish Manuscripts in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin* (Dublin and London, 1921), p. 355.

[9] In this connection see also Mulchrone, *op. cit.*, pp. xiv and xxx.

Despite the fact that *H* represents one branch in the stemma of the manuscripts, it is, however, seldom employed in the reconstitution of *CRC* because of the careless, slovenly way in which on the whole it has been copied by the scribe from his source. Occasionally, to be sure, *H* preserves an older or better form than is to be found in *B* or *L*; yet its chief value lies rather in the fact that it serves to confirm many of the readings in these two manuscripts. Upon the readings of *B* and *L*, which together constitute the other branch of the stemma, the present edition of this text is, therefore, principally based. As is customary in editing Irish texts, the punctuation, the paragraphing, and the use of capitals are made to accord with modern practice; scribal omissions of marks of length are supplied by means of horizontal bars over the vowels; the various sections are numbered for purposes of convenient reference; and expansions of ambiguous resolution are italicized, particularly with respect to the numerals which may be spelled variously depending upon the date of composition of the text in question. As is also customary, the spellings of personal and place names are normalized in the translation; and even when there is no indication in the source, the lenition of consonants and the length of vowels are indicated. Since almost all of these names are recorded in Edmund Hogan's *Onomasticon Goedelicum*,[15] this indispensable work is not cited in the footnotes in order to avoid needless repetition.

One of the reasons for establishing a critical text along the lines that have been suggested above is to be able to determine more accurately than otherwise might be feasible just when such a text was composed. Yet even if a critical edition is undertaken, it may not be always possible to ascertain the exact date of composition. *CRC* affords a good instance in point. Its *terminus ad quem* is reasonably certain since *B*, the oldest manuscript to preserve a copy of *CRC*, was compiled not later than A.D. 1406. Its *terminus a quo*, on the contrary, is far from certain; for, owing to the nature of this text with its lack of decisive forms, the application of linguistic tests affords no conclusive results. Indeed, the evidence of the language points to no other more definite conclusion than that *CRC* was composed sometime before the Early Modern Irish period, which begins about the middle of the thirteenth century, and sometime after the Old Irish period, which comes to an end about the middle of the tenth century. *CRC*, therefore, stems from the Middle Irish period. That fact at all events seems to be borne out by such forms as *crāin* (§3) for Old Irish genitive plural *cráine*,

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[10] Only in §§5 and 9 do *B* and *L* not agree entirely as to the amount of the tribute in each instance.

[11] Namely, all of §10 and most of §15.

[12] Compare §§2, 6, 9, and 13.

[13] In §5, for instance, *H* has *ceart* for *dliged*, the reading in both *B* and *L*.

[14] See in this connection §§9 and 12.

[15] Dublin and London, 1910.

·*bia* (§16) for Old Irish present subjunctive third singular ·*bé*, and *cānaid* (§17) for Old Irish accusative singular *cáin*.

The span of approximately three hundred years (A.D. 950—A.D. 1250) during which Middle Irish was operative may, however, be somewhat reduced insofar as the compositional date of *CRC* is concerned if the non-linguistic evidence bearing on this text also is taken into consideration. According to John MacNeill, *The Book of Rights*, which sets forth the gifts of the overkings to the sub-kings and the tributes that in turn are due from them, originally was compiled about A.D. 900 but then was revised about A.D. 1000 in order "to increase Brian's revenue and power as king of Munster, and thus to strengthen him for the attainment of the supreme kingship."[16] Now in this revised version even though the Osraigi admitted the hegemony of Munster, they nevertheless are not listed as a tributary state because Brian "did not think it well to push his claim as far as the exaction of tribute."[17] In *CRC*, on the other hand, not only are the Osraigi mentioned first among the tributary states, but they are forced to pay one of the largest of all the tributes to the king of Cashel, a tribute consisting of six hundred mantles and six hundred cows.[18] The payment of such a heavy tribute would seem to imply that subsequent to the revision of *The Book of Rights* the Osraigi were reduced to a complete state of subjection.[19] If that is true, then the revised version of *The Book of Rights* antedates *CRC*, and *CRC* consequently must have been composed sometime after A.D. 1000. Yet just exactly at what later period it was composed cannot be determined until further evidence is forthcoming, on the basis of which its date of composition may be established more precisely than is at present feasible.

CERT RĪG CAISIL

1. Ceart rīg Caisil ō chrīchaib and so sīs.

2. Dligid d'Osraigib uili *sé céd* brat 7 sē *céd* bō 7 a tabairt co Rāith Cinn Ḟælad i n-ǣnlō.

3. A dlighedh ōna Dēsib: *seacht cáecait* brat 7 *seacht cáecait* crāin 7 *seacht cáecait* bō 7 *seacht cáecait* dam.

4. A dliged ō Mūscraigib Urmuman: *tri cáecait* mart, *tri cáecait* brat dub, *tri cáecait* lulgach, *tri cáecait* torc.

5. A dliged ōna Huaithnib: ceit*hri cáecait* lulgach 7 cet*hri cáecait* dam 7 ceit*hri cáecait* mart 7 ceit*hri cáecait* brat, et ní dīb sin isin gemred 7 ní aile isin t-ṡamrad.

6. A dliged ōna Haradaib: tri *trichait* brat 7 *tri trichait* mart 7 *tri trichait* bō 7 *tri trichait* muc 7 a riachtain co Cnāmchoill ō rīg Arad.

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[16] *Celtic Ireland* (Dublin and London, 1921), p. 75. In *Duanaire Finn, "The Book of the Lays of Finn," Part I* (Irish Texts Society, VII, London, 1908), pp. xxvii-xxix, and in *Phases of Irish History* (Dublin, 1937), pp. 274-277, Mac Neill likewise discusses *The Book of Rights*.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[18] In *H*, the tribute is said to be "seven hundred mantles and seven hundred cows."

[19] In 'Dál Caladbuig and Reciprocal Services between the Kings of Cashel and Various Munster States,' ed. J. G. O'Keeffe, *Irish Texts*, I (1931), 19-21, the Osraigi are mentioned in §§11 and 16, but that they actually are subject to tribute is not specified.

Cert Rīg Caisil] Ceart 7 Ciís Ríg Cassill *H;* om. *L.*

1 *chrīchaib*] *chrichaib B, L, H. and so sīs*] ann so *L;* and sis *H.*

2 *d'Osraigib*] d'Osraidib *L;* d'Osrigib *H. uili*] uile *H. sé———sē*] *seacht———seacht H. tabairt*] tobairt *L;* tbairt *H. Rāith Cinn Ḟœlad*] Raith Cind Ḟælad *L;* Rath Cinn Ḟælad *B;* Raith Cind Ælad *H. i n-œ̄nlō*] i n-enlo *B;* a n-ænlo *H.*

3 *A dlighedh*] a dligead *H;* dligid *L. Dēsib*] Deissib *H. cáecait brat*] caecat brat *H. cáecait crāin*] *cáecat* crain *B;* caecat cran *H. 7 seacht cáecait bō*] 7 *seacht cáecat* bo *B;* caca bo *H. cáecait dam*] *cáecat* dam *B;* cæcat dam *H.*

4 *dliged*] dligad *H. ō*] ona *L. Mūscraigib*] Muscraidib *L;* Musgraidib *H. Urmuman*] *Urmaman H;* Urmumain *L. cáecait mart*] *cáecat* mart *B;* cæcat mart *H. lulgach*] loilgech *B;* loilgeach *H.*

5 *dliged*] ceart *H. Huaithnib*] Huathneachaib *H. lulgach*] loilgheach *H.* 7] om. *H. 7 ceithri cáecait mart*] ceit*hri cáecait* mart *H; seacht* mairt *B. 7 ceithri cáecait brat*] ceit*hri cáecait* brat *H;* 7 *seacht* brait *B. et*] 7 *H;* om. *L. isin gemred*] isin geímredh *B;* a geimrig *H. ní aile*] ní ele *B;* araill *L. isin t-ṡamrad*] isin t-amradh *B;* a samrad *H.*

6 *dliged*] dligead *H. Haradaib*] Haraib *B, L.*

7. A chīs ō Fearaib Muige: *cethracha* mart, *cethracha* dam, *cethracha* lulgach, *cethracha* brat.

8. A chīs ō Mūscraidib Desmuman: *tri céd* dam, *tri céd* brat, *tri céd* bō.

9. A chīs ō Chorco Laīgde: *tri cáecait* dam, *sesca* brat, *sesca* bō.

10. A chīs ō Orbraigib in Chairn: *sesca* bō, *sesca* brat, *sesca* muc.

11. A chīs ō Dairbri .i. ō Chorco Duibne: *seachtmoga* brat, *seachtmoga* dam, *seachtmoga* muc mōr, *seachtmoga* lulgach, 7 a tabairt sin cacha blīadna.

12. A chīs ō Chiarraidi Luachra 7 Chuirchi .i. *seacht cáecait* lulgach, *seacht cáecait* brat, *seacht cáecait* dam.

13. A chīs ō Chorco Baiscinn: *sé cáecait* mart, *sé cáecait* dam, *sé cáecait* lulgach, *sé cáecait* míach bracha ō-tā Lēm Chon Culainn co Clār Ātha Dā Chara.

14. A chīs ō Chorcamruad: *tri céd* mart ō Boirind; 7 *tri céd* brat 7 *tri céd* loilgeach 7 *tri céd* torc a chís sin ōn leith airtheraig genmothā a sǣrthūatha .i. Eōganacht Ārann 7 Comli.

15. Sǣrthūatha Caisil imorro .i. Eōganacht cach dū i·tāt fo Ērinn. At iat so iad-side : Eōganacht Caisil 7 Eōganacht Āine 7 Eōganacht Glendamna 7 Eōganacht Raithlend 7 Eōganacht Locha Lēin 7 Eōganacht Ārann 7 Eōganacht Ruis Argaid.

16. Sǣri Dāil Cais imorro indister anosa. Ní·dlegar dīb-side in tan na·bia rī dīb i Caisil acht a eachlasc dara gūalaind do rīg Eōganacht 7 a leath-gūala 7 a each 7 a erradh 7 unga d'ōr cach lis 7 lethet a aigthi d'ōr.

17. Sǣrthūatha Muman ō sin amach can chīs 7 can chānaid acht slūagad 7 coimidecht. At iat so iad-side .i. *Huí* Chonaill Gabra 7 *Huí* Chairpri 7 *Huí* Liathain 7 *Huí* C[h]ormaic 7 Tradraigi 7 *Huí* Chathbaid Chuili 7 Ēli.

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trichait brat] trichat brat *H;* tricha brat *B, L.* 7] om. *H. trichait mart*] tricha mart *B, L; cáecait* mart *H.* 7] om. *H. trichait bō*] tricha bo *B, L; cáecait* bo *H.* 7] om. *H. trichait muc*] tricha muc *B, L;* tricat muc *H. co*] go *B. Cnāmchoill*] Cnamcoill *B;* Cnamcaill *H. rīg*] ri *B, L.*

7 *chīs*] cis *B;* ciss *H. Fearaib*] Feraib *B;* Fearaib *H. Muige*] Muigi *B, L. cethracha mart*] .i. *cethracha* mart *L. lulgach*] luilgeach *B;* loilgeach *H.*

8 *chīs*] cis *B;* ciss *H. Mūscraidib*] Musgraidib *H;* Musgraidhib *B. Desmuman*] Deasmuman *H.*

9 *chīs*] cis *B;* ciss *H. Chorco*] Corco *B;* Corca *H. Laīgde*] Laidi *L;* Laige *H. tri cáecait dam*] *sé* dam *B. sesca brat*] *sesca* braat *B; cethracha* brat *H. sesca bō*] *cethracha* muc, *cethracha* mart *H.*

10 *A chīs*] a cis *B;* om. *H. ō Orbraigib in Chairn*] o Orbraigib in Cairn *B;* o Ḟorbraidib in Chairn *L;* om. *H. sesca——muc*] om. *H.*

11 *chīs ō*] cis o *B;* cis a *H. ō Chorco*] o Corco *B;* a Corca *H. Duibne*] Duibni *L. seachtmoga dam——lulgach*] 7 *seachtmoga* dam 7 *seachtmoga* muc mor 7 *seachtmoga* lailgeach *H. tabairt*] dubairt *H;* dbairt *L. cacha blīadna*] gacha bliadna *B;* cach ænblidain *H.*

12 *chīs ō*] cis o *B;* cis a *H. Chiarraidi*] Ciarraigi *B;* Ciarrige *H. Chuirchi*] Curchi *L;* Cuirce *H. lulgach*] luilgeach *B;* loilgeach *H. seacht cáecait brat*] 7 *seacht cáecait* brat *L:* 7 *seacht cáecait* ro-brat 7 *seacht cáecait* ró-mart mor *H. seacht cáecait* dam] 7 *seacht caecait* dam *H.*

13 *chīs*] cis *B;* ciss *H. ō*] a *H. Chorco*] Corco *B;* Corca *H. Baiscinn*] Baiscind *B, L. sē*] *seacht* (for all occurrences of *sē* in §13) *H. mart*] brat *L. lulgach*] luilgech *B;* lailgeach *H. ō-tā*] a-do *H. Lēm*] Lim *H. Chon Culainn*] Chon Culaind *L;* Con Culainn *H;* Con Ulainn *B. co*] go *B. Clār*] Lar *L. Chara*] Cara *H.*

14 *chīs*] *cis B, H. ō*] a *H. Chorcamruad*] Corcamruad *B;* Corcamruag *H. ō*] a *H.* 7 *tri céd loilgeach*] *tri céd* loilgeach *H.* 7 *tri céd torc*] *tri céd* torc *B, L. chís sin*] cis sin *L;* cis *H. ōn*] asa *H. airtheraig*] airrthearaig *L. genmothā*] genmota *H. sǣrthūatha*] særtuatha *B, H. Ārann*] Arand *B, L. Comli*] Comle *B;* Coimle *L.*

15 *Sǣrthūatha*] særtuatha *H. imorro*] uero *B;* om. *H. cach*] gach *B. i·tāt*] a-taid *H. Ērinn*] Erind *L. At*] om. *H. iat*] iad *L;* om. *H. so*] om. *H. iad-side*] iad-sen *B;* om. *H. Eōganacht Caisil*] om. *H.* 7 *Eōganacht Āine*] Eoganacht Aíne *B;* om. *H.* 7 *Eōganacht Glendamna*] Eoganacht Glendamna *B;* 7 Gleannamnach *L;* om. *H.* 7 *Eōganacht Raithlend*] Eoganacht Raithlend *B;* 7 Eoganacht Raithleand *L;* om. *H.* 7 *Eōganacht Locha Lēin*] Eoganacht Locha Leín *B;* 7 Eoganacht Lacha Lein *L;* om. *H.* 7 *Eōganacht Ārann*] Eoganacht Arand *B;* om. *H.* 7 *Eōganacht Ruis Argaid*] Eoganacht Ruis Airgit *B;* om. *H.*

16 *Sǣri*] sairi *L;* dire *H. Dāil Cais*] Dail Caiss *H;* Dal Cais *B. imorro*] uero *B. indister*] indisdar *H. anosa*] anossa *B. Ní·dlegar*] ni·dleagar *L. dīb-side*] dib-sidein *H; na·bia*] nach·bia *L. rī*] rig *H. i*] a *H. acht a*] acht *H. eachlasc*] eachlusc *B, L. leath-gūala*] leith-guala *H. erradh*] erad *H;* errud *L. unga*] uinge *H. cach*] gach *B. lethet*] letheat *H;* lethit *L. aigthi*] aithe *H. d'ōr*] do or *L.*

17 *Sǣrthūatha*] særtuatha *H. sin*] hoin *H. can chīs*] gan chis *B;* can cain *H.* 7 *can chanaid*] 7 can chanaig *L;* gan canaid *B;* can ciss *H. slūagad*] sluaiged *B;* sluaigead *H. coimidecht*] coimideacht *L, H. At iat*] at iad *L;* id iat *H. iad-side*] iat-sidein *H:* iat-sen *B. Huí*] U (for all occurrences of *Huí* in §17)

THE RIGHT OF THE KING OF CASHEL[1]

1. Here below [follows] the right of the king of Cashel from his[2] territories.

2. He is entitled to 600 mantles and 600 cows[3] from all the Osraigi, and on a single day they are to be brought[4] to Ráith Chinn Ḟælad.

3. His due from the Déisi: 350 mantles, and 350 sows,[5] and 350 cows, and 350 oxen.

4. His due from the Múscraigi of Ormond: 150 beeves, 150 black mantles, 150 milch-cows, [and] 150 boars.

5. His due[6] from the Uaithni: 200 milch-cows, and 200 oxen, and 200 beeves, and 200 mantles,[7] and some of these in the winter and the rest[8] in the summer.

6. His due from the Araid: 90 mantles, and 90 beeves, and 90 cows,[9] and 90 pigs, and they are to arrive[10] at Cnamchoill from the king of Ara.

7. His tribute from the Fir Muige:[11] 40 beeves, 40 oxen, 40 milch-cows, [and] 40 mantles.

8. His tribute from the Múscraigi of Desmond: 300 oxen, 300 mantles, [and] 300 cows.

9. His tribute from Corco Laígde: 150 oxen,[12] 60 mantles, [and] 60 cows.[13]

10. His tribute from the Orbraigi of Carn:[14] 60 cows, 60 mantles, [and] 60 pigs.[15]

11. His tribute from Dairbre, that is, from Corco Duibne: 70 mantles, 70 oxen, 70 full-grown[16] pigs, 70 milch-cows, and these are to be given[17] every year.[18]

12. His tribute from Ciarraige Luachra and [Ciarraige] Cuirchi,[19] that is, 350 milch-cows, 350 mantles,[20] [and] 350 oxen.

13. His tribute from Corco Baiscinn: 300[21] beeves,[22] 300 oxen, 300 milch-cows, [and] 300 measures of malt from Léim Con Culainn to Clár Átha Dá Chara.

14. His tribute from Corcamruad:[23] 300 beeves from Boirenn; and 300 mantles, and 300 milch-cows, and 300 boars [is] his tribute[24] from the eastern part excluding their free peoples, that is, the Eóganacht of Aran and Comle.

15. The free peoples of Cashel, however, are[25] the Eóganacht wherever[26] they

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B. Chairpri] Cairbri *B;* Ga Cairpri *H. Tradraigi*] Tradraidi *L;* Tradtraige *H. Chathbaid Chuili*] Chathbad Chuili *L;* Cathbaid *B, H. Ēli*] Eile *H;* Eli thuaiscert *L.*

[1] To Dr. Osborn Bergin I am indebted for several valuable suggestions in connection with the ensuing translation.

[2] My rendering assumes that ō represents an earlier *ō-a* with subsequent vocalic coalescence.

[3] For "600 mantles and 600 cows," *H* substitutes "700 mantles and 700 cows."

[4] Literally, "their bringing."

[5] In Old Irish the genitive plural of *cráin*, "sow" would be *cráine* since *cráin* is an i-stem, but in Middle Irish the uninflected forms *cráin* and *crán* tend to replace *cráine.* Of these forms, *crán* with a broad *n* subsequently ousts *cráin* as the genitive plural; cf. J. Strachan, *Contributions to the History of Middle Irish Declension* (Hertford, 1905), pp. 25-27.

[6] For *a dliged* in *B* and *L, H* has *a ceart,* "his right."

[7] For "200 beeves and 200 mantles," *B* has "7 beeves and 7 mantles."

[8] Literally, "something other." Instead of *ní aile, L* employs the neuter substantival form *araill* of *aile*, "other."

[9] For "90 beeves and 90 cows," *H* has "150 beeves and 150 cows."

[10] Literally, "their arriving."

[11] From this sept the present-day Fermoy on the Blackwater river in County Cork derives its name.

[12] In *B*, the tribute is only "6 oxen."

[13] For "60 mantles and 60 cows," *H* substitutes "40 mantles, 40 pigs, [and] 40 beeves."

[14] *Carn,* signifying originally "a pile of stones, a cairn," occurs in numerous Irish place names.

[15] *H* omits this whole section.

[16] Literally, "big" or "large."

[17] Literally, "their giving that." In *H* and *L, dubairt (dbairt)* stands for *dtubairt* with nasalization of the first *t* owing to the preceding possessive pronoun *a*, "their."

[18] *H* replaces the temporal genitive *cacha (gacha) blīadna* in *B* and *L* by the temporal dative *cach œ̄nblī[a]dain*, "every (single) year."

[19] Over the first *i* of this word in *B* there seems to be a slanting stroke which perhaps is intended to break up an ambiguous series of minims.

[20] *H* specifies that the mantles must be "large." It also increases the tribute by "350 very large beeves."

[21] In place of "300," *H* has "350" both here and in all other occurrences of numerals in this paragraph.

[22] For "beeves," *L* substitutes "mantles."

[23] *Corcamruad* represents the contracted form of *Corcu Mu Druad.*

[24] Literally, "his tribute that."

[25] Literally, "that is."

[26] Literally, "each place in which."

are throughout Ireland. These[27] they are: the Eóganacht of Cashel, and the Eóganacht of Áine, and the Eóganacht of Glennamain, and the Eóganacht of Raithliu, and the Eóganacht of Loch Léin, and the Eóganacht of Aran, and the Eóganacht of Ros Argaid.

16. Now, however, the exemption[28] of Dál Cais will be related.[29] Nothing is due[30] from them when a king of theirs shall not be[31] in Cashel, except his horse-switch[32] over his shoulder[33] to the king of the Eóganacht, and a seat on one side of him,[34] and his horse, and his accoutrements, and an ounce of gold for each homestead, and the breadth of his face of gold.[35]

17. Except for military service and attendance,[36] the remaining[37] free peoples of Munster are not subject to[38] tribute and to impost.[39] These they are: the Uí Chonaill Gabra, and the Uí Chairpri,[40] and the Uí Liathain, and the Uí Chormaic, and the Tradraigi, and the Uí Chathbaid Chuili, and the Éili.[41]

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[27] *H* does not contain the remainder of this paragraph.

[28] Apparently *H* misunderstood its source since instead of *sœ̄ri*, "exemption" it reads *dīre*, "a fine."

[29] Literally, "is related."

[30] Literally, "there is not due."

[31] In Old Irish one expects *·bé*, not *·bia*, but in Middle Irish the future forms of the substantive verb begin to be used with the meaning of the subjunctive; cf. O. Bergin, *The Three Shafts of Death by Geoffrey Keating, D.D.* (Dublin and London, 1931), p. xx.

[32] In mediaeval Ireland "horse-switches" sometimes were made of precious materials such as *findruine;* cf. Mary E. Byrne and M. Dillon, *Táin Bó Fraích* (Dublin, 1933), p. 2, and E. Windisch, 'Táin Bó Dartada,' *Irische Texte* II (1887), ii, 191. That they were much prized is shown by the fact that in the tale entitled "Forbuis Droma Damhghaire," ed. Marie L. Sjoestedt, *Revue Celtique*, XLIII (1926), 60, one of them actually serves as a surety.

[33] The precise force of the phrase "over his shoulder" has not been established.

[34] Literally, "his one shoulder."

[35] For a discussion of this locution, see R. Thurneysen, 'Ir. Eneclann,' *Zeitschrift für Celtische Philologie*, XX (1933), 205 and ff.

[36] In *B* there is apparently a slanting stroke over the second *i* of *coimidecht*.

[37] Besides meaning "from that (time) on," the phrase *ō sin amach* also signifies in enumerations "from that (already mentioned) on," and hence "the remaining, the rest," etc.

[38] Literally, "are without."

[39] Since the *i*-stem noun *cáin*, which in Middle Irish tends to develop dental forms in the oblique cases, has various meanings, it is not certain that "impost" here is the correct rendering, but at all events *cáin* in collocation with *cís* occurs in several passages where its antecedent is either *ícaid*, "pays" or *tobach*, the verbal noun of *do·boing*, "levies"; cf. C. Plummer, 'Betha Farannáin,' *Anecdota from Irish Manuscripts*, III (1910), 6, and K. Meyer, *Contributions to Irish Lexicography* (Halle a. S., 1906), I, i, 301-302.

[40] In *H*, the *Ga* before *Cairpri* is merely a scribal slip owing to the preceding *Gabra*.

[41] *L* adds *thūaiscert*, "of the north," for which read *thūaisceirt* or *thūaiscirt* as a genitive qualifying *Éili*.

Report of a Recent Thesis Defended at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies

The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought. (Philosophy Section).
J. Owens C.Ss.R.

ORIGIN OF THE STUDY

THIS study of Aristotelian Being arose from a topic in a Seminar conducted by Professor Etienne Gilson at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies during the winter term of the year 1946. The topic was a well-known text of the *Metaphysics* in which Aristotle says that the nature of each thing is essentially a Being.[1] The obvious meaning of the passage is that the Being of a thing adds nothing over and above the nature of that thing. In this sense both Greek and modern commentators have always understood the text.

The context of the passage showed the reason why 'Being' added nothing to a thing's nature. The Aristotelian Being is a primary nature which is expressed whenever anything is called 'Being'. Just as nothing is added to a medicine or to exercise by their being 'healthy', so nothing more is found *in* a thing's nature when it is considered as a 'Being'. It is merely expressed in reference to the primary instance of Being. What is the primary instance of Being?

The immediately preceding context located this primary instance in the nature of *ousia.* Only the *ousia* of *sensible* things seemed meant in the treatment. But shortly after in the same Book a distinction between primary and secondary *ousiai* was implied.[2] The Being considered universally in all things was apparently the nature of the separate, i.e. immaterial Entities.

Should this view be correct, it would readily explain the failure of Aristotelian Being to add anything to a nature. When a thing is called a Being, it is merely expressed in reference to the separate natures. Nothing whatsoever is implied in it over and above its own proper nature. That nature has essentially, without any addition at all, a reference to separate Entity. This reference is expressed when a thing is called a Being.

If such were the doctrine of Being actually contained in the text of the *Metaphysics* which confronted the mediaeval philosophers, it must have important consequences in explaining the subsequent history of the science which received its technique from these Aristotelian treatises. The Christian thinkers of the Middle Ages approached the text with a conception of Being already determined in its general lines by the dogmas of their faith. God was the first and infinite Being. This infinity extended even to the fullest notion of omnipotence. All other Beings were created freely by God from nothing. When this Christian concept of Being was expressed in the Aristotelian formulae, it occasioned radically different metaphysical doctrines among the mediaeval thinkers. Endless controversy and utter disagreement resulted in the various schools of thought. Metaphysics gradually fell into disdain, and was later declared an illusion by Kant.

Could this discouraging history of Western metaphysics have its ultimate historical explanation in the contact of the mediaeval philosophers with the Aristotelian text? Were these thinkers trying to express a Christian notion of Being in incompatible pagan formulae? Did the Aristotelian technical expressions burst open in various ways under the new pressure? Were these rifts accountable for the radically different types of metaphysics that arose during this crucial period in Western thought?

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[1] *Gamma* 2,1003b22-33.

[2] *Ibid.* 1004a3-4; 3,1005a35. Cf. *Epsilon* 1,1026a10-32.

These questions seemed deserving of investigation and answer. But a short acquaintance with the subject imposed necessary limits. The first step was to determine exactly the doctrine of Being objectively contained in the text of the *Metaphysics*. This proved ample scope for the limits of a single monograph. The present study is therefore confined to the Aristotelian treatises. But the viewpoint of the mediaeval problem is always kept in mind, even though great care is taken to prevent its giving rise to any bias in probing the Greek text. The treatment is frankly an objective study in the Aristotelian background of mediaeval metaphysics.

The limits of the investigation likewise exclude the relation of the doctrine in the treatises to the conceptions of Being found in the fragments of the literary works. These fragments are quite commonly believed to contain a doctrine that differs from at least parts of the *Metaphysics*. The problem here is rendered particularly difficult through lack of sufficient data. But the Aristotelian teachings were known to the Christian Middle Ages only through the treatises. The study may therefore be limited to determining the doctrine objectively contained in these treatises when read without reference to the literary fragments. The possibility of indirect influence of the literary works, through Neoplatonic channels, has to be taken into consideration. Moreover, if the conception of Being is not clear from the treatises themselves, the fragments could be looked to as a help in interpretation. But these are subsequent questions. The investigation of the text of the *Metaphysics* and of passages needed to supplement it from the other *treatises* provide fully sufficient scope for the present study.

The limits of the undertaking were in this way precisely determined to the text of the metaphysical treatises. The first difficulty arose from the widely diverging interpretations given by the commentators. The Greeks looked upon the Aristotelian Being *qua* Being—Being in its own proper nature—as the Being of the separate and unchangeable Entities. The mediaeval commentators understood this Being *qua* Being as *Ens commune*. It was sharply distinguished from the Being of God. But it was far from an 'empty' concept. In some way it contained all its differences. The modern critics inherited these two general lines of interpretation, but conceived them in various senses. Some have seen no difficulty in reconciling them. Others have held them to be hopelessly contradictory. The approach to the subject usually reflects the immediate philosophical background of each nineteenth or twentieth century commentator.

A striking phenomenon became evident at this early stage of the investigation. Each commentator who advocated a special view of the Aristotelian doctrine could find numerous texts in the treatises to support his notions. But just as inevitably there were other texts which stated quite the opposite. There were three ways of dealing with such refractory texts. Thy could be excised as unauthentic—a procedure best exemplified in Natorp. Or they could be explained as representing successive stages in the Stagirite's intellectual development—a method of interpretation inaugurated by Jaeger. Finally, they could be left as indicating fundamental contradictions and hopeless confusion in Aristotle's deepest thought. In varying degrees this last view of the Stagirite's work is the most widespread. It reaches its extreme in writers like Gomperez and Werner. In the final analysis, the interpretation on the basis of historical development admits these contradictions, and merely offers a method of explaining them.

This situation implied that one could approach Aristotle with almost any preconceived notion of Being, and find ample justification in the text. The necessity of avoiding all alien conceptions of Being as norms of interpretation became evident. Aristotle had to be approached solely from his own viewpoint. This demanded a study of the nature of the metaphysical treatises, their method, their relative order, and their chronolgy. The all-pervading extent of the 'contradictions' and 'ambiguities' and 'vacillations' throughout the treatises required a careful study of what the Stagirite understood by 'equivocals' and 'things expressed in various ways'. The use of the English language as a medium necessitated an investigation of the proper translations of difficult Aristotelian terms and expressions, in order to ensure the correct rendering of the thought expressed by the Greek idiom.

These preliminary studies required more research than did the actual pursuit of the topic throughout the metaphysical treatises. But they were necessary to safeguard the correct Aristotelian approach to the treatment of Being. Once they had been made they left the way clear for the examination of the texts in the proper order and interdependence. The investigation, accordingly, follows the doctrine of Being as progressively unfolded according to the methodical sequence of the treatises.

SYNOPSIS OF THE TREATMENT

The actual discussion of the topic follows quite closely these lines of its genetic development. The problem of Being is first isolated in its bearing on mediaeval thought, and then traced to its Aristotelian origins. Being in its own proper nature, Being *qua* Being, is found treated by a distinct science. But that same science is characterized by the Stagirite as dealing with the highest causes of things, with the causes of Being *qua* Being, with the causes of visible divine things, with the divine immobile Beings, with *ousia*, with the causes of *ousiai*, with truth, or with form. Are all these designations merely different ways of expressing the innermost nature of Being? If such is the case, what peculiar doctrine of Being can justify so widely divergent formulations?

The interpretations of the Greek, mediaeval and modern commentators are collected and objectively presented. They offer a surprising variety of opinions, and throw the thought of the Stagirite into a number of radically different backgrounds. They show that the problem of Being springs from the most fundamental doctrines of the Stagirite, and cannot be solved by an isolated study of particular texts.

To arrive at the proper Aristotelian viewpoint, the *content* of the Metaphysics must be examined in close and continual union with the *form*. The philological, historical, and other critical information now available is used to determine as far as possible the nature and interconnection of the different treatises. On the basis of the data at hand, the Books of the traditional *Metaphysics* are seen to contain school *logoi*. These are neither literary works destined for an undetermined public, nor lecture notes meant to aid the memory of teacher or students. They are a type of literary product that is peculiar to the ancient Greek culture. They were read aloud, copied by the 'hearers', and perhaps memorized to a certain extent. They formed the basis of subsequent oral discussion. Each was a 'treatment' of one definite field in a science. They tended by their nature to become associated in groupings of greater or lesser extent, for purposes of reference or citation. As the treatises in the present *Metaphysics* finally left Aristotle's hands, they seem for the most part to have been associated in a definite sequence and grouping. Philological indications suggest the following order as the *methodical* sequence finally employed by the Stagirite:

A 1-7 & 10; Β; Γ; *E* 1; Δ; *E* 2-4; *ZH;* Θ 1-9; Θ 10; Ι; *M* 1-9; *M* 9-10.

The last three 'treatments' follow in indifferent order upon the preceding sequence. Δ continued to be cited as an independent treatise long after Aristotle's death. But methodically it is the basis from which *E* 2-4 and the immediately following treatises proceed. It is cited (explicitly) only in the *Metaphysics*. So it seems to have been regarded by the Stagirite as belonging methodically to this series of treatises. Book *K* appears to be an epitome of *AΓE*, without any important doctrinal additions.

The other Books show no certain methodical connection with the main series. They are authentically Aristotelian, and deal with things pertaining to the Primary Philosophy. They can therefore be used as independent sources to supplement the doctrine of the main series, but their lack of established methodical connection must be kept in mind when they are used to interpret those treatises. Among themselves, the only interconnection observable is a dependnce of Λ upon *N*.

The *form* of the treatises as school *logoi* must be constantly kept in mind for their interpretation. When Aristotle, for instance, expresses himself negatively or aporematically in regard to a certain doctrine, he is not necessarily reflecting ignorance or doubt on his own part at the time of writing. He is merely assuming ignorance or uncertainty from the side of his 'hearers'. Considerations of this nature have important results in assessing the doctrines contained in the treatises.

The possibility of studying the treatises in chronological perspective is next investigated. The modern chronologies, those of Jaeger, von Arnim, Nuyens, and Oggioni and the relative chronology of Thielscher, are examined in detail. The result is negative. The only *absolute* datings acceptable are *A* 9 as after Plato's death, Λ 8 as after the death of Callippus, and the rest of Λ as before the death of Speusippus. None of these datings offer any help towards a chronology of the main series. *Relative* datings of *A* 9 before *M*, *N* before Λ and probably *BΓE* before *K* seem established. But these offer little *positive* help in interpreting the doctrine of the main series. The methodical order of the treatises remains therefore, instead of being an added historical phenomenon, the only available sequence for following a problem through the *Metaphysics*. This does not mean a return to Zeller's stand that all the treatises may be used indiscriminately as the work of Aristotle's maturity. Rather, the nature of the treatises as school *logoi* fosters the presumption that they represent the Stagirite's intellectual activities over an extended period of time. This situation has to be constantly remembered, even though the actual datings of the different treatises cannot be even tentatively determined.

The widespread accusations of inconsistency, contradiction, or vacillation in the Stagirite's use of terms and concepts are next examined. The Aristotelian counterpart is located in the 'equivocals' and the 'things expressed in various ways'. A highly developed doctrine is found to lie behind these terms. A number of different manners in which things are expressed equivocally appear in the text. Of these the two most important types are the analogous and the things which are expressed by reference in various ways to one and the same nature. The latter type is designated by the technical phrase πρὸς ἕν. These two types have to be kept carefully distinct. Analogy necessarily involves a four-term relation. The πρὸς ἕν type can have only a two-term relation. It is not analogous in the Aristotelian sense. The 'equivocals' in general comprise things, concepts and terms, according to a πρὸς ἕν relationship. They are primarily things, and secondarily concepts and terms. The doctrine of cognition involved in the 'equivocals' necessitates an approach to the *Metaphysics* that differs radically from the setting of any modern philosophy.

Finally, attention is given to the translation of Greek technical terms. Since the Primary Philosophy deals with πρὸς ἕν things, it requires for each group a translating word which in every application expresses chiefly the primary instance, yet which can extend to all secondary instances without exception. The translation of *ousia* is an important case. The current translations, as well as the transliteration *ousia* prove unsatisfactory for an *ex professo* investigation of the Aristotelian doctrine of Being. A long historical and linguistic study shows that the English word 'Entity' corresponds morphologically to the Greek *ousia*, and is able to take on in correct relation all the various meanings of the Aristotelian term. It is the only English word that meets these requirements. It is moreover a neutral term philosophically, since in modern circles it implies no preconceived doctrine of Being. It has, without doubt, certain drawbacks. It lacks the overtones possibly implied by the popular usage of the Greek term to denote 'property'. It has till very recently no sanction in tradition.[3] It means using a term derived from a Latin root in conjunction with the word 'Being'. But in spite of these disadvantages it remains the only English term capable of denoting in their proper interdependence all the things signified by the Aristotelian *ousia*. Its use is consequently imperative in this study of Being, even though in other contexts it need not and perhaps should not be advocated as a substitute for the traditional renditions.

For other technical terms and expressions, a received or literal translation, or a transliteration, will in nearly every case be found satisfactory.

This technique of approach constitutes the first Part of the study. The second Part investigates the 'introductory' treatises *ABΓE* 1. These treatises are found to establish, by an empirical procedure, the notion of a science of separate Entity. By an examination of the various types of human cognitional activity, wisdom is located successively as the science of the highest causes of sensible things, the science of Beings *qua* Beings, the science of the causes of the visible divine things, and finally as the science of the separate Entities. In this process the highest causes are located as the four causes treated in the Physics, and are ultimately seen as reduced to the one cause, the form. This cause is called Entity. Being appears as a πρὸς ἕν equivocal, of which the primary instance is Entity. But Entity also is regarded as a πρὸς ἕν equivocal, apparently with separate Entity as its absolutely primary instance. Yet the separate Entities are not established in these treatises. The Stagirite's procedure is to first establish the science of separate Entities, and only afterwards treat the separate Entities themselves.

The nature of the Aristotelian aporia is carefully studied. The aporia in the context of Book B is found to denote a conception or group of conceptions already in the minds of the 'hearers' and hindering or preventing their intellects from making further progress till the 'knot' is untied. The primary instance of the aporia, however, is the state of the intellect caused by such conceptions. The conceptions and the things giving rise to the conceptions are secondary instances. The limitation to the concrete historical circumstances of the 'hearers' in the Lyceum has important consequences on the interpretation of Book *B*.

In *E* 1 the two questions *'if'* a thing is and *'what'* it is are studied. The 'if' question is shown to be concerned not with the existence of the thing, but with a generic or quasi-generic knowledge of its nature which will be a sufficient basis for demonstration where immediate evidence is lacking.

The 'introductory' character of these treatises is also examined. Only the first two chapters of Book *A* are found to contain an 'introduction' in the modern sense. The rest of these treatises are within the field of Wisdom itself. They form part of the Aristotelian dialectic, by which the principles of a science are established.

The third Part of the investigation deals with the treatises from *E* 2-4 to *I*. These treatises examine the nature of sensible Entity, with the express intention of thereby reaching separate Entity. Within sensible Entity the primary instance is seen to be the form, with the matter and the composite as secondary instances. The form in sensible things, allowing for possible exceptions, is seen to be 'separate in notion', but not separate absolutely. In the expression 'separate in notion', the sense of 'notion' is objective, not subjective. The form is not dependent for its intelligibility on the matter. In this way the form, though separate, is not 'abstract'. It is a 'this'—τόδε τι—and the primary instance of a 'this'. The composite is also a 'this', but only as a secondary instance.

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[3] 'Entity' is used as the regular translation of *ousia* by Philip Merlan in 'Aristotle's Unmoved Movers', *Traditio* IV (1946), 8 ff., an article which reached me after my own research on the subject had been completed. I do not know of any other instance of its use in this sense.

The form is found to be most properly expressed by its ultimate difference. It is shown to be act, and to be most perfectly actual when it in no way tends to anything outside itself.

Being is finally studied from the viewpoints of truth and unity.

All these investigations of sensible Entity culminate invariably in the question of supersensible Entity. The procedure is still dialectical in the Aristotelian sense. The 'conceptions' giving rise to some of the aporiae of *B*, in particular the aporiae regarding separate Entities, have been removed by these treatments. But the treatises *ZH*Θ show no evidence of having been *originally* written for this purpose. They proceed independently, not on the basis of *AB*, but on lines sketched in Δ. They seem to have been incorporated only later, but by Aristotle himself, into their present methodical order in the main sequence. Book *I*, on the other hand, unites both streams of thought in the one treatise.

The fourth and final part of the study examines the remaining treatises in the series, and seeks to supplement their doctrines from other Aristotelian treatises. The Platonic and mathematical ways of establishing separate Entities are rejected as impossible. The form, along with the act which knows it, is shown to be actually a 'this', and only potentially universal. Science, accordingly, deals actually with neither the universal nor the singular, but with a form which is prior to both the universal and the singular, and which is the cause of both. This means that science treats *form as act,* and that *act* implies determination and finitude.

With this doctrine the development of the main series of the treatises comes to an abrupt end. Supplementary data from *N* and Λ and other treatises show that separate Entities are established as pure act. Pure act is best expressed as 'self-thinking'. Whether these separate Entities are one or more than one in number is a matter of comparative indifference to the Primary Philosophy. Their number is reached by a study of the movements in the firmament which demand each a distinct immobile Mover. The separate Entities exercise only final causality upon sensible things. 'Being' in sensible things means the attaining as far as possible, by final causality, of the permanent actuality found in the separate Entities.

From all these considerations a fairly clear picture can be formed of the doctrine of Being in Aristotle's mind as he composed the series of treatises which begins with Book *A*. Being is a group of πρὸς ἕν equivocals, of which the absolutely primary instance is separate Entity. These separate Entities are forms without any admixture of matter. The Aristotelian form is form in the sense of act. If one combines the Platonic characteristics of permanence and unchangeableness and knowability and finitude and necessity with the Aristotelian notion of *act* as developed from the basic 'energy' of sensible things, one will have a fairly accurate notion of 'form as act'. Content, difference, necessity and the other characteristics merge in the one notion of *act*. That 'form as act' is the Aristotelian Being. It is the nature of the separate Entities. This nature appears by reference of final causality in all other things that are called Being. The 'Being' of all other things is the Being of the separate Entities. Accordingly, the science which studies separate Entity thereby studies the Being of all things whatsoever. The Primary Philosophy may be defined without any further addition as the science of separate Entity, the science of the primary instance of Being. By that very fact it treats all Beings universally as Beings. It is likewise the science of the highest causes, of Entity, of Form, and so on, because it treats the primary instance in each of these groups. It is also the science of truth in the sense in which truth is used as synonymous with Being and the causes.

This doctrine of Being is definitely not Platonic. The Being studied by the Primary Philosophy is of a different *nature* from anything found in the sensible order. The Platonic Dialectic, as Aristotle repeatedly insists, attains merely sensible natures plus the characteristic 'eternal'. The Aristotelian Being is something entirely beyond the Platonic conceptions. Nowhere in the treatises is there any evidence of a 'Platonic' doctrine of Being.

Just as little is there present any 'ontological' doctrine of Being in the Wolffian sense of the term. The Primary Philosophy deals with one definite type of Being, and not with an abstraction which is common to all Beings. There is no notion in Aristotle of a science of Being which is in any way different from the science of that definite type of Being. Being *qua* Being, in its primary instance, is the Being of the separate Entities.

These conclusions have important consequences when confronted with the metaphysical developments in the Middle Ages. In the text of Aristotle there was no metaphysical abstraction. What science studied was neither a universal nor a singular, but a form which was prior to both, and yet prior in a sense entirely different from the common nature of Duns Scotus. This doctrine made possible a single science of things whose relations to the one form were either καθ'ἕν or πρὸς ἕν. In such a philosophy there was no room for the study of any *act of existing* which could not be reduced to form. Act was entirely limited to form. The Being studied by the Primary Philosophy could in no way overstep the limits of the primary instance. Creation, in the Christian sense of a free act of God, could have no interest for such a philosophy, even though it were admitted as a religious dogma. A necessary creation would be impossible, for the perfection of the Aristotelian separate Entities requires limitation. This finitude demands a strict interpretation of the imperfection inherent in efficient causality. The act of any agent is in the product. The Aristotelian perfect Beings could not be efficient causes.

Finally, Being in the *Metaphysics* is not analogous. Analogies run through every category, but they presuppose the Beings as already constituted. No four-term relations are possible in the constitution of Being as set forth in the Primary Philosophy. Form, by the very fact of being form, denoted difference and limitation. It was limited by its own nature. It could exercise its actuality without any dependence upon a further act.

In a word, the Aristotelian doctrine of Being is thoroughly Greek. It is part of the ancient world. It does not culminate in the Christian notion of God and creatures. It tends in a quite different direction. It seeks a type of Being which will satiate, merely at times and for brief intervals on each occasion, the natural desire of men to know. That is the fullest *life* possible to man. The unicity or plurality of this separate Entity is of little moment. The plurality is accepted without any hesitation. No providence towards man is possible on the part of the separate Entities. Their sole interest to specifically human activity is that they are *knowable*.

To express Christian thought in the formulae of this philosophy was the tremendous task undertaken by the mediaeval metaphysicians. Their thought inevitably had to break through the formulae. The present study has been limited to determining what those formulae were meant to express by Aristotle himself, but from the viewpoint of a basis upon which the changes inaugurated by the middle ages may be understood and appreciated.

THE *LIBER DE ANIMA* OF WILLIAM OF VAUROUILLON O.F.M.

IGNATIUS BRADY O.F.M.

THE third book of the *Liber de anima* of William of Vaurouillon forms the matter for the present article. Since the publication of the first two books of the treatise,[1] Father Ephrem Longpré O.F.M. has furnished further details on *A* (BN *Latin*, 6684). The third book presents a problem in mediaeval literary history that touches on a scholarly controversy of recent years. These two topics we propose to study in this Introduction.

I. The manuscript *A*.

A—Paris, BN *Latin*, 6684, formerly Bibl. Royale 2168, is a parchment of the fifteenth century, embracing 89 folios divided into quaternios; the pages measure 210 x 140 mm.; the text is given in a single column of 39 lines covering 135 mm. x 85 mm. of each page. The first folio is highly ornate; the large initial *M* contains within itself a miniature of two angels supporting a shield graced with the arms of Jean le Bon, count of Angoulême. The volume is bound in wood-boards covered with calf.

Folios 1-73^{v} contain the *Liber de anima* of William of Vourouillon, copied by George le Maalot, chaplain to Jean le Bon.[2] This is followed (folios 74^{r}-87^{r}) by another treatise written by the same copyist, *Liber de medicina animae,* the author of which is not indicated; Father Longpré does not venture to guess his identity. The prologue begins (fol. 74^{r}):

> Coges me, frater carissime, ut ea quae de medicina animae ad Johannem medicum scribere coeperam, tibi transmittere non omittam . . . Incipit liber de medicina animae. Cap. primum De homine, qui microcosmos id est minor mundus appellatur.
>
> *Incipit*: Homo microcosmus, id est minor mundus, appellari ab antiquis solet.
>
> *Explicit* (fol. 87^{r}): Si quis ergo ab hac infirmitate curari desiderat, necesse est ut emplastrum verecundiae fronti suae supponat quo mediante sanitatem recipiet aeternalem. Quam nobis concedat Jesus benedictus in saecula. Amen.
>
> The scribe then appends his own conclusion:
>
> Explicit tractatus de medicina animae multum salubris et devotus scriptus per me Georgium le Maalot, in decretis et sacra theologia licentiatum, illustrissimique ac potentissimi principis domini Joannis Dei gratia comitis Engolismensis capellanum immeritum Pictavis studentem. Deo gratias.

Folios 87^{v} to 89^{v} are blank.

The work, as is evident, formed part of the library of Jean d'Orleans, count of Angoulême; this in turn became part of the Bibliothèque Royale of his grandson Francis I, which is at present in the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris.[3]

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[1] Cf. *Mediaeval Studies*, X (1948), 225-297. The reading of the *explicit* of *A*, there presented on p. 226, should be amended according to the correct reading; cf. *infra*, p. 307, n. 103.

[2] Cf. Book III, c xix, n. 103; *infra*, p. 307.

[3] Cf. Léopold Delisle, *Le cabinet des manuscrits de la bibliothèque impériale* I (Paris, 1868), pp. 147-149. Also G. Dupont-Ferrier, *Jean d'Orléans, comte d'Angoulême,*

Jean le Bon was known for his literary interests and the library of more than 160 volumes in his chateau of Cognac to which he gave much of his leisure time. Some of these volumes he had copied himself during his captivity of thirty-two years as a hostage in London.[4] The two treatises on the soul contained in BN *Latin*, 6684, were copied for him by George le Maalot after his liberation and return to France in 1445, more likely after 1450.[5]

II. The *De potentiis animae.*

Vaurouillon has a happy penchant for accuracy and exactitude in quoting his authorities, especially the great Scholastics.[6] John of Rupella, Alexander of Hales and Saint Bonaventure are distinctly cited as his major sources. To these must be added John Duns Scotus;[7] and, to a lesser extent, Saint Thomas Aquinas. Our author exhibits a remarkable familiarity with many works of Saint Albert the Great, cites him on several occasions, and even borrows a large section from him without acknowledgement.[8]

The use made of a *De potentiis animae*, cited by Vaurouillon as the work of Saint Thomas, leads us into a current controversy, the solution of which has not been reached. In treating the interior senses,[9] the author cites *beatus Thomas* no less than five times, and states that the material is taken from a treatise or two separate treatises of Saint Thomas on the powers of the soul: . . . *ut inquit beatus Thomas in tractatu quem de sensu communi edidit* (III, x; *infra*, p. 271); and, a chapter later: *Sequar autem in his magna in parte Sanctum Thomam in tractatu quem edidit de potentiis animae interioribus* (III, xi; *infra*, p. 272).

But no genuine work of Saint Thomas contains the material used by Vaurouillon. The *Summa theologiae* I, 78, 4, has only a brief treatment, and in addition admits only four interior senses (following Averroes), whereas Vaurouillon and his source give five (following Avicenna) by distinguishing the *imaginatio* and the *vis imaginativa*. The Opusculum XL of Saint Thomas, *De potentiis animae*,[10] agrees with the *Summa* on the four-fold division of the interior senses.[11]

There is, however, a work or, perhaps, two separate works listed among the unauthentic writings of the Angelic Doctor, *De sensu communi et de sensibus quinque interioribus*;[12] though properly two treatises, they are invariably found together in manuscripts, and are often given the general title of *De potentiis animae*. In many manuscripts these tracts are attributed to Saint Thomas,[13] although no modern mediaevalist considers them authentic. There is, besides, a manuscript tradition for Saint Albert, *frater Albertus theutonicus, dominus frater*

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d'après sa bibliothèque (Mélanges d'histoire du moyen âge, I, Paris, 1897), pp. 39-54, for the general background of the library of Jean le Bon.

[4] Among these was one of Petrarch: Meditation de François Petrarque avec plusieurs contemplacions et oraisons escrit de la main de monseigneur; BN *Latin*, 3638 (L. Delisle, *op. cit.*, p. 147).

[5] Cf. *Mediaeval Studies*, X (1948), 226; Delisle, *op. cit.*, p. 147, esp. n. 4; G. Dupont-Ferrier, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

[6] This does not preclude mistakes, for he depends on his major sources for many of his Patristic authorities.

[7] Cf. my note, *Mediaeval Studies*, X (1948), 227, n. 17.

[8] Cf. Book II, c. xii, *Med. Studies*, X (1948), 288-289.

[9] Cf. *infra*, Book III, chapters x, xi, xiii and xiv: pp. 270-275 and 278-282.

[10] Cf. *Opera omnia S. Thomae* XVII (Parma, 1852-1873), pp. 27-34.

[11] This work has been considered unauthentic by Monsignor Grabmann, Père Mandonnet and others. Cf. M. Grabmann, *Die echten Schriften des hl. Thomas von Aquin* (*BGPTMA* XXII, 1-2, Münster, 1920), 167; P. Mandonnet O.P., *Des écrits authentiques de s. Thomas* (Fribourg, 1910), p. 152. More recently, however, Fr. Pelster has claimed it to be authentic, an early work of Saint Thomas later incorporated into the corresponding questions of the *Summa theologiae* rather than a pseudo-Thomist work that is drawn from the *Summa*. Cf. F. Pelster, 'Zur Forschung nach den echten Schriften des hl. Thomas von Aquin', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, 36 (1923), 42-43.

[12] Cf. M. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, p. 254 ff.

[13] Thus *Ms* Bruxelles, Bibl. Royale 1561 (873-885), fols. 150^r-156^r, which Fr. Pelster considers one of the oldest collections of the Opuscula of St. Thomas (*Scholastik*, 6 (1931), 126).

Albertus, etc.;[14] and much of the doctrine, often the very words, of the two treatises (or, at least, of Vaurouillon's chapters) is to be found in the *Summa de creaturis* of Saint Albert! Further complications arise from the text of a *De potentiis animae* recently published by Monsignor Geyer as the fifth book of the *Summa naturalium* (*Philosophia pauperum*) and ascribed by Monsignor Grabmann and Geyer to Albert of Orlamünde, a thirteenth-century Dominican.[15] Monsignor Geyer notes that the *De potentiis animae* is found as such in many manuscripts independently of the *Summa naturalium*, but claims that the text he publishes is substantially identical with this independent version.[16] Proof of this can be had only through collation of the manuscripts in question. Some of these, as far as I have ascertained, show radical differences, at least in Scholastic form; they contain a series of *Quaestiones* rather than the treatise-format of Monsignor Geyer's text.[17]

Much has been written on this problem in recent years;[18] and the publication of the text of Monsignor Geyer has by no means closed the controversy. Thus, it can be easily ascertained that the *De potentiis animae* used by William of Vaurouillon is hardly identical with the text as newly published. Our author, for example, cites many definitions of the interior senses, all of which are found in the *Summa de creaturis*, none in Monsignor Geyer's text. Because of the controversy, and for want of further material at the present time, I have been content to cite the *Summa de creaturis* for all references made by Vaurouillon to the *De potentiis animae* and, where possible, the text of Monsignor Geyer.

At this juncture, I would not care to dispute the position that the *De potentiis animae*, which forms the fifth book of the *Summa naturalium*, is to be attributed to Albert of Orlamünde. I am inclined to agree, however, with Dom O. Lottin that the *De potentiis animae*, as an independent (and unpublished) series of Questions, is anterior to the text of the *Summa naturalium*. There is need of an edition of these *Quaestiones*, and of a more detailed comparison with the *Summa de creaturis* as well as with the *Philosophia pauperum*. This I hope to undertake in a future article. Is it possible also that the original *De potentiis animae* is a genuine work of Saint Albert? Father Pelster had projected this opinion some years ago,[19] but seems to have abandoned it later as a result of the criticism of Dom Lottin.[20] However, if Saint Albert delivered, *ut magister*, a number of questions which he later revised and compiled to form the *Summa de creaturis*,[21] then it is at least possible that the unedited *De potentiis animae* is the original

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[14] Cf. M. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-256; S. H. Thomson, 'Eine neue Bestätigung der Echtheit der *Summa naturalium* Alberts des Grossen', *Scholasik*, 8 (1933), 237 ff.; and B. Geyer, *Die Albert dem Grossen zugeschriebene Summa naturalium (Philosophia Pauperum)* (*BGPTMA* XXXV, 1, Münster, 1938), 8 ff.

[15] Cf. M. Grabmann, *Die Philosophia pauperum und ihr Verfasser Albert von Orlamünde* (*BGPTMA* XX, 2, Münster, 1918); B. Geyer, *op. cit.*, p. 46: Ich halte es deshalb für höchst wahrscheinlich, dass dieser Albertus de Orlamunda in der Notiz über den Verfasser der Summa gemeint ist. Cf. also, *ibid.*, p. 47. The text of the *De potentiis animae* is given, *ibid.*, pp. 38*-62*.

[16] B. Geyer, *op. cit.*, p. 21. It is his opinion, likewise, that this separate treatise is actually an extract from the *Summa naturalium* (*ibid.*, p. 23). This has since been denied by Fr. Pelster and Dom Lottin. See review of B. Geyer's work by Fr. Pelster, *Theologische Revue*, 39 (1939), 67 ff.; by O. Lottin, *BTAM*, 3 (1938), n. 775; also O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux xii^{e} et xiii^{e} siècles* I (Louvain, 1942), p. 497, n. 1.

[17] Cf. B. Geyer, *op. cit.*, p. 9 (for BN *Latin*, 16222, fols. 68^{ra}-71^{rb}); P. Mandonnet O.P., *Siger de Brabant* II (Phil. Belges VII, Louvain, 1908), p. vi (for BN *Latin*, 16195, fols. 25^{a}-28^{b}); p. vii (for a manuscript of the late fifteenth century).

[18] A general summary of the controversy is given by S. H. Thomson, *art. cit.*, 233-239; and B. Geyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-3. To these must be added, as more directly on the problem of the *De potentiis animae*, Dom. O. Lottin. 'L'authenticité du "De potentiis animae" d'Albert le Grand', *RNP*, 32 (1930), 321-328.

[19] Cf. his 'Das Compendium de negotia naturali (Summa naturalium) ein echtes Werk Alberts des Grossen', *Phil. Jahrbuch*, 36 (1923). 316-324: and 'Literargeschichte der Scholastik'. *Scholastik*, 6 (1931), 126.

[20] Cf. O. Lottin, 'L'identité de l'âme et de ses facultés pendant la première moitié du xiii^{e} siècle', *RNP*, 36 (1934), 191-210; and F. Pelster's review of this in *Scholastik*, 10 (1935), 444.

[21] Cf. V. Doucet O.F.M., *Prolegomena in Librum III necnon in Libros I et II "Summae fratris Alexandri"* (Quaracchi, 1948), pp. CCXXXVI-CCXXXVII.

form of such Questions. This is a bare hypothesis on my part which calls for further study.[22]

INCIPIT LIBER TERTIUS[1]

[De Anima Per Respectum Ad Suas Potentias]

I. DE IDENTITATE ANIMAE AD SUAS POTENTIAS[2]

A 39*v* DIVINO fretus auxilio, intemeratae Virginis Matris ejus et beati
B 21*va* Francisci[3] juvamine, ostenso utcumque de anima rationali, quae sit,
quanta sit et qualis sit in se, jam aliud sumendum est principium ut
diligenter videamus qualiter ad suas se habeat potentias; quod et in
superioribus promissum est. Et est consideratio triplex: prima est videre
A 40*r* utrum a parte rei / idem sint anima et suae potentiae; secunda, quae
sint animae potentiae; tertia ex incidenti agetur de synderesi et
conscientia, ut completior tractatus habeatur.[4]

Quantum ad primum dico cum Doctore Subtili, libro secundo, distinctione 15, quaestione secunda, quod anima et suae potentiae sunt idem realiter, distinctae tamen formaliter.[5] Cujus positionis fundamentum est divinus Dionysius in libro *Divinorum nominum*: Continentia enim unitiva non est eorum quae sunt omnino idem;[6] non enim proprie dicimus quod idem contineat seipsum. Secundo, continentia unitiva non
B 21*vb* est eorum quae ita sunt distincta / sicut ante unionem; jam enim unita
non essent. Unde sequitur tertio quod continentia unitiva est eorum quae sunt inter se et[7] unum et distincta. Dicimus autem animam rationalem suas continere potentias unitive. Ideo quaerere debemus identitatem et distinctionem inter eas; non talem identitatem qualem conspicimus inter albedinem et colorem: color enim de ratione est albedinis; nec talem distinctionem qualem videmus inter subjectum et accidens, quae queunt ad invicem separari, ut homo et albedo ejus; sed talem identitatem quaerimus qualis est entis ad suas passiones, quae est realis, ut probat Aristoteles in principio VIII *Metaphysicae*,[8] et talem solum distinctionem qualem habent ens et suae passiones a parte rei, quae quidditativa realis est et non solum rationis a parte ipsius intellectus; alioquin Metaphysica non esset scientia realis.

Unde patet quod nec intellectus nec voluntas sunt partes essentiales animae rationalis, sed potius passiones quibus mediantibus operativa est anima, et distinctae formaliter ab anima et inter se, ut imaginetur primo anima in primo instanti secundum suam essentiam, in secundo quasi potens operari, in tertio operans. Unde primo salvatur quod istae potentiae egrediuntur aut quasi ebulliunt de essentia animae, scilicet ut passiones et virtutes; secundo, quod sunt quasi mediae inter formas substantiales et accidentales; tertio, quod una potentia non est alia formaliter, licet sint idem realiter, et ex hoc est quod dicuntur partes animae, quia neutra totam perfectionem dicit. Et hoc beatus intendebat Augustinus in libro *De anima et spiritu* dum dicebat:

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[22] Several objections to such an hypothesis will be found in O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, etc., I, p. 499, n. 1.

[1] Tertius liber incipit *B*.

[2] *Om.* title *A*.

[3] Omnium sanctorum *A*; cf. *Mediaeval Studies*, X (1948), 226, note 10.

[4] The division of the third book is borrowed from John of Rupella, *Summa de anima* II (ed. Teofilo Domenichelli, [Prato, 1882], pp. 217 ff.), and the *Summa theologica Alexandri Halensis* I-II, nn. 349 ff., II (Quaracchi, 1928), 424 ff.

[5] In the Vivès edition: *Opus Oxoniense* II, d. 16, q. unica; XIII, pp. 23 ff.; cf. also William de Vaurouillon, *Vademecum vel Collectarium* II, d. 15 (Padua, 1485), fol. 24^{v}.

[6] Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* V, §§ 5 and 7; PG 3, 819, 822.

[7] inter se et sunt *A*.

[8] More correctly, *Meta.* IV, 2, 1003b6 and 1005a13 ff.; as can be gathered from *Op. Oxon.*, *loc. cit.*, n. 17; *ed. cit.*, XIII, p. 43a. The following paragraph is based on *Op. Oxon.*, *ibid.*, n. 19; *ed. cit.*, p. 44a.

> Anima secundum sui operis officium variis nominibus nuncupatur. Dicitur namque anima dum vegetat, sensus dum sentit, animus dum sapit, mens dum / *A 40v* intelligit, ratio dum discernit, memoria dum recordatur, dum vult voluntas. Ista tamen non differunt in substantia quemadmodum in nominibus, quoniam omnia ista una sunt anima, proprietates quidem diversae sed essentia una.[9]

Ex quo primo sequitur quod illud quod est in principio III *De anima* secundum commentum Thomae: De parte autem animae qua cognoscit, etc.,[10] non cogit / *B 22ra* quia potentiae animae sunt perfectiones partiales. Secundo, nec illud Anselmi in libro *De concordia*: Sicut habemus in corpore membra, etc.[11] Sic enim suo modo sunt potentiae animae perfectiones. Notandum tamen quod argumentum a simili semper claudicat, non enim currit per omnia; jam enim non esset similitudo sed identitas. Et tertio, quod illud Boethii in libro *Divisionum*, quod divisio animae in istas potentias est sicut divisio totius in partes virtuales,[12] pro ista via est.

Unde sequitur primo quod non sunt partes integrales;[13] secundo, quod non sunt partes essentiales animae, quia totum partes sequitur, ut patet in VII *Metaphysicae*, de hac syllaba *BA* quasi *B* et *A*.[14] Sequitur tertio quod sunt partes potentiales et hoc vult Augustinus in libro *De Trinitate*,[15] in quo dicit quod hae tres potentiae, memoria, intelligentia[16] et voluntas, sunt una essentia, una vita, realiter inquam non formaliter. Et si dicatur quod potentiae non distinguuntur nisi per actus, ex II *De anima;*[17] dicendum quod potentiae primo distinguuntur inter se et ab essentia animae ex natura rei, sed ex tribus ostenduntur ad extra distingui: ex actibus, ex objectis, ex organis. Et licet intellectus organum non habeat, distinguitur tamen ab habente ex organo, sicut ovis non signata a signata, nec oportet quod quaelibet ab alia ex tribus sed aut ex uno aut ex duobus aut ex tribus ostendatur distingui.

Ex quo patet falsa Thomae opinio in[18] prima parte *Summae*, q. 77, articulo primo, ponentis quod potentiae animae sunt accidentia fluentia ab essentia animae, distincta inter se realiter et ab essentia animae.[19] Haec opinio probatur triplici ternario. Tum primo, quia potentia et actus sunt ejusdem generis; operatio autem intellectus est accidens; ergo et intellectus. Tum secundo, quia anima ex se est actus, et ita si potentia esset id[20] quod anima, semper intelligeret anima; quod est falsum. Tum tertio, et est ratio fratris Hervaei Natalis, *Quolibeto primo*, quaestione nona: Anima nequit esse principium diversarum / *A 41r* operationum immediatum[21] sicut nec materia prima diversarum formarum nisi

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[9] C. xiii; PL 40, 788; cf. also c. iv; 782.

[10] Aristotle, *De anima* III, 4, 429a10 ff. Cf. St. Thomas, *In III De Anima*, lect. 7; and Duns Scotus, *loc. cit.*, n. 11; *ed. cit.*, p. 33b, the source here.

[11] St. Anselm, *De concordia gratiae et liberi arbitrii* xi; PL 158, 534; quoted by Duns Scotus, *ibid.; ed. cit.*, p. 34a.

[12] *Liber de divisione;* PL 64, 888; in Duns Scotus, *ibid.; ed. cit.*, p. 33b.

[13] Cf. *Op. Oxon.*, *loc. cit.*, n. 11; *ed. cit.*, XIII, p. 34a.

[14] *Meta.* VII, 17, 1041b11 ff.

[15] *De Trinitate* X, xi, 18; PL 42, 983. Cf. O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux xii^e^ et xiii^e^ siècles* I (Louvain, 1942), pp. 483-484.

[16] intellectus *A*.

[17] Aristotle, *De anima* II, 4, 415a14 ff.

[18] *Om. A.*

[19] St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 77, 1, esp. ad 5; and a. 6. Taken from Duns Scotus, *loc. cit.*, n. 3; *ed. cit.*, p. 24b.

[20] illud *A*.

[21] immediatarum *A*.

per varias dispositiones; aliter enim ex quolibet posset fieri quodlibet.[22] Ecce primus ternarius. Tum quarto, quia accidens variabile ut intellectio praesupponit accidens invariabile cujusmodi est potentia; semper enim minor unitas majorem praesupponit, ut arguit frater Aegidius de
B 22rb Roma, / *Quolibeto tertio*, quaestione decima.[23] Quinto, quia agens per essentiam suam semper agit; igitur anima non est sua potentia quia non semper agit. Tum sexto, sicut esse ad essentiam, ita potentia ad operari; ergo permutatim, sicut esse ad operari, sic potentia ad essentiam; sed nullius creaturae suum esse est operari; ergo nec sua essentia potentia. Ecce secundus ternarius. Tum septimo, quia potentia suscipit magis et minus, non autem essentia animae. Unde Augustinus in libro *De Trinitate*: Unus est ingeniosior alio.[24] Tum octavo, quia tam Aristoteles quam Simplicius in *Praedicamentis*[25] collocant potentiam naturalem in secunda specie qualitatis; anima autem est in praedicamento substantiae aut reducitur ut pars. Tum nono, quia Averroes, *Super I de Anima*, dividit animam in has potentias sicut pomum in colorem et saporem; quae est in accidentia.[26] Ecce tertius ternarius.

Sed haec argumenta non concludunt propositum.[27] Primum enim aequivocat de potentia et actu; si enim accipitur potentia et actus ut ens dividunt, ex IX *Metaphysicae*,[28] et dicitur potentia objectiva, non solum sunt actus et potentia ejusdem generis, immo sunt idem numero. Sortes enim primo est producibilis, secundo est ens actu, et sic nil est ad opinionem. Secundo accipitur potentia ex V *Metaphysicae*[29] dum dividitur in principium activum et passivum, et sic non oportet potentiam et actum esse ejusdem generis, immo secundum Augustinum, ut dictum est, potentia est substantia et actus est accidens;[30] et sic patet quod argumentum nihil est.

Secundum etiam aequivocat de actu primo et secundo;[31] est enim anima actus primus corporis et causa formalis corpori unde vivit, sed non est actus secundus cujusmodi est intellectio, ad quam effective se habet mediante potentia. Tertium sumit falsum, etiam secundum Thomam,[32] quia anima immediatum est subjectum intellectus et voluntatis, quae ponit accidentia. Ad quartum patet: ex quo anima secundum Thomam potest esse immediatum subjectum intellectus et voluntatis, quae sunt accidentia invariabilia, poterit et variabilium, cujusmodi sunt *A* 41*v* intellectio / et volitio quae sunt variabilia accidentia nec dicunt tantam perfectionem, quod enim[33] potest in majus et in minus. Ad quintum dicendum quod accipiendo agere per essentiam, id est, independenter, antecedens verum est; sed anima non sic agit. Accipiendo autem agere per essentiam, id est, non per accidens, sic anima per essentiam suam agit, Avicenna dicente in VI *Metaphysicae* suae[34] quod virtutes animae[35] *B* 22*va* sunt agentes non per additum; et hoc modo agens / per essentiam non oportet semper agere. Ad sextum dicendum quod illa est falsa: Sicut esse ad essentiam sic potentia ad operari; quia esse est actus intrinsecus essentiae, operari actus extrinsecus potentiae.[36] Ad septimum dico[37] quod unus ingeniosior est alio quia anima una est perfectior altera, etiam in naturalibus, articulo Parisiense dicente:

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[22] Cf. *Op. Oxon., loc. cit.*; *ed. cit.*, p. 24b. However, on examining *Quodlibet* I, q. 9, of Hervaeus Natalis (Hervé Nedellec O. P.) in *Ms* Toulouse 743, fols. 34^{vb} ff. (and also q. 12, fol. 51^{vb}), I find nothing that bears any reasonable resemblance to this supposed quotation. It is the reference supplied by Vaurouillon himself in the *Vademecum* II, d. 15; *ed. cit.*, fol. 25^{r}; by Wadding (Vivès), *loc. cit.*, p. 24b; and other Scotists. However, Salvator Bartoluccio, in his edition of the *Opus Oxoniense* II (Venice, 1583), p. 344b, seems to realize that this is a faulty reference, since he warns the reader to consult Wa (William of Ware?), Godefroid and earlier authors, because Natalis is later than Scotus, *ut quibusdam videtur*. His surmise is correct; the reference cannot be to Hervaeus, since his *Quodlibet* I is dated 1307, and therefore posterior to the *Opus Oxoniense*. Furthermore, in *Quodlibet* I he is attacking Duns Scotus, though he did not know the *Opus Oxoniense*.

Cf. P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique* I (Paris, 1925), pp. 200-201; F. Pelster, 'Eine Münchener Handschrift des beginnenden vierzehnten Jahrhunderts, etc.', *Franziskanische Studien*, XVII (1930), 272; and J. Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano*, etc. (*BGPTMA* XXVI, I, Münster, 1927), 213, and 268-269. Dr. Krebs (*Theologie und Wissenschaft nach der Lehre der Hochscholastik* [*BGPTMA* XI, 3-4, 1912], 88*) makes the mistake of saying that Scotus is attacking Hervé's *Quodlibet* I, 3, in *Opus Oxon.*, prol. q. 4, n. 10. Finally, see the remark of Fr. C. Balic, 'De critica textuali scholasticorum scriptis accommodata,' *Antonianum*, XX (1945), 305, n. 2: Via ac ratio quam Hervaeus sequitur allegando opinionem Scoti adeo singularis est, ut vix ac ne vix stabiliri queat quodnam opus et quamnam redactionem operum Duns Scoti . . . prae oculis habuerit.

On the other hand, it can be clearly seen that Godefroid de Fontaines is the *doctor modernus* to whom Duns Scotus refers. A reading of his *Quodlibet* II, q. 4 (ed. M. De Wulf and A. Pelzer [Philosophes Belges II, Louvain, 1904], pp. 80-85) is enough to convince one of this.

[23] Aegidius de Romanis, *Quodlibet* XI (Venice, 1502), fols. 33^{rb}-33^{va}; and Duns Scotus, *ibid.*, n. 4; *ed. cit.*, p. 25a.

[24] Lib. XV, xxiii, 43-44; PL 42, 1090-1091.

[25] Duns Scotus refers both to Aristotle (*Categories* I, 8, 9a15 ff.) and Simplicius (*loc. cit.*, n. 4; *ed. cit.*, p. 25a; and n. 14; p. 37a).

[26] Averroes, *In I De anima*, text. comm. 92 (Venice, 1562), VI, 1-2, fol. 46E: Ita quod divisio animae in suas potentias sit sicut pomi in odorem, colorem et saporem.

[27] Cf. Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.*, *loc. cit.*, n. 5; *ed. cit.*, p. 25b.

[28] *Meta.* IX, 1, 1045b33.

[29] *Meta.* V, 12, 1019a15 ff.

[30] Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

[31] *Op. Oxon.*, *loc. cit.*, n. 6; *ed. cit.*, p. 26.

> Quicumque dixerit animam Judae esse aequalem animæ Christi in perfectionibus, error.[38]

Ad octavum dico[39] quod potentia naturalis non est in secunda specie qualitatis, sed facilitas; et hoc modo intelligunt tam Aristoteles quam Simplicius, sicut patet per exempla in textu.[40] Ad nonum dico quod sicut sapor non est omnis qualitas pomi sic nec voluntas omnis potentia animae, et non plus concludit.[41]

Ex quo secundo sequitur illam opinionem fore falsam quae dicit quod potentiae animae non sunt accidentia animae sed sunt partes realiter distinctae inter se,[42] non tamen ab anima.[43] Cujus opinionis fundamentum ex triplici auctoritate sumptum, Aristotelis, Anselmi et Boethii, jam fractum est ante positionem opinionis Thomae. Confirmatur tamen haec opinio auctoritate beati Augustini, XV *De Trinitate*:

> Detracto corpore, si sola anima cogitetur, aliquid ejus est mens, tamquam caput ejus, vel oculus, vel facies.[44]

Sed dicendum quod non vult Augustinus mentem esse partem essentialem aut integralem animae, sed nobiliorem partem potentialem. Dicitur enim ibi mens ab eminere, non a memini, per quod intelliguntur memoria, intelligentia, voluntas.[45]

Ex quo tertio sequitur quod opinio Henrici de Guandavo, *Quolibeto tertio*, quaestione 14, est falsa, quae[46] dicit quod potentiae animae non

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[32] *Summa theol.* I, 77, 1 (Ottawa, 1941), pp. 463-464.

[33] *Om. A.*

[34] C. 2 (Venice, 1508), fol. 92^r; and Duns Scotus, *loc. cit.*, n. 10; *ed. cit.*, p. 28a.

[35] aliquae, Avicenna and Scotus; this seems the more correct reading.

[36] Duns Scotus, *ibid.*, Ad aliud, etc.

[37] dicendum *A.*

[38] Proposition 124 of the Parisian condemnations of 1277. Cf. P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant* II (Les Philosophes Belges, VI, Louvain, 2^e éd., 1908), p. 186, n. 147.

[39] dicendum *A.*

[40] That is, *Op. Oxon.*, *loc. cit.*, n. 22; *ed. cit.*, XIII, p. 46b.

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] *Om.* inter se *B.*

[43] Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.*, *loc. cit.*, n. 11; *ed. cit.*, XIII, p. 33b; and n. 19; p. 44. Vaurouillon attributes this opinion to St. Bonaventure (*Vademecum*, *ed. cit.*, fol. 25^r); the authorities, however, which Scotus claims are cited for this opinion do not coincide with those cited by St. Bonaventure (*II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1; ed. Quaracchi, II, p. 560).

[44] C. vii, n. 11; PL 42, 1065.

[45] *Op. Oxon.*, *loc. cit.*, n. 11; *ed. cit.*, p. 34a.

[46] qui *B.*

distinguuntur ab anima nisi sicut quidam respectus ad diversa objecta
aut actus.[47] Patet falsum quia remanent potentiae etiam non entibus
objectis aut actibus. Relatio autem manere non potest sine fundamento
et termino. Ideo dicamus, ut Scotus sentit, quod potentiae sunt per-
A 42r fectiones / absolutae, in quibus possunt fundari respectus ad organa,
objecta vel actus, et sunt eaedam realiter cum anima sed distinctae
formaliter.[48]

Est autem notandum ut notat hic frater Joannes de Rupella, triplicem
fore potentiam.[49] Est potentia quae non exigit neque organum nec
objectum nec actum nisi se, sicut potentia cognitiva Dei qui se cog-
noscendo omnia novit. Est secundo potentia quae exigit et objectum et
organum et actum distinctos, ut potentiae sensitivae. Est tertio potentia
B 22vb quae exigit / et objectum et actum distinctos, nisi in cognitione abdita
si ponatur, non tamen organum, sicut exstat intellectus qui non est
organica potentia.—Et tantum de identitate potentiarum cum anima.

II. DIVISIO POTENTIARUM ANIMAE SECUNDUM AUGUSTINUM

Nunc quae sint[1] animae potentiae aperire tempus est. Et primo secundum Aurelium Augustinum; secundo, secundum Joannem Damascenum; tertio, secundum philosophos,[2] intermiscendo tamen aliquando dicta theologorum et[3] maxime Parisiensium. Primus est Latinus, secundus Graecus, tertii sunt Arabes, Graeci et Latini. Si autem de cetero in hoc libro tertio non servo ut in primo et secundo numerum ternarium, in promptu causa est, quia loqui et oportet et convenit ut loquitur qui dividit.

Quoad primum, in quo tractanda est potentiarum animae distinctio et virium secundum beatum Augustinum, ex diversis locis libri *De spiritu et anima*, quem aut edidit Augustinus aut ex ejus dictis editus est, talis elicitur potentiarum animae divisio. Anima enim ad tria comparatur: primo ad corpus quod perficit; secundo, ad actum quem elicit; tertio, ad objectum quod aspicit.

Quoad primum, in anima sunt tres vires, prima naturalis, secunda vitalis, tertia animalis.[4] Prima sedet in hepate, secunda in corde, et tertia in cerebro. Prima sanguinem et alios humores operatur quos per venas miseraicas quae non sunt pulsatiles ad membra transmittit singula, ut inde animal ex nutrimento ut quid nutriatur, secundo ut quantum augeatur, tertio ut ex superfluo generare queat. Est autem ista[5] vis attractiva ex sicco, retentiva ex frigido, digestiva ex calido, expulsiva ex humido.

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[47] Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* III, q. 14 (Paris, 1518), fols. lxvi and lxviii^{v}; Scotus, *Op. Oxon.*, *loc. cit.*, n. 12; *ed. cit.*, p. 35b.

[48] Duns Scotus, *ibid.*, nn. 13-14, n. 16; *ed. cit.*, pp. 36, 40a.

[49] *Summa de anima* II, ii; *ed. cit.*, p. 223.

[1] sunt *A.*

[2] This triple treatment is based on Rupella's plan, *Summa de anima* II, iii ff.; *ed. cit.*, pp. 223 ff. The author adheres closely to the *Summa*, adding new elements from later theologians; chapter xvii, *infra*, is an example of such an addition.

[3] *Om. A.*

[4] *De spiritu et anima* xx; PL 40, 794-795; cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, iii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 223-224. As is evident from the preceding paragraph, Vaurouillon doubts the Augustinian authorship of this work, now usually attributed to Alcher of Clairvaux; cf. G. Théry, 'L'authenticité du "De spiritu et anima" dans S. Thomas et Albert le Grand', *Revue de sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, X (1921), 373-377; A. Wilmart, *Auteurs spirituels et textes dévots du moyen âge latin* (Paris, 1932), p. 175, n. 3. Saint Bonaventure likewise had a misgiving that it did not belong to Saint Augustine (*II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1; *ed. cit.*, II, 561a); and Duns Scotus does not attribute the work to the great Doctor (*Op. Oxon.* II, d. 16, n. 12; *ed. cit.*, XIII, p. 36a).

[5] illa *A.*

Secunda, quae est vitalis, ut cordis calor temperetur, aerem aspirat
A 42*v* et exspirat, aut aliquid consimile in animalibus imperfectis; / qui per
venas pulsatiles, quae dicuntur arteriae, ab arctando ne exeat spiritus—sunt equidem vestitae duplicibus—discurrens corpori vitam et custodit et ministrat.[6]

Tertia, quae est in cerebro, quae est animalis, primo vigere facit
quinque sensus corporis, secundo vocem edere jubet, tertio corpus
B 23*ra* moveri facit.[7] Tres rursus sunt cerebri ventriculi: / primus anterior, a
quo omnis sensus; secundus posterior, a quo omnis motus; tertius inter utrumque medius, id est, rationalis, vel planius judicativus. Unde Ebrardus in suo *Graecismo* dicit:[8]

> Tresque cellae sunt,
> Phantasis et logicae memoransque.[9]

Sensus corporis sic fiunt. Quod est in corpore subtilissimum et ob hoc animae similius et vicinius quam cetera, id[10] est, lux, primum per oculos diffunditur emicatque in radiis[11] oculorum ad visibilia intuendo.[12] Unde patet Augustinum Empedoclem et Platonem fuisse secutum.[13] Dehinc mixta quidem cum aere puro ut in auditu, tertio cum aere caliginoso et sic nebuloso[14] ut in olfactu, quarto cum corpulentiore ut in gustu, quinto cum terrena crassitudine ut in tactu, quinque sensus perficit.

Et potest hic quinarius ad ternarium reduci isto modo. Aut enim primo occurrit lux ut pura: ecce visus; aut secundo cum terra mixta: ecce tactus; aut tertio cum aere, et istud fit tripliciter: aut primo cum aere puro: auditus; aut secundo cum aere caliginoso seu nebuloso:[15] ecce odoratus; aut tertio cum corpulentiore: ecce gustus. Hi quinque sensus in facie splendent hominis. Unde anima inesse noscitur, ut recte Genesis secundo scriptum sit,[16] dum formatur homo: *Inspiravit*, aut *insufflavit, in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae.*[17]

In prima parte cerebri vis animalis vocatur phantastica, id est, imaginaria, quia in ea rerum imagines et similitudines imprimuntur. Unde et phantasticum dicitur. In secunda parte vocatur rationalis sive judicativa sive[18] excogitativa, quia ibi examinat et judicat ea quae per imaginationem repraesentantur. In tertia parte vocatur memoria.

Sic igitur distinguit Augustinus animae potentias ex aspectu ad corpus quod perficit.

Secundo distinguit Augustinus animae potentias in comparatione ad
A 43*r* actus quos elicit, et / hoc modo dividit Augustinus potentias animae
seu vires in has tres: rationalem,[19] concupiscibilem et irascibilem.[20] Rationalis habet cognoscere pro actu et cognoscit hic[21] actu aliquid supra se, ut Deum, aliquid intra[22] se ut se, aliquid juxta se ut angelum vel animam aliam, aliquid infra se ut caelum et quidquid caeli ambitu continetur aliud a praefatis. Et potest hic quaternarius reduci ad ter-

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[6] *De spiritu et anima* xxi; *ed. cit.*, 795; cf. Rupella, *loc. cit.*, p. 224.

[7] *Ibid.*, xxii; *ed. cit.*, 795.

[8] *Om. B.*

[9] Liber V, vii, verse 64: Tres cellae sunt: fantasis et logice memoransque; cf. *Corpus grammaticorum medii aevi* I, gr. 1 (Breslau, 1887), p. 26. (University of Pennsylvania Library).

[10] *Om. A.*

[11] radios *B* and Rupella, *op. cit.*; p. 224.

[12] intuenda, Rupella and *De spiritu et anima;* this is a direct quotation.

[13] Cf. Plato, *Republic* VI, 507-508; *Meno* 76; and Aristotle, *De anima* II, 7, 418b20 ff.

[14] et sic nebuloso, *in marg.* B; *om.* sic *A.*

[15] nebuloso seu caliginoso *A.*

[16] scribitur *A.*

[17] *Genesis ii*, 7; *insufflavit* is used in *De spiritu et anima* xxii; PL 40, 795.

[18] seu *B.*

[19] rationabilem *A.*

[20] *De spiritu et anima* iv; *ed. cit.*, 781; cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, iv; *ed. cit.*, p. 225.

[21] hoc *A.*

[22] infra *B*, *corr. in marg.*, *s. m.*, *to* intra.

B 23*rb* narium hoc / modo: cognitio enim omnis est aut supremi: ecce Deus; aut medii: ecce anima et angelus; aut infimi: ecce reliqua omnia.

Et hanc cognitivam ex actu cognoscendi (et ampliando nomen rationalis ad omne cognoscitivum ut in eodem libro loquitur Augustinus: De rationalitate, inquit, animae omnis sensus oritur,[23] ut contra affectivam partem dividitur) idem ibidem dividit Augustinus in tres partes, sic inquiens:

> Aliud est, inquit,[24] in nobis quo corpora sentimus, quod quinque sensibus facimus; aliquid quo non corpora sed corporibus similia cernimus; aliud quo nec corpora nec corporum similitudines inspicimus sed illas res quae non habent imagines sui[25] similes, sicut Deus, ipsa mens et virtutes.[26]

Primum pertinet ad virtutem cognitivam exteriorem, quae dicitur sensitiva exterior. Secundum ad virtutem sensitivam interiorem, quae dicitur imaginatio. Tertium ad virtutem intellectivam.

Et secundum hoc distinguit triplex genus visionum: primum corporale, quo per corporis sensus corpora sentiuntur; secundum spirituale, quo corporum similitudines inspiciuntur, vocat autem ibi spiritum interiorem sensum; tertium intellectuale, quo illae res quae nec sunt corpus nec corporum similitudines conspiciuntur.[27] In tertio genere seu intellectuali non est fallacia; aut enim quod intelligit verum est aut nullatenus intelligit. In primo autem seu corporali error multus contingit cum aestimamus in objecto fieri quod fit in organo, ut divaricatis oculis una res duae videtur et remus in aqua fractus et navigantibus terra moveri. Sic in secundo seu spirituali: aliquando enim in eo apparent vera, aliquando falsa, sicut patet in somniis phreneticis et febre laborantibus, et talibus similibus.

Concupiscibilis vero et irascibilis sunt affectivae partis sicut rationalis cognitivae; differenter tamen in tribus, ut dicunt doctores veteres.[28] Primo, quia concupiscibilis respectu boni consequendi, irascibilis /
A 43*v* respectu mali fugiendi; secundo, quia concupiscibilis respectu boni simpliciter, irascibilis respectu boni ardui; tertio, quia concupiscibilis est ut appetens, irascibilis est[29] ut defendens. Unde et Damascenus dicit quod irascibilis est audax vindex concupiscentiae[30] laesae,[31] ut sit secundum eos ordo iste: primo anima, secundo potentia, tertio vis. Et sicut in eadem anima sunt multae potentiae, ita in eadem potentia sunt
B 23*va* multae vires, ut in voluntate quae est / una potentia sunt concupiscibilis in qua est caritas et[32] irascibilis in qua spes. Hoc tamen ultimum, inquit Doctor Subtilis, libro tertio, distinctione 26 in fine, est falsum.[33] Tam enim caritas quam spes, quae sunt virtutes theologicae, sunt in concupiscibili, non in irascibili; irascibilis enim non est nata Deum habere pro objecto; differenter tamen, quia spes respectu commodi, caritas simpliciter respectu honesti. Unde, ut dicit in tertio, distinctione 32,[34] in solutione argumentorum principalium, hae vires, concupiscibilis et irascibilis, ita

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[23] *De spiritu et anima* vii; *ed. cit.*, 784, ad sensum.

[24] inquit est *A.*

[25] sibi *A.*

[26] *De spiritu et anima* xxiii; *ed. cit.*, 795, with a few words omitted. The quotation may be from Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, iv; *ed. cit.*, p. 225, though the printed text of the latter is corrupt; the comment that follows is taken from Rupella, *ibid.*

[27] *De spiritu et anima* xxiv; *ed. cit.*, 797; almost all verbatim from Rupella, *loc. cit.*; pp. 225-226.

[28] *De spiritu et anima* iv; *ed. cit.*, 782. Vaurouillon departs at length from Rupella here, who barely mentions this division in *Summa de anima* II, iv; *ed. cit.*, pp. 227-228.

[29] *Om. B.*

[30] concupiscibilis *B.*

[31] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xvi; PG 94, 934.

[32] *Om. A.*

[33] Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* III, d. 26, n. 27; *ed. cit.*, **XV, 350.**

[34] tertia (3ª) *A.*

sunt in voluntate sicut in parte sensitiva sive earum objecta sint delectabile et arduum sive non.[35]

Et est notandum quod aliquando sumptum est nomen vis pro nomine potentiae, aliquando nomen potentiae pro nomine vis. De organo autem earum et actibus infra in opinione philosophorum de potentiis motivis.[36] Et tantum de comparatione animae ad actus quos per potentias elicit.

Tertio possunt secundum eum distingui animae potentiae ex objectis quae anima aspicit.[37] Et intelligo semper ostendi distingui, quia seipsis distinguuntur formaliter.[38] Unde dicit hoc modo animam distingui in sensum, imaginationem, rationem, intellectum et intelligentiam, in haec quinque.[39] Quae ad unum ternarium reducuntur: aut enim primo corpora et eorum praesentes formas aspicit, et[40] sic est sensus qui est exterior; aut secundo corporum species, non ipsa corpora seu formas, inspicit, sic[41] est imaginatio qui est sensus interior; aut tertio ad partem venimus intellectivam et hoc tripliciter: primo, dum universalem rationem rerum corporalium inspicimus,[42] consideratione quidem non remotione a rebus particularibus—sic est ratio quae universalium est praeter singularia; *A 44r* aut secundo, dum rem / singularem creatam quidem sed incorpoream apprehendimus: sic est intellectus, ut est anima, angelus; aut tertio, spiritum increatum—sic intelligentia nuncupatur. Et hujus partis intellectivae secundum eumdem triplex est actus: investigare, discernere, retinere. Investigamus secundum ingenium quod se ad varia extendit; discernimus ratione; retinemus memoria. Ingenium inquirit ignota, ratio discernit inventa, memoria recondit judicata.[43]—Et tantum de vi et potentia animae secundum Augustinum. Et ampliatur ista divisio usque ad actum, ita quod potentia accipitur large. /

B 23vb

III. DIVISIO POTENTIARUM ANIMAE SECUNDUM JOANNEM DAMASCENUM

Ex promisso venimus ad Damascenum post Augustinum declaratum.[1] Dividit autem aut distinguit hoc modo animae potentias. Dicit ergo in secundo *Sententiarum* suarum:[2] Oportet autem scire quod natura animae duplices habet virtutes, has quidem cognitivas, illas autem zoticas.[3] Sunt autem virtutes zoticae appetitivae seu motivae. Unde descendit zodiacus[4] a zoa, quae[5] est vita; in eo describuntur equidem animalia aut in toto aut in parte, quod dico propter libram et urnam. Appetitus enim proprie sumptus et motus ex se vitam pandunt. Et licet ex arte Boethii, in libro *Divisionum*,[6] omnis divisio aut bimembris sit aut ad bimembrem reducitur si bona est, haec tamen ad trinitatem reducitur sicuti omnia quae sunt. Omnis enim animae potentia aut cognitiva est aut secundo motiva irrationalis aut tertio motiva rationalis, etiam secundum Damascenum.

Dicamus primo de primo, ut consequenti[7] ordine ad secundum veniamus et tertium. Cognitivum[8] in quinque membra dividit et large accipit[9] potentiam quae virtus est ut etiam se ad actum extendit, ut patebit infra. Sunt autem haec: sensus, imaginatio, opinio, mens, intellectus.[10] Et iste quinarius ad ternarium reducitur. Potentiae enim animae aut in sensu sunt exteriori, et sic nomine appropriato sensus nominantur; aut in sensu interiori, et hoc tripliciter: aut in prima parte cerebri: ecce imaginatio; aut in secunda: ecce opinio; aut in tertia: ecce mens seu[11] memoria;[12] aut tertio in parte intellectiva: ecce intellectus.

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[35] *Op. Oxon.* III, d. 33, n. 20; *ed. cit.*, XV, p. 455b.

[36] *Infra*, c. xv; p. 282.

[37] *De spiritu et anima* iv; PL 40, 782.

[38] Cf. Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 16, n. 16; *ed. cit.*, XIII, p. 40a; d. 24, n. 6; p. 183; and especially *Quodlibet* XIII, nn. 30-31; *ed. cit.*, XXV, p. 577.

[39] *De spiritu et anima* iv; *ed. cit.*, 782; and Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, iv; *ed. cit.*, pp. 226-227.

[40] *Om. A.*

[41] sicut *B.*

[42] aspicimus *A.*

[43] *De spiritu et anima* xi; PL 40, 787; and Rupella, *loc. cit.*; p. 227.

[1] Cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, v; *ed. cit.*, pp. 228 ff. As in the foregoing chapter, Vaurouillon seems but to take his cue from Rupella; whether he has actually read the work of Saint John Damascene is debatable.

[2] suarum Sententiarum *A.*

[3] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xxii; PG 94, 942.

[4] zodicacus *A.*

[5] quod *A.*

[6] PL 64, 877 and 883.

[7] convenienti *B.*

[8] cognitivam *B.*

[9] *corr. from* accipitur *A.*

A 44v Primum igitur[13] / quinarii est sensus, qui in quinque sensus particulares divisus est;[14] et ex parte medii divisionem tangendo Augustini ad tria quinarius reductus est.[15] Primus est visus, cujus organum sunt nervi duo optici prodeuntes ex cerebro et oculus, objectum adaequatum[16] color, reliqua ex consequenti.[17] Altius tamen loquitur Doctor Subtilis in *Reportatis Parisius*, libro secundo, distinctione 13, dicens[18] quod color non est objectum adaequatum visus, quia lux et lumen videntur, maxime *B 24ra* lux; nec lux, quia color conspicitur; sed tertium innominatum / quidem sed commune tribus. Secundus sensus auditus est. Hujus organum nervi venientes a cerebro et constitutio auris, objectum vero sonus. Tertius odoratus remittens per nares vapores, usque ad anteriores fores cerebri, cujus objectum est odor. Quartus sensus est gustus, cujus organum sunt lingua, palatum, in quibus sunt nervi dilatati qui a cerebro prodeunt, cujus objectum est sapor. Quintus sensus est tactus omni communis animali; hujus organum sunt nervi ex cerebro per totum expansi corpus. Unde et aliorum organa sensuum obtinent sensum tactus. Objectum autem tactus secundum duplicem contrarietatem assignatur: cujus una est inter calidum et frigidum et[19] alia inter siccum et humidum. Ex quo sequitur a posteriori, non a priori, sensum tactus[20] unius non fore specialissimae speciei sed fore genus subalternum ad duas suas species, et sic unus ternarius ex uno resultans binario. Sensus enim quilibet in specie unius est contrarietatis, ut patet discurrendo inter quae contraria media inclusa sunt, sicut in colore patet. Contrariantur enim albedo et nigredo inter quas medii sunt colores, ut rubedo, fuscedo, viriditas et similes. Et si obicitur quod tunc sunt duo visus in specie distincti, unus lucis, coloris reliquus; dico quod inter opacum quod coloris est subjectum et lucidum quod lucis et tertio diaphanum quod luminis satis contrarietas patet una.[21]

Addit praeterea Joannes Damascenus omnes sensus in organis duplicari, *A 45r* tactu dempto: duo oculi, duae aures, duo foramina / naris, duae linguae in serpentibus divisae, quae in hominibus[22] uniuntur; tactus vero per totum corpus in modum retis expanditur praeter ossa, nervos, ungues, cornua, pilos et talia. Et notandum hos sensus in uno differre ternario. Visus quidem solum per rectum aspicit; odoratus et auditus in circuitu sentiunt; gustus et tactus solum dum eis objecta sua approximant.[23]

Ex quibus satis patet Joannem Damascenum sensus exteriores distinguere ex organis et objectis. Jungatur quod secundum Augustinum in

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[10] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xxii; PG 94, 942.

[11] sive *A*.

[12] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xvii; *ed. cit.*, 934; xix; 938; xx; 939; cf. also Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica* I-II, n. 357; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 434a.

[13] ergo *A*.

[14] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xii; PG 94, 926.

[15] adductus est seu reductus *A*.

[16] aequatum *A*.

[17] convenienti *B*.

[18] Duns Scotus, *Rep. Paris.* II, d. 13, n. 3; *ed. cit.*, XXIII, p. 43a; cf. *supra*, Book I, c. iv; *Mediaeval Studies*, X (1948), 242 (all references to Books I and II of the *Liber de anima* are to this volume).

[19] *Om. A.*

[20] *Om. B.*

[21] *Rep. Paris.*, loc. *cit.*; cf. *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 13, n. 3; *ed. cit.*, XII, pp. 616 ff.; and I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 23; *ed. cit.*, IX, p. 147.

[22] omnibus *A*.

[23] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xviii; PG 94, 938; cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, v; *ed. cit.*, p. 230.

B 24rb praecedenti / capitulo distinguuntur ex mediis,[24] et tenemus ternarium. Hoc de sensu exteriori secundum eum dictum sit.

Veniendum est[25] ad sensum interiorem quem dividit in tres partes juxta tres partes capitis: sinciput, interciput, occiput.[26] Sinciput est capitis prima pars seu prora. Unde dicitur sincera pars capitis aut sinceritas capitis, in qua vigent omnes sensus exteriores. In hac prora est, in prima parte cerebri, sensus interior, quem tam Augustinus quam Damascenus imaginationem nominant,[27] a quo loco nervi particularium sensuum oriuntur ut a fonte rivus, et terminantur et referunt judicia ut ad centrum quem philosophi sensum nominant communem, ut suo loco ostendetur.[28] Hunc distinguit a phantasia Damascenus, quia imaginativa ab imaginabili patitur, sed phantasia fictrix est, ut chimaerae phantasia.[29]

Interciput est media pars et cerebri et capitis.[30] Ideo interciput quasi inter caput dicitur, in qua collocatur opinio, id est, vis opinativa, quam Damascenus excogitativam dicit, quam cum hoc rationalem et judicativam asserit Augustinus,[31] ut notetur iste ternarius: primo, sensus exterior comprehendit speciem praesentem in materia et simplicem; secundo, imaginatio comprehendit formam absente materia et simplicem; tertio, excogitativa judicat de ea atque componit ut fiat prosecutio vel fuga.[32]

Unde notandum haec tria differre: dubitatio, suspicio, opinio. Consideretur circulus. In medio est dubitatio ut in centro nusquam declinans sed suspensam ex toto tenens sententiam. Suspicio, de qua Philosophus in VI *Ethicorum*,[33] in centro est, sed plus pendet[34] ad partem unam quam aliam, neutram tamen accipiens. Opinio vero, de qua Philosophus in
A 45v libro *Posteriorum*,[35] declinat / a centro et unam partem accipit, tamen formidans de altera.

Occiput est ultima et tertia pars capitis et cerebri. Ideo occiput occasus capitis dicitur in qua, ut in *Almasorio* Rasis dicit,[36] incipit mica cerebri vicarius, ut per spondilia dorsi motum generet et reliquas corporis partes. In hac, inquit Damascenus, est promptuarium memoriae et rememorationis.[37] Et comparans haec tria, imaginationem, excogitativam et memoriam ad invicem, dicit sic:[38] Phantasticum quidem, id est, imagi-
B 24va nativum, per sensus suscipiens / mens tradit excogitativo vel discretivo, illud[39] autem suscipiens et dijudicans tradit memorativae.[40]

Unde haec tria distinguit: memoria, oblivio, rememoratio. Memoria enim[41] est susceptorum medio excogitativae retentio. Oblivio vero est memoriae ablatio.[42] Rememoratio autem dicitur memoriae deperditae oblivione restitutio.[43] Dicit autem Damascenus quod memoria est phantasia derelicta ab aliquo sensu secundum actum apparentem;[44] phantasia autem dicit formam sensibilem. Ex quo primo sequitur quod alio modo nunc capit phantasiam quam quando eam contra imaginationem distinxit. Secundo sequitur quod haec memoria non est illa quae est prima pars imaginis apud Augustinum.[45] Tertio sequitur quod potest dari una memoria quae utrumque complectitur. Et hanc definire videtur Damascenus dicens: Memoria est coarcervatio sensus et intelligentiae.[46] Et hanc intelligentiam seu intellectum, quae[47] est tertia pars cognitivae apud Damascenum, ad sequens dimittemus capitulum ne longitudo fastidium generet.

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[24] *Supra*, III, ii; p. 255.

[25] *Om. B.*

[26] Cf. note 12, *supra*. The names of the three parts of the brain are not given by Damascene; cf. also Avicenna, *De anima*, P. I, c. 5 (Venice, 1508), fol. 5^b; St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litt.* VII, xviii, 24; PL 34, 364; and St. Isidore, *Etymol.* XI, i, 27; PL 82, 401.

[27] Cf. *supra*, III, ii; p. 255; and Damascene, *op. cit.*, II, xvii; *ed. cit.*, 934.

[28] *infra*, c. x; p. 270.

[29] *De fide orthodoxa, loc. cit.;* and Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, vi; *ed. cit.*, p. 230.

[30] The term is not used by Damascene, as we have noted.

[31] Cf. *supra*, III, ii; p. 255.

[32] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xix; *ed. cit.*, 938; the presentation is based on Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, vii; *ed. cit.*, p. 231.

[33] *Ethic. Nic.* VI, 3, 1139b17.

[34] pandet *A.*

[35] *Analyt. Post.* I, 33, 88b30 ff.

[36] Al-Razi, *Kitab-al-Mansuri;* Latin translation (*Liber Al-mansoris*) published at Milan, 1481; unavailable. R. Foerster, *Scriptores Physiognomici* II (Leipzig, 1893), pp. 161-179, edits Lib. II, cc. 26-58, but our reference is not found therein. Cf. Geo. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science* I (Washington, 1927), p. 609; and C. H. Haskins, *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science* (Cambridge, Mass., 1924),, pp. 131 and 286.

[37] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xx; PG 94, 938; cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, viii; *ed. cit.*, p. 231.

[38] *Om. B.*

[39] id *B.*

[40] *loc. cit.; col.* 939.

[41] *Om. A.*

[42] oblatio *B.*

[43] *De fide orthodoxa, loc. cit.*

IV. TRIPLEX VIA INTELLECTUS SECUNDUM JOANNEM[1] DAMASCENUM

De intellectu igitur[2] ut de eo loquitur Damascenus loquendum est,[3] et hoc secundum triplicem viam: primo, secundum viam inveniendi; secundo, secundum viam addiscendi; tertio, secundum viam docendi. Via prima quae est inventiva a sensu incipit, in imaginatione ambulat, in opinione proficit, in mente metitur, in intellectum terminatur. Ex sensu enim experimentum nascitur, in imaginatione retinetur, in opinione discutitur, in mente judicatur an opinio vera sit an falsa. Et tunc res
A 46*r* intellectu intelligitur.[4] Quinque sunt, sed ternario complectuntur. / Est primo pars sensitiva, secundo intellectiva, tertio quasi media.

Primo ergo est sensitiva, et est[5] triplex. Prima, sensus exterior et hic in propria venit: ex sensu, dicitur, incipit. Secunda, prima pars anterior sensus interioris; dicitur: In imaginatione retinetur. Tertia, media subtilior; dicitur: In opinione discutitur.

Secundo principaliter est pars quasi ad partem retinens[6] et sensitivam et intellectivam. Haec dicitur mens. Unde dicitur: In mente judicatur. Unde mens solet dici apud Sanctos tripliciter.[7] Primo dicitur apud
B 24*vb* Augustinum prima / pars imaginis, quando in libro *De Trinitate* tria ponit quae sunt: mens, notitia, amor; et sic mens a meminisse dicitur;[8] et sic in praecedenti capitulo dictum est secundum Damascenum quod mens et memoria idem, etsi sit sensibilium memoria, et mens non est pars imaginis sed est ex parte sensitivae.[9] Si autem mens sit praesentia objecti ad intellectum, in actu primo non secundo, sic est prima pars imaginis, ut inquit Doctor Subtilis,[10] et sic patet mentem hoc modo mediare inter intellectum et sensum. Secundo modo mens dicitur pars intellectiva distincta contra partem sensitivam, et sic loquitur Boethius in primo *De consolatione*, metro [secundo]:

> Heu quae praecipiti mersa profundo
> Mens hebet, etc.[11]

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[44] *Ibid.;* the Latin version is from Rupella.

[45] Cf. *supra*, II, ix; p. 282.

[46] *De fide orthodoxa, loc. cit.* The definition is to be found also in Nemesius, *De natura hominis* xiii; PG 40, 662, the source for Damascene's work.

[47] qui *A*.

[1] *Om. B.*

[2] ergo *A*.

[3] Based on Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, ix; *ed. cit.*, pp. 232-235; the matter is given some treatment in the *Summa* of Alexander, I-II, nn. 378-830; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 457-459.

[4] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xxii; PG 94, 942.

[5] haec *B*.

[6] actinens *A*.

[7] Cf. St. Bonaventure, *I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, *resp.*; *ed. cit.*, I, p. 89.

[8] Cf. *supra*, II, viii; p. 281. Cf. *De spiritu et anima* xxxiv; PL 40, 803: Mens autem vocata est, quod eminet in anima, vel quod meminerit; and St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, vii, n. 11; PL 42, 1065.

[9] Cf. *supra*, c. iii; p. 259; and Alexander, *Summa theologica* I-II, n. 368, I, ad 1; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 448ab.

[10] Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 9, n. 3; *ed. cit.*, IX, p. 406b.

[11] Verses 1-2; PL 63, 593.

Et sic dicitur ab eminere per afferesim quia eminet in anima.[12] Tertio dicitur mens virtus judicativa. Unde, inquit Damascenus, a metiendo dicitur.[13] Metitur enim ut judicet, et hoc judicium a parte intellectus aut sensus potest esse. Ideo haec virtus inter utrumque mediat.

Tertio principaliter est intellectus qui exstat verorum. Unde notandum intellectum tripliciter accipi.[14] Primo ut distinguitur contra intelligentiam, quomodo accepit in sua divisione Augustinus dum dicebat intelligentiam esse respectu spiritus increati, intellectum autem respectu spiritus creati.[15] Secundo accipitur intellectus ut est veri, sit simplex aut compositum, praemissa aut conclusio, et sic hic accipit Damascenus. Tertio accipitur ut est potentia, et sic accipit Philosophus in III *De anima* dum intellectum dividit.[16]—Et tantum de via inveniendi.

Secunda via est via[17] addiscendi. Haec in intelligentia incipit, sed[18] in
phronesim terminatur. Sunt enim quatuor in hac via: scilicet[19] intelligentia,
intentio, excogitatio, phronesis, secundum Damascenum.[20] Intelligentia
enim in universali ambulat, intentio ad aliquid applicatur,
A 46*v* excogitatio permanens format animam, / phronesis fert judicium. Unde
hic quaternarius ad Trinitatem increatam reducitur, ut sicut tres personae
unus Deus sic intelligentia, intentio, excogitatio tria sunt quae phronesis
secundum incessum judicat. Verbi gratia, formetur syllogismus ut
videatur quod dico. Omne totum majus est sua parte: ecce major, cujus
est intelligentia; in universali enim et totum et partem aspicit atque
B 25*ra* indeterminate. Subsumatur minor: Omne / continuum est totum. Ecce
jam intelligentia in intentionem convertitur; ad aliquid enim particulare
applicatur et determinatum. Inferatur conclusio: Ergo omne continuum
majus est sua parte. Ecce excogitatio quae ex aliis cogitatur; pandet
enim ex majori et minori, et format et figurat animam dum majorem et
minorem extremitates jungit et in veritate permanens non transitur
ulterius; finis enim syllogismi est. Quem syllogismum an sit bonus an
sit malus ipsa phronesis judicat.

Notandum tamen est intelligentiam accipi[21] tripliciter.[22] Uno modo pro spiritu creato aut etiam increato. Unde et exstat liber *De intelligentiis*.[23] Secundo, prout apud Augustinum, ut dictum est,[24] contra intellectum distinguitur quia intellectus respectu est spiritus creati, intelligentia respectu increati. Tertio, ut est respectu universalium, et sic capit Damascenus.—Et sic finit via discendi.

Et sic[25] incipit tertia via quae exstat docendi.[26] Signum enim sapientis est posse docere, inquit Aristoteles in I *Elenchorum*.[27] Et in hoc secundum

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[12] Cf. note 8 above.

[13] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xxii; PG 94, 942; cf. St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*

[14] Alexander, *Summa theologica* I-II, n. 368; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 448a.

[15] *De spiritu et anima* vi and xxxviii; PL 40, 783, 809; for St. Augustine himself, cf. E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de S. Augustin* (Paris, 1^{e} éd., 1931), p. 54.

[16] dividit intellectum *A;* Aristotle, *De anima* III, 5, 430a10 ff.

[17] *Om. A.*

[18] *Om. B.*

[19] *Om. B.*

[20] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xxii; PG 94, 942-943. Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, ix; *ed. cit.*, p. 232; and Alexander, *Summa* I-II, n. 380; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 458-459.

[21] intelligentia accipitur *B.*

[22] Cf. William de Vaurouillon, *I Sent.*, d. 3, a. 1 (Basle, 1510), fol. 18A.

[23] It would be hard to determine which *Liber de intelligentiis* Vaurouillon has in mind. E.g., Pseudo-Avicenna, *De intelligentiis* (inter opera Avicennae, Venice, 1508), fols. 64^{vb}-67^{vb}; and in the critical edition, *De causis primis et secundis et de fluxu qui consequitur eas*, of R. de Vaux, O.P. (*Notes et textes sur l'avicennisme* ***latin aux confins des*** ***xii***^{e}***-xiii***^{e} ***siècles,*** Bibliothèque thomiste, XX, Paris, 1934). Or, Alfarabi, *De intelligentiis* (inter opera Avicennae, *ed. cit.*), fols. 68^{ra}-69^{rb}, and in the critical edition of E. Gilson, *AHDLMA*, IV (1930), 108-126; and Pseudo-Witelo, *Liber de intelligentiis* (ed. Cl. Baeumker, *BGPTMA*, III, 2, Münster, 1908).

[24] *Supra*, c. ii; p. 257.

[25] *Om. B.*

[26] Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, ix; *ed. cit.*, pp. 233-234.

[27] Aristotle, *De sophisticis elenchis* I, 165a22; more correctly, perhaps, *Meta.* I, 1, 981b7.

Damascenum tria sunt.[28] Primo, veritatis examinata certitudo, quae dicitur phronesis, quae dilatata facit cogitationem, id est, disponendo judicat quomodo sermo fiat interius et hic sermo interior, ut secundum, cogitatio dicitur. Simul enim agitatur mens ut sermo fiat interior. Et tertio ex sermone interiori sermo procedit exterior. Ex vero igitur ad doctrinam sermo secundo incipit interior, ut tertio docendus exterius prolato sermone doceatur.—Et tantum de triplici via intellectus.

V. DE POTENTIIS MOTIVIS IRRATIONALIBUS

Ad secundum principale Damasceni tempus exigit nos venire, tractatu habito de cognitivis potentiis; quod est de potentiis motivis irrationalibus.[1] Et sunt duae apud eum:[2] una quae non obedit rationi nec persuadetur /
A 47r ut obediat rationi; alia est[3] quae persuadetur ut obediat rationi. Et ista dualitas in ternarium hoc modo surgit: virium irrationalium primae sunt quae nec imperio nec exsecutione motus rationi obediunt; secundae, quae imperio obediunt rationi, non tamen exsecutione motus; tertiae sunt quae exsecutione motus rationi obediunt, non tamen imperio.

Prima est vitalis, quam pulsativam dicit.[4] Ex qua oriuntur tres:
B 25rb nutritiva, / quae conservat individuum et deperditum restaurat; augmentativa, quae corpora plasmat et ad perfectionem ducit; et[5] generativa, quam dicit seminativam, ut species conservetur. Sine enim vi pulsativa in animalibus non potest vis nutritiva proficere. Quod si non placeat nutritivam ex pulsativa dependere, ut in enumeratione secundum Augustinum dictum est,[6] jungatur latino graecus et veritas apparebit, ut primo pulsativa sit in corde: unde vita; secundo, nutritiva in hepate: unde sanguis; tertio, augmentativa procedat ex ambabus ad profectum animalis.

Secundae sunt irascibilis et concupiscibilis.[7] Hae enim secundum rationem motum frequenter imperant, non tamen exsequuntur. Et capit Damascenus in loco isto concupiscibilem et irascibilem ut solum sunt partes sensitivae. Augustinus vero[8] eas extendit ad partem intellectivam, ut in sua divisione patuit.[9]

Tertiae sunt motuum membrorum potentiae exsecutivae.[10]

VI. DE PASSIONIBUS ANIMAE[1]

Quia propter concupiscibilem et irascibilem agit idem Damascenus de passionibus, notandum quinque esse genera passionum, scilicet: spem, gaudium, tristitiam, timorem et iram;[2] quae ad ternarium reducuntur. Omnis enim animae passio aut est respectu praesentis solum, et sic est gaudium et tristitia; aut respectu futuri solum, et sic est spes et timor; aut respectu utriusque, et sic est ira.

De spe autem quae est respectu boni futuri, Damascenus non loquitur hanc dividens, quia non dividitur ut aliae. Potest tamen spes[3] sumi tripliciter.[4] Primo modo ut est theologica virtus, et sic Haymo eam

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[28] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xxii; PG 94, 943; and xxi; 939.

[1] Taken almost directly from Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, x; *ed. cit.*, pp. 235 ff.

[2] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xii; PG 94, 927 and 930.

[3] *Om. A.*

[4] *De fide orthodoxa, loc. cit.;* 927; Rupella, *loc. cit.*

[5] *Om. B.*

[6] *Supra*, c. ii; p. 254.

[7] *De fide orthodoxa, loc. cit.*; Rupella, *op. cit.;* p. 236.

[8] Sed Augustinus *A.*

[9] *Supra*, c. ii; p. 256.

[10] *De fide orthodoxa, loc. cit.;* 930.

[1] *Marg. A.*

[2] Except for the first few paragraphs, this chapter is a summary of Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, x; *ed. cit.*, pp. 236-239; with its source in *De fide orthodoxa* II, xii; PG 94, 930, wherein Saint John Damascene treats of the five species of *Passio*.

[3] *Om. A.*

[4] Cf. St. Bonaventure, *III Sent.*, d. 26, a. 1, q. 1, *resp.*; *ed. cit.*, III, p. 556.

definit: Spes est certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis ex meritis et
gratia proveniens.[5] Secundo, pro objecto spei, et sic dicit Psalmus ad
A 47v Dominum: *Domine, tu es spes mea a juventute / mea.*[6] Tertio, pro
passione; unde Boethius, metro ultimo primi *De consolatione*, ubi
passiones docet fugiendas, de spe dicit: Spemque fugato.[7]

Veniant aliae in medium, ut videatur de eis. Gaudium: dicit, ubi
supra, Boethius: Gaudia pelle. Damascenus nominat hanc laetitiam;[8] et
laetitia laudata animali, quam ex anima non ex animali[9] vocat, ut
laetitia, contemplationem[10] scientiae et virtutis; corporalem quae conjuncti ex anima et corpore existit, in tres dividit laetitias. Prima naturalis
est et necessaria, ut est nutritivae potentiae; haec praetermitti nequit.
B 25va Secunda naturalis est sed non necessaria, / ut generativae; haec[11] praetermitti potest et pro loco et tempore non haberi, ut patet in virginibus.
Tertia nec naturalis nec necessaria, ut sequens ebrietatem, et haec non
admitti debet.[12]—Et tantum de laetitia.

Sequens est tristitia. Hanc Boethius, ubi supra, dolorem nominat: Nec dolor adsit. Haec sicut gaudium respectu praesentis est, non futuri; differenter tamen quia laetitia respectu boni, tristitia respectu mali. Haec apud Damascenum quatuor habet species, quae sunt: acedia, achos, invidia, misericordia.[13] Et ad ternarium hoc modo quaternarius revertitur: omnis enim tristitia aut est respectu sui, et sic est[14] acedia quam sic definit: Acedia est tristitia aggravans; aut secundo, respectu alterius, et si de bono est invidia, quam sic definit: Invidia est tristitia in alienis bonis; si de malo, est misericordia, quam sic[15] definit: Misericordia est tristitia in alienis malis; aut respectu utriusque, et sic est achos, quam sic definit: Achos est tristitia vocem auferens.

Sequitur de timore qui commune nomen habet cum Damasceno et Boethio dicente, ubi supra: Pelle timorem.[16] Est autem timor suspicio futuri mali, et habet tres binarios specierum, qui sunt: est primo segnities, quae est timor futurae operationis; est secundo erubescentia, quae est timor in exspectatione convicii. Ecce primus binarius. Est tertio verecundia, quae est timor in turpi actu; est quarto admiratio, quae est timor ex magna imaginatione. En secundus binarius. Est quinto stupor, qui est timor ex inassueta imaginatione; est sexto agonia, quae[17] est timor per casum, scilicet infortunium. En tertius binarius.

A 48r Ultima / ira sequitur, quam Damascenus tripliciter describit.[18] Primo
sic: Ira est fervor ejus qui circa cor est sanguinis ex evaporatione fellis;
et haec est respectu praesentis, ut patet. Secundo sic: Ira est desiderium
vindictae; et haec est respectu futuri. Tertio sic: Ira est audax vindex
concupiscentiae laesae; et haec est tam praesentis quam futuri. Habet
autem apud eum ira tres species.[19] Prima est fel, de qua dicit: Fel est
[ira][20] principium et motum habens; hoc est, de facili decidit. Secunda est
mania, de qua dicit: Mania est ira permanens, scilicet memoria mali;
unde a manendo dicitur et memoriae tradendo. Tertia est cotus, id est,

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[5] *De varietate librorum* II, v; PL 118, 895.

[6] *Psalm* lxx, 5: *Quoniam tu es patientia mea, Domine: Domine, spes mea a juventute mea.*

[7] *De consolatione philosophiae* I, metrum vii, 25-29; PL 63, 657-658:
Gaudia pelle, Pelle timorem,
Spemque fugato, Nec dolor adsit.

[8] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xiii; PG 94, 930; cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, x; *ed. cit.*, p. 236.

[9] I.e., psychicae, in the Greek; this sentence seems corrupt in both mss.

[10] contemplatio *A*.

[11] quae *B*.

[12] *De fide orthodoxa, loc. cit.*; 930-931.

[13] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xiv; *loc. cit.*, 931; cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*; p. 237.

[14] *Om. B.*

[15] *Om. A.*

[16] *De fide orthodoxa, loc. cit.;* 931.

[17] qui *mss.*

[18] *Op. cit.*, II, xv; PG 94, 931-934; cf. Rupella, *loc. cit.*; p. 238.

[19] *Ibid.*; 934.

[20] Added from Rupella, *loc. cit.*, and St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, q. 46, a. 8; *ed. cit.*, 957a.

B 25vb furor, de qua dicit: Cotus / est ira observans tempus ad vindictam. Unde dicitur cotus a coce[21] acuendo.[22]

Confortatur autem concupiscibilis spe et laetitia, sed tristitia disconfortatur. Sic timore disconfortatur irascibilis, quam ira confortat. Et tantum de passionibus istis. Quid autem sit passio habetur libro secundo, capitulo de passibilitate animae;[23] et infra de potentiis motivis secundum mentem philosophorum enumerantur variae[24] passiones[25] concupiscibilis et irascibilis.

VII. DE LIBERO ARBITRIO

Tertio loco opus est ad potentias motivas rationales devenire, quas assignat Damascenus in quodam trisagio: voluntate, ratione et libero arbitrio.[1] Et quia liberum arbitrium voluntatem et rationem juxta nomen comprehendit, dum enim liberum voluntas, dum arbitrium dicitur ratio insinuatur, merito libero cognito arbitrio et voluntas et ratio cognoscetur.

Definitur autem liberum arbitrium tripliciter.[2] Primo a beato Augustino, et recitat Magister, libro secundo, distinctione 24:

> Liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis, qua bonum eligitur gratia assistente, et malum eadem desistente.[3]

Secundo ipsum definit Venerabilis Anselmus, libro *De libero arbitrio*: Liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem propter se.[4] Tertio ipsum definit Bernardus, in[5] libro *De libero arbitrio*: Liberum arbitrium est consensus ob voluntatis inamissibilem libertatem et rationis indeclinabile judicium.[6] Et hoc modo distinguuntur: liberum enim arbitrium A 48v ad tria comparatur: ad objectum, ad actum, / ad finem. Primo modo definit Augustinus, secundo Bernardus, tertio Anselmus, ut patet consideranti.[7]

Ex quo primo sequitur liberum arbitrium in solis substantiis rationalibus posse reperiri, ut voluntas et ratio.[8] Ex sola enim tali laus sequitur et vituperium, poena et praemium, quae libero debentur arbitrio, sicut deliberare et consiliari. Est enim in homine nobilissimum in quo cum brutis non communicat. Liberum enim ut liberum commune est, non arctatum, ad bonum honestum, conferens et delectabile, ad tria haec. Ad quorum primum, circa quod virtus bruti appetitus non se extendit sed arctatur ad conferens aut delectabile, etiam liberum ut liberum B 26ra dominium sui habet actus, etiam interioris; quod / bruta non habent, dicente Damasceno quod magis agantur quam agant.[9] Cum etiam dicitur arbitrium, id dictum est ut cognoscat et judicet inter injustum et justum, proprium et alienum, quod non potest brutum primam regulam ignorans justi et injusti nec super se est conversivum. Unde licet brutum ut ovis lupum fugiat et sequatur pastorem, non hoc facit sub ratione honesti, sed solum conferentis aut delectabilis.[10] Et licet in aliqua opposita bruta moveantur[11] ut modo sint benigna modo severa, non tamen nisi in illa quae infra sunt dignitatem liberi arbitrii. Et si cohibeant motum exteriorem, non tamen interiorem nec providentiam deliberationis habent sed instinctus naturales,[12] ut patet in formicis et araneis.[13] Nec si quaedam animalia domari nequeant, est hoc libertatis sed ferocitatis ratione.[14]

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[21] cote *A*.

[22] This seems to be Vaurouillon's own interpretation of *cotus*. St. John Damascene derives it from *keisthai*, which the Renaissance version of the *De fide orthodoxa* (PG 94, 934) renders: id est, eo quod anima reposita sit, since *keimai*, *keisthai*, means "to be laid", "to lie". Actually, *kotos* is derived from *kotaino* or *koteo*, "to bear hatred against someone".

[23] *Supra*, Book II, c. xiii; p. 291.

[24] plures et variae *A*.

[25] *Infra*. c. xv; p. 282.

[1] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xxii; PG 94, 942; cf. John of Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xi-xiv; *ed. cit.*, pp. 239-245. Vaurouillon has changed Rupella's treatment, to undertake immediately the question of the *liberum arbitrium*. Moreover, he makes extensive use of St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 592 ff., with the result that he actually has but little from the work of Damascene. In fine, this chapter proves little more than a summary of the doctrine of Saint Bonaventure.

[2] St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, dub. II: *ed. cit.*, II, p. 608.

[3] Peter Lombard, *Libri IV Sent.*, II, d. 24, c. 3 (Quaracchi, 1916), I, p. 421; from St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia* xi, 32; PL 44, 935.

[4] C. iii; PL 158, 494.

[5] *Om. B.*

[6] C. ii, n. 4; PL 182, 1004.

[7] St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.;* p. 608.

[8] St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, q. 1, fund. 2-4 and *resp.*, *passim; ed. cit.*, II, pp. 592b-593a.

[9] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xxvii; PG 94, 962.

Cum ergo dico liberum arbitrium voluntatem dico et rationem, non quidem tertiam potentiam ab eis distinctam, sed ambas ut possunt prodire in actum.[15] Dicit enim X *De Trinitate* Augustinus: Nihil volitum nisi praecognitum.[16] In parte enim intellectiva solum potentiae sunt secundum Augustinum,[17] memoria, intellectus, et voluntas; et[18] patet ex actibus liberi arbitrii, qui sunt judicare, consentire, et consimiles, qui sunt aut intellectus aut voluntatis. Et si dicatur de illo verbo Bernardi in libro *De libero arbitrio*, de ipso libero arbitrio: Quid similius aeternitati quod non sit aeternitas,[19] ut liberum arbitrium Patri, ratio Filio, voluntas approprietur Spiritui Sancto; dicendum quod non ideo dicit ut sit potentia a voluntate et ratione distincta, sed ex ipsa facilitate operationis
A 49*r* quam notat ex / ambarum unione, potentia autem operandi Patri attribuitur, nisi forsan, ut tangit Doctor Subtilis, libro primo *Operis Anglicani*, quaestione de praxi et practica,[20] triplicem poneremus potentiam juxta tria ad opus[21] necessaria, scilicet posse, scire, velle, ut sciamus ratione, velimus voluntate, exsequamur libero arbitrio. Et patent in lapide
B 26*rb* quodammodo haec tria in descensu deorsum. Intendit enim / descendere, appetit descendere, et potest descendere. Tria sunt: intentio, appetitus, et[22] virtus.

Verius tamen tenetur quod dictum est, ut non sit liberum arbitrium potentia a ratione et voluntate distincta, sed ambas contineat. Quod persuadetur tripliciter.[23] Primo ex nomine; dum dicitur liberum: ecce voluntas; dum arbitrium: ecce[24] ratio. Secundo, ex notificatione; unde Magister, libro secundo, distinctione 25: Liberum arbitrium est liberum de voluntate judicium.[25] Tertio, ex dominio quod habet super triplex bonum et actum suum, ut dictum est; ut sicut ex concursu duorum hominum resultat facilitas ad portandum unum lapidem; aut secundo, sicut ex concursu patris et matris una resultat potestas ad regimen domus; aut tertio, sicut ex manu et oculo una potestas ad scribendum, sic dicendum in proposito. Unde Augustinus in *Libro quinque responsionum* dicit: Cum de libero arbitrio loquimur, non de parte animae loquimur, sed de tota.[26] Nec id obviat quod de Doctore Subtili objectum est. Illa[27] enim potentia de qua loquitur nec dicit rationem nec voluntatem, sed ab eis distinguitur formaliter.

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[10] St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*, ad 1; *ed. cit.*, p. 593b.

[11] *Add.* falso *A*.

[12] naturalis *A*.

[13] St. Bonaventure, *ibid.*, ad 2 & 3.

[14] *Ibid.*, ad 6; p. 594a.

[15] St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, q. 2; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 596b; cf. also his *Breviloquium* II, ix, n. 8; *ed. cit.*, V, p. 227b.

[16] *De Trin.* X, i, n. 2; PL 42, 973: Certe non amari aliquid nisi notum non potest. Cf. also c. ii, n. 4; 974-975; and Lib. XV, xxvii, n. 50; 1097: Nemo vult quod omnino quid vel quale sit nescit.

[17] Cf. *De Trin.* X, xi, n. 18; PL 42, 982; XIV, xii, n. 15; 1048.

[18] ut *B*.

[19] C. ix, 28; PL 182, 1016; cf. St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*, arg. 1-2; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 595a; and the answer, ad 1-3; p. 597a.

[20] *Op. Oxon.* I, prol. q. 4, n. 4; *ed. cit.*, VIII, pp. 197b-198a; cf. also *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 39, n. 14; *ed. cit.*, X, p. 626a; d. 43, n. 3; *ed. cit.*, X, p. 729.

[21] corpus *A*.

[22] *Om. B*.

[23] From St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, q. 3, *resp.*; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 598-599.

[24] *Om. B*.

[25] Peter Lombard, *op. cit.*, II, d. 25, c. 1; *ed. cit.*, I, p. 428. Originally, Boethius, *In libr. Arist. De interpretatione, editio secunda*, III; PL 64, 492.

Unde ultra sequitur quod liberum arbitrium tripliciter dicitur.[28] Primo, potentia dicitur, et haec est ratio et voluntas, et hoc tangit Bernardus in libro *De libero arbitrio*: Tolle liberum arbitrium, et non erit quod salvetur.[29] Secundo, dicit facilitatem ex potentiarum unione, et est veluti habitus. Unde Bernardus in *De libero arbitrio* liberum arbitrium definiens dicit: Liberum arbitrium est habitus animi liber sui.[30] Tertio, dicit respectum aptitudinalem ad actum. Unde Damescenus, *Sententiarum* libro secundo: Anima libero arbitrio appetit, libere judicat, etc.[31] Unde[32] oportet quod ad hos respectum[33] habeat, ad minus aptitudinis.[34] Ex qua distinctione variae eliciuntur opiniones, ut quidem et primi illud potentiam dicant, secundi habitum, tertii actum. Unde et nomina potentiarum hoc[35] habent quod quandoque significant potentiam, quandoque habitum, quandoque actum. Unde intellectus aliquando potentiam, aliquando habitum, aliquando actum signat.[36] Ex quo patet si quid addat *A* 49*v* ad intellectum / et voluntatem liberum arbitrium et qualiter.[37]

Quod autem dicitur synderesim esse potentiam quamdam semper tendentem in bonum simpliciter, et sensualitatem semper in bonum ut nunc, ideo tertiam et mediam ponere oportet quae ad utramque con- *B* 26*va* tingenter se habeat, / de hoc dicetur in sequentibus.[38] Nec liberum arbitrium etsi nobilitatem habeat, tantam habet ex intellectu quantam ex ipsa voluntate, cum voluntas intellectu exstat nobilior. Unde ejus nobilitas ex intellectu incipit sed voluntate consumatur, quod signatur in nomine: arbitrium enim substantivum est, et quasi materiale; liberum vero[39] adjectivum et formale.[40] Et ideo si voluntas non cogitur, nec liberum arbitrium, sed aequaliter reperitur in omnibus in quibus est.[41]

Est tamen notandum quod triplex est libertas: a miseria, a culpa, a coactione. De primis duabus non loquimur, sed de tertia quae a necessitate est.[42] Et sunt in ea tria. Primum a coactione immunitas, et sic aequaliter est in Deo et creatura secundum Bernardum.[43] Secundum excellentiae dignitas, et sic inaequaliter in Creatore et creaturis, sed in creaturis aequaliter secundum Augustinum.[44] Tertium potestas seu facultas, et haec inaequaliter est in creaturis secundum Anselmum.[45] In quibusdam enim cum miseria, in aliis sine miseria, in aliis cum culpa, in aliis sine culpa.

Ex qua divisione primo sequitur quod in libero arbitrio secundum quod liberum arbitrium non cadit mutabilitas.[46] Patet quia cum in Deo sit liberum arbitrium ejusdem rationis cum nostro libero arbitrio, ut potest patere per definitionem de libero arbitrio datam ab Anselmo,[47] sequeretur Deum fore mutabilem. Ex quo sequitur secundo quod licet Deus per suum liberum arbitrium agat contingenter ad extra, non tamen mutabiliter. Quod enim contingenter agat, probatur quia non necessario, quia potest non agere; alioquin de necessitate omnia eveniant,[48] quod non est dicendum. Causa enim prima causante necessario, necesse est causam secundam causare, quae non causat nisi mota a prima. Contingens autem, ut patet II *Perhermenias*,[49] est quod potest esse et non esse. Et patet tamen quod non mutabiliter.[50] Mutari enim, ut dicit Philosophus, est alio modo se habere nunc quam prius.[51] Ab aeterno autem per suum liberum arbitrium se determinavit Deus ad producendum mundum. Ideo prius non erat determinatus ad non producendum aut *A* 50*r* indeterminatus / ad producendum vel non producendum. Ante enim aeternum non est prius.[52]

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[26] sed de tota loquimur *A*. Pseudo-Augustine, *Liber quinque responsionum* (or *Liber Hypognosticorum*) III, v, 7; PL 45, 1624.

[27] Ista *A*.

[28] Based on St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, q. 4; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 600 ff.

[29] C. i, 2; PL 182, 1102.

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xxii; PG 94, 946.

[32] Ex quo *B*.

[33] secundum *A*.

[34] aptitudinis ad minus *B*.

[35] haec *A*.

[36] Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* II, ii, 414a5.

[37] Cf. St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, q. 5: *ed. cit.*, II, p. 603.

[38] Cf. St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, q. 4, arg. 3; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 600; and *infra*, c. xix; p. 300.

[39] *Om. B.*

[40] formaleque *A*, for et formale. St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, q. 6; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 605.

[41] St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 2, q. 1; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 610-611.

[42] *Ibid.*; p. 610.

[43] *Ibid.*; p. 611; St. Bernard, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* iv, 9; PL 182, 1006-1007; v, 15; 1010. See also St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*, fund. 1-2; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 609-610a.

[44] St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*; p. 611a; St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XI, v, 8; PL 42, 990.

[45] *Ibid.*; St. Anselm, *De libero arbitrio* xiv; PL 158, 506.

[46] St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 2, q. 2; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 612.

[47] Cf. *supra*, note 4.

Ex quo ultima et tertio sequitur quod nil prohibet liberum arbitrium ex uno tendere naturaliter aut necessario in actum, ex alio contingenter.[53] Patet hoc quia dicit intellectum, qui est potentia naturalis, et voluntatem, *B* 26*vb* quae contingenter operatur. / Et patet ex hoc quod concedi potest Deum se[54] cognoscere et amare per liberum arbitrium. Unde sequitur quod objectum adaequatum liberi arbitrii nec est verum nec bonum quia utrumque cognosci potest et amari, sed quoddam eis commune, quod dicitur ens in quantum ens, cujus passiones sunt.[55] Et si dicatur quod potentiae distinguuntur per objecta, id est, distingui ostenduntur, dico quod veritatem habet in potentiis organicis de quibus loquitur Aristoteles in II *De anima*,[56] non de intellectu et voluntate quae non sunt organicae sed se habent sicut cognitiva et ejus appetitus. Et tales idem habent objectum, sicut visiva et sua appetitiva colorem. Consimiliter de libero arbitrio censendum[57] est. Haec dicta sunt juxta Anselmi definitionem.[58] Si enim limitare quis vellet liberum arbitrium ad contingens, cum Deus non sit contingens, nec se cognosceret nec amaret libero arbitrio; sed Sanctus sic non accepit. Ex dictis patet malum directe sub libero arbitrio non cadere, bene tamen indirecte, maxime illius qui nullum malum esse permitteret nisi sapientissime ordinaret.[59]

Sic igitur patet quid sit liberum arbitrium, unde nomen veniat, qualiter libertas dividatur, quod subjectum habeat et objectum. Reliqua de ratione, voluntate et libero arbitrio quae Joannes narrat Damascenus omittuntur, quia non apparent magni fructus et sunt multi taedii. Unum dico quod apud Bernardum triplex est libertas: prima libertas consilii, secunda libertas complaciti, tertia libertas arbitrii.[60] Prima magis in ratione, secunda magis in voluntate, tertia in ambabus.—Et tantum de libero arbitrio.

VIII. DE POTENTIIS ANIMAE SECUNDUM PHILOSOPHOS: ET PRIUS DE VEGETATIVA[1]

Excussis quae dicenda erant de potentiis animae primo secundum

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[48] evenient *A*.

[49] Aristotle, *De interpretatione* II, 12, 21b12.

[50] Cf. Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 20; *ed. cit.*, VIII, p. 444; d. 8, q. 5, n. 19; *ed. cit.*, IX, p. 756a.

[51] Aristotle, *Phys.* VI, 10, 241a27; cf. Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* IV, d. 11, q. 1, n. 5; *ed. cit.*, XVII, p. 322.

[52] Cf. Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 39, n. 21; *ed. cit.*, X, pp. 636 ff.

[53] St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 2, q. 2; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 612-613.

[54] *Om. A.*

[55] Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* IV, d. 50, q. 50, q. 6, n. 5; *ed. cit.*, XXI, p. 554.

[56] C. 4, 415a20 ff.

[57] concedendum *B*.

[58] Cf. St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, q. 2, *resp.; ed. cit.*, II, p. 596b: Loquendo autem, etc.

[59] St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 2, q. 3; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 614b.

[60] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* iv, 11; PL 182, 1007; and vii, 21; 1013; cf. St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 2, dub. II; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 625-626.

[1] Title very faint in margin, *s. m. B.*

Augustinum, secundo secundum Joannem Damascenum, nunc tertio de
eis loquendum est secundum philosophorum collegium.[2] Sunt autem
A 50*v* secundum philosophos tres partes animae, quae non dicuntur / partes
integrales quasi unam integrantes animam, ut partes quanti quantum, nec essentiales, ut corpus et anima animatum constituunt, sed sic dicuntur partes quia aliquando contingit unam solam inveniri, non aliam. Sunt autem vegetativa, sensitiva, rationalis. De vegetativa in praesenti capitulo dicendum est, si quid philosophi conformiter ad Sanctos dixerunt seu difformiter.[3] /

B 27*ra* Hanc dividunt philosophi in tres potentias: nutritivam, augmentativam, generativam. Similiter Augustinus, solum quod hanc vocat naturalem quam philosophi vegetativam asserunt,[4] et Damascenus pulsativam.[5] De his tribus, nutritiva, augmentativa, generativa, hi tres, philosophi, Augustinus, Damascenus, quid sint dicunt conformiter.

Generativa, ut dicunt philosophi, si cum suis speciebus sumitur, constituit ternarium. Habet enim seminativam, quae semen ministrat; habet et plasmativam,[6] quae membra format aut plasmat, ut artifex, ex semine, et hoc tripliciter: primo principalia membra, quae sunt, ut narrat Aegidius de Salerno in libro *De pulsibus*,[7] hepar, cor, cerebrum; quoad individuum, haec tria; addit[8] testiculos propter speciem; secundo venas his deservientes, ut arterias cordi, miseraicas hepati, cerebro nervos; tertio, consimilia et officialia membra, ut corpus perficiatur.

Sic nutritiva cum suis viribus ternarium facit; habet enim vires adminiculares, et istae sunt quatuor. Prima, appetitiva, quae attrahit cibum, sicco evacuato interius; unde gignitur esuries; et potum, humido consumpto; unde venit sitis. Secunda, retentiva, quae[9] retinet. Tertia, digestiva, quae impurum a puro segregat. Expulsiva, quae nocivum expellit. Et hae quatuor ad ternarium reducuntur. Prima enim, scilicet attractiva, de extra ponit intus. Ultima vero, scilicet, expulsiva, de intus ponit foras.[10] Aliae operantur interius. De his jam apud Augustinum dictum est.[11]

Habet et nutritiva vires principales, et hae tres sunt: prima mutativa alimenti; secunda assimilativa alimenti ad alitum tripliciter: primo in cambium, secundo in rorem, tertio in gluten; tertia unitiva per humidum, in qua maxime fiunt impressiones.

Tertia autem, quae est principalis, exstat augmentativa, et haec si
A 51*r* recte / ambulat secundum triplicem dimensionem operatur, secundum
longitudinem, scilicet, latitudinem et profunditatem aucti; alioquin non indicatur augmentum ut loquuntur de augmento philosophi. Et certam habet suae operationis periodum, sed non ita nutritiva.

Et in tantum de vegetativa sufficiat secundum philosophorum sententias.[12]

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[2] This chapter is fundamentally a summary of Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xvi ff.; *ed. cit.*, pp. 235 ff.

[3] Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, c. xvii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 246-251.

[4] Cf. *supra*, Book III, c. ii; p. 254.

[5] Cf. *supra*, Book III, c. v; p. 262.

[6] pulsativam *A*.

[7] Prooemium, lines 1-3; ed. L. Choulant, *Aegidii Corboliensis Carmina medica* (Leipzig, 1826), p. 21: Quatuor sunt membra principalia, quibus humani corporis machina firmis basibus et fundamentis roborata consistit, scilicet cerebrum, cor, hepar et testiculi . . . Ideo principalia dicuntur, quia toti corpori dominantur et principantur secundum dispositionem et secundum moderationem virtutem, etc. Cf. *supra*, Book I, c. iii, n. 61; p. 241.

[8] *Om. B.* Cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xvii; *ed. cit.*, p. 247 for this and what follows.

[9] *Add.* tenet seu *A*.

[10] foris *A*.

[11] Cf. *supra*, *Book* III, c. ii; p. 254; and *De spiritu et anima* xx; PL 40, 794-795.

[12] *Om.* secundum philosophorum sententias *A*. The author has omitted the greater part of Rupella's treatment of this subject.

IX. DE SENSIBUS EXTERIORIBUS SECUNDUM PHILOSOPHOS

B 27rb Oportet post haec agere de vi seu potentia sensitiva; in quo triplex occurrit consideratio: prima de potentia sensitiva exteriori, secunda de potentia interiori sensitiva, tertia de sensitiva motiva.[1]

Quoad primum. Sunt quinque sensus exteriores: visus, auditus, odoratus, gustus et tactus, de quibus ex parte mediorum dictum est exponendo mentem Augustini, et ex parte organorum et objectorum opinionem Damasceni declarando;[2] eorumque numerus quinarius ad ternarium reductus est. In praesenti autem ut planior et plenior eorum consideratio habeatur, ex mente philosophorum unus apponetur ternarius, et maxime in homine quo completur.[3]

Primus modus ternarii ex parte finis accipitur.[4] Omnis enim sensus exterior datus hominibus aut primo est ad inveniendam scientiam per se, et sic est sensus visus; aut secundo doctrina per alium, et sic est sensus auditus; aut tertio ad serviendum corpori, et istud fit tripliciter. Corpus enim hominis et animalis nutrimento salvatur. Ad discernendum ergo an nutrimentum sit nocivum an salubre sunt tres sensus, quorum primus judicat in distantia, ut odoratus, per odores; secundus judicat in propinquitate ex primis qualitatibus quae sunt calidum, frigidum, humidum et siccum, ut tactus; tertius judicat secundum qualitates consequentes in propinquitate, ut sunt sapores, et sic est gustus. Et sic patet primus modus ternarii ex parte finis sensuum.[5]

Secundus modus ternarii sumitur ex parte modi sentiendi, qui triplex est. Aut enim sensibile sentitur primo secundum superficiem, et sic est tactus; aut secundo secundum profunditatem, et sic est gustus, dum enim magis cibus frangitur magis sentitur; aut tertio secundum distantiam et istud fit tripliciter: primo dum sensibile solum secundum unam partem, ut secundum rectum, cognoscitur, et sic est visus; aut secundo
A 51v secundum / omnem partem, et[6] sic est auditus; aut tertio secundum plures non tamen omnes partes, et sic est odoratus. Unde odor venit ad odoratum magis secundum expansum motum quam secundum orbem vel rectum. Et sic patet de secundo ternario[7] qui sumptus est ex modo sentiendi.

Tertius modus ternarii sumitur ex nobilitate corporum sensibilium.[8] Est autem triplex corpus, clarum, pervium, opacum. Primo corpus clarum
B 27va sicut / lux aut est quintae essentiae aut verius qualitas corporis quintae essentiae, et sic[9] sensibile determinat visus. Derelinquit enim primo in corpore diaphono aut transparenti lumen; secundo in corpore opaco resistenti splendorem; tertio in corpore mixto colorem. Definitur enim color: Extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato.[10] Aut corpus clarum est elementum primum, scilicet ignis, et est causa odoris. Virtute enim ignis seu caloris est primo[11] odor in odorabili secundum esse reale; secundo in deferente sicut aere, in esse vaporis aut resoluti fumi; tertio in odoratu, secundum esse intentionale.

Secundo, secundum corpus est pervium, in quo habitat rarum et densum; sed si magis rarum, aer est; si magis densum, aqua est; et subjectum est soni quo determinatur auditus, ita quod sonus consideratur secundum triplex esse: primo secundum esse causaliter: sic est in sonante; secundo secundum esse reale: sic est in sonoro; tertio secundum esse intentionale, et sic est in auditu. Unde ultra corpus pervium in quo magis abundat densum quam rarum, cujusmodi est aqua et est elementum, tertium est determinativum objecti gustus, cujusmodi est sapor.

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[1] Cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xviii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 251 ff. However, a clearer indication of this division is had in Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica* I-II, before n. 354; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 430a.

[2] Cf. *supra*, *Book* III, c. ii; p. 254; c. iii; p. 257.

[3] complectitur *A*.

[4] Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, xix; *ed. cit.*, p. 252, from which most of the present chapter is taken.

[5] Cf. Avicenna, *De anima*, p. II, c. 3; *ed cit.*, fols. 7^{vb}-8^{r}; and the *Summa Alexandri* I-II, n. 356; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 433b.

[6] *Om. A.*

[7] ternarii *A*.

[8] Rupella, *ibid.*; pp. 254-255; and Avicenna, *De anima*, p. III, c. 1; *ed. cit.*, fols. 10^{ra} and 10^{va}.

[9] *Om. A.*

[10] Aristotle, *De sensu et sensibili*, c. 3, 439b11.

[11] primo est *A*.

Ubi notandum in proposito quod haec tria differunt: humiditas, humor, humeus. Humiditas enim aquae proprie causa est humoris saporabilis; humor autem commixtus substantiae gustabilis varie varios sapores efficit secundum complexionem saporabilis secundum hoc ternarium: calidae, frigidae vel temperatae; vel hoc ternarium: grossae, subtilis,[12] mediocris; humeum autem, ut saliva, susceptum in lingua spongiosa et perveniens ad instrumentum gustus rationem medii determinat.

Tertio, tertium corpus, opacum scilicet, sensum tactus determinat. Sensibilia enim tactu primo habent esse in sensibilibus extra sicut in
A 52r radice; secundo in / carne in qua maxime terra praeeminet, ideo terra dicitur et terrea, sicut in medio; tertio in organo tactus sicut in termino.

Et sic patet iste ternarius. Cui si jungatur ternarius ex dictis Augus-
B 27vb tini / et Damasceni[13] collectus, quinque sensuum ordo, natura et officium apparebit. Et ista sufficiant.

X. DIVISIO POTENTIARUM[1] SENSITIVARUM INTERIORUM ET DE SENSU COMMUNI

Consequenter est de sensu interiori loquendum, cujus est secundum diversos triplex divisio.[2] Prima est in tres sensus, secunda in quatuor, tertia in quinque.

Prima est Augustini et[3] Damasceni, qui dividunt sensum interiorem in tres sensus secundum tres cellulas aut tres partes capitis, sinciput, interciput, occiput. Et sunt: prima imaginativa seu phantastica; secunda, excogitativa vel rationalis vel judicativa; tertia, memorativa.[4] Et de hoc[5] satis fuit dictum tangendo opiniones ipsorum in divisione potentiarum animae.[6]

Secunda divisio est in quatuor sensus, et est Averrois in libro *De sensu et sensato*.[7] Et sunt secundum eum: sensus communis, imaginativa, cogitativa, memorativa.[8] Sed quia ista patebunt in quinario, ideo venit tertia divisio, quae est in quinque membra et est Avicennae.[9] Quae sunt: sensus communis, imaginatio, imaginativa, aestimativa, memorialis. Haec autem divisio tractanda est per singula; per quam duae praecedentes palam erunt.

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[12] subtilis grossae *B*.

[13] Cf. note 2 *supra;* Vaurouillon omits much of Rupella's doctrine; e.g., *de objecto sensuum* (*Summa de anima* II, xxii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 257 ff.).

[1] *Om. B.*

[2] Taken, it would seem, from Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica* I-II, before n. 357: *ed. cit.*, II, p. 434; though there is no mention of the second division, that of Averroes. Very little is to be found in Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxiii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 260 ff. See also note 10, *infra.*

[3] *Add.* Joannis *A.*

[4] memoria *A.*

[5] hoc modo *B for* de hoc.

[6] Cf. *supra*, Book III, c. ii; p. 254; c. iii; p. 257.

[7] Cf. Averroes, *De memoria et reminiscentia* VI (Venice, 1574), p. 2, fol. 210H; in the *De sensu et sensibilibus, ibid.*, fol. 16HI, he speaks only of the *sensus communis* and the *vis imaginativa.* Vaurouillon could have obtained this faulty reference from Averroes himself, who in III *De anima*, text 6; *ed. cit.*, VI, 1-2; fol. 154AB, refers the reader to *De sensu et sensato* for all the interior senses. The editors correct the reference in the margin, to *De memoria et reminiscentia.*

[8] memoria *A.*

[9] Cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxiii; *ed. cit.*, p. 261; and Avicenna, *De anima*, p. I, c. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 5^{rb}; and p. IV, c. 1; fol. 17^{va}.

Primum membrum est sensus communis. Cujus necessitas est, ut inquit beatus Thomas in tractatu quem de sensu communi edidit,[10] quia ex quo sensibilis cognitio communicata est omnibus sensibus oportet esse unum fontem unde illa communicabilitas oriatur, et hic fons est sensus communis.[11] Sed revera haec ratio modicum cogit. Videmus enim, ut inquit frater Nicolaus Boneti in sua subtili *Metaphysica*,[12] quod primae et ultimae differentiae sunt simpliciter simplices et tamen distinguibilitates habent ejusdem rationis. Et si dicatur quod dictum Thomae sumi videtur[13] ex I *Posteriorum*, ubi[14] ostendit Philosophus quod demonstrationes augentur in post assumendo et illatus, sicut per rationem hominis ostenditur risibilitas de omnibus hominibus; dicendum quod intendit Philosophus de incluso quidditative in suis inferioribus, cujusmodi non est sensus communis. Bene tamen concedo quod est fons sensuum
B 28*ra* particularium, / sed ratio[15] non cogit. Unde necessitas ejus ex actu /
A 52*v* vel actibus ejus accipitur sicut patet per Philosophum, II *De anima*.[16]

Unde notandum quod tres actus habet.[17] Primus est quod species rerum recipit sine materia etiam praesente materia, et per hunc non ostenditur ejus necessitas cum aliis etiam exterioribus conveniat sensibus. Secundus actus ejus est judicium de sensuum particularium operationibus. Hoc enim sensu dum videmus apprehendimus nos videre et audire dum audimus. Unde dicimus: Audio quod video et video quod audio. Tertius actus ejus est discretio seu discernere inter objecta diversorum sensuum, ut inter sonum et colorem, quod nullus exteriorum sensuum particularium posset. Et ex his duobus actibus ejus ostenditur necessitas.[18]

Definitur autem tripliciter. Primo secundum Avicennam:

> Sensus communis est vis ordinata in prima concavitate cerebri recipiens per seipsam formas omnes quae imprimuntur quinque sensibus et redduntur ei.[19]

Secunda definitio ejus secundum eumdem: Sensus communis est virtus cui redduntur omnia sensata.[20] Tertia definitio est Algazelis in *Physica* sua: Sensus communis est sensus a quo omnes proprii derivantur, et ad quem impressio eorum renuntiatur.[21]

Prima definitio est data per respectum ad locum et subjectum. Secunda per respectum ad objectum. Tertia per respectum ad effectum et finem.

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[10] Because of the problem involved here (cf. Introduction, *supra*, p. 248), all references to this tract and that on the interior senses (chapters xi, xiii, xiv, *infra*) will include both the *Summa de creaturis* and, as far as the text allows, the tract ascribed by Monsignor Geyer to Albert of Orlamünde (B. Geyer, *Die Albert dem Grossen zugeschriebene Summa naturalium* [*Philosophia Pauperum*], *BGPTMA*, XXXV, Heft 1, 38*-62*).

[11] St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 35, a. 2; ed. Borgnet, XXXV, p. 313b; this is not found in the published text of the tract *De potentiis animae* edited by Mons. Geyer.

[12] C. III, *De distinctione formali* (Venice, 1505), fol. 20^{ra}: Decem genera et omnia in ipsis per se inclusa necessario formaliter sunt distincta; omnes etiam differentiae ejusdem generis sive oppositae sive subalternae formaliter distinguuntur cum omnes, ut supra fuit dictum, habeant conceptum simpliciter simplicem et omnes species ejusdem praedicamenti: ut substantiae vel qualitatis quae non habent idem genus subalternum proximum: quia tales habent diversas definitiones et quiditates per se inclusas quae invicem sunt distinctae. Cf. also C. V, *De modis intrinsecis*, *ibid.*, fol. 20^{vb}: . . . sicut nec modi intrinseci variant rationem formalem: sicut sunt differentiae accidentales vel passiones: sicut masculus et femella, homo albus et niger sunt ejusdem rationis.

[13] videtur sumi *A*.

[14] Cf. Aristotle, *Analyt. Post.* I, 1, 71a11 ff.

[15] ideo *A*.

[16] Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* III, 2, 425b12 ff.; and *De somno et vigilia* II, 455a13 ff.

[17] St. Albert, *loc. cit.;* p. 310; *De potentiis animae* vi; *ed. cit.*, p. 52*, lines 18 ff. However, the first act, as explained by Vaurouillon, is not found in the latter treatise.

[18] Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* III, 2, 426b22 ff.

[19] *De anima*, p. 1, c. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 5^{rb}.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. IV, c. 1; *ed. cit.*, fol. 17^{rb}.

[21] *Metaphysics*, p. II, tr. IV, 4 (Toronto, 1933), p. 169. These three definitions are to be found in St. Albert, *loc. cit.;* p. 310a, but not in the *De potentiis animae* ascribed to Albert of Orlamünde.

Est autem primo notandum quod sensus communis primo non dicitur communis ad modum universalis, quia non praedicatur de sensibus particularibus;[22] nec secundo ad modum totius integralis, quia non constituitur ex eis; sed communitate triplici: prima communitate objecti, quia omnia sentit sensibilia; secunda, quia magnitudo qua per se immutatur subjectum est omnium sensibilium; tertia, quia omnes sensus proprii ab eo ut a fonte prodeunt et ad ipsum ut ad centrum referuntur, etiam, inquit Avicenna,[23] cum lucro, quia quilibet aliquid sibi[24] praesentat ut visus colorem, auditus sonum, et sic de aliis.

Secundo notandum quod ideo in prima concavitate capitis est quia mollior et facile impressiones suscipit.[25] Tertio notandum quod sensibilia communia, quae sunt quinque: numerus, motus, quies, magnitudo, et figura, aut quae reducuntur ad ipsa, sicut situs, locus, tempus, asperum,
B 28rb lene, et cetera,[26] non dicuntur communia solum / primo quia sunt[27]
A 53r objecta sensus communis, sed / vel secundo quia ab omnibus sentiuntur sensibus particularibus, ut motus, quies et numerus, vel a pluribus, ut magnitudo et figura a visu et tactu, et sic triplicem sui nominis[28] habet rationem.

XI. DE IMAGINATIONE ET IMAGINATIVA[1]

De sequentibus interioribus ad communem sensum sensibus, imaginatione et imaginativa, novum et per se fiet capitulum ut melius capiatur.[2]

Potentia autem sensum sequens communem imaginatio est. Sequar autem in his magna in parte Sanctum Thomam in tractatu quem edidit de potentiis animae interioribus.[3] Ubi primo hanc occurrit potentiam tripliciter nominari.[4] Primo, imaginatio dicitur quia retinet sensibilium imagines, imaginibus abeuntibus ab organis communis sensus et proprii. Unde haec vis sita est proxime post sensum communem.[5] Secundo, dicitur formalis[6] eo quod formalius habet illa[7] imagines quam sensus, quia sensus aut proprius aut communis solum habet eas praesente materia; ideo quodammodo possunt dici materiales. Imaginatio autem, etiam non praesente materia; ideo dicitur formalis. Tertio, dicitur ab Augustino[8] spiritus propter naturam illarum imaginum quia illae sunt secundum esse spirituale in virtute imaginativa, licet sint imagines corporum.

Definitur autem tripliciter.[9] Primo, ab Augustino sic: Imaginatio est vis quaedam mente inferior cui rerum imagines imprimuntur.[10] Secundo, ab Algazele sic, et accipit[11] imaginativam pro imaginatione:[12] Imaginativa est virtus ejus quod impressum fuit sensui communi retentiva.[13] Tertio, ab Avicenna sic:

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[22] St. Albert, *loc. cit.;* p. 312b; not in the *De potentiis.*

[23] *De anima*, p. IV, c. 1; *ed. cit.*, fols. 17^{rb} and 17^{va}.

[24] sibi aliquid *A.*

[25] suscipit impressiones *A.* Cf. St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 35, a. 3; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 314b; and Avicenna, *De anima*, p. V, c. 8; *ed. cit.*, fol. 28^{va}.

[26] Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* III, 1, 424a15 ff.

[27] sint *A.*

[28] sui nominis triplicem *A.*

[1] Aestimativa *A.*

[2] Treated by Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxiii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 262-263; but beyond the topic, this work is not used here.

[3] Cf. the Introduction, *supra*, p. 248.

[4] St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 37, a. 1; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 324a; to some extent, the subject is treated in the *De potentiis animae*; *ed. cit.*, p. 53*.

[5] According to Avicenna, *De anima*, p. I, c. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 5^{rb}; St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, xvii; PG 94, 934; and Pseudo-Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* xxii; PL 40, 795.

[6] formaliter *B.*

[7] illas *A.*

[8] Cf. *De spiritu et anima* xi; PL 40, 786; xxiv; 797; and xxxiii; 802-803.

[9] Cf. St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 37, a. 1; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 324a; the definitions are not found in B. Geyer's edition of the *De potentiis animae.*

[10] According to St. Albert, *loc. cit.*, this is to be found in *De Genesi ad litteram;* the closest reference in this work seems to be Lib. XII, xxiii, 49; PL 34, 473. Cf. also *De spiritu et anima* xi; PL 40, 786; and xxxviii; 808.

[11] accepit *B.*

[12] *Add.* Imaginatio seu *A.*

> Formam sensibilem retinet illa virtus quae vocatur formalis et imaginatio; et non discernit illam ullo modo nisi quia tantummodo retinet.[14]

Et licet memoria retineat sicut imaginatio, non tamen eodem modo.[15] Primo, quia imaginatio retinet sine differentia temporis, sed memoria cum differentia temporis, scilicet praeteriti. Secundo, quia imaginatio retinet recepta a sensibus tantum secundum quod vere in sensu fuerunt; memoria vero retinet maxime intentiones quae numquam in sensu
A 53*v* fuerunt elicitas per aestimationem. Tertio, quia / imaginatio est in parte capitis anteriori, memoria in posteriori.

B 28*va* Quod autem imaginatio, ut dicit Avicenna, dicitur retinere / et non discernere, sic intelligitur. Capiantur tres potentiae: sensus communis, imaginatio, et[16] phantasia. Sensus communis discernit comparando sensata propria inter se et propria cum communibus, et hoc re praesente. Phantasia autem componit et dividit imagines inter se, ut patebit in loco suo.[17] Imaginatio vero neutrum habet, sed retinet solum.

Est autem imaginationis objectum imaginabile. Unde Gregorius Nyssenus: Imaginabile est quod facit passionem in imaginativo.[18] Unde sciendum ultra pro organo imaginationis, quod prima pars cerebri habet habet dividi in tres partes: in primam quae immediate nervis sensuum particularium conjungitur, et ibi est sensus communis, et est multum humida: ideo facile suscipit sed non retinet, sicut patet in aqua; et in mediam quae non sic abundat humido sed aliquantulum est terminata per siccum, ut sit melius retentiva et ibi est organum imaginationis, cujus est retinere formas re non praesente, et hoc est virtute sicci terminantis humidum; in tertia parte primae partis sita est phantasia et aestimativa, ut dicit Constabulus.[19]

Et imaginari proprius actus est imaginationis,[20] sicut intellectus actus est intelligere, nec in potestate nostra est nisi phantasia juncta, quomodo loquitur in principio III *De anima* Philosophus: Imaginari est in nobis quando volumus.[21] Praeter autem illam praeparationem quam praeparat[22] imaginatio potentiae superiori ut intelligentiae, ut patet in mathematicis, praeparat primo viam phantasiae et aestimationi, ut patet de aestimativa in intentionibus insensatis inimicitiae inter lupum et ovem, et amicitiae inter[23] ovem et pastorem, quae fundantur in imaginatione aut imaginibus.[24] Secundo servit memoriae quando per imaginationem aut imagines praeparatas in anima recursus est in rem quae accepta fuit in praeterito per sensus. Tertio servit sensui communi quando refluunt imagines in organum sensus communis, et sic deservit revelationi quae est in somniis. Hanc vocat Augustinus phantasticam, Damascenus imaginationem, ut patuit superius.[25]

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[13] Cf. St. Albert, *loc. cit.;* p. 323; and Algazel, *Metaphysics*, p. II, tr. IV, 4; *ed. cit.*, pp. 169-170.

[14] *De anima*, p. IV, c. 1; *ed. cit.*, fol. 17^{va}.

[15] Cf. St. Albert, *loc. cit.;* p. 325a.

[16] *Om. B.*

[17] *Infra*, p. 275.

[18] That is, Nemesius, *De natura hominis* vi; PG 40, 634; quoted by St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 37, a. 2; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 326b. For what follows, cf. *ibid.*, a. 3; p. 328a. None of this matter is in the edition of the *De potentiis animae.*

[19] *De differentia animae et spiritus*, c. 2 (Bibliotheca philosophorum mediae aetatis, herausg. von C. S. Barach, II [Innsbruck, 1878], pp. 124-126). Quoted by St. Albert, *loc. cit.*, art. 2; p. 327.

[20] See St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 37, a. 4; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, pp. 328-329.

[21] C. 3, 427b17.

[22] *Add.* illa *A.*

[23] pariter *A.*

[24] imaginalibus *A.*

[25] superius patuit *A.* Cf. *supra*, Book III, c. ii; 255; and c. iii; p. 259.

A 54r Post imaginationem phantasia sequitur.[26] / Solet autem tripliciter phantasia
dici et definiri. Primo large, secundum quod comprehendit imaginationem
et phantasiam proprie sumptam. Et hoc modo loquitur Philosophus
B 28vb in *De anima*; / phantasiam definiens dicit:[27] Phantasia est motus a
sensu secundum actum factus.[28] Et debet sumi motus non formaliter sed materialiter pro potentia mota quae speciem sensibilem a sensu recipit, et in hoc sortitur rationem imaginis; et movetur circa eam motu discretionis et judicii, et in hoc habet rationem phantasiae proprie sumptae. Movetur autem a quolibet sensu particulari mediate sed a solo sensu communi immediate.

Secundo dicitur stricte phantasia potentia collativa imaginum per compositionem et divisionem. Et sic definit eam Algazel:

> Phantasia est virtus quae operatur componendo et dividendo, quandoque in his quae sunt in arca formarum, quandoque in his quae sunt in arca intentionum.[29]

Vocat autem arcam formarum imaginationem quia ibi custodiuntur species sensibiles. Vocat autem arcam intentionum memoriam quia in ea custodiuntur intentiones non sensatae, ut amicitia, inimicitia,[30] et cetera.

Tertio dicitur phantasia improprie objectum phantasiae, et sic dicit Philosophus in *De anima*[31] quod contingit phantasiam esse aliquando veram, aliquando falsam; vel actus ejus; et hoc modo definit phantasiam Huguccio: Phantasia est imago alicujus corporis visa cogitando postea figurata.[32] Et hoc modo, quando dicit Philosophus quod phantasia est motus factus a sensu secundum actum, potest motus capi formaliter pro actu aut objective pro objecto.

Unde notandum quod hoc nomen phantasia descendit, secundum Adam Britonis,[33] ab ista[34] dictione graeca, *fasmos*, quod in graeco idem est quod apparitio, et dicit quod ista tria idem significant: *fasma, fantasma,* et *fantasia,*[35] et tunc debet scribi per *f*, non per *p*. Secunda opinio est quod descendit ab ista dictione graeca: *phanes,* sicut *epiphania,* et est idem quod apparitio, et tunc debet scribi per *p,* et non per *f*. Tertia opinio est quod descendit a fannis, qui sunt ficti homines; vel a fanum, -ni, quod delubrum est daemonum, et hi etiam per *f* scribuntur, et sic fantasia.

Et notandum est quod haec potentia tria habet nomina. Dicitur primo
A 54v imaginativa; dicitur secundo / cogitativa; dicitur tertio phantastica.[36]
Primo dicitur imaginativa; non enim est imaginandum, licet nomina sint vicina, quod eadem sit potentia imaginatio et imaginativa. Imaginatio enim imagines non efficit, sed recipit ut dictum est. Imaginativa autem plus efficit imagines quam suscipiat imagines. Non dico, efficit simpliciter,
B 29ra sed componendo / et dividendo, ut verbi gratia: in imaginatione est
imago auri et imago montis, quae sunt simplices imagines; has attendens phantasia fabricat montem aureum et sic componit.[37] Secundo, in imagina-

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[26] St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 38, a. 1; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, pp. 330-331; and *De potentiis animae; ed. cit.*, p. 54*, for some parallelism.

[27] *Om. A.*

[28] *De anima* III, 3, 429a2.

[29] *Metaphysics*, p. II, tr. IV, 4; *ed. cit.*, p. 170. lines 17 ff.; cited by St. Albert, *loc. cit.*; p. 330a.

[30] inimicitia, amicitia *B*.

[31] *De anima* III, 3, 428a1 ff.

[32] Cf. M. Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters* III (*München*, 1911-1931), pp. 191-193. Hugutio (late twelfth century) wrote a *Liber derivationum*, as yet unprinted, from which I would judge this definition is taken.

[33] Unidentified; he may be Adam du Petit-Pont. Cf. M. Manitius, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 202-204; and G. Mollat, 'Adam du Petit-Pont', *DHGE*, I, 490.

[34] illa *A*.

[35] fantasia et fantasma *A*.

[36] phantasia *A*.

[37] Cf. Avicenna, *De anima*, p. IV, c. 1; *ed. cit.*, fol. 17^{va}.

tione est imago hominis quam perpendens phantasia dividit ut phantasiet hominem sine pedibus, manibus aut capite.

Unde imaginatio passiva est, imaginativa activa. Et ita componere et dividere imagines in imaginatione sitas, est proprium imaginativae opus, licet Thomas dicat[38] quod opus ejus etiam est intentiones non sensatas elicere, ut amicitiam et inimicitiam, in hoc Algazelem de arca duplici imitatus, ut alicui videretur. Sed hoc, ut de aestimativa videbitur,[39] aestimativae est officium. Nec hoc Algazel dicit, sed dicit quod componit et dividit ea quae sunt in arca intentionum, sicut ea quae sunt in arca imaginationis. Unde tertio dicitur quod imaginativa est illa potentia *qui fait les chateaux*[40] *en Espaigne.*[41]

Dicitur secundo cogitativa, ut Avicennae placuit, ut deservit imperanti intellectui.[42]

Dicitur tertio phantastica[43] ex miris apparitionibus. Quo autem sit sedes phantasiae in imaginatione dictum est. Ex quibus quid sit ejus objectum satis patet. Nil enim prohibet diversas potentias super eodem objecto operari sed varie: ut visus videt colorem quem communis sensus a sono distinguit, sic[44] imaginatio recipit imagines quas imaginativa aut componit aut dividit virtute subtilis spiritus.[45]

Quomodo autem corrumpatur[46] phantasia dicendum est tripliciter. Primo, ratione corruptionis anterioris partis capitis, sicut in multis contingit infirmitatibus. Secundo, ex improportione phantasiae ad communem sensum aut imaginationem. Tertio, quando plus adhaeret per phantasiam phantasticus suis phantasmatibus quam obediat rationi.[47] Unde notandum quod aliquando fit corruptio in anteriori parte capitis, et tunc laeditur phantasia. Secundo in posteriori, et laeditur memoria. /
A 55*r* Tertio in parte media, et tunc fit debilitatio cogitationis et rationis.[48]

XII. DE SOMNIIS

Ut ex toto imaginationis et imaginativae perfectior habeatur notitia, somniorum brevissimum apponetur capitulum, quoniam ex his saepius prodeunt. Primo secundum Augustinum; secundo secundum Hieronymum; tertio secundum Averroem.[1]

Quoad primum. Dicit Augustinus in libro *De anima et spiritu*, et idem
B 29*rb* habet Ambrosius Macrobius, *Super Somnium Scipionis* / libro primo: Omnium, quae sibi videntur videre dormientes, quinque sunt genera: oraculum, visio, somnium,[2] insomnium, phantasma.[3] Qui quidem quinarius ad ternarium reducitur. Aut enim primo videtur verum aut secundo falsum aut tertio in actu fit deceptio. Si primo modo, tripliciter: primo

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[38] Rather, St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 37, a. 1, solut. (in fine) and ad 1; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 325a. Cf. also Avicenna, *loc. cit.* There is no parallel in the *De potentiis animae*; *ed. cit.*, p. 54*.

[39] Cf. *infra*, c. xiii; p. 278.

[40] chasteaulx *A*.

[41] This simile is found in the *De potentiis animae* vi; *ed. cit.*, p. 54*, lines 5ff.: Imaginativa sive formativa est componens speciem cum specie et ista facit castra in Hispania et fingit chimaeras sive hircocervos. Cf. also Guillaume de Lorris, *Le Roman de la Rose* (publié par E. Langlois, Société des anciens textes francais, 1920) II, p. 124, line 2442: Lors feras chastiaus en Espaigne.

[42] Avicenna, *De anima*, p. IV, c. 1; *ed. cit.*, fol. 17va.

[43] phantasia *A*.

[44] sicut *A*.

[45] Cf. St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 38, a. 2, sol.; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 332b.

[46] corrumpitur *A*.

[47] St. Albert, *loc. cit.*, a. 5; p. 335a.

[48] Cf. Avicenna, *De anima*, p. IV, c. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 18^{rb}.

[1] The exposition of St. Augustine and St. Jerome (see note 11, *infra*) is taken from Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxv; *ed. cit.*, pp. 264-267.

[2] somnium, visio *B*.

[3] Pseudo-Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* xxv; PL 40, 798; Macrobius, *Comment. in Somn. Scipionis* I, iii, 2-4; ed. F. Eyssenhardt, *Macrobius* (Leipzig, 1893), p. 484.

modo dum tectum videtur, et[4] sic est somnium in quo velata apparet veritas; secundo modo ut sicut in dormiendo apparet sic simpliciter videtur, et sic est visio; aut tertio cum admiratione aut manifestatione alicujus venerabilis personae manifeste apparet et sic est oraculum.

Si secundo modo principaliter quod videtur falsum sit, sic est insomnium, et aliquando fit ex infirmitate ut sanguinei rubea, cholerici ignea, phlegmatici aquea, melancholici nigra somniant; aliquando exercitatione operis; aliquando et tertio meditatione intentionis. Unde Cato:

Somnia ne cures, nam mens humana quod optat,
dum vigilat sperat, per somnum cernit idipsum.[5]

Quod Cato dicit somnia Augustinus dicit insomnia.

Aut tertio principaliter in actu fit deceptio, et sic est phantasma. Est enim in proposito phantasma quando dormire vix aliquis coepit et adhuc vigilare aestimat se et aspicere videtur irruentes in se et passim vagantes formas[6] discrepantes et varias, laetas et turbulentas. In hoc genere est phialtes[7] quem publica persuasio quiescentes opinatur invadere et pondere suo pressos ac sentientes [gravare].[8] Quod non est aliud nisi[9] quaedam fumositas a stomacho et a corde ad cerebrum ascendens, et ibi vim animalem comprimens. Haec secundum Augustinum et Macrobium.[10]

Secundo sumitur somniorum divisio secundum beatum Hieronymum *A 55v* super secundum capitulum / Danielis, in quo dicit sic: Sex sunt genera vel maneries somniorum.[11] Et ita sunt tres binarii somniorum secundum eum. Duo sunt quae nemo sanctus vitare potest: primum ex nimia ventris exinanitione, secundum ex nimia ingurgitatione. Ecce primus binarius. Tertium ex illusionibus nocturnis, quartum ex praevia[12] cogitatione, illusione secuta. En secundus binarius. Quintum per revelationem Sancti Spiritus, quae multis modis fit;[13] sextum ex curis praemissis ad caput nostrum Christum vel ecclesiam vel membra pertinentibus revelatione subsecuta. Ecce tertius binarius.

Quorum sufficientia ex causis sumitur somnii,[14] et est triplex: prima *B 29va* ex parte corporis nostri, et est duplex: aut primo / exinanitione aut secundo ex superfluitate. Ecce primus binarius. Aut secundo ex parte mentis nostrae, et est duplex: aut primo ex parte cognitivae, et sic accidit ex cogitatione praemissa; aut secundo ex parte affectivae, et sic accidit ex cura. En secundus binarius. Aut tertio causa est extra nos, et est duplex: aut primo ex[15] substantiae malae spiritualis operatione, quae est diabolus, quae est illusio, et sic est somnium ex illusione; aut secundo ex operatione substantiae bonae spiritualis, et sic dicitur fieri per revelationem. En tertius binarius. Unde Matthaei primo scriptum est: *Angelus Domini apparuit in somniis Joseph*;[16] et Joelis secundo scribitur: *Juvenes vestri visiones videbunt et seniores vestri somnia somniabunt*,[17] quod nihil aliud est quam in virtute imaginationis rerum imagines imprimere, et per has ad occultorum cognitionem elevare; quod non solum bonus sed malus potest facere spiritus, sed bonus docendo, malus seducendo. Implere tamen mentem vel animam sola potest gloriosa Trinitas, quam si Satanas aliquando implevisse legitur, allective per tales formas intelligatur, sicut patet in speculis in quibus ex viso objecto nonnumquam aliquae maculae imprimuntur. Haec in magna parte secundum Hieronymum.

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[4] *Om. A.*

[5] *Catonis Disticha* II, 31; ed. J. W. Duff, *Minor Latin Poets* (Loeb Classical Library, London, 1934), p. 608.

[6] formis *mss.*; formas adopted from *De spiritu et anima.*

[7] ephialtes, *De spiritu et anima, loc. cit.*; epialtes, Macrobius, *op. cit.*, I, iii, 7; *ed. cit.*, p. 485.

[8] Added from *De spiritu et anima*; most of this paragraph is found almost verbatim in this work.

[9] quam *B.*

[10] Cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxv; *ed. cit.*, pp. 264-265. Macrobius is not mentioned in the printed text of the *Summa.*

[11] Actually, Saint Gregory the Great, *Dialog.* IV, xlviii; PL 77, 410. Cf. St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 52; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 44b; and Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, xxv; *ed. cit.*, p. 265, where the edition has *Leo* in place of *Hieronymus!* There is nothing on the subject in St. Jerome, *Comm. in Daniel* II; PL 25, 498 ff.

[12] prima *A.*

[13] fit multis modis *A.*

[14] somnii sumitur *A.* Cf. Rupella, *loc. cit.*

[15] *Add.* parte *B.*

[16] *Matthew* i, 20: *Ecce Angelus Domini apparuit ei in somnis.*

[17] *Joel* ii, 28: *Senes vestri somnia somniabunt, et juvenes vestri visiones videbunt.*

Tertio sumitur somniorum divisio secundum Averroem, in libro *De somno et vigilia.*[18] Ubi primo notandum quod haec tria differunt: somnus, somnium, divinatio, secundum quae tria liber *De somno et vigilia* in tres libellos parvos dividitur, quorum primus est de somno, secundus de somnio, tertius de divinatione.

A 56*r* Somnus autem / est quies animalium virtutum cum intensione naturalium.[19] Et triplici de causa accidit somnus privans vigiliam. Est enim vigilia, ut inquit Avicenna, dispositio in qua anima imperat sensibus et virtutibus moventibus exterius voluntarie, quibus non est necessitas,[20] ita quod vigilia est ab intus extra. Somnus autem ab extra intus, et differt a sopore ut notat Albertus Magnus, secunda parte *Summae*, de sopore Adae,[21] quia sopor gravedinem ad somnum addit. Quod probat ex *B* 29*vb* illo quod Jonae dictum est, Jonae primo: *Quid / tu sopore deprimeris?*[22] Est ergo triplici causa somnus:[23] primo propter lassitudinem spiritus animalis, qui intus redit ut quiescat; secundo propter sollicitudinem, calor enim solliciti humores capitis resolvit, qui somnum ingerunt nisi calor sit nimius qui desiccet; tertio propter cibi sumptionem seu potus: calor extra expansus intus repanditur ut perfecta digestio compleatur.

Somnium autem est passio somni. Et differunt haec tria, ut Averroes narrat aliquos dixisse, ubi supra, somnium, divinatio, prophetia. Unde haec sunt verba ejus: Dicunt enim quod somnia sunt ab angelis et divinationes a daemonibus, et prophetiae a Deo.[24] Sed tunc multum arctatur somnium. Unde ultra notandum secundum eum quoddam ternarium: Quidam enim somniant et[25] sunt primi, sed interpretari nesciunt, ut, inquit, patet in Pharaone et Joseph.[26] Pharao fuit somnians; Joseph interpres somnii. Secundi interpretantur somnia quae non somniant, ut Joseph, et hi, inquit, debent esse mundi, non declinantes ad mores brutae animae.[27] Tertii autem somniant et somnium suum ipsimet interpretantur aut immediate aut per aliud somnium. Unde dicit sic:

> Et forte accidit homini ut unum somnium interpretetur in alio somnio, quod narravit Aristoteles. Somniavit somnium quod nullus scivit interpretari, et cum dormivit interpretatum fuit ei et remansit sollicitus in hoc quousque acciderint illae res.[28]

Et[29] tantum de somniis, ut melius imaginationis et imaginativae cognoscatur officium.

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[18] *Ed. cit.*, VI, p. 2, fols. 31-37.

[19] This definition is not found in Averroes. Cf. *supra*, Book I, c. iii, n. 58; p. 241.

[20] *De anima*, p. IV, c. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 19ra.

[21] St. Albert, *Summa theologiae* II, tr. 13, q. 80, m. 3, q^a 3; *ed. cit.*, XXXIII, pp. 118a and 120a: Sopor (est) gravis somnus et depressivus . . . Sopor sine dubio profundus somnus est.

[22] *Jonas* i, 6.

[23] Cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxiv; *ed. cit.*, pp. 263-264.

[24] *De somno et vigilia; ed. cit.*, fol. 34A; an exact quotation.

[25] ut *B*.

[26] Averroes, *ibid.;* fol. 36C-D.

[27] animae brutae *A*.

[28] Averroes, *ibid.;* fol. 36E, an exact quotation, except for the omission of one phrase: in alio somnio: *sicut accidit Herculi regi in somnio*, quod narravit, etc. Averroes gives no reference for the experience of King Hercules; and I have not located it in any of the Philosopher's works.

[29] *Add.* in *B*.

XIII. DE AESTIMATIVA

Sensus quartus interior aestimativa occurrit. Ubi primo occurrit ejus *A* 56*v* definitio triplex.[1] Prima est / Avicennae:

> Aestimativa est vis ordinata in summo concavitatis mediae cerebri apprehendens intentiones sensibilium sicut [est vis] in ove dijudicans quod a lupo est fugiendum, et cum hoc[2] agno habitandum.[3]

Et est haec virtus transcendens. Apprehensio enim sua non est formarum sensibilium et materialium, sed immaterialium. Bonitas enim et malitia, *B* 30*ra* conveniens et nocivum, utile et inutile inter se / non sunt materiales nec cadentes in sensu exteriori. Sunt tamen accidentia sensibilium et ideo dicuntur intentiones sensibilium. Unde merito haec virtus in supremo capitis collocatur ut regina.

Secunda est Algazelis: Aestimativa est virtus apprehendens de sensato quod non est sensatum.[4] Et dicit Thomas quod circa idem operantur phantasia et aestimativa, sed phantasia speculative, aestimativa practice, id est, ad fugam aut prosecutionem.[5] Et idem habent organum, ut sit phantasia inferius, aestimativa superius. Quod tamen phantasia circa intentiones operatur,[6] glossandum est: componendo et dividendo, ut dictum est.[7]

Tertia definitio est beati Thomae: Aestimativa est virtus sequens phantasiam determinans electionem vel fugam in intentionibus apprehensis;[8] quae, inquam, intentiones conjunctae sunt compositioni et divisioni phantasmatum, non tamen a sensibus sunt acceptae. Et licet in habentibus rationem haec tria, inquisitio, disputatio, praeoptio, sententiam praecedant de prosequendo aut fugiendo, non oportet tamen in brutis cum impetu agant naturae, et magis agantur quam agant.[9]

Secundo notandum quod apud Augustinum haec aestimativa trinomia est: dicitur rationalis, dicitur secundo judicativa, dicitur tertio excogitativa. Apud autem Damascenum dicitur opinio, et ratio nominum in locis suis declarata fuit.[10]

Tertio notandum quod secundum fratrem Joannem de Rupella, aestimatio nocivorum aut utilium tribus modis fit. Primus est ex cautela naturali, sicut accidit puero qui cum elevatur ad standum et aestimat cadere, statim adhaeret alicui, et sicut ovis timet lupum naturaliter, leonem animalia, aves accipitrem.[11] Secundus modus est per experientiam;[12] sicut poeta dicit:

> Excauturizantes laesus abhorret aquas.[13]

Tertius modus est per modum similitudinis, sicut dum pomum croceum videmus maturum aestimamus et dulce, cujus tamen nec maturitatem nec dulcedinem tangimus.—Et tantum[14] de aestimativa.[15] /

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[1] Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxvi; *ed. cit.*, p. 267, contains the first definition only; the matter of this chapter is drawn mainly from the *De potentiis animae* (cf. chapter x, note 10; *supra*, p. 271); the edition of B. Geyer contains only a dozen lines on the topic (*ed. cit.*, p. 55*).

[2] *Om. A.*

[3] *De anima*, p. I, c. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 5^{rb}; the explanation that follows is from Rupella; the words in brackets are supplied from Avicenna.

[4] *Metaphysics*, p. II, tr. IV, 4; *ed. cit.*, p. 170.

[5] Cf. St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 39, a. 1, sol., and ad 1; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 337a.

[6] operetur *A*.

[7] *Supra*, Book III, c. xi; p. 274.

[8] St. Albert, *loc. cit.*, sol.; p. 337a; cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 78, 4; *ed. cit.*, p. 478a.

[9] Cf. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, xxvii; PG 94, 962.

[10] Cf. *supra*, Book III, c. ii; p. 255; c. iii; p. 259.

[11] *Add.* Dicitur *B*.

[12] A direct excerpt from *Summa de anima* II, xxvi; *ed. cit.*, pp. 267-268.

[13] Not identified.

[14] *Add.* sit dictum *A*.

[15] *Add.* Sequitur capitulum de memoria *A*.

XIV. DE MEMORIA

A 57r Memoria tam in numero interiorum sensuum quam in situ ultima est.[1]
Circa quam primo notandum memoriam tripliciter accipi.[2] Primo pro
B 30rb potentia quae dicitur memorativa, / et si limitatur ad praeterita erit sensibilium memoria, quomodo Joannes Damasceni et Nyssenus Gregorius accipiunt[3] dicentes ipsam esse sensibilis animae per se et per accidens intellectivae. Si autem indifferenter ad omne tempus accipitur, apud Augustinum prima pars est imaginis.[4] Secundo accipitur memoria pro habitu memoriae. Tertio dicitur memoria objectum memorabile,[5] sicut dicit Augustinus quod nihil erit de memoria quod non sit in memoria,[6] id est, nihil est in memorabilibus quod non sit in potentia memorativa.

Datur autem memoriae triplex definitio. Prima est Algazelis:

> Memoria est conservatrix earum intentionum quas apprehendit aestimativa; et ideo est arca intentionum, sicut dicitur imaginativa conservatrix formarum.[7]

Secunda definitio est Avicennae, in VI *Naturalium*:

> Memoria est vis ordinata in concavitate cerebri posteriori retinens quod apprehendit vis aestimationis de intentionibus non sensatis singulorum sensibilium.[8]

Tertia definitio est Alpharabii: Memoria nihil aliud est quam conservatio continua.[9]

Prima[10] definitio datur de memoria secundum quod est subjectum; sicut enim imaginatio conservat imagines rerum sensibilium quas sensus communis apprehendit, sic memoria intentiones rerum sensibilium quas apprehendit aestimativa. Secunda datur in comparatione ad organum. Tertia in comparatione ad reminiscentiam, a qua differt. Ubi primo occurrit quid sit reminiscentia; secundo, quomodo differt a memoria; tertio, qualiter impeditur.[11]

Quoad primum. Triplex datur de reminiscentia definitio. Prima est Aristotelis: Reminiscentia est ejus rei quae quodam modo in anima est et quodam modo non.[12] Quo enim ad principia est in anima, et quoad ultimo quaesitum non, sed cessit in oblivionem. Secunda definitio est Avicennae: Recordatio est ingenium revolvendi illud[13] quod oblitum est.[14] Tertia est beati Thomae: Reminiscentia est earum intentionum quas apprehenderat aestimativa, vel earum formarum quas conservaverat imaginativa jam oblitarum per discursum syllogisticum revolutio.[15] Et

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[1] Cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxvi-xxvii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 268-270. Vaurouillon follows the topic of the *Summa*, but makes little use of the material for the present chapter.

[2] Cf. St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 40, a. 1, sol.; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, pp. 343b-344; there is nothing of importance in the printed text of the *De potentiis animae*.

[3] St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, xx; PG 94, 938; cf. *supra*, c. iii; p. 259. St. Gregory of Nyssa (i.e., Nemesius), *De natura hominis* xiii; PG 40, 662.

[4] Cf. *supra*, Book II, c. ix; p. 282.

[5] memoriale *A*.

[6] Cf. St. Albert, *loc. cit.;* p. 344: Memoria etiam dicitur memoriale, sicut dicit Augustinus, quod nihil est de memoria quod non sit in memoria. Cf. St. Augustine, *De Trin.* XIV, vi, 8; PL 42, 1042.

[7] *Metaphysics*, p. II, tr. IV, 4; *ed. cit.*, p. 170.

[8] *De anima*, p. I, c. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 5^{rb}.

[9] St. Albert, *loc. cit.;* p. 345a. Cf. also Geo. P. Klubertanz, *Vis cogitativa according to St. Thomas Aquinas: sources and doctrine* (University of Toronto thesis, 1947), p. 58.

[10] Tertia *A*.

[11] Cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxvii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 268-270; and St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 41; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, pp. 351 ff.

[12] *De memoria et reminiscentia*, 2, 451b6; and St. Albert, *loc. cit.*, ad 1; p. 353a.

[13] id *A*.

[14] *De anima*, p. IV, c. 3; *ed. cit.*, fol. 19^{rb}: Sed recordatio quae est ingenium recordandi quod oblitum est, non invenitur, ut puto, nisi in solo homine.

[15] I have not located this in the *Summa de creaturis* ,of St. Albert. Cf. St. Thomas *Summa theol.* I, 78, 4; *ed. cit.*, p. 478b.

dicitur hic per discursum syllogisticum ad differentiam memoriae, /
A 57v quae non fit per hujusmodi discursum. Prima datur per respectum ad
objectum; secunda per respectum ad rationem revolventem, quam vocat
ingenium; tertia utrumque complectitur.

B 30va Differt autem quoad secundum re- / miniscentia a memoria tripliciter.[16] Primum est quia reminiscentia conjunctum habet actum rationis, quod non habet memoria; propter quod reminiscentia in solis est hominibus nisi aliqua animalia alia[17] in particulari ratione moveantur; memoria autem in homine et in brutis. Secundum, quia reminiscentia est a principiis determinatis, ut a loco certo, a tempore certo, ex actu certo arguitur cognitio rei alias habitae. Memoria autem non, quia non utitur nisi phantasmate vel imagine[18] ad veniendum in rem. Ex quo patet tertia differentia. Reminiscentia quidem vadit per intentiones propinquas, licet non sint conjunctae ordine naturali, et in talibus trahit consequentiam a consuetudine quia talia consuevit simul accipere, sicut cum libro magistrum, et cetera. Memoria vero non procedit hoc modo, sed a propriis intentionibus et imaginibus rei procedit in rem prius acceptam a sensu.

Et notandum quod haec tria differunt: memoria, reminiscentia, disciplina.[19] Memoria nil dicit oblivionis, reminiscentia autem oblivionem dicit. Est enim inquisitio incognitorum ut in futuro fiant cognita, quae aliquando fuerunt cognita in praeterito. Ideo dicitur reminiscentia et recordatio quasi ad memoriam aut ad cor reverti. Unde actus reminiscentiae sic potest definiri: Actus reminiscentiae est discursus rationis secundum modum reditionis in id quod oblitum est sive in rem oblitam, et hoc per speciem rei apud se conservatam; et fit[20] talis discursus per universalia. Propter hoc incipit ab universalibus et terminatur in particulari quod praeacceptum fuit in praeterito, et propter hoc habet et universalia et imagines et intentionem particularium.[21] Disciplina vero vel discere est inquisitio ad cognoscendum quae tamen prius non fuerunt cognita.

Qualiter autem quoad tertium impeditur reminiscentia triplex causa
est.[22] Prima quia reminiscens revolvere nescit principia ex quibus habetur
quaesitum ultimum; secunda quia pauca principia revolvit; tertia
A 58r quia in malis / complexionibus spiritus animalis est grossus et discurrere
nequit impediente caruncula quae sita est in ostiis cellularum in modum
vermis. Unde bene reminiscitivi caput inclinant ut foramen memoriae
aperiatur et locum accipiat spiritus animalis ad discursum. Est enim
reminiscentia in subjecto eodem cum memoria cujus media ad reminiscendum
communius sunt probabilia ex icotibus et signis.[23]

B 30vb Sed / circa memoriam tria dubia occurrunt. Primum: quid sit objectum memoriae?[24] Dico quod ad illud tria concurrunt. Primum rem determinat in quam revertitur memoria per actum recordationis, et hoc est tempus praeteritum. Secundum est id[25] quod ducit in rem illam ex parte animae, et est rei proximum, et hoc est imago ut imago, id est, ducens in rem illam. Tertium est id quo cognoscitur illa imago esse illius rei, et haec est intentio rei elicita per comparationem[26] et divisionem imaginum, et hoc est proximum memoriae. Per intentionem enim devenit memoria in imaginem et per imaginem in rem acceptam in praeterito. Et haec sententia est Alpharabii in libro *De memoria et reminiscentia.*[27]

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[16] St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 41, a. 1; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 353; Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscentia*, 2, 453a5 ff.

[17] alia animalia aliqua *A*.

[18] imaginatione *A*.

[19] From Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxvii; *ed. cit.*, p. 269.

[20] *Om. A*.

[21] particularem *A*.

[22] Cf. St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 41, a. 3; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 355b.

[23] *Ibid.*, ad q. 2; p. 355b.

[24] St. Albert, *op. cit.*, q. 40, a. 2, sol., *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 348a.

[25] illud *A*.

[26] compositionem *A*.

Secundum dubium est de organo memoriae.[28] Et propter istud enodandum[29] clarissime et [ut] videatur quis sensus interior in qua cellula[30] resideat, tres opiniones ponentur. Prima est Constabuli in libro *De differentia spiritus et animae*, quem Magnus Albertus aliquando nominat Constabenlucae.[31] Dicit iste quod prora capitis habet dividi in tres partes: in prima est sensus communis, in secunda imaginatio, in tertia phantasia. Et de ista[32] opinione habitus fuit sermo in capitulo de imaginatione et imaginativa.[33] Secunda opinio est Avicennae, in brutis animalibus in qualibet cella duo locans, dum tamen sint de perfectis; caput dividens in tres cellas.[34] In prima parte primae concavitatis cerebri requiescit[35] sensus communis, in secunda ejusdem concavitatis ipsa imaginatio. In principio secundae concavitatis phantasia, in fine aestimativa. In posteriori cella memoria et reminiscentia. Tertia opinio videtur Gregorii Nysseni, Algazelis et Avicennae in homine locantium[36] vim quam logisticam et rationalem dicunt in capitis medio; et secundum hoc potest dici quod phantasia et aestimativa in media cella erunt, sed phantasia inferius, aestimativa ut regina superius, ut in capitulo de aestimativa dictum est.[37] Caput enim hominis non ita extensum est sicut bruti.

A 58*v* Tertium dubium: Qui sunt bonae / memoriae?[38] Dico secundum Avicennam quod sicci in posteriori parte[39] capitis.[40] Siccum enim bene retinet nisi calor nimius impediat. Qui enim sic calidi sunt et sicci, licet bene recordentur,[41] non tamen sunt bene memores propter nimium discursum. Humiditas vero bona dispositio est ad disciplinam; facile enim suscipit. Unde patet oppositas esse per se dispositiones memoriae et disciplinae, licet per accidens pueri qui sunt humidi sint bonae memoriae
B 31*ra* et juvenes qui sicci sunt malae. Causa enim / est quia pueri non occupantur circa multa; ideo multum quod apprehendunt sigillatur in memoria eorum. Juvenes autem[42] multos habent motus et discurrunt nimium ex[43] calore humidante.[44] De senibus autem dico quod de communi sunt malae memoriae propter phlegma corruptivum partis illius; sicut ruinosa aedificia amittunt formam artis et sunt interius sicca, exterius humida, sic in proposito. Unde optima organi illius dispositio est, ut sit temperate siccum siccitate determinante humidum ne sit nimis fluidum, et temperate frigidum frigiditate coagulante figuras formarum impressarum ne dissolvantur,[45] quod calidum dissolvit. Patet igitur[46] ex omnibus actum memoriae esse primo recipere intentiones non sensatas, et secundo

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[27] St. Albert, *ibid.*: Dicti autem hujus sententia latet in libro Alpharabii de *Memoria et Reminiscentia.*

[28] St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 40, a. 3; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 349; and G. P. Kluberstanz, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[29] elidendum *A.*

[30] cella *A.*

[31] St. Albert calls him Constabenluce in *De natura et origine animae*, tr. II, c. 2; *ed. cit.*, IX, p. 403a: and Constabulus, in *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 61; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 524a; etc.

[32] illa *A.*

[33] Cf. *supra*, Book III, c. xi; p. 273. Costa ben Luce, *De differentia animae et spiritus*, c. 2; *ed. cit.*, pp. 124-126.

[34] *De anima*, p. V, c. 8; *ed. cit.*, fol. 28^{va}.

[35] quiescit *A.*

[36] Cf. Nemesius, *De natura hominis* xiii; PG 40, 663; Algazel, *Metaphysics*, p. II, tr. IV, 4; *ed. cit.*, p. 170; Avicenna, *De anima*, p. I, c. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 5^{rb}.

[37] *Supra*, Book III, c. xiii; p. 278.

[38] St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 40, a. 3; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, pp. 349-350; cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxvii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 269-270.

[39] parte posteriori *A.*

[40] *De anima*, p. IV, c. 3; *ed. cit.*, fol. 19^{va}. Cf. also Averroes, *De memoria et reminiscentia; ed. cit.*, VI, p. 2, fol. 23B: Bonae autem rememorationis homo est . . . cujus complexio posterioris cerebri est retinens formam consistentem in ipso; et est ille, in cujus hac parte dominatur siccitas magis quam humiditas.

[41] recordantur *A.*

[42] Sed juvenes *A.*

[43] *Om. A.*

[44] abundante *A.*

[45] dissolventur *A.*

[46] ergo *A.*

per illas devenire in imagines sensatas, et tertio per imaginem in rem prius habitam.

Ad sciendum autem uti memoria et conservationem ipsius notandae sunt octo claves quas[47] frater Joannes de Rupella in *Arte praedicandi* posuit, quae[48] incipit: *Foecunditatem Liae*, et in his metris continentur:

> Si cupis esse memor, bis quatuor accipe claves:
> Esto vacans, mitis, sis sobrius ac breviator,
> Ordo sit et numerus, tibi constituatur imago,
> Et quae perlegeris ipse[49] meditare frequenter.[50]

Expositionem ibi qui quaerit[51] inveniet. Addo autem et nonam, ut sint tres clavium ternarii. Et haec est bona vita coram Deo et hominibus; tantam enim tranquillitatem et securitatem ingerit ut locata remaneant in memoria. Condita est enim turris David quae aedificata est cum propugnaculis, ut scribitur in Canticis.[52]

Differentia autem horum quinque interiorum sensuum accipitur tripliciter.[53] Primo sic: quidam apprehendunt formas sensibiles, ut sensus
A 59*r* communis, / imaginatio, imaginativa; quidam intentiones sensibilium, ut aestimativa, memorativa. Secundo sic: quidam apprehendunt et operantur, ut sensus communis, imaginativa et aestimativa; quidam apprehendunt sed non operantur, ut imaginatio et memoria. Tertio sic: quidam apprehendunt principaliter, quidam secundario. In apprehensione sensibilium sensus communis principaliter apprehendit cum sensibus exterioribus; secundario imaginatio et imaginativa. Similiter in apprehensione intentionum sensibilium principaliter aestimativa, secundario
B 31*rb* memoria ap- / prehendit.—Et tantum de his sensibus.

XV. DE POTENTIIS SENSITIVIS MOTIVIS[1]

Tertia consideratio de anima sensitiva seu potentiis sensitivis, postquam primo[2] actum est de sensu exteriori, secundo de sensu interiori, est ut agamus de potentiis sensitivis motivis.[3] Et si ea jungantur quae in explanatione Augustini et Joannis Damasceni dicta sunt,[4] perfecta habebitur cognitio.

Sunt autem potentiarum sensitivarum motivarum tres species. Prima est naturalis, secunda animalis movens imperio, tertia exsecutione movens.[5] Quoad primum:[6] illa vis dicitur naturalis quae rationi non obedit, nec sequitur rationem, sicut est vis pulsativa aut vitalis cujus sedes est in corde per inspirationem et respirationem, principium existens contemperati caloris cordis et corporis. Ex quo sequitur quod haec vis non est animalium nisi pulmonem habentium. Unde nec est piscium communium nec vermium nec testudinum quia pulmonem non habent; calor enim animalium perfectorum[7] et consumit et alterat, ideo est nutritiva ut restauret, et pulsativa quae temperet; nisi in animalibus imperfectis aliquid ponamus proportionale cordi et aliquid pulmoni, aut in illis sit ut vitalis, ut dicere videtur Augustinus,[8] non ut pulsativa ut patet, quia calor piscium est diminutus non indigens diminui cum salventur in aqua; sic de vermibus dicendum, quod ostendit tardus motus; aut aliquid sit in eis etiam[9] proportionale pulsativae,[10] quod dicere Joannes videtur Damascenus.[11]

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[47] quae *B*.

[48] *Add.* Ars *A*.

[49] conceperat tua mens *A*. *for* perlegeris ipse.

[50] That Rupella composed a work on preaching is admitted, but the *Ars* considered authentic has a different incipit from the *Tractatus* here cited. I have discovered no Tract with the incipit that Vaurouillon cites. Cf. P. Minges, 'De scriptis quibusdam Fr. Joannis de Rupella O.F.M.', *AFH*, VI (1913), 621-622; Th.-M. Charland O.P., 'Les auteurs d' "Artes praedicandi" au xiii^{e} siècle d'après les manuscrits', *Etudes d'histoire litteraire et doctrinale du xiii^{e} siècle*, prem. serie (Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales d'Ottawa, I, Ottawa, 1932), 44-66; and the expansion of this work: *Artes praedicandi, contribution à l'histoire de la rhétorique au moyen âge* (Ottawa, 1936), pp. 62-64. See also Henry Caplan, *Mediaeval Artes praedicandi: a Hand-list* (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, XXV, Ithaca, 1934); and *Mediaeval Artes praedicandi: a Supplementary Hand-list* (*ibid.*, XXVI, 1936).

[51] qui quaerit ibi *A*.

[52] *Canticle of Canticles* iv, 4: *Sicut turris David collum tuum, quae aedificata est cum propugnaculis.*

[53] Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxvii; *ed. cit.*, p. 270; almost verbatim.

[1] animae *A*.

[2] *Om. B*.

[3] Vaurouillon returns to Rupella's *Summa de anima* II, xxviii-xxxiii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 271-283, as his main source, though he does not hesitate to criticize the opinions of Rupella; on the other hand, at times he takes whole paragraphs from his Franciscan confrere.

[4] *Supra*, Book III, c. ii; p. 254; c. v; p. 262.

[5] Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, xxviii; *ed. cit.*, p. 271; and xxix; p. 272; and Avicenna, *De anima*, p. I, c. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 4^{vb}.

[6] From Rupella, *loc. cit.*; p. 271.

Quantum ad secundum, de virtute animali movente imperio,[12] primo notandum est quod danda est quia imaginatio, imaginativa et aestimativa solum sunt apprehensivae, solum ostendentes quid agendum, ideo *A* 59*v* necesse / est ponere imperantem potentiam propter opus exsequendum, sicut cibo ostenso si fames sit movet ipse appetitus. Et haec potentia trinomia est: apud philosophos appetitiva, apud theologos sensualitas,[13] communi nomine appetitiva sensibilis nuncupatur, in homine ad rationem ordinata. Et ut sit quidem ternarius in concupiscibilem et irascibilem dividitur. Et quia de objecto irascibilis et concupiscibilis satis dictum fuit *B* 31*va* in expositione opinionis beati Augustini de potentiis / animae,[14] nunc loqui oportet de organis earum et actibus, ut compleatur ternarius.

Quantum ad organum dicunt quidam quod organum concupiscibilis est jecur, aut aliquid loco ejus; organum irascibilis cista fellis vel aliquid proportionate secundum loquentes communiter.[15] Unde et metra exstant:

> Cor sapit, pulmo loquitur; fel commovet iras;
> Splen ridere facit, cogit amare jecur.

Sed verius dicitur quod organum tam concupiscibilis quam irascibilis est cor;[16] sicut enim virtutis apprehensivae organum est cerebrum, sic motivae cor, sicut dicunt philosophi. Et hujus signum dilatatio cordis et constrictio, revocatio sanguinis et spirituum ab exterioribus ad interiora, vel emissio ab interioribus ad exteriora in motibus concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Cum enim motus est a virtute confortata, tunc fit dilatatio cordis et emissio sanguinis et spirituum a corde ad exteriora, sed leviter confortata concupiscibili, impetuose confortata irascibili; disconfortata vero virtute, fit cordis constrictio et revocatio spirituum; sed disconfortata concupiscibili, lente; disconfortata vero irascibili, impetuose. Ex his patet propositum.

Quantum ad actus seu passiones concupiscibilis secundum complacentiam[17] sunt tres binarii.[18] Primus binarius est concupiscentia et desiderium, qui actus sunt respectu proprii boni absentis; differenter tamen.[19] Concupiscentia enim simpliciter appetitum boni nominat absentis. Desiderium autem appetitus et intensus et ardens. Secundus binarius est gaudium et laetitia, et sunt respectu proprii boni praesentis; differenter tamen. Gaudium enim est jucundari de adeptione boni; laetitia vero est *A* 60*r* jucundari de fruitione vel usu boni. / Tertius binarius est dilectio et amor, et proprie sunt respectu boni in Deo vel proximi, licet accipiantur[20] et respectu sui, ut dicit frater Joannes de Rupella hic.[21] Sed amor simplex est; dilectio vero electionem includit quasi de diversis electio. Ecce igitur unus binariorum ternarius respectu complacentiae concupiscibilis.

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[7] perfectiore modo *A*.

[8] Cf. *De Genesi ad litt.* III, ii, 3; PL 34, 280, as the possible reference here.

[9] *Add.* propter *AB*.

[10] pulsativa *AB*.

[11] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xii; PG 94, 930.

[12] Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, xxix; *ed. cit.*, p. 272.

[13] Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* III, 10-11, 433a10 ff.; Avicenna, *De anima*, p. I, c. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 5^{rb}. On *sensualitas*, cf. *De spiritu et anima* xxxvii-xxxviii; PL 40, 808.

[14] *Supra*, Book III, c. ii; p. 256.

[15] Cf. St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 71, a. 1, arg. 3; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 591a; and ad 3; p. 593b. See also Nemesius, *De natura hominis* xvi; PG 40, 671; St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, xvi; PG 94, 931. A very clear reference is to be found in St. Isidore, *Etymol.* XI, 125; PL 82, 412: In jecore autem consistit voluptas et concupiscentia, juxta eos qui de physicis disputant. And in n. 127, *loc. cit.*; 413, something resembling verses cited by Vaurouillon:

> . . . splene ridemus, felle irascimur,
> corde sapimus, jecore amamus.

[16] Almost verbatim from Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, xxxi; *ed. cit.*, p. 278.

[17] *Om.* secundum complacentiam *A*.

[18] *Add.* et hoc secundum complacentiam *A*. Cf. Rupella, *loc. cit.;* pp. 274-275.

B 31*vb* Est sequens concupiscibilis actuum ternarius / binariorum ratione displicentiae.[22] Primus binarius est fastidium et abominatio, et sunt respectu proprii boni; differenter tamen. Fastidium enim est delectabile simpliciter repellere seu respuere et habet opponi concupiscentiae. Abominatio vero est cum ardore et intensione respuere et opponitur desiderio. Secundus binarius est dolor et tristitia, et sunt respectu mali; differenter tamen, quia dolor solum respectu mali proprii, tristitia vero respectu proprii et alieni. Dolor enim est afflictio ex separatione seu divisione boni delectabilis sive convenientis dolenti, et habet opponi gaudio. Tristari[23] vero est affligi ex praesentia sive conjunctione disconvenientis sive tristabilis aut sibi aut alii, et opponi habet laetitiae. Ex quo patet quod male connumerat inter actus concupiscibilis frater Joannes de Rupella misericordiam et invidiam, cum tristitiam numeret cujus[24] sunt species, et species non condividuntur contra genus.[25] Est enim misericordia tristitia de malo alieno, et invidia tristitia de bono alieno, ut[26] fuit dictum exponendo mentem Joannis Damasceni de passionibus in isto tertio.[27] Et notandum quod hic actus capitur large ut includat passionem. Tertius binarius est non-placentia[28] et odium,[29] et sunt[30] respectu boni alterius; differenter tamen. Non-placentia enim solum privat amorem cui opponitur; odium vero oditum vult non esse, secundum Philosophum, II *Rhetoricae*,[31] et habet opponi dilectioni. Ecce igitur unus binariorum ternarius respectu displicentiae, et ita placentia et displicentia quae sunt duo ascendunt ad duodecim, ubi quatuor ternarii sunt aut[32] tres quaternarii.—Et tantum de concupiscibilis passionibus.

Quantum ad irascibilem, sunt quindecim passiones aut actus, large accipiendo,[33] et ita sunt quinque ternarii aut tres quinarii. Quod sic deducitur: capiatur irascibilis ut confortata ad bonum honoris aut *A* 60*v* excellentiae. Ecce quinarius / primus: ambitio, spes, superbia, dominatio, contemptus, quae sic differunt. Ambitio et spes respectu sunt excel- *B* 32*ra* lentiae vel honoris / adhuc distantis; differenter tamen. Ambitio enim est appetitus honoris vel excellentiae non habitae etiam sine habendi confidentia; spes autem cum habendi confidentia. Haec tria autem, superbia, dominatio, contemptus, sunt respectu honoris aut excellentiae jam obtentae; differenter tamen. Superbia enim est ab inferius ad superius excellere, sicut et vocabulum sonat; dominatio autem est per superioritatem inferioribus praeesse; contemptus vero est detestatio seu reprobatio subjectionis seu vilitatis, et proprie est reprobatio alicujus rei vel personae quae aestimatur vilis.

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[19] tamen differenter *B*.

[20] accipiatur *B*.

[21] Rupella, *loc. cit.;* p. 275.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 275-276.

[23] Tristitia *B*.

[24] cujusmodi *A*.

[25] *Summa de anima* II, xxxi; *ed. cit.*, p. 275: Possemus addere aliam contrarietatem actuum, qui pertinent ad concupiscibilem, scilicet misereri et invidere. Sed quia misereri est contristari de alienis malis, invidere tristari in alienis bonis; ideo continentur sub tristitia.

[26] et *A*.

[27] *Supra*, Book III, c. vi; p. 263.

[28] non-complacentia *A*.

[29] Added by Vaurouillon, this third binary is not found in Rupella.

[30] sumitur *A*.

[31] C. 4, 1382a15.

[32] ut *A*.

[33] capiendo *A*. Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, xxxi; *ed. cit.*, pp. 276-277.

Capiatur secundo irascibilis ut disconfortata respectu boni, et sic est fuga a bono non quocumque sed arduo seu difficili, et sic timore juncto propter convenientiam quam habet ad reverentiam, licet timor sit respectu mali. Est secundus quinarius: paupertas spiritus, desperatio, humiliatio, reverentia, timor.[34] Paupertas spiritus est appetitus fugae honoris et reverentiae, et opponitur ambitioni. Desperatio[35] est appetitus resiliens a bono arduo propter diffidentiam obtinendi, sive diffidentia resiliens a bono arduo obtinendo, et est contraria spei. Humiliatio est amor subjectionis fugiens excellentiam, et est contraria superbiae et dominationi. Reverentia est ex consideratione excellentiae alterius resilitio in propriam parvitatem sive veneratio rei vel personae alicujus propter suam excellentiam, et est contraria contemptui.[35] Timor autem qui est respectu mali, quia est suspicio futuri mali, est audaciae opposita, de qua non[36] dicetur.

Sed tertio capiatur irascibilis ut confortata respectu mali; sunt tres passiones: audacia, ira, insurrectio. Et ut disconfortata respectu mali sunt tres: poenitentia, impatientia, timor, quo remoto, ut dictum est, tertius remanet quinarius. Audacia est praesumptio de victoria mali, et timori opponitur. Irasci est vindictam vel reputationem[37] appetere, et
A 61*r* poenitentiae opponitur. Insurrectio vero est vindictam inferre / et opponitur impatientiae quae non audet intus gemens. Poenitentia est fuga vel[38] resilitio a praeterito malo seu detestatio. Impatientia est resilitio a praesenti malo.

B 32*rb* Sic[39] / uniendo passiones ambarum, concupiscibilis, quae sunt duodecim, et irascibilis, quae sunt quindecim, surgit numerus viginti septem, qui est secundus cubitus confectus ex tribus novenariis, qui est secundus quadratus et in quolibet novenario sunt tres ternarii, et sic novem ternarii, ut in cunctis etiam in passionibus laudetur Deus in personis trinus.

Si jungatur haec cum dictis de passione in communi, in De passibilitate animae, libro secundo,[40] et cum dictis de passionibus in particulari in expositione Joannis Damasceni in libro hoc tertio,[41] bene cognoscetur natura passionis.

Est autem sciendum triplicem fore in nobis causam variorum motuum et affectionum.[42] Prima est differentia apprehensionis, ut si infirmus cogitat se sanari vel imaginatur, aut sanus infirmari, multum facit. Unde imaginatio in infirmo sanitatis plus prodest infirmo multotiens quam medicus. Conspicio me sine timore ambulare super trabem in terra, sed si ut pons poneretur super aquas[43] propter apprehensionem casus non auderem. Secunda causa est exercitium: laeti saepius cito laetantur, tristes saepius cito tristantur. Sic[44] in passionibus ceteris. Tertia causa est dispositio complexionis secundum tria: spiritus, sanguinem et humores ceteros. Spiritus, ut dicit Avicenna,[45] est substantia lucida, et effigiat vultus hominum ad similitudinem caelestium corporum. Unde spiritus vitalis vocatur radius et lux. Anima enim videns lucem gratulatur, et molestatur in tenebris. De spiritu ergo faciamus ternarium: spiritus cordis multus temperatae complexionis in tenuitate et spissitudine cujus lux resplendens aptissimus est gaudio; secundo, spiritus parvae quantitatis cujus materia pauca, sicut in convalescentibus ex infirmitate, qui sunt graciles; aut secundo senibus aut tertio distemperatae complexionis ut aegris, ex qualibet causa ad laetitiam aut tristitiam convertetur, sicut sulphur ex quolibet igne accenditur, cum multo majora ligna igne non incendantur; tertio, spiritus spissus ex qualibet causa patietur, cum spissitudo ex compressione, non multitudo ex claritate, passionem arguat. /

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[34] In the *Summa de anima* (*loc. cit.*; p. 277), *timor* is considered later, with *poenitentia* and *impatientia*, as Vaurouillon notes in the next paragraph.

[35] A direct excerpt from Rupella, *loc. cit.*; p. 277.

[36] modo *B*.

[37] repunitionem *Rupella, loc. cit.*

[38] fugalis (for fuga vel) *Rupella, ibid.*

[39] *Add.* autem *A*.

[40] Cf. *supra*, Book II, c. xiii; p. 291.

[41] Cf *supra*, Book III, c. vi; p. 262.

[42] Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxxii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 279-280.

[43] aquam *A*.

[44] *Add.* est *A*.

[45] *De anima*, p. V, c. 6; *ed. cit.*, fol. 21^{vb}.

A 61*v* Circa[46] sanguinem quatuor dantur regulae.[47] Prima: sanguis temperatus
inferius inter tenuitatem et spissitudinem propter abundantiam spiritus
B 32*va* resplendentis aptat animam gaudio. Secunda: sanguis / clarus distemperatus in calore propter multam ejus accensionem et velocitatem sui motus aptat eam iracundiae. Tertia: sanguis tenuis, aquosus, frigidus, aptat eam debilitati cordis et timori. Spiritus enim qui fit ex eo est gravis ad movendum exterius et est parvae accensionis. Quarta: sanguis grossus et turbidus distemperatus in calore, aptat tristitiae et iracundiae pertinaci; sed tristitia fit per spiritum turbidum qui generatur ex eo; ira vero propter velocitatem accensionis suae ex calore; pertinacia vero irae fit ex eo quod est spissus quia spissum cum calescit non cito frigescit. Sic distinguuntur haec tria.

Hae quatuor regulae ad tres reducuntur: prima est pro sanguineis, secunda et quarta pro cholera, rubea et[48] nigra, tertia pro phlegmaticis. De reliquis humoribus remitto ad medicos.[49]

Et notandum quod anima ex se tantum quasdam habet dispositiones, ut intelligere et contemplari veritatem. Secundo, corpus quasdam ex se, ut complexionem. Tertio, quasdam habent ex se mutuo sicut somnium et vigiliam.—Et tantum de movente potentia ex imperio.

Quantum ad tertium, de potentia movente exterius[50] exsecutione, notandum triplicem esse talem potentiam quae prodeunt ex una generali quae ortum habet ex extrema capitis parte et cerebri a qua oriuntur nervi motivi sicut ab anteriori nervi sensitivi, et per totum corpus ramificantur et fluunt in lacertis et musculis qui inserti sunt membris, et sunt organa illius.[51] Prima est motiva secundum locum. Et si secundum partem, non secundum totum, dicitur potentia contractiva, sicut in conchilibus et conchis; moventur enim secundum motum dilatationis et constrictionis, reflexionis et extensionis, quamvis a toto loco suo non discedant. Si vero est motiva secundum totum locum, dicitur vis progressiva. Organa vero hujus[52] potentiae sunt secundum diversitatem animalium. Ad praesens autem tripliciter: quaedam gradiuntur pedibus ut gressibilia; quaedam feruntur pennis, ut aves, aut pennulis vel pinnulis, quae sunt quaedam parvae pennae, ut pisces; tertia[53] trahuntur
A 62*r* costis et ventre reptando, ut reptilia. Secunda potentia dicitur / operativa.
Hujus potentiae, in habentibus manus, organa sunt manus, in non
B 32*vb* habentibus aliquid loco earum, ut os vel pedes, / sicut in apibus vel[54]
araneis. Tertia potentia dicitur vocativa, quae est principium emissionis

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[46] *Add.* vero *A*.

[47] Cf. Rupella, *loc. cit.*; and Avicenna, *De anima*, p. V, c. 6; *ed. cit.*, fols. 21^{vb}-22^{ra}.

[48] aut *B*.

[49] Cf. Avicenna, *loc. cit.*; and Galen, *On the Natural Faculties* II, viii (Loeb Classical Library, London, 1924), pp. 183-184.

[50] exterius *in marg.* B. Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, xxxiii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 281-283.

[51] Cf. Avicenna, *De anima*, p. I, c. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 4^{vb}.

[52] ejus *A*.

[53] tertiae *AB*.

[54] et *B*.

vocis, nec est eadem virtus cum pulsativa;[55] pulsativa enim[56] de necessitate et semper movet ut natura et non secundum apprehensionem; vocativa vero non semper nec de necessitate sed secundum apprehensionem movet, et est affectionum indicativa, cujus organum est pulmo et vocalis arteria. Unde sola animalia habentia pulmonem vocant. Ad emittendum autem completam vocem ter tria, id est novem, requiruntur, quae his metris continentur:

> Instrumenta novem sunt: guttur, lingua, palatum,
> Quatuor et dentes, et duo labra simul.

Et in tantum sufficiat de potentiis sensitivis vel sint apprehensivae vel motivae vel intus vel extra.

XVI. DIVISIO INTELLECTUS SECUNDUM PHILOSOPHOS

Adest post tractatum expletum tam vegetativae quam sensitivae animae partium tempus ut ad intellectivam stilus convertatur, sed breviter;[1] jam enim in primo mentem declarando Aristotelis quomodo tota sit in toto et tota in qualibet parte ostensum est,[2] in secundo definiendo animam et agendo qualiter secundum intellectivam sit imago Dei in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate exstitit declaratum,[3] et tertio in hoc tertio[4] in declarando mentem Joannis Damasceni,[5] patefactum est quid intellectus, quid voluntas, quid liberum arbitrium, haec tria in quibus pars intellectiva animae consistit. Superest solum pro hujusmodi[6] complemento tria peragere brevissime: primum, qualiter intellectum diviserunt philosophi; secundum, qualiter theologi; tertium, ad intellectum intellectus descendemus.

Quoad[7] primum. Fuit quidam qui dictus est Joannes Sapiens, sed causam nescio (non enim opera ejus tam mira legi); hic quemdam librum de intellectu edidit cujus exstat exordium: *Intentio nostra est scribere aliquid de intellectu et potentia intellectiva hominis.*[8] Ex libro illo clare conspicitur secundum philosophos intellectum primo dividi secundum quoddam ternarium, secundo secundum quoddam quaternarium, tertio secundum quoddam quinarium.

Avempace enim et Abubacher triplicem posuerunt intellectum: materialem, agentem,[9] speculativum.[10] Vocant autem intellectum materialem
A 62*v* ipsam imaginativam / potentiam in qua sunt formae potentia intellectae; /
B 33*ra* intellectum autem agentem nominant quamdam substantiam abstrahen-

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[55] *Add.* quia *A.*

[56] *Om. A.*

[1] This and the following chapter, as well as chapter XIX, are completely independent of Rupella's *Summa de anima.*

[2] *Supra,* Book I, c. vi; p. 250.

[3] *Supra,* Book II, c. i-iii; pp. 255-263; c. ix; pp. 282-283.

[4] tertio hoc *B.*

[5] *Supra,* Book III, c. iv; p. 260.

[6] hujus *B.*

[7] Quantum ad *A.*

[8] *Joannes Sapiens* is simply Jean LeSage, a disciple of Godefroid of Fontaine and master at Paris about 1303; according to Fr. Leon Amoros O.F.M., he is to be identified with Jean de Pouilly (de Polliaco). No mediaevalist, as far as I know, has opposed this identification. (Cf. L. Amoros, *Fr. Gonsalvi Hispani O.F.M. Quaestiones disputatae et de Quodlibet* [Bibl. Fran. Schol. medii aevi, IX, Ad Claras Aquas, 1935], p. LXIX, n. 2; and appendix, pp. 429 ff., for *Quaestiones Ioannis Sapientis*). His *Liber de intellectu,* apparently used by Vaurouillon, has not been identified; it is not to be found in the lists of works of Jean de Pouilly or of Jean LeSage (P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au xiii^e siècle* I, p. 450, n. 223; p. 441, n. 213; and his *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320,* I, p. 223 ff. [de Pouilly] and II, p. 155 [Jean LeSage]). Vaurouillon may have used Averroes directly also; there is nothing to show that he used either Saint Thomas or Saint Albert as sources. As far as possible, I have tried to verify his statements with the texts at my disposal.

[9] *Add.* et *A.*

[10] Cf. Averroes, III *De anima,* text. 5; *ed. cit.,* VI, 1-2, fol. 144D: Abubacher autem et Avempace videtur intendere in manifesto sui sermonis, quod intellectus materialis est virtus imaginativa.

tem formas ab esse individuali quod habent et per quod vel in quo sunt potentia intelligibiles et facientem eas in esse universali in quo sunt actu intellectae; tertium autem intellectum quem dicunt speculativum dicunt esse ipsas formas in esse universali abstractas per agentem intellectum. Non enim posuerunt eas subjective in intellectu materiali qui intelligit, quia tunc, inquiunt, essent individuae, non universales. Individuatur enim accidens secundum individuationem subjecti. Hae autem formae sunt universales et ubique et semper et per consequens per se existentes et in illis est idem intellectus et id[11] quod intelligitur. Quod probant per Philosophum in III *De anima*: In his quae sunt sine materia est idem intellectus et id[12] quod intelligitur.[13] Ex quo infertur intellectum speculativum non dici a speculo aut speculor sed a speciebus. Unde secundum istos diceretur intellectus[14] verius specilativus quam speculativus. Secundo sequitur apud eos intellectum agentem productivum esse substantiarum; ex quo enim illae formae abstractae, sic intelligunt, sunt substantiae. Ex quo tertio sequitur quod homo non erit homo sed brutum; sicut Albertus dicit in libro *De animalibus* de pigmeis quod non sunt homines sed habent imaginativam nobilissimam ut sint supremum genus simiarum,[15] sic et homo, ponendo intellectum agentem esse separatum et intellectum speculativum separatum et solam imaginativam formam ejus supremam, non erit homo, cum secundum omnes sapientes philosophos rationale sit pars definitionis hominis, sed brutum nobilissimum.—Et tantum de isto ternario intellectus.

Venio secundo ad quaternarium, quem tres famosissimi philosophi posuerunt. Primus Aristoteles, quem aliam naturae regulam *Super III de Anima* Averroes dicit.[16] Secundus Alexander, qui per excellentiam dictus est Peripateticus, cujus commenta in Philosophum Averroes paucis demptis aut positis secutus est, ut super *Sententias* frater Petrus de Candia ordine Minorum, post Alexander quintus, docuit.[17] Tertius Themistius, vir tanti nominis ut sine eo Aristotelis gymnasium narrari posset vacuum.

Primo[18] ergo Aristoteles quadruplicem[19] posuit intellectum: possibilem, in habitu, agentem, passivum.[20] Intellectus possibilis apud eum est quo
B 33rb est omnia fieri.[21] Et iste apud eum / immixtus est / et impassibilis.
A 63r Immixtus quia cuncta intelligit, ideo ab illis segregatus sicut pupilla oculi nullo colore coloratur ut omnes colores capiat; secundo, quia a nulla corporali denominatur qualitate:[22] unde neque calidus neque[23] frigidus dicitur; tertio, quia organa non habet ut potentiae sensitivae. Est et impassibilis; post enim excellens sensibile sensus minus sensibile percipere nequit, quod apud intellectum possibilem non contingit, qui post fortissimum intelligibile minus intelligibile facilius comprehendit,[24] quod multum Joannes notavit Grammaticus;[25] nec dixerim Aristotelem dixisse intellectum possibilem impassibilem quia intellectionem non suscipiat, sed quia corruptionem non patitur.

Secundus intellectus dicitur intellectus in habitu, et est apud eum intelligendum in quodam ternario. Consideretur primo intellectus ut tabula rasa: dicetur possibilis.[26] Secundo consideretur ut scientiis informatus aut inventione aut doctrina: sic est intellectus in habitu. Tertio consideretur ut actu considerans: est intellectus speculativus et sic secundum Aristotelem solum a speculari actu intellectus dicitur speculativus; eumdem tamen intellectum nominat in habitu et speculativum quia non differunt nisi per accidens.

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[11] illud *B.*
[12] illud *B.*
[13] *De anima* III, 4, 430a7 ff.
[14] *Om. A.*
[15] Lib. XXI, tr. 1, c. 2, nn. 11-12; ed. H. Stadler, *BGPTMA*, XVI, 1327-1328.
[16] Text. 14; *ed. cit.*, fol. 159D.
[17] *II Sent.*, q. 1, a. 3, *Ms* Bruxelles, Bibl. Royale 3699-3700, fol. 113^{va}, the closest reference I have found.
[18] Prima *B.*
[19] triplicem *A.*
[20] *De anima* III, 4, 429a10 ff.; 5, 430a10 ff.
[21] *Ibid.*, 5, 430a11.
[22] quantitate *B.*
[23] nec *B.*
[24] *De anima* III, 4, 429b1 ff.
[25] Cf. M. de Corte, *Le commentaire de Jean Philopon sur la troisième livre du 'Traité de l'âme' d'Aristôte* (Liège, 1934), p. 13, lines 4-33; p. 23, lines 7-27.

Tertius intellectus est agens, de quo dicit quod est quo est omnia facere;[27] et rursus quod est separatus, immortalis et perpetuus.[28] Quartus est passivus, et est corruptibilis.[29] Unde secundum omnes commentatores, dempto Alexandro, passivum intellectum vocat hic phantasiam.[30]

Secundus hujus quaternarii est Alexander qui quadruplicem posuit intellectum: agentem, possibilem, speculativum, adeptum.[31] Dicit primo intellectum agentem esse substantiam separatam, non de essentia animae, et unum in omnibus hominibus.[32] Dicit secundo intellectum possibilem virtutem in corpore eductum de potentia materiae generabilem et corruptibilem;[33] alioquin semper intelligeret si esset perpetuus, inquit, quia agens semper illuminat, quod tamen est falsum; et inde est, inquit Alexander, quod post mortem non recordamur eorum quae fecimus quia noster intellectus possibilis corrumpitur, et dato quod agens sit unus, non tamen possibilis quia numeratur ad numerationem corporum A 63*v* humanorum. Nec mirum debet esse si ex elementorum / mixtione prodeat tam mira forma cum ex mixtione elementorum mira fiant. Dicit tertio intellectum speculativum intellectum possibilem informatum speciebus intelligibilibus. Et sic intellectus speculativus secundum eum B 33*va* dicitur, dato quod actu non / speculetur.[34] Et si obicitur[35] contra eum per Aristotelem in III *De anima*[36] ubi approbat Anaxagoram dicentem intellectum esse immixtum et impassibilem nec esse corpus nec virtutem in corpore, dicit Alexander quod Philosophus intendebat dicere quod ipse intellectus est ipsa praeparatio et non subjectum praeparationis.[37] Est enim intellectus possibilis quaedam praeparatio in homine ad recipiendum influentiam intellectus agentis, et dicit quod intellectus materialis magis assimilatur praeparationi et rasae tabulae quam tabulae rasae.[38]

Ubi nota: ecce tres philosophi, Aristoteles, Theophrastus,[39] Alexander.

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[26] Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* III, 4, 430a1 ff.; and 430a5, for the speculative intellect.

[27] fieri *A*; cf. *De anima* III, 5, 430a12.

[28] *Ibid.*, 430a17; and 4, 429b24.

[29] *Ibid.*, 430a24 f.

[30] Averroes, III *De anima*, text. 5; *ed. cit.*, fols. 139E and 152D; cf. St. Albert, *Liber III De anima*, tr. II, iv; *ed. cit.*, V, p. 335b.

[31] Cf. E. Gilson, 'Les sources gréco-arabes de l' augustinisme avicennisant', *AHDLMA*, IV (1929), 7-15, for Alexander of Aphrodisias. The Latin text of Alexander's *De intellectu et intellecto* (which is actually a Latin translation of a section of his *De anima*) is published by G. Théry, O.P., *Autour du décret de 1210: II, Alexandre d'Aphrodise. Aperçu sur l'influence de sa noétique* (Bibliotheque thomiste, VII, 1926), pp. 74-82. The terminology used in our text differs somewhat from that found in the documentation of Prof. Gilson and Fr. Théry's edition, as also from Averroes' presentation of Alexander, III *De anima*; *ed. cit.*, fol. 142D, etc.

[32] Cf. E. Gilson, *art. cit.*, p. 14; and G. Théry, *op. cit.*, pp. 77 and 80.

[33] This is the interpretation of Averroes, *loc. cit.*; fol. 143D: Intellectus materialis est virtus generata, etc.; cf. also text 20; fol. 163B; and of St. Albert, *loc. cit.*; but not of Alexander himself. Cf. the statement of Averroes' position in G. Théry, *op. cit.*, pp. 46 ff.; the explanation of Alexander, *ibid.*, pp. 27 and 33, and text, *ibid.*, pp. 74-75; and the presentation of Prof. Gilson, *art. cit.*, pp. 8-10.

[34] This would be the *intellectus in habitu*. Cf. Prof. Gilson, *art. cit.*, p. 11; and the remark of Fr. Théry *op. cit.*, p. 32: Le *nous ho thurathen* nous apparaît donc comme l'état définitif du *nous hulikos* en continuité immédiate avec le *nous poietikos*.

[35] obiciatur *A*.

[36] C. 4, 429a19 and 429b23 ff.

[37] Cf. G. Théry, *op. cit.*, p. 76; actually, this is again the interpretation of Averroes, *op. cit.*, text. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 143C: intendebat ipsam praeparationem, non subjectum praeparationis, et ideo dicit . . . quod intellectus materialis magis assimilatur praeparationi, quae est in tabula non scripta, quam tabulae praeparatae.

[38] Cf. G. Théry, *op. cit.*, p. 31; and text, *ibid.*, p. 76; and note 41, *infra*.

[39] *Supra*, Book II, c. xii; p. 289.

Textus Aristotelis dicit quod intellectus est sicut tabula rasa; legit hunc textum Theophrastus et commentat; radit rasa, dicit rasura; verius, dicit, intellectus est rasura quam tabula rasa. Venit Alexander et non radit sed pervertit ut epiteton faciat et adjectivum suum substantivum praecedat, non sequatur; et dicatur rasa tabula intellectus velut rasura tabulae, et non tabula rasa veluti subjectum[40] rasurae.[41] O miri glossatores, quorum unus radit, alius pervertit textum! Cur magistrum invaditis cujus estis praecipui discipuli?[42] Et addit Alexander quod de illa praeparatione potest vere dici quod non est hoc aliquid nec corpus nec virtus in corpore, et quod non est passibilis sed est relatio quaedam et ordo unius ad alterum.[43] Sed hoc dictum Alexandri inquit Averroes[44] esse nihil et probat sic: quod verum est dicere de omni praeparatione quod non est corpus nec virtus in corpore, quare dicit hoc plus de intellectu quam de aliis praeparationibus si non intendebat nobis demonstrare subjectum praeparationis, et multa alia quae reperiuntur apud eum?

Quarto dicit intellectum adeptum, et dicit quod ille est qui etiam conjunctus in hac vita cum corpore ad tantam venit puritatem ut videre et intelligere queat substantias separatas ac etiam intelligat.[45] Sed revera hic immortalitatem animae rationalis evacuat et brutus brutis nos A 64r similat, ut vere dicit[46] de eo Psalmus: *Homo, cum in / honore esset, non intellexit: comparatus est jumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis.*[47] Arguatur contra eum ex immortalitate animae, libro secundo.[48]

Tertius hujus viae exstat Themistius qui et secundus Aristoteles B 33vb dictus / est. Hic quadruplicem etiam posuit intellectum: possibilem, agentem, speculativum, passivum.[49] Possibilem dicit ab agente neomata et scientias suscipere ita quod unus imprimat, alius suscipiat, ambo tamen sunt separati ab esse hominis; et inter se secundum substantiam differentes, perpetui, immixti, impassibiles, unum tamen ex eis fit ex influxu unius in alterum, quod vocavit intellectum speculativum;[50] in quo sibi contradixit[51] Averroes,[52] quia tunc intellectus speculativus foret aeternus cum causae ejus sint aeternae, scilicet intellectus agens et intellectus possibilis; quod Themistius non horruit. Quartum intellectum dicit passivum quem nominat animae passiones, ut ira, amor; et quia post mortem non remanent, actuum suorum non recordabitur homo.

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[40] substantivum *A.*

[41] Cf. G. Théry, *op. cit.*, p. 28, in regard to Alexander's position: On peut employer à son sujet la comparaison de la tablette sur laquelle rien n'est encore inscrit, mais à condition de bien s'entendre. Il ne s'agit pas d'établir un rapprochement entre l'intellect et la tablette, car ce serait laisser supposer que l'intellect hylique est déterminé comme la tablette. La comparaison porte unique sur des négations: la non-détermination du *nous hulikos* est identique à la non-détermination de la tablette. In a note, Fr. Théry points out that this comparison is not given explicitly in the *De intellectu* of Alexander, though it is presupposed therein; it is found in Alexander's *De anima.*

[42] Cf. Averroes, III *De anima*, text. 14; *ed. cit.*, fols. 159A and 162E, for his reproaches addressed to Alexander.

[43] Cf. text of Alexander; ed. G. Théry, *loc. cit.*, p. 74: Hoc autem quod dico materialis est, scilicet intellectus substantivus quem possibile est fieri intellectum, et est quasi materia; et per hoc quod dico materia, non intelligo aliquod quod sit subjectum, et possit fieri aliquid significatum [better: signatum, according to Prof. Gilson, *art. cit.*, p. 8, n. 3] propter existenciam alicujus forme in se.

[44] Averroes, *op. cit.*, text. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 143D: Sed hoc, quod dicit Alexander, nihil est. Vaurouillon may have derived this and the following explanation directly or through Jean LeSage.

[45] Cf. E. Gilson, *art. cit.*, p. 14; and G. Théry, *op. cit.*, p. 32; and text, *ibid.*, p. 77; also Averroes, III *De anima*, text. 36; *ed. cit.*, fol. 177A.

[46] dixit *A.*

[47] *Psalm* xlviii, 13 and 21.

[48] *Supra*, Book II, c. xii; p. 288 ff.

[49] Cf. Averroes, III *De anima*, text. 20; *ed. cit.*, fol. 163D; and St. Albert, *Liber III De anima*, tr. I, c. v; *ed. cit.*, V, p. 338a. See also G. Théry, *op. cit.*, pp. 44 ff.

[50] Averroes, *loc. cit.*, fols. 163B-164A: Themistius . . . opinatur quod intellectus agens est speculativus secundum quod tangit intellectum materialem.

[51] contradicit *A.*

[52] The text should read, I think: contradixit, dixit Averroes, etc. Cf. Averroes, *loc. cit.*, implying such a contradiction in Themistius.

Sed hic vir licet[53] magnus in parvitatem incidit praecedentis ut[54] hominem brutum dicat. Mirandum praeterea quod intellectum dixerit esse animae passiones; extra intellectum intellectum[55] legit qui sic de intellectu locutus est. Intellectus enim non extra sed intus lectus legitur, sicut sonat ejus nomen.—Tantum de hoc quaternario quem conficit ternarius sapientum.

Tempus est ut tertio accedat quinarius intellectus quem Averroes disposuit, et sunt isti: intellectus materialis, intellectus agens, intellectus speculativus seu in habitu, intellectus passivus, intellectus adeptus.[56] Intellectus materialis apud eum dicitur intellectus possibilis, et est apud eum substantia separata, non forma corporis.[57] Unitur tamen quodam modo corpori[58] quia species intellecta in actu est forma intellectus possibilis quae est subjective in phantasmate, quod phantasma est in nobis, et si phantasmata essent perpetua nostrum intelligere esset perpetuum, quia intellectus possibilis[59] est perpetuus;[60] et propter hoc intelligimus quando volumus quia in potestate nostra est formare phantasmata quando volumus. Et hic intellectus apud eum est universalis et unus in omnibus hominibus; ideo dicitur materialis quia sicut materia est una in omnibus *A* 64*v* materialibus et nullam [formam][61] habet actu, sic / intellectus in genere intelligibilium et suam intellectionem et aliorum suscipit. Unde non est sua operatio sicut Rabbi Moyses voluit.[62]

Intellectus agens est sicut lux intellectus possibilis et est substantia *B* 34*ra* aeterna, sicut intellectus / possibilis apud eum, et ex ambobus resultat unum tertium qui est[63] intellectus speculativus qui nil aliud est quam intellectus materialis informatus speciebus intelligibilibus, et est tertius intellectus. Quartum intellectum dicit esse passivum quem[64] nominat vim cogitativam per quam differt homo a brutis animalibus, ut dicit.[65] Quintum dicit intellectum adeptum, dum homo non in pueritia sed juxta senectam aut senium ad tantam venit cum intellectu possibili unitatem ut substantias separatas videat, ad quas videndas est hominis naturale desiderium quod frustra non ponitur.[66]

Quid veri aut falsi in dictis suis habeat hic maledicus maledictus Averroes, ut loquar de eo sicut Doctor Subtilis loquitur,[67] satis patet ex nunc dictis in aliis de praesenti impugnatis. Brutum aestimavit totum mundum ipse brutus, sed non Brito,[68] primo Christianus, secundo Judaeus, tertio Saracenus mortuus est.[69]

Qui horum sex de intellectu dicta amplius aut profundius legere voluerit, Joannem legat qui dictus est Sapiens ubi dixi; et sit hic Joannes non jam primus sed septimus horum sex sapientum in numero post[70] septem sapientes quos habuit antiquitas, quorum primus tempore Thales[71] Milesius, Solon primus fuit dignitate, quinque in medio sunt locati.—Tantum de his sufficiat.

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[53] *Om. B.*

[54] utut *A.*

[55] *Om. B.*

[56] Averroes, III *De anima*, text. 17; *ed. cit.*, fol. 160EF; and G. Théry, *op. cit.*, pp. 48 ff.

[57] *Op. cit.*, text. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 139F; text. 6, fol. 153E; and G. Théry, *op. cit.*, pp. 58 ff.

[58] cum corpore *B.*

[59] *Om. A.*

[60] *Add.* intellectus inquam possibilis *A.*

[61] Supplied from Averroes, III *De anima*, text. 4; *ed. cit.*, fol. 138A: Et ex his duabus sequitur quod ista substantia, quae dicitur intellectus materials, nullam habeat in sui natura de *formis* materialibus istis.

[62] Cf. S. Munk, *Le guides des égarés. Traité de théologie et de philosophie* par Moise ben Maimoun, Part I, c. liii (Paris, 1856) I, pp. 209-210, and p. 210, n. 1, for the closest reference to this statement.

[63] *Om.* unum . . . est *B.*

[64] quam *A.*

[65] III *De anima*, text. 5; *ed. cit.*, fol. 151B; and text. 6, fol. 154BC.

[66] Averroes, *op. cit.*, text. 36; *ed. cit.*, fol. 184C.

[67] Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* IV, d. 43, q. 2, n. 5; *ed. cit.*, XX, p. 37a.

[68] Cf. my note, *supra*, part I of this edition; *Mediaeval Studies*, X (1948), 229, n. 28.

[69] The only other reference I have found to such a legend is that contained in the answer of the University of Cologne (1425) to the Prince Electors who had written that the University should adopt the *via nova*; refusing to desert the *via antiqua*, the scholars remarked: Eya, quomodo dictat alicujus recta conscientia, quod ubi commentator Averoys, a Fide apostata, honoratur, illic tam mirifici Christiani Doctores turpiter repudiarentur? (F. Card. Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia* [Münster, 1925], p. 285).

[70] primus *A.*

XVII. MODI DIVIDENDI PARTEM INTELLECTIVAM SECUNDUM THEOLOGOS

De divisione partis intellectivae maxime secundum theologos agendo, tria occurrunt: primum de divisione illius partis in se, secundum de intellectu possibili, tertium de differentia intellectus agentis et possibilis.[1]

Quantum ad primum sciendum quod sunt tres binarii modorum divisionum illius partis vel animae quos ponit[2] Doctor Seraphicus, libro secundo *Sententiarum*, distinctione vigesima quarta, articulo secundo, quaestione tertia.[3] Primus modus est secundum naturam ipsarum potentiarum, ut[4] cum dividuntur potentiae animae in vegetativam, sensitivam et rationalem, vel ipsa rationalis in intellectivam et affectivam seu volitivam. Secundus modus cum fit divisio secundum officia, ut cum A 65r dividit Augustinus / in libro XII *De Trinitate*[5] partem intellectivam in portionem superiorem et inferiorem, quarum quaelibet portio habet / B 34rb memoriam, intellectum et voluntatem, ut ostendit Doctor Subtilis, libro secundo, distinctione vigesima quarta,[6] et non sunt in homine duo intellectus aut agentes aut possibiles quorum unus sit respectu superiorum, reliquus respectu inferiorum, et superior dicitur vir et inferior mulier, et ideo solum secundum officia distinguuntur. Unde Augustinus, XII *De Trinitate*:

> Cum disserimus de natura mentis humanae, de una quadam re disserimus; nec eam per haec[7] duo, quae commemoramus nisi per officia geminamus.[8]

Ecce primus binarius.

Tertius modus est secundum status, ut cum dividitur intellectus in speculativum et practicum. Intellectus enim secundum unum habitum speculativus, secundum alium est practicus ex prioritate et directivitate ad praxim quas habet ex objecto. Quartus modus dividendi est ex aspectibus, sicut dividit in libro *De anima et spiritu* Augustinus intellectivam potentiam in rationem, intellectum et intelligentiam, secundum inferius, par et superius.[9] Ratio est inferioris, intellectus respectu paris, intelligentia respectu superioris[10] quia Dei. En secundus binarius.

Quintus modus dividendi est secundum actus, ut cum dividimus intellectum in potentiam inventivam et judicativam. Invenire enim et judicare duo sunt actus intellectus ad invicem ordinati. Sextus modus dividendi est secundum modos movendi, et sic est illa divisio voluntatis secundum Joannem Damascenum in thelesim et bulesim, id est, in naturalem et deliberativam.[11] Thelesis est voluntas naturalis, bulesis vero deliberativa; non enim sunt duae voluntates sed duo modi movendi. En tertius binarius.—Et tantum de primo.

Quantum ad secundum est sciendum quod intellectus possibilis dicitur

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[71] *Om. A.*

[1] An independent chapter, with St. Bonaventure as the main source, as indicated below.

[2] posuit *B.*

[3] St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, *resp.*; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 566; cf. William of Vaurouilon, *II Sent.*, d. 25, a. 1; *ed. cit.*, fol. 190H, for a similar method of division.

[4] et *B.*

[5] C. iv, 4; PL 42, 1000.

[6] Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 24, q. un., n. 3; *ed. cit.*, XIII, pp. 181b-182a.

[7] hoc *B.*

[8] *loc. cit.*

[9] *De spiritu et anima* xi; PL 40,787.

[10] superiorum *B.*

[11] *De fide orthodoxa* II, xxii; PG 94, 943.

tripliciter.[12] Primo modo dicitur intellectus possibilis ille intellectus qui non est sed potest esse, ita quod est in potentia objectiva quia est objectum secundarium divini intellectus. Nec est intelligendum quod illa possibilitas qua dicitur intellectus sic possibilis sit aliqua entitas extra Deum qua dicatur essentia intellectus potentia seu possibilis. Nequaquam hoc, sed est solum potentia logica, id est, non contradictio terminorum, sicut ante mundi constitutionem mundus erat possibilis et tamen extra Deum nulla erat mundi entitas.[13] Et hoc modo solum Deus est intellectus
A 65*v* agens / qui intellectum talem potest producere de non esse ad esse.
B 34*va* Et huic intellectui possibili / opponitur intellectus in actu, non ratione intellectus quia eadem res numero primo est in potentia et secundo in actu, sed ratione potentiae et actus talis quae numquam simul sunt. Quod enim est possibile esse sic non est, et quod habet actum jam est. Contradictio autem est idem esse et non esse secundum conditiones contradictionis.

Secundo dicitur intellectus possibilis intellectus informabilis intellectione ut actu secundo et specie intelligibili ut actu primo, ita quod ille intellectus cum specie intelligibili constituit memoriam quae est prima pars imaginis, et cum actu qui est intellectio maxime respectu Dei constituit intelligentiam quae est secunda pars imaginis.

Et de isto intellectu possibili loquitur Philosophus in III *De anima*, ipsum definiens: Intellectus, inquit, possibilis est quo est omnia fieri.[14] Solet autem[15] Doctor Subtilis in dubio relinquere utrum active se habeat ad producendum intellectionem vel speciem aut passive solum se habeat suscipiens.[16] De quo etiam dicit idem[17] Philosophus quod intellectus nihil est eorum quae sunt ante intelligere.[18] Unde quidam scioli, inscii verius, moti sunt ad dicendum intellectum possibilem esse de se puram potentiam in genere intelligibilium sicut materia prima in genere corporalium.[19] Quod non est verum; potentia enim ad accidens non fundatur nisi in substantia; intellectio autem in nobis est accidens quae recipitur in intellectu possibili. Bene tamen verum est quod illa possibilitas non est respectus actualis sed aptitudinalis; sed hoc nihil ad rem quia illi respectui substantia supponitur. Unde Philosophus nihil plus vult dicere nisi quod intellectus possibilis non se intelligit ante intelligere aliorum, quia prima intellectio nostra naturalis ex phantasmatibus est. Et hic intellectus possibilis contra intellectum agentem dividitur in III *De anima*, qui est quo est omnia facere.[20]

Tertio dicitur intellectus possibilis qui naturaliter potest esse et non esse, et hunc intellectum Aristoteles passivum vocat quia corrumpitur quodam interius in nobis corrupto.[21] Et hic opponitur intellectui possibili secundo modo dicto, quia hic est naturaliter incorruptibilis, ille corruptibilis; hic intellectionum, ille autem phantasmatum aut intentionum sensibilium[22] susceptivus. Unde et intellectus possibilis secundo modo

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[12] Cf. Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 7, n. 38; *ed. cit.*, IX, pp. 387-388.

[13] *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 14; *ed. cit.*, X, p. 581.

[14] C. 5, 430a14.

[15] enim *A*.

[16] E.g., *Ov. Oxon.* I, d. 2, q. 7, n. 4; *ed. cit.*, VIII, p. 512b; *Quodlibet* XV, nn. 2-20; *ed. cit.*, XXVI, pp. 119a-153b. Cf. E. Gilson, 'Les seizes premiers Theoremata et la pensée de Duns Scot', *AHDLMA*, XII-XIII (1937-1938), 17, n. 2.

[17] idem dicit *A*.

[18] Aristotle, *De anima* II, 4, 429a24 and 429b30; and Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 8, n. 14; *ed. cit.*, XII, p. 195b, which apparently Vaurouillon has in mind.

[19] This statement and the remainder of the paragraph is from Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 7, n. 38; *ed. cit.*, IX, p. 388a. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 87, 1; *ed. cit.*, pp. 540b5 ff., with reference to Aristotle, *De anima* III, 4, 428a22.

[20] C. 5, 430a14.

[21] *De anima* I, 4, 408b25 ff.

[22] intentionum sensibilium aut phantasmatum *A*.

A 66r dictus potest dici agens respectu istius quia corruptioni[23] / resistit, alius
B 34vb non, ideo possibilis ad non esse.—Et tantum de secundo.

Quantum ad tertium, quomodo differunt intellectus agens et possibilis, notandum quod[24] sunt tres binarii modorum dicendi.[25] Primus modus dicendi est quod differunt sicut duae substantiae. Et hic modus duos habet modos. Primus est quod agens intellectus est decima intelligentia illuminans, intellectus possibilis anima corpori conjuncta illuminationem suscipiens. Sed haec via erronea est; animam enim humanam proprie loquendo solus Deus illuminat, sicut in multis locis Augustinus docet.[26] Alius modus quod intellectus agens est Deus, intellectus possibilis noster animus, et habet fundamentum ex dictis Augustini dicentis in libro *Soliloquiorum*:

> Sicut in isto sole tria animadvertimus, scilicet quod est, quod fulget, quod illuminat, sic in secretissimo Deo tria intelligere debemus: quod est, quod intelligit, quod cetera intelligere facit.[27]

Et rursus dicit quod lux quae nos illuminat et magister qui docet nos et veritas quae nos dirigit Deus est, juxta illud Joannis primo: *Erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem.*[28] Ecce primus binarius.

Secundus modus principalis dicendi est quod differunt sicut duae potentiae. Et hic modus duos habet modos. Primus est quod intellectus possibilis sit pure materialis qui inest animae ex parte suae materiae, intellectus vero agens sit pure formalis qui inest animae ex parte suae formae. Et hic modus super verba Philosophi fundari videtur[29] dicentis quod intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri, intellectus agens quo est omnia facere.[30] Sed haec positio falsa est, quia tunc ubicumque esset materia esset intellectus possibilis. Secundus modus, quod intellectus agens et possibilis sint diversae intellectus differentiae datae uni substantiae quae respiciunt totum compositum, appropriatur autem intellectus agens formae et possibilis materiae, quia possibilis ordinatur ad suscipiendum, agens ad abstrahendum, juvant tamen se mutuo in suis operationibus. En secundus binarius.

Tertius modus dicendi principalis est quod differunt sicut potentia et habitus. Et habet duos modos. Primus ut intellectus agens dicatur habitus quidam constitutus ex omnibus intelligibilibus; intellectus possibilis intelligatur ut potentia potens acquirere notitiam omnium per phantas-
B 35ra mata. Et hic modus fundari videtur[31] super verba Boethii / dicentis: Summam retinens, singula perdit.[32] Quod quidam sic voluerunt intelligi quod intellectus noster dicatur apud se habere cognitionem innatam /
A 66v universalium, alioquin non posset per virtutem suam abstrahendo a sensibus et phantasmatibus facere intellectum possibilem actu intelligentem; omne enim quod educit alterum de potentia in actum est ens in[33] actu. Sed hic modus dicendi verbis Philosophi non consonat, qui dicit animam creatam sicut tabulam rasam.[34] Secundus modus dicendi est ut dicatur intellectus agens differre a possibili sicut habitus a potentia, non quia agens sit pure habitus sed quia est potentia habitualis quia

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[23] corruptionem *B.*

[24] notandi *B.*

[25] St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4, *resp.*; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 568-570.

[26] E.g., *De Civitate Dei* VIII, vii and x; PL 41, 232 ff.; *De magistro* xi ff.; PL 32, 1216 ff. Cf. also E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* (Paris, 1e éd., 1931), pp. 87 ff.

[27] *Soliloq.* I, viii, 15; PL 32, 877; cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-106.

[28] *John* i, 9; St. Augustine, *De magistro*, *loc. cit.*, cited by St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*

[29] videtur fundari *A.*

[30] See note 20, *supra.*

[31] videtur fundari *A.*

[32] *De consolatione philosophiae* V, metr. 3; PL 63, 845.

[33] *Om. B.*

[34] Aristotle, *De anima* III, 4, 430a1.

dicitur lux; et fundatur hic modus[35] dicendi super philosophiam et theologiam. Dicit enim divinus Dionysius quod substantiae intellectuales eo ipso quod intellectuales[36] lumina sunt.[37] Unde perfectio et complementum substantiae spiritualis lux est spiritualis; de quo lumine intelligi potest illud Psalmi: *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine.*[38] Unde et Philosophus hoc intellexisse videtur in III *De anima* dicens; dicit enim quod ille intellectus quo est omnia facere est sicut habitus quidam, ut[39] in lumine; quodam enim modo[40] et lumen facit colores potentia actu colores.[41] Et potest poni simile in oculo cati qui non solum habet potentiam suscipiendi per naturam perspicui sicut alii oculi, sed etiam potentiam faciendi in se speciem per naturam luminis sibi inditi. En tertius binarius.

Ex his tribus binariis eligatur semper secundus, et distinctam de ambabus capiemus intellectibus veritatem.[42] Ex primo verum est Deum illuminare animam et ita agentem esse intellectum et animam possibilem,[43] sed non ad mentem Philosophi qui ambos ejusdem naturae posuit. Ex secundo verum dicitur intellectum possibilem ad modum se habere materiae quae recipit et agentem ad modum formae quae agit, sed indistincte nimis loquitur. Sed tertius totum complet et declarat ut sint ejusdem substantiae, sed possibilis ad modum diaphani aut perspicui, agens ad modum lucis et luminis.[44]

Notandum tamen intellectum possibilem tripliciter dici. Primo modo possibilitate essentiali, ut in pueris; secundo, possibilitate accidentali, ut in doctis; tertio, possibilitate actuali, ut actu intelligentibus.—Et tantum de his.

XVIII. DE OBJECTO ET ORGANO INTELLECTUS[1]

B 35*rb* Oportet deinceps[2] de ipso intellectu in se agere[3] ut cogno- / scatur. Et quia ex organo, ex objecto et actibus, ex tribus his, potentia cognoscitur,
A 67*r* ut docuit in II *De / anima* Aristoteles,[4] merito de his dicemus in conclusionibus tribus.[5]

Prima conclusio est de organo, et est haec: Intellectus aut agens aut possibilis nullum habet in corpore proprium organum quo suas operationes exerceat. Probatur tripliciter. Primo sic:[6] quia tunc naturam sui organi non posset excedere. Videmus enim quod visus non potest sonos videre aut sapores. Cum ergo[7] organum sit corporale, non posset intellectus possibilis intelligere nisi corporalia, nec intellectus agens irradiare super eum nisi ad cognitionem corporalium; quod est manifeste falsum, cum seipsum intelligat et metaphysica de separatis sit substantiis. Et si obicitur per Philosophum: Phantasmata se habent ad intellectum sicut sensibilia ad sensum,[8] ergo phantasia est organum intellectus; negatur consequentia. Auctoritas enim seipsam solvit: Sensibilia enim non sunt organa sensuum sed objecta, et sicut sensibile cum sensu unam causam effectivam constituit ad sensationem producendam, sic phantasma ut causa partialis cum intellectu agente aut possibili aut[9] utroque vel altera causa[10] producit speciem intelligibilem aut intellectionem.[11] Sed qualiter est possibile quod intelligat in corpore et organum non habeat? Faciliter, cum forma sit corporis et super se conversiva et omnes partes corporis, ut in parabola ipsum Plato dixerit circulum.[12]

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[35] hic modus fundatur *A*.

[36] *Om.* eo . . . intellectuales *B*.

[37] According to the Quaracchi editors of the *Summa Alexandri, ed. cit.*, II, p. 127, n. 4, the reference is rather St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, iii; PG 94, 868. But cf. also Pseudo-Dionysius, *De caelesti hierarchia* iii, § 2; PG 3, 166, for a like expression.

[38] *Psalm* iv, 7.

[39] et *AB*.

[40] meo *B*.

[41] Aristotle, *De anima* III, 5, 430a15 ff.

[42] The author has omitted the fourth mode of St. Bonaventure (*loc. cit.*; p. 569b).

[43] passibilem *B*.

[44] Cf. St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*, ad 5-6; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 571.

[1] Vaurouillon again uses as source: Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxxiv-xxxv; *ed. cit.*, pp. 283-288; with added material from the *Summa Alexandri Halensis* and the works of Duns Scotus.

[2] *Add.* agere *A*.

[3] *Om.* agere *A*.

[4] C. 2, 413b12; and esp. c. 4, 415a14 ff.

[5] This division is from Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, xxxv; *ed. cit.*, p. 283; the first conclusion also.

[6] modo *A*.

[7] igitur *B*.

[8] Aristotle, *De anima* III, 7, 431a14.

Secundo ex signo id probatur: Intellectus enim abstrahendo cognoscit et se segregando a rebus materialibus quam maxime; quod patet ex viris studiosis et contemplationi deditis qui in Deum surgunt immotis nonnumquam cunctis sensibus tam intus quam extra raptum et ecstasim patientes. Et probatur illud[13] tertio quia omnes intellectiones ejusdem sunt rationis ex parte potentiae; intellectio[14] autem Dei aut in corpore alicujus simplex est, non extensa, in intellectu; ergo nullam suscipit mediante organo, sicut visio suscipitur in quodam constituto ex visiva potentia et organo.

Secunda conclusio est de objecto.[15] Objectum primum adaequatum intellectus creati est ens inquantum ens. Probatur auctoritate Avicennae, I *Metaphysicae* quinto capitulo: Ens et res prima impressione imprimuntur in animam.[16] Et si dicatur quod non loquitur de separatis substantiis;
B 35*va* dicendum quod / a fortiori de illis habet veritatem cum nobilioris sint entitatis, Deo dempto cujus objectum adaequatum est Deitas per quam
A 67*v* cuncta / intelligit, ne ejus vilescat intellectus si a rebus creatis moveretur. Unde patet quod objectum intellectus nostri creati, etiam pro statu viae, non est quidditas rei materialis, ut Thomas voluit,[17] motus ex isto ternario quia triplex est potentia cognitiva: prima separata ex toto a materia et in essendo et in operando, ut intellectus separatus; secunda conjuncta materiae et in essendo et in operando, ut potentia organica; tertia quae perficit materiam in essendo sed non utitur organo materiali in operando, ut intellectus noster. Primae potentiae, inquit, correspondet[18] quidditas omnino separata a materia; secundae singulare omnino materiale; tertiae quidditas rei materialis quae etsi sit in materia, tamen [non][19] cognoscitur ut in materia singulari.

Contra hanc opinionem arguit Doctor Subtilis tripliciter, libro primo *Operis Anglicani*, distinctione tertia, quaestione tertia.[20] Primo, quia venit contra fidem: anima enim quae nunc est in corpore viatoris postmodum videbit Deum qui non est contentus sub quidditate rei materialis; etiam dico, videbit in corpore suo glorioso. Et si dicatur quod elevabitur per lumen gloriae, hoc nihil est, quia objectum habitus non excedit objectum potentiae; alioquin non esset habitus illius potentiae aut faceret potentiam non potentiam. Secundo, quia debet poni objectum potentiae alicujus secundum quod talis potentia, non secundum statum aliquem; ut si quis puer esset natus in carcere et numquam exisset carcerem, non deberet poni objectum adaequatum visus ejus id solum quod est in carcere, sed idem cum reliquis hominibus. Sic de nobis, qui sumus in carcere hujus mundi. Tertio, quia intellectus noster pro statu isto

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[9] vel *B*.

[10] *Add.* constituit seu *A*.

[11] Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 7, n. 20 ff.; *ed. cit.*, IX, pp. 361 ff.; and *Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaph.* VIII, q. 18, n. 9; *ed. cit.*, VII, p. 459a.

[12] *Timaeus* 55.

[13] id *B*.

[14] intellectus *B*.

[15] From Rupella, *op. cit.*, II, xxxv; *ed. cit.*, p. 284; but with Scotist additions. Cf. *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 3; *ed. cit.*, IX, pp. 87-161; and *Quodlibet* XIV, n. 12; *ed. cit.*, XXVI, pp. 46-47. Cf. Vaurouillon, *I Sent., Dubietas proemialis collativa*; *ed. cit.*, fol. 5A.

[16] Rather, c. 6; *ed. cit.*, fol. 72^{rb}.

[17] *Summa theol.* I, 84, 7c; *ed. cit.*, p. 521b; and I, 85, 1c; p. 524; cf. Vaurouillon, *I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 14CD.

[18] corrumpit *A*.

[19] Supplied from Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.*, *loc. cit.*

[20] Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 2; *ed. cit.*, IX, p. 89.

cognoscit ens inquantum ens, cujus est ratio communior quam quidditas rei materialis; quod non esset possibile si quidditas materialis rei ejus esset objectum adaequatum; alioquin potentia suum objectum excederet. Nec illa proportio quem moveat; non similitudo, quia quae sunt proportionalia multotiens sunt multum[21] dissimilia, ut patet de materia et
B 35*vb* forma / et activo et passivo.[22]

Et est notandum quod tripliciter dicitur objectum primum: primo dignitate, secundo origine, tertio adaequatione.[23] Primo modo Deus est objectum primum omnis intellectus. Secundo modo loquendo de cognitione confusa, demissis singularibus, primum cognitum est viatori species
A 68*r* specialissima cujus singulare efficacius movet sensum. / In cognitione autem distincta ens est primum cognitum quia nihil potest distincte cognosci nisi ente praecognito. Tertio autem modo ens est primum cognitum quia nihil est quod entis rationem subterfugiat aut identice aut quidditative, quinimmo non-ens per ens cognoscitur.

Ex quo infertur verum non esse objectum adaequatum intellectus sive veritatem.[24] Veritas enim rei est intelligibilitas rei ut potest patere ex II *Metaphysicae*,[25] et ita passio. Melius autem cognoscitur homo in se quam inquantum risibilis; cognitio enim ejus perfectissima est, ex VII *Metaphysicae*.[26] Ita ens praeconceptibile est inquantum ens quam inquantum verum, cum verum sit passio ejus. Est etiam ens inquantum ens objectum voluntatis creatae et non bonum quia ens inquantum ens potest diligi sicut cognosci antequam cognoscatur sub ratione boni.[27] Et quod dicit Philosophus quod potentiae distinguuntur per objecta,[28] intelligitur de potentiis organicis; verissima enim cognitio et purissima est rei in se.

Unde notandum quod triplex est formarum abstractio:[29] aliquae sunt abstractae simpliciter a materia et conditionibus materiae, ut formae spirituales, quae a philosophis nuncupantur metaphysicae,[30] et hae proprie intellectu capiuntur.[31] Secundae sunt quae sunt abstractae a materia, non tamen a conditionibus materiae, ut magnitudo, numerus. Magnitudo enim materiam non habet corporalem ut sit aurea aut cuprea, tamen sibi situm determinat et positionem. Ita dico de numero, ut sit ovium aut caprarum, tamen multiplicitudinem sibi et divisionem determinat; et hae dicuntur mathematicae et imaginatione capiuntur aut interiori sensu, et si pure intelliguntur conditiones materiales relinquunt. Tertiae inabstractae sunt secundum se et a materia et a materiae conditionibus, et
B 36*ra* hae sensu ex- / teriori capiuntur. Unde dum ad purum intellectum

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[21] *Marg. B.*

[22] actio et passio *B*. In these last few lines, the text of both mss. is evidently corrupt. It is intended to be a paraphrase of the *Opus Oxoniense* I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 4; *ed. cit.*, IX, p. 90a: Congruentia etiam illa, quae adducitur pro illa opinione, nulla est. Potentia enim et objectum non oportet assimilari in modo essendi; se habent enim ut motivum et mobile, et ita se habent ut dissimilia, quia ut actus, et potentia; sunt tamen proportionata, quia ista proportio requirit dissimilitudinem proportionatorum, sicut communiter dicitur in omni proportione, sicut patet de materia et forma, parte et toto, causa et causato, et ceteris proportionalibus; igitur ex modo essendi talis potentiae, non potest concludi similis modus essendi in objecto. Cf. also *Op. Oxon.* IV, d. 49, q. 11, n. 4; *ed. cit.*, XXI, p. 391: Talis autem inter quae requiritur sola proportionalitas possunt esse maxime dissimilia, ut patet de materia et forma, similiter de activo et passivo.

[23] Cf. *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 2, nn. 21 ff.; *ed. cit.*, IX, pp. 47 ff.; *Quodlibet* V, n. 11; *ed. cit.*, XXV, p. 213a.

[24] Cf. *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 20; *ed. cit.*, IX, p. 145; and IV, d. 50, q. 6, n. 5; *ed. cit.*, XXI, pp. 554 ff.

[25] C. 1, 993b28.

[26] C. 6, 1031b7.

[27] *Op. Oxon.* IV, d. 50, q. 6, n. 5; *ed. cit.*, XXI, p. 554.

[28] Aristotle, *De anima* II, 4, 415a16 ff.; cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 77, 3; *ed. cit.*, p. 446a.

[29] Cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, xxxv; *ed. cit.*, pp. 287-288.

[30] mathematicae, *Rupella* (!).

[31] concipiuntur *B*.

deducuntur ab utroque abstrahuntur, et materia scilicet et conditionibus materiae, et hae physicae nuncupantur.

Tertia conclusio est de actu ipsius intellectus. Et quamvis actus multos habeat, ut simplicis cognitionis quae est respectu simplicium et dicitur intelligentia, secundo respectu complexorum et dicitur enuntiatio, tertio respectu discursus et dicitur argumentatio seu ratiocinatio, secundum quos tres actus tota logica dividitur; sunt et alii actus de quibus tam[32] in opinione Augustini quam Joannis Damasceni dictum est;[32] universalis tamen et proprius ejus actus, sicut et nomen sonat, dicitur intellectio.

A 68*v* Quia vero nunc facta est mentio / de sensu exteriori juxta formas ultimas et[33] secundo de sensu interiori juxta formas medias, ut jungatur[34] textus, agemus de actu intellectus sub nomine sensus.[35] Et est conclusio talis: sensus qui est actus intellectus aut affectus communis est nobis et angelis. Ista conclusio habet tres partes. Prima dicit quod sensus est actus intellectus. Probatur tripliciter. Primo, auctoritate Origenis super illud Levitici septimo: *Insuper partem:*[36]

> Restituamus sanctis actibus quinque sensus interioris hominis, ut mundi corde audiamus et videamus quae docet Jesus.[37]

Hoc non potest fieri nisi intellectu. Unde Augustinus in libro *De videndo Deum*: Quantumcumque oculi nostri mutentur in melius, oculis spiritualibus non aequabuntur.[38] Secundo, auctoritate Augustini in libro *De anima et spiritu*: Sensus interior reficietur in contemplatione divinitatis.[39] Tertio auctoritate ejusdem, XI *De Civitate Dei*:

> Nos ea sensu corporis ita capimus, ut de iis non sensu corporis judicemus. Habemus enim alium interiorem sensum isto longe praestantiorem, quo justa et injusta sentimus;[40]

quod solo potest fieri intellectu.

Sed contra haec tripliciter obicitur.[41] Primo auctoritate Gregorii super illud Job, vigesimo octavo: *Non adaequabitur ei aurum:*[42] Uniuscujusque mentem ab alterius oculis corpulentia non abscondet.[43] Secundo, Augustinus dicit in libro *De anima et spiritu*[44] quod in patria sensus vertetur in imaginationem, imaginatio vertetur in rationem, et ratio in intellectum;
B 36*rb* et ita sen- / sus tunc corporalis sufficiet ad intelligendum. Et tertio confirmatur quia per sensum differt ab angelis qui tamen habent intellectum.

Sed dicendum quod nullus sensus aut interior aut exterior ad hunc tertium potest ascendere de quo loquitur Apostolus, Ad Romanos, duodecimo: *Reformamini in novitate sensus vestri.*[45] Potest tamen sensus corporalis aliquos nutus percipere ex quibus pervenitur[46] ad cognitionem hujus sensus, quod in multis faciunt sapientes medici. Unde Augustinus in *Libro 83 Quaestionum*:

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[32] Augustinus in sua opinione et etiam Joannes Damascenus tangunt *A*; cf. *supra*, Book III, c. ii; p. 255; and c. iv; p. 260.

[33] *Om. A.*

[34] conjungatur *A*.

[35] Vaurouillon turns to the *Summa Alexandri* I-II, nn. 381 ff.; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 459 ff., for this matter which is not found in Rupella's *Summa*. Cf. Karl Rahner, 'La doctrine des "sens spirituels" au moyen âge, en particulier chez s. Bonaventure', *Revue ascét. et mystique*, XIV (1933), 263-299.

[36] *Leviticus* vi, 5: *Reddet omnia quae per fraudem voluit obtinere, integra, et quintam insuper partem domino cui damnum intulerat.*

[37] *In Levit.*, hom. 4, n. 7; PG 12, 432.

[38] *Epist.* 147, n. 49; PL 33, 619.

[39] C. ix; PL 40, 785.

[40] C. xxviii, n. 2; PL 41, 341.

[41] Alexander, *Summa* I-II, n. 381; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 460a; and the answers, *ibid.;* p. 460b.

[42] *Job* xxviii, 17.

[43] St. Gregory the Great, *Moralium* XVIII, xlviii, 78; PL 76, 84: cf. Wal. Strabo, *Glossa ordinaria*, in h. 1.; PL 113, 829.

[44] C. xii; PL 40, 788.

[45] *Romans* xii, 2.

[46] pervenietur *A*.

> Capienda est conjectura ex parte corporis nostri quae plus habet lucem. Si enim nonnulli animi nostri motus in oculis nostris cognoscuntur, probabile est quod tunc nullus animi motus latebit
> A 69*r* rationi cum corpus / aethereum fuerit, in cujus comparatione isti oculi nostri caro sunt.[47]

Et sic intelliguntur[48] Gregorius et Augustinus; et hunc sensum habet angelus, ut patebit, non corporalem. De quo sensu Bernardus dicit, *De amore Dei*: Spiritus habet suos sensus sicut et corpus suos.[49]

Ex qua auctoritate et secundo Origenis patet quod sunt plures tales sensus.[50] Quod tertio confirmatur auctoritate glossae Hieronymi super illud Marci, decimo quarto: *Poterat illud venumdari:*[51] Fides nostra trecentis emitur denariis, decem sensibus per corpus et animam et spiritum triplicatis.[52] Sunt equidem plures sensus, non tamen plures potentiae sicut in sensibus corporeis in quibus cum actibus et modo multiplicantur potentiae. Quod devotissime dicit in libro *Confessionum* Augustinus:[53] Cum amo Deum meum, lucem meam, vocem, odorem, cibum, amplexum interioris hominis mei, ubi fulget animae meae quod non capit locus: ecce visus. Ubi sonat quod non capit tempus: ecce auditus. Ubi olet quod non spargit flatus: ecce olfactus. Ubi sapit quod non minuit[54] edacitas: ecce gustus. Ubi haeret quod non divellit societas:[55] ecce tactus. Isti ergo sensus ex modo comprehendendi sunt varii, cum tamen idem habeant objectum,[56] Deum. Unde super illud ad Ephesios primo: *Det vobis spiritum*,[57] dicit Glossa: In sensu exteriori non est videre idem quod gustare; in sensu interiori non sic, sed idem;[58] quod ratione objecti dicitur. Et secundo, Haymo super Apocalypsim dicit: Raptus est Joannes spiritu / B 36*va* ad summa contemplanda, ubi nihil aliud vidit quam audivit,[59] quia nihil aliud est videre quam audire, ut dum actus a Deo imprimitur audire sit, dum res conspicitur videre sit, et ita solus modus varius sit. Gustus vero et tactus qui sunt spiritualiores, ex parte sunt affectus; tres reliqui, videre, audire et odorare ex parte intellectus. In sensibus exterioribus minus perfecti sunt gustus et tactus; hic magis. Et rursus tertio Augustinus dicit in libro *De anima et spiritu*: Sic aptae naturae est spiritus, ubi idem audire et videre.[60] Dictum autem Hieronymi se extendit ut patet ad tres sensus: exteriorem, interiorem, spiritualem.[61]

Ex hac prima parte, scilicet quod hic sensus est animae rationalis aut A 69*v* secundum / intellectum aut secundum affectum, patet liquide pars secunda, quod convenit nobis. Tertia dicit quod convenit angelis.[62] Probatur auctoritate Augustini in libro *De Civitate Dei*:

> Sive universi mundi corpus, figuras, qualitates ordinatumque motum et elementa disposita a caelo usque ad terram et quaecumque corpora

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[47] Quaest. 47: PL 40, 31.

[48] intelligit *A*.

[49] Rather, William of S-Thierry, *De natura et dignitate amoris* vi, 15; PL 184, 390.

[50] Cf. Alexander, *Summa* I-II, n. 382; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 461; for Origen, cf. n. 37, *supra*.

[51] *Mark* xiv, 5.

[52] St. Jerome, *In Marc.* XIV; PL 30, 630.

[53] Lib. X, vi, 8; PL 32, 782 f.; this is a direct quotation, with interjections.

[54] diminuit *A*.

[55] satietas, St. Augustine and Alexander, *loc. cit.;* p. 461b; one ms. of the *Summa* reads *societas*. This is the end of the quotation.

[56] objectum habeant *A*.

[57] Ephesians i, 17: *Ut Deus, Domini nostri Jesu Christi pater gloriae, det vobis spiritum sapientiae et revelationis, in agnitione ejus.*

[58] *Glossa ordinaria*; PL 114, 589; taken from St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* II, iii, 8; PL 32, 1424.

[59] The Quaracchi editors of the *Summa Alexandri* I-II, n. 382; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 461a, refer to Haymo [Autissiodorensis], *Expositio in Apocalypsim* I, 1; PL 117, 950. This is manifestly erroneous; it is possible that the reference may be found in Haymo, *Super Apocalypsim*, *Ms.* Assisi, Bibl. Comm., 57 (Sacro Convento 85), fols. 5a-67b; not available (Cf. V. Doucet, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia fratris Matthaei ab Aquasparta* [Quaracchi, 1935], p. xxxv).

[60] C. xix; PL 40, 794; the closest *secundum sensum*.

[61] Cf. Alexander, *Summa* I-II, n. 382, ad 3; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 461b.

[62] Cf. Alexander, *op. cit.*, n. 384; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 462-463.

> in eis sunt, sive omnem vitam vel quae nutrit et continet, qualis est in arboribus, vel quae habet et sentit, qualis est in pecoribus, vel quae et hoc habet et intelligit, qualis est in hominibus vel quae nutritorio subsidio non indiget sed tamen continet, sentit, intelligit, qualis est in angelis;[63]

et de hoc[64] sensu loquitur. Quod post eum secundus declaravit Augustinus, Hugo de Sancto Victore, sic inquiens in quodam ternario:

> Una creatura erat cujus sensus totus intus, et alia creatura cujus sensus totus foris erat, et positus est homo in medio ut intus et foris sensum haberet.[65]

Prima[66] autem est angelus,[67] ut patet.

Ex his tria infero corollaria. Primum, quod hic sensus est maxime respectu divinitatis.[68] Et confirmatur auctoritate Augustini in libro *De anima et spiritu* loquentis de Christo Jesu, in quo nostra erit felicitas:

> Duo, inquit, sunt in homine sensus: unus interior et unus exterior, et utrumque bonum suum habet in quo reficitur; sensus interior reficitur in contemplatione divinitatis, sensus exterior in contemplatione humanitatis.[69]

Secundum, quod exterior sensus interiorem attenuat.[70] Patet quia *B* 36*vb* mundialia spiritum multotiens ex- / stinguunt. *Caro enim concupiscit adversus spiritum,*[71] inquit Paulus, ad Ephesios quinto.[72] Et econtra dicit Gregorius: Modicum gustato de spiritu desipit[73] omnis caro.[74] Unde Augustinus in *De anima et spiritu*:

> Cum exterior sensus carnalis bono suo utitur, interior sensus mentis quasi obdormit; non enim cogitat bona quae sunt interioris sensus, qui jucunditate exteriorum bonorum capitur.[75]

Tertium corollarium. Voluntas sive potentia volitiva non solum est affectiva sed etiam perceptiva. Patet quia in ea sunt hi duo sensus: gustus et tactus, qui sunt perfectissimi. Haec est conclusio fratris Adae de Wodham,[76] in primo *Sententiarum* suarum, distinctione prima, cum suis rationibus et auctoritatibus.[77]—Et tantum de his sensibus. /

A 70*r*

XIX. DE SYNDERESI ET CONSCIENTIA

Ut ad finem liber iste deveniat, juxta promissum in principio tertii, de synderesi et conscientia breviter agendum est.[1] Ubi primo tres termini exponentur; secundo, tres conclusiones ponentur; tertio, corollaria inferentur.

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[63] *De Civitate Dei* VIII, vi; PL 41, 231, with much omitted.

[64] hoc de *B*.

[65] *De sacramentis* I, p. 6, c. 5; PL 176, 266.

[66] Primus *B*.

[67] angelis *B*.

[68] Cf. Alexander, *Summa* I-II, n. 385; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 463.

[69] *De spiritu et anima* ix; PL 40, 785.

[70] Cf. Alexander, *op. cit.*, n. 386; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 463-464.

[71] *Add.* et spiritus adversus carnem *A*.

[72] Rather, *Galatians* v, 17.

[73] disipat *B*.

[74] More correctly, St. Bernard, *Epist.* III, n. 3; PL 182, 255: Gustato spiritu, necesse est desipere carnem. I would take it that Vaurouillon is citing from memory and has confused St. Bernard with the Homily 36 of St. Gregory, which he would have read in the third nocturn of the Sunday within the Octave of Corpus Christi (PL 76, 1266).

[75] *De spiritu et anima* ix; PL 40, 785.

[76] Codam *AB*, one of many variations of this name.

[77] *I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 3 (Paris, 1512) [abbreviatio of Henry Oyta], fol. xii^{ra}: Secunda conclusio, non asserendo sed opinando, est ista: quod omnis volitio est cognitio, etc. Cf. also fol. xii^{va}. On the various recensions of the *Sentences* of Wodham, cf. C. Balic, 'De critica textuali, etc.', *Antonianum*, XX (1945), 274-275.

[1] Thus the *Summa Alexandri* I-II, nn. 417 ff.; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 491 ff., concludes the treatment of the powers of the soul. There is but the briefest mention of the synderesis in Rupella, *Summa de anima* II, 1; *ed. cit.*,

Quoad primum. Termini sunt: prohaeresis, synderesis, conscientia. Primus ergo terminus est prohaeresis:[2] verbum graecum, latine electio dicitur, a *protos*, quod est primum,[3] et *haeresis*, divisio, quasi prima divisio; secundum enim quod sunt divisae intus in voluntate electiones dividuntur opera exterius, et potest electio esse boni vel mali, quae divisa sunt. Quod autem *protos* in graeco primum sit ostendit protomartyr, prototypus, protocula; quod vero *haeresis* sit divisio dicit metrum:

> Est haeresis secta, sensus, vel opinio dicta.[4]

Tria signat, quorum primum est secta, quae non a sequor, sequeris, sed a seco, -cas, dicta est. Unde in principio I *Ethicorum*, ubi secundum translationem Roberti Grossi Capitis, Episcopi Linconiensis, habemus: Omnis ars et omnis doctrina, similiter autem actus et electio, antiqua translatio habet: similiter autem praxis et prohaeresis.[5]

Et est notandum quod tres sunt affirmativi quoad praesens actus voluntatis: volitio, electio, voluntas. Volitio est actus communis tam actui electionis quam voluntatis; electio autem quae dicitur prohaeresis est actus voluntatis respectu entium ad finem aut bene aut male.[6] Unde *B* 37*ra* dicit Philosophus in III *Ethicorum* / quod est actus praeconsiliati.[7] Consilium autem non est, secundum eumdem ibidem, nisi entium ad finem, et non finis.[8] Aliquando autem limitatur ut solum sit respectu boni sed non omnis nec mali. Et hoc modo definit eam Joannes Damascenus: Electio est duobus entibus bonis alterum alteri praeoptare.[9] Voluntas autem ut actus est voluntatis est solum respectu finis, ut dicit Aristoteles tractatu ultimo III *Ethicorum*.[10]—Et tantum de isto termino prohaeresis.

Secundus terminus est synderesis, a *sin*, quod est sine, et *haeresis*, divisio,[11] quia non dividit ut aliquando hoc insinuet volendum aliquando non, sed volenda semper volenda ostendit et nolenda semper nolenda demonstrat. Quid autem sit synderesis Glossa super Ezechielem, primo capitulo, ostendit: Synderesis est scintilla conscientiae.[12] Scintilla enim *A* 70*v* superior / pars ignis est, et multae scintillae ignem conficiunt. Unde et Gregorius super tria, id est, rationalitatem, concupiscibilitatem et irasci-

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p. 298, and nothing on conscience. That St. Bonaventure is also a source of the present chapter will be evident below. For background, cf. O. Lottin, 'Syndérèse et conscience aux xii^e et xiii^e siècles', in his *Psychologie et morale aux xii^e et xiii^e siècles* II (Louvain, 1948), pp. 103-350. Vaurouillon has a parallel treatment of the subject in his own *II Sent.*, d. 38-40; *ed. cit.*, fols. 222 ff.

[2] Cf. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* III, xxii; PG 94, 946; and O. Lottin, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

[3] principium *A*.

[4] Thus St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis* II, q. 71, a. 1, contra, 1; *ed. cit.*, XXXV, p. 591b: Synderesis secundum suum nomen sonat haesionem quamdam per scientiam boni et mali: componitur enim ex Graeca propositione *sun* et *hairesis*, quod idem est quod opinio vel scientia haerens in aliquo per rationem. Cf. O. Lottin, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

[5] Cr. A. Pelzer, 'Les versions latines des ouvrages de morale conservés sous le nom d'Aristôte en usage au xiii^e siècle', *RNP*, 23 (1921), 316-341, 378-412. On p. 327, Monsignor Pelzer gives two specimens of the *antiqua translatio* of which Vaurouillon speaks (which is really the *Ethica nova, ibid.*; pp. 324 ff.); and p. 379, the Incipit of Grosseteste according to *Ms. Ottoboni lat.* 2214. Cf. also p. 389, for Grosseteste's remarks on the changes thus introduced.

[6] Cf. Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 6, q. 1, n. 4; *ed. cit.*, XII, p. 335b; and Vaurouillon, *I Sent.*, d. 45, a. 1; *ed. cit.*, fol. 106G.

[7] *Ethic. Nic.* III, 2 1112a18.

[8] *Ibid.*, 3, 1112b12.

[9] Cf. note 2, *supra*; this is wrongly assigned to Aristotle in the *Summa Alexandri*, I-II, n. 173; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 226, note 2.

[10] *Ethic. Nic.* III, 12, 1119b16.

[11] Cf. O. Lottin, *op. cit.*, p. 104, n. 1, on the origin of the term; and B. Geyer, *F. Ueberwegs Grundriss*, etc., p. 677.

[12] St. Jerome, *In Ezech.* i, 7; PL 25, 22; cf. O. Lottin, *op. cit.*, *pp.* 103-104.

bilitatem ipsam constituit et aquilae comparavit, illud exponens Ezechielis, primo: *Et facies aquilae desuper ipsorum quatuor:*[13]

> Dicunt plerique juxta Platonem rationabilitatem et irascibilitatem et concupiscibilitatem, quartam ponentes super has, quam Graeci vocant synderesim.[14]

Non quod sit potentia; est enim habitus principiorum practicus collocatus subjective non in voluntate sed in intellectu; sed nobilitatem illius insinuat ex situ.[15]

Unde notandum quod haec tria differunt, synderesis, ratio, conscientia. Et ad id manifestandum fiat syllogismus practicus iste: In omnibus Deo est obediendum; non furari praecipit Deus; ergo[16] non est furandum. Synderesis majorem aspicit, cognitis enim terminis in lumine intellectus scitur haec major. Minor gubernatur ratione; conclusio existit conscientiae. Et tantum de synderesi.

Tertius terminus est conscientiae. Unde conscientia solet accipi tripliciter, ut inquit Doctor Devotus, libro secundo, distinctione trigesima nona, articulo primo, quaestione prima.[17] Primo modo dicitur conscientia ipsum conscitum, et hoc modo Joannes Damascenus conscientiam definiens dicit: Conscientia est lex intellectus nostri;[18] lex enim est id quod per conscientiam novimus. Secundo accipitur conscientia pro eo quo conscii sumus, scilicet pro habitu aut actu. Tertio accipitur pro *B* 37*rb* potentia consciente secundum quod scribitur quod lex / naturalis scripta est in conscientiis nostris. In proposito autem nostro pro habitu sumitur et actu ejus, et in hoc conveniunt Sanctus Thomas, prima parte *Summae*, quaestione 401,[19] Doctor Seraphicus, ubi supra, et Doctor Subtilis eadem distinctione in dissolutione duarum quaestionum simul junctarum,[20] quod conscientia stat ex parte intellectus. Hoc enim et nomen indicat: dicitur enim a cum et scientia, et per ly cum signatur quod est habitus practicus aut actus non speculativus, cum enim in loco hoc motum indicat. Et distinguit Thomas ejus actus tripliciter, aut primo respectu praeteriti simpliciter non arctando, et tunc actus ejus est testificari; secundo respectu futuri, et sic actus ejus est instigare aut ligare; aut tertio respectu alicujus an sit bene an male factum, et *A* 71*r* sic actus ejus est accusare et excusare. In synderesi autem / Sanctus Thomas et Doctor Subtilis, qui in multis aliis sibi contradicunt, contra Doctorem Devotum conveniunt veluti contra tertium, ipsis dicentibus[21] synderesim ex parte intellectus, ipso dicente[22] ex parte affectus.—Et tantum de primo.

Quantum ad secundum, sunt tres conclusiones. Prima erit de synderesi; secunda de conscientia; tertia de comparatione ambarum ad invicem.

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[13] *Ezechiel* i, 10.

[14] This is rather from St. Jerome, *loc. cit.* The mistaken attribution is traceable from Alexander's *Summa* to Philip the Chancellor. Cf. O. Lottin, *op. cit.*, p. 140, n. 1; p. 180, n. 4.

[15] Cf. Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 39, q. 1, n. 2; *ed. cit.*, XIII, pp. 410-411; *Rep. Paris.* II, d. 39, q. 1, n. 4; *ed. cit.*, XXIII, p. 204b.

[16] igitur *B*.

[17] St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, *resp.*; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 899; cf. Vaurouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 38-40, a. 1; *ed. cit.*, fol. 222C.

[18] *De fide orthodoxa* IV, xxii: PG 94, 1199.

[19] 41 *B*; i.e., *Summa theol.* I, 79, 13; *ed. cit.*, p. 494b, which is actually the 401st article.

[20] Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 39, n. 3; *ed. cit.*, XIII, p. 411a.

[21] St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 79, 12; *ed. cit.*, p. 493b; Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 39, n. 2; *ed. cit.*, XIII, pp. 410-411. Cf. Introduction to part I of the present text, *Mediaeval Studies*, X (1948), 230. For the doctrine of St. Thomas, cf. O. Lottin, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 222 ff., esp. p. 233.

[22] St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 910-911. Dom Lottin, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-207, summarizes the position of the Seraphic Doctor; p. 235, shows the contrast between St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure; and pp. 236 ff., points out the influence of the latter on subsequent Scholastics.

Prima est haec: Synderesis ut practicum principium ad malum non incitat nec ex toto exstinguitur.[23] Haec conclusio tres habet partes. Prima dicit quod synderesis est practicum principium. Probatur tripliciter. Primo, auctoritate Augustini in libro primo *De baptismo parvulorum*:

> Si rationem ipsam, quae adhuc velut quieta et quasi sopita, tamen insita et quodam modo inseminata in parvulis latet, illuminationem voluerit appellare quis, tamquam interioris oculi curationem;[24] non resistendum est tunc eam[25] fieri, cum anima creatur, et non absurde hoc intelligi, cum homo venit in mundum.[26]

Est igitur lumen et ita non potentia sed habitus, et ad operandum, igitur practicum. Secundo, quia fomes est incentivum ad malum, et non potentia sed habitus; ergo synderesis habitus ad bonum quia opponuntur. Tum tertio, quia est principium unum in speculabilibus, ergo et unum in agibilibus. Illud est synderesis quae apud Philosophum recta ratio dicitur.[27]

Et si dicatur quod fuit hic remissum cum ageretur[28] de libero arbitrio in expositione opinionis Damasceni quod sensualitas est potentia semper inclinans ad malum, synderesis semper ad bonum et liberum arbitrium
B 37va indifferens in medio; dicendum quod / sensualitas ut appetitus sensitivus solum non inclinat semper ad malum de se, quia fuisset in statu innocentiae, sed ut induit rationem fomitis et sic habet rationem habitus, et sic non includit ratio. Et ad idem tendit id quod dicit Glossa super illud Malachiae, secundo: *Custodite spiritum vestrum, et uxorem adolescentiae vestrae nolite despicere.*[29] Glossa:

> Per uxorem adolescentiae intelligit legem naturalem scriptam in corde, spiritus vero dicitur non animalis pars, quae non percipit quae Dei sunt, sed rationalis spiritus qui interpellat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus.[30]

Dicitur enim synderesis spiritus non eo quod sit potentia sed sui nobilitate, et dicitur interpellare quia ad[31] interpellandum nos inclinat. Unde
A 71v apud Gregorium exponentem / illud Job, primo: *Et evasi ego solus,* etc.,[32] ratio dicitur; dicit enim:

> Unus, id est[33] rationis discretio ad animum redit, quae amissa nuntiat, ut quod praeoccupata mens perdit, afflicta recipiat.[34]

Ad idem[35] secundo est glossa Lucae, decimo, super illud: *Abierunt semivivo relicto.*[36] Glossa:

> Immortalitatem exuere, sed rationis sensum abolere non possunt quin homo sapere et Deum possit cognoscere.[37]

Tertio ad idem est Augustinus, III *De libero arbitrio*:

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[23] Cf. Alexander, *Summa* I-II, nn. 419-420; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 493-495; and St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*; p. 910; and q. 2; p. 912.

[24] creationem, in original of St. Augustine (note 26, *infra*); and Alexander, *Summa* I-II, n. 417; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 492a.

[25] eam tunc *B*.

[26] Lib. I, xxv, 38; PL 44, 130.

[27] Aristotle, *Ethic. Nic.* VI, 1, 1138b19.

[28] Cf. *supra*, Book III, c. vii; p. 266. Cf. Vaurouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 25, a. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 192C.

[29] *Malachy* ii, 15: *Custodite ergo spiritum vestrum, et uxorem adolescentiae tuae noli despicere.* First used by Philip the Chancellor in this regard; cf. O. Lottin, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

[30] St. Jerome, *In Malach.* 2; PL 25, 1562; the last phrase alludes to *Romans* viii, 26: *Ipse Spiritus postulat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus.*

[31] *Om. A.*

[32] *Job* i, 15: *Et evasi ego solus ut nuntiarem tibi.*

[33] *Om.* unus id est *A*.

[34] Cf. *Moralium* II, xlvi, 73; PL 75, 590.

[35] id *B*.

[36] *Luke* x, 30.

[37] St. Bede, *In Luc.* III, x; PL 92, 469.

> Ante omne meritum boni operis non est parum accepisse naturale judicium, quo sapientiam praeponat errori et quietem difficultati.[38]

Sed quid est hoc nisi synderesis? Unde Magnus Basilius[39] dicit quod synderesis est naturale judicatorium.[40]

Secunda pars conclusionis dicit quod synderesis ad malum non incitat.[41] Probatur tripliciter. Primo, quia semper remurmurat contra malum. Secundo, quia fomiti semper[42] ex toto adversatur qui semper inclinat ad malum. Tertio, quia a Deo indita est, ut patuit ex Augustino, in libro I *De baptismo parvulorum.*

Tertia pars dicit quod synderesis etiam in damnatis non exstinguitur ex toto.[43] Probatur tripliciter. Primo, Isaiae ultimo: *Vermis eorum non morietur.*[44] Ille vermis est synderesis semper rodens. Secundo, Sapientiae quinto: *Dicent intra se, poenitentiam agentes: Quid profuit nobis jactantia?*[45] Et Bernardus, *De libero* arbitrio, illud exponens dicit:

> Quo modo non est ibi aliquod sapere, ubi mala, quae tolerantur,
> *B 37vb* cogunt poenitere malorum quae facta sunt? Numquid[46] aut in / tormentis non est poenitere aut poenitere mali non est sapere?[47]

Tertio,[48] Glossa super illud Lucae, decimo sexto,[49] ubi petit Dives ut mitteretur Lazarus ut extremo digiti tactus refrigerium sentiret et[50] ut nuntiaret duobus suis fratribus ne venirent in hunc locum tormentorum. Glossa:

> Reproborum mentem poena sua erudit quandoque inutiliter ad dilectionem, ut etiam suos spiritualiter diligant, qui hic, dum peccata diligerent, nec se amabant.[51]

Unde Hieronymus super Ezechielem dicit quod in Cain non est exstincta scintilla conscientiae.[52] Ex quo patet quod nec in haeresiarchis ex toto exstinguitur, licet actu motum non sentiant.[53] Et illud quod habet Glossa super illud Jeremiae, secundo: *Filii Mempheos et Taphnes constupraverunt te usque ad verticem;*[54] Glossa:

> Malignus spiritus de membris inferioribus usque ad verticem per-
> *A 72r* tingit, quando castam celsitudinem mentis diffidentiae / morbus corrumpit,[55]

de fide intelligitur, non de synderesi. Sic et illa glossa super illud Psalmi: *Corrupti sunt, et abominabiles facti sunt;*[56] *Glossa:*[57] Omni vi rationis privati,[58] de voluntate deliberativa intelligitur, nequaquam de synderesi.—Et tantum de prima conclusione.[59]

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[38] C. xx, 56; PL 32, 1298.

[39] Basius *B.*

[40] *In Hexaemeron*, homil. vii, 5; PG 29, 158; cf. *Homil. xii, in princ. Prov.;* PG 31, 406. First used, apparently, by John of Rupella; cf. O. Lottin, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

[41] Cf. Alexander, *Summa* I-II, n. 419; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 493.

[42] *Om. B.*

[43] Alexander, *op. cit.*, n. 420, pp. 494-495; and St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 2, q. 2; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 911 ff. Cf. also Vaurouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 38-40, art. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 223C.

[44] *Isaias* lxvi, 24; cf. *Mark* ix, 43.

[45] *Wisdom* v, 3, 8: *Dicentes intra se, poenitentiam agentes . . . Quid nobis profuit superbia? aut divitiarum jactantia quid contulit nobis?*

[46] mirabile *A.*

[47] *De gratia et libero arbitrio* ix, 31; PL 182, 1017.

[48] *Om. A.*

[49] *Luke* xvi, 24.

[50] *Om. A.*

[51] St. Gregory the Great, *Homil. XL in Evang.*, xl, 8; PL 76, 1308.

[52] *In Ezech.* I, i; PL 25, 22.

[53] Cf. Alexander, *Summa* I-II, n. 420, ad 1; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 495b.

[54] *Jeremias* ii, 16.

[55] Cf. St. Jerome, *Comm. in Jeremiam*, in h.l.; PL 24, 718.

[56] *Psalm* xiii, 1.

[57] *Om. B.*

[58] Peter Lombard, *Comm. in Psalmos Davidicos*, Ps. xiii, v. 2; PL 191, 163.

[59] *Add. title* De conscientia *A.*

Secunda conclusio est de conscientia et est talis: Conscientia est habitus a lege naturali et synderesi distinctus. Ista conclusio habet tres partes. Prima dicit quod conscientia est habitus.[60] Probatur:[61] quia conscientia scientiam includit quae est habitus. Non tamen nego quin aliquando sit actus, ut dictum est in primo articulo,[62] et inde est quod conscientia dicitur erronea et recta, tranquilla et turbata, nec nego quin dicatur aliquando potentia, ut cum dicitur conscientia munda aut immunda proprie de potentia aut anima intelligitur. Unde et conscientia potest dicere habitum innatum et habitum acquisitum.[63] De innato non venit error aut immunditia, sed de acquisito.

Et si dicatur quod conscientia in damnatis est poena, quod habitui non convenit; dico quod tunc conscientia accipitur pro afflictione eam consequente.[64] Sed quaero, quis habitus? Dicit frater Alexander quod habitus B 38ra sunt in triplici differentia:[65] primi sunt pure cognitivi, ut omne totum est majus sua parte; secundi sunt pure motivi, ut habitus virtutis; tertius est cognitivus ut primi et motivus ut secundi, et talis est conscientia. Dum dico cum, motum signo; dum scientia, cognitionem insinuo, sicut patet in multis auctoritatibus quarum tres accipio. Prima est prima[66] ad Corinthios, quarto; dicit Paulus: *Nihil mihi conscius sum.*[67] Non est sensus: non moveor ad peccatum; sed, non cognosco me esse in peccato. Unde Glossa ibidem: In nullo me remordet conscientia mea.[68] Secunda est Ecclesiastes, septimo: *Scit enim conscientia tua, quia et tu crebro maledixisti aliis.*[69] Unde in Glossa: Qua judice nemo et absolvitur nocens;[70] judicium autem ad scientiam pertinet. Tertia est Glossae super principium Ezechielis loquentis de conscientia: Putant quidam ipsam errata corrigentem,[71] quod est scientiae opus. Unde cum dicimus: Iste est conscius secretorum illius, id est, scit. Et ex tali scientia oritur tristitia A 72v aut / gaudium. Ideo secundae ad Corinthios primo, Paulus dicit: *Gloria nostra haec est, testimonium conscientiae nostrae.*[72] Ubi Glossa: Sicut impiis est magna poena conscientia, ita piis est gaudium.[73]

Secunda pars dicit quod conscientia differt a lege naturali.[74] Probatur tripliciter. Primo: conscientia est deponibilis; dicitur enim aliquando alicui: Depone conscientiam tuam. Lex autem naturalis non. Secundo, quia mundum et immundum conveniunt conscientiae, non legi naturali. Tertio, quia dicit Joannes Damasceni:[75] Lex Dei, id est, naturalis, intellectum nostrum attrahit ad seipsam et pungit nostram conscientiam. Nihil autem pungit seipsum. Lex naturalis enim est objectum; conscientia est habitus aut actus. Unde sic debet intelligi illud[76] ad Romanos, secundo capitulo: *Cum gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter ea, quae legis sunt, faciunt, ipsi sibi sunt lex.*[77] Ubi Glossa:

> Etsi Gentiles non habent legem scriptam, habent tamen legem

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[60] Cf. Alexander, *op. cit.*, n. 421; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 496; St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 1; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 899; and Vaurouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 38-40, a. 1; *ed. cit.*, fol. 222C.

[61] *Add.* tripliciter *A.*

[62] *Supra*, p. 302; the division into articles is not found in the text, apart from note 59 *supra.*

[63] St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*, q. 2; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 903.

[64] Alexander, *loc. cit.*, ad a; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 496b.

[65] Alexander, *op. cit.*, n. 423; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 498a.

[66] *Om. A.*

[67] *I Cor.* iv, 4: *Nihil enim mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc justificatus sum.*

[68] P. Lombard, *Collectanea in omnes D. Pauli Apostoli epistolas*, in h. l.; PL 191, 1565.

[69] *Eccles.* vii, 23.

[70] Cf. Alexander, *loc. cit.;* p. 498a.

[71] St. Jerome, *In Ezech.* I; PL 25, 22.

[72] *II Cor.* i, 12.

[73] P. Lombard, *op. cit.;* PL 192, 13.

[74] Cf. Alexander, *Summa* I-II, n. 425; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 499; and St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, in fine; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 911.

[75] *De fide orthodoxa* IV, xxii; PG 94, 1199.

[76] primo *A.*

[77] *Romans* ii, 14.

> naturalem, qua quisque intelligit et sibi conscius est quid sit bonum et quid sit malum.[78]

Tertia pars conclusionis dicit quod conscientia distinguitur a synderesi.[79] Probatur tripliciter. Primo, quia synderesis est habitus principiorum, conscientia conclusionum. Secundo, quia conscientia aliquando dicitur
B 38rb erronea, numquam tamen[80] synderesis. / Tertio, quia aliquando conscientia praecipitari dicitur, quod non ita convenit synderesi, quamvis aliqualiter dicatur de ea praecipitium. Unde Gregorius super Ezechielem: Hanc conscientiam, cum impius in profundum peccatorum venerit, praecipitari videmus.[81]—Et tantum de secunda conclusione.

Tertia conclusio est de praecellentia inter synderesim et conscientiam. Et est talis: Conscientiae synderesis exstat nobilior. Ista conclusio probatur, quia synderesis est habitus principiorum, conscientia[82] conclusionum.—Et tantum de secundo principali.

Quoad tertium, infero tria corollaria. Primum corollarium: Synderesis tribus ternariis secundum Sanctos nominatur.[83] Primo dicitur scintilla conscientiae, ex[84] Glossa super Ezechielem,[85] quia volat. Dicitur secundo synderesis juxta Gregorium in expositione animalium,[86] quia ad bonum unita est. Dicitur tertio lumen, juxta Augustinum, primo libro *De baptismo parvulorum*,[87] quia ad bonum agendum illuminat. Ecce primus ternarius. Quarto, apud Philosophum recta ratio[88] dicitur, ex VI *Ethicorum*,[89] quia recte, non ex obliquo, ambulat. Quinto dicitur spiritus, ex Glossa super Malachiae, secundo capitulo,[90] quia hominem spiritualem efficit. Sexto dicitur apud Gregorium super Job[91] ratio, quia syllogismi
A 73r practici exstat principium. / En secundus ternarius. Septimo dicitur apud Magnum Basilium judicatorium naturale,[92] quia ex lege naturali judicat. Dicitur octavo vermis, Isaiae ultimo capitulo,[93] quia mentem continuis dentibus rodit. Dicitur nono principium practicum operabilium, ut dicit Thomas, prima parte *Summae*, quaestione 400, quia boni est exordium.[94] Ecce tertius ternarius.

Secundum corollarium: quod in omnibus conscientiam habentibus semper conscientia aliquem actum habet aut effectum.[95] Id probatur quia accidens est, suum aspiciens et denominans subjectum. Quod secundo probat nomen, quia a conscientia conscius. Tertio patet quia conscientia ignis est, Ezechielis decimo nono capitulo: *Producam ignem de medio tui.*[96] Glossa: Omnia quae aedificasti male conscientiae ignis absumet.[97]

Tertium corollarium est: quod non sine causa pensatis omnibus, distinctione trigesima nona secundi *Sententiarum* Doctor Subtilis loquens de synderesi in solutione principali dicit:

> Si synderesis ponatur aliquid habens actum elicitum semper tendentem in actum justum et resistentem peccato,

et infra:

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[78] P. Lombard, *op. cit.*, in h.l.; PL 191, 1345.

[79] Alexander, *Summa* I-II, n. 426; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 500. This is the last section of the *Summa* to be used by Vaurouillon; it might be noted likewise that he has quoted only those parts which are anterior to 1245.

[80] *Om. B.*

[81] More correctly, St. Jerome, *In Ezech.* I, 1; PL 25, 22; cf. O. Lottin, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

[82] scientia *B.*

[83] Cf. St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 908 ff.

[84] et *A.*

[85] See note 12, *supra.*

[86] Note 14, *supra.*

[87] See note 26, *supra.*

[88] ratio recta *A.*

[89] Cf. note 27, *supra.*

[90] Note 30, *supra.*

[91] Note 34, *supra.*

[92] Note 40, *supra.*

[93] capitulo ultimo *A. Isaias* lxvi, 24.

[94] That is, *Summa theol.* I, 79, 12; *ed. cit.*, 439b.

[95] Cf. Alexander, *op. cit.*, n. 424; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 499.

[96] Rather, *Ezechiel* xxviii, 18.

[97] assumet *AB;* the Gloss is of St. Jerome, *In Ezech.* IX; PL 25, 274.

non potest aliud poni quam habitus principiorum;[98] /

B 38*va* ubi innuere videtur,[99] ut patet studenti, quod de necessitate non oportet ponere nisi intellectum qui cognitis rationibus terminorum immediate assentit principiis; et hoc innuere videtur frater Alexander, qui nec potentiam nec habitum synderesim simpliciter vocat sed habitualem potentiam.[100]

Locutus sum tamen, ut doctores communius loquuntur, nec a veritate nec a meo magistro discedens, qui nihil affirmat hac in parte sed sub conditione loquitur.

Sit igitur in synderesi et conscientia libri istius finis, quae conformari habent illi fini cujus nec principium nec finis. Ad quem et cujus gratia factus est[101] et qui fecit[102] ab angelis deducantur in haereditates perpetuas, ad Deum in substantia unum sed trinum in personis, et Christum in persona unum, in Deitate, anima et corpore, quoad substantiam ex triplici substantia, contemplandum. AMEN.[103]

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[98] Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 39, q. 2, n. 4; *ed. cit.*, XIII, p. 415a.

[99] videtur innuere *A*.

[100] *Summa* I-II, n. 417; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 492a.

[101] *Add.* liber *A*.

[102] *Add.* et qui audit *A*.

[103] *Add. A.*: Explicit apparatus trium librorum de anima editus per eximium sacrae theologiae professorem Magistrum Guillelmum de Valle Rouillonis, fratrum minorum provinciae Turoniae ministrum provincialem meritissimum atque dignissimum; scriptus per manum Georgii le Maalot, sui discipuli, in decretis et sacra theologia licentiati, Illustrissimique ac potentissimi principis domini Joannis Dei gratia Comitis Engolismensis capellani immeriti, Pictavis studentis. Deo gratias.

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